The American Political Science Review

Articles and Research Notes by James W. Clarke and E. Lester Levine, M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, Chong Lim Kim, Gerald H. Kramer, Frank Levy and Edwin M. Truman, Robert Melson, Adam Przeworski and Glaucio A. D. Soares, Douglas W. Rae, Duff Spafford, and Donald S. Zagoria

URSULINE COLLEGE
CLEVELAND, OHIO

Karl W. Deutsch
On Political Theory and Political Action

Duncan MacRae, Jr.
Scientific Communication, Ethical Argument, and Public Policy

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.
Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government

Theodore Marmor
On Comparing Income Maintenance Alternatives

Michael Taylor and V. M. Herman
Party Systems and Government Stability

Published Quarterly by

The American Political Science Association

Vol. LXV March 1971 No. 1

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Headquarters: 2, rue André-Pascal, Paris XVI, France

OECD

economic growth
development aid
trade expansion

OECD Member countries account for over 65% of world trade and 90% of all development aid.

INFLATION—THE PRESENT PROBLEM. Report by the Secretary-General of OECD. A study advocating a concerted effort to deal with the problem of inflation in OECD countries. Various anti-inflationary policies are discussed, and recommendations made. Charts, tables and annexes on selected OECD Member countries. (December 1970) 114 pp. **$4.50**

THE GROWTH OF OUTPUT 1960-1980. Retrospect, Prospect and Problems of Policy. The retrospective analysis of economic growth in OECD countries over the last 15 years is followed by projections of supply during the next decade and an analysis of the performance, prospects and problems of the developing countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Turkey) within the OECD group. Tables and graphs. (December 1970) 280 pp. **$8.75**

FOOD CONSUMPTION STATISTICS 1960-1968. Statistical food balance sheets for OECD Member countries, giving production, exports and imports, consumption totals and consumption per head for a variety of commodities. (December 1970) 610 pp. **$19.00**

OCCUPATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE LABOR FORCE AND LEVELS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Possibilities and limitations of an international comparison approach. A statistical analysis of the source data published in February 1969 in "Statistics of the Occupational and Educational Structure of the Labour Force in 53 Countries". (November 1970) 321 pp. **$6.25**

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, 1970 REVIEW. Annual report by the Chairman of DAC. An authoritative analysis of the effectiveness of the aid policies and programs pursued by the 16 nations which contribute 90 per cent of the world's aid to developing countries, and which coordinate their work in this field through OECD. Annexes show comparative tables, graphs and detailed statistics on aid efforts. (December 1970) 211 pp. **$6.25**

INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: Facilities for the Promotion of Foreign Private Investment in Developing Countries. (September 1970) 120 pp. **$3.00**

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1959-1968. Presents data otherwise available only in widely scattered and incomplete sources. (June 1970) 269 pp. **$5.50**

MANUAL OF INDUSTRIAL PROJECT ANALYSIS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Volume II—Social Cost Benefit Analysis, by Ian M. D. Little and James A. Mirrlees. Deals with projects from the point of view of society as a whole. Part 1 addresses itself primarily to senior administrators or politicians, and Part 2 to those actually making project evaluations or teaching others how to make them. (Volume I with Annex also available. $12.50). Volume II (May 1970) 280 pp. **$5.00**

FOOD MARKETING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. Developments in food processing and distribution, and the significance for agriculture. (May 1970) 130 pp. **$3.00**

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF THORKIL KRISTENSEN

A volume of essays on important international economic and development issues contributed by distinguished authors in OECD Member countries in honor of the first Secretary-General of OECD. (December 1970) 305 pp. **$6.50**

MEMBER COUNTRIES

Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

SPECIAL STATUS Australia New Zealand Yugoslavia

Standing orders may be placed for recurring titles, and a Blanket Order Plan is available to give complete coverage of OECD publications. Send for free catalogue.

OECD PUBLICATIONS CENTER
SUITE 1207P, 1750 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 • (202) 298-8755

Officers of the American Political Science Association

President
ROBERT E. LANE
Yale University

President-Elect
HEINZ EULAU
Stanford University

Vice Presidents

EDWARD C. BANFIELD
Harvard University

JOHN A. DAVIS
City College, CUNY

VICTORIA SCHUCK
Mount Holyoke College

Secretary
THOMAS R. DYE
Florida State University

Treasurer
DONALD R. MATTHEWS
The Brookings Institution

Program Chairman
SIDNEY VERBA
University of Chicago

Executive Director
EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Managing Editor, APSR
NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

1970–1971
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
Harvard University
HENRY S. KARIEL
University of Hawaii
JOHN H. KESSEL
Ohio State University
HERBERT MCCLOSKY
University of California, Berkeley
JEWEL L. PRESTAGE
Southern University
ROBERT H. SALISBURY
Washington University, St. Louis
ALLAN P. SINDLER
University of California, Berkeley
ELLIS WALDRON
University of Montana

1971–1972
CHADWICK F. ALGER
Northwestern University
PHILIP E. CONVERSE
University of Michigan
FRED I. GREENSTEIN
Wesleyan University
JOYCE M. MITCHELL
University of Oregon
JAMES W. PROTHRO
University of North Carolina
WILLIAM P. ROBINSON, SR.
Norfolk State College
DANKWART A. RUSTOW
Graduate Center, CUNY
GORDON TULLOCK
Virginia Polytechnic Institute

FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW
ALBERT SHAW
FREDERIC N. JUDSON
JAMES BRYCE
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
WOODROW WILSON
SIMEON E. BALDWIN
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
W. W. WILLOUGHBY
JOHN BASSETT MOORE
ERNEST FREUND
JESSE MACY
MUNROE SMITH
HENRY JONES FORD
PAUL S. REINSCH
LEO S. ROWE
WILLIAM A. DUNNING
HARRY A. GARFIELD
JAMES W. GARNER
CHARLES E. MERRIAM
CHARLES A. BEARD
WILLIAM B. MUNRO
JESSE S. REEVES
JOHN A. FAIRLIE
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH
EDWARD S. CORWIN
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY
ISIDOR LOEB
WALTER J. SHEPARD
FRANCIS W. COKER
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
THOMAS REED POWELL
CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA
CHARLES GROVE HAINES
ROBERT C. BROOKS
FREDERICK A. OGG
WILLIAM ANDERSON
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN
LEONARD D. WHITE
JOHN M. GAUS
WALTER F. DODD
ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
HENRY R. SPENCER
QUINCY WRIGHT
JAMES K. POLLOCK
PETER H. ODEGARD
LUTHER H. GULICK
PENDLETON HERRING
RALPH J. BUNCHE
CHARLES MCKINLEY
HAROLD D. LASSWELL
E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER
V. O. KEY, JR.
R. TAYLOR COLE
CARL B. SWISHER
EMMETTE S. REDFORD
CHARLES S. HYNEMAN
CARL J. FRIEDRICH
C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
DAVID B. TRUMAN
GABRIEL A. ALMOND
ROBERT A. DAHL
MERLE FAINSOD
DAVID EASTON
KARL W. DEUTSCH

The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXV, No. 1 MARCH, 1971

ARTICLES

11 **On Political Theory and Political Action.** This paper is a revision of the Presidential Address delivered to the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, California, September 10, 1970. It identifies nine aspects of political theories: storage and retrieval of memories; assistance to insight; simplification of knowledge; heuristic effectiveness; self-critical cognition; normative awareness of values; scientifically testable knowledge; pragmatic skills; and wisdom, or second-order knowledge of what contexts are worth choosing—a wisdom subject to the possibility of radical restructuring. These nine aspects of theory form an integrated production cycle of knowledge. "Scientific" and "humanistic" political theorists need each other to understand the central task of politics: the collective self-determination of societies. To appraise this steering performance of political systems, large amounts of empirical data as indicators of social performance are indispensable. Political science has grown in knowledge of cases, data, research methods, and sensitivity to problems of disadvantaged groups and of the individual. It is learning to recognize qualities and patterns, verify the limited truth content of theories, and be more critical of its societies and of itself. It needs to increase research on implementation of insights, on positive proposals for reform, changes in political wisdom, and on the abolition of poverty and large-scale war. For these tasks, cognitive contributions from political theory are indispensable; working to make them remains a moral commitment.

By KARL W. DEUTSCH, Professor of Government, Harvard University

28 **Party Systems and Government Stability.** Arguments are presented for and against a series of hypotheses about the influence of the parliamentary party system on the stability of governments, and the hypotheses are tested against data on 196 governments in parliamentary democracies since 1945. A strong relation is found between the duration of governments and the fragmentation of the parliamentary party system and of the government parties, but the fragmentation of the opposition parties seems not to affect stability. One-party governments are more stable than coalition governments, and majority governments more than minority governments. The ideological dispersion of the parties—in the whole parliament, in the government, or in the opposition—does not explain stability any better than fragmentation, which is based upon only the number and sizes of parties; but the proportion of seats held by 'anti-system' parties (communists and neo-fascists, mainly) is a good indicator of stability. The best explanation of government stability found here is the combined linear influence of the size of the anti-system parties and the fragmentation of the pro-system parties.

By MICHAEL TAYLOR, Lecturer, Department of Government, University of Essex and Visiting Lecturer in Political Science, Yale University; and V. M. HERMAN, Lecturer in Government, University of Essex

38 **Scientific Communication, Ethical Argument, and Public Policy.** The paper argues that ethical discourse is intimately involved in the research literature of social science, and especially of political science, but is relegated to a subsidiary position. It therefore shares some of the vagueness, flexibility, and potential self-contradiction of the discourse of everyday life, rather than being sharpened by rational criticism. The norms governing scientific discourse provide not only for empirical testing, but also for rational criticism in the formulation of theories; an analogous type of criticism is shared by legal discourse. Some of the norms of scientific communication may be transferred to ethics by the specification of rules for ethical argument, requiring that arguments derive from previously specified, clear and consistent "ethical hypotheses." Within such rules, ethical systems formulated by social scientists and philosophers may be compared critically. Systems amenable to such comparison include those of welfare economics, cost-benefit analysis, and formal democratic theory. The discourse embodying this argument and criticism is particularly appropriate within the normative tradition of political science. Its possible benefits include clarity about our valuations; communication among disciplines that enlarges the perspectives of each discipline; and a more independent, self-conscious examination within the university of the criteria for policy formation.

By DUNCAN MACRAE, JR., Professor of Political Science and Sociology, The University of Chicago

51 **Theories in Search of a Curve: A Contextual Interpretation of Left Vote.** This article contends that the voting behavior of individuals depends not only upon their own traits but also upon the social context within which it takes place. Left voting depends upon the extent of class consciousness of the workers, where class consciousness is defined as the marginal rate of change of left voting when social structure changes. Marxist theory does not predict that workers will always vote for left parties but only that they will do so when the class is politically organized. According to this theory, the behavior of individuals depends upon the characteristics of the class and not vice versa. Several models can be constructed on the basis of these hypotheses. The choice of the proper function relating the variables is crucial for theory construction. This choice must be theoretically determined, i.e., it must follow from the premises of the theory. However, several theories may equally well explain the reality and the choice on the basis of empirical criteria is not always possible.

By Adam Przeworski, Associate Professor of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis; and Glaucio A. D. Soares, Professor of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis.

---

69 **The Division of Political Labor Between Mothers and Fathers.** This paper starts from the premise that traditional views of political roles among married couples emphasize role-differentiation, leading to masculine superiority; more recent perspectives stress role-sharing, leading to equality. The implications for individual political participation and political socialization vary according to the prevalence of and conditions surrounding the two patterns. Interview data from a national sample of middle-aged couples reveal substantial equality with respect to command over political resources, attention paid to politics, and manifest political participation. Levels of equality remain high under a variety of controls. When inequalities do exist, male dominance is more common, but the extent of that dominance varies across the range of political labor. Superiority of either parent in one arena tends to occur in others also, suggesting fixed modes of behavior. The relative advantage in education and personal efficacy which one partner holds over the other vitally affects the political advantage. These factors and mother's employment status operate more strongly among working class than middle class couples. Age of children has no appreciable impact. To achieve political parity or superiority mothers ordinarily need extraordinary resources to overcome the built-in constraints of culturally-defined sex roles.

By M. Kent Jennings, Professor of Political Science and a Program Director of the Center for Political Studies, The University of Michigan; and Richard G. Niemi, Professor of Political Science, The University of Rochester

---

83 **On Comparing Income Maintenance Alternatives.** This paper seeks to clarify choices in income maintenance, not to advocate a particular policy alternative. It makes explicit the trade-offs between competing objectives that are required of policymakers, but often obscured by polemics about the advantages or disadvantages of particular transfer mechanisms (e.g., negative income taxes, child allowances, demogrants). The paper first presents a critique of contemporary public debate on welfare reform and antipoverty cash transfer schemes. The next section distinguishes among the goals of reforming the present system of public assistance, substantially reducing American poverty, and making both the tax system and the social distribution of income more equitable. There follows a discussion of six criteria for evaluating and comparing alternative measures to one or another of these goals. The paper concludes with an application of the evaluative scheme to the welfare reform alternatives considered by the Nixon Administration in the spring of 1969.

By Theodore R. Marmor, Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Director, School of Public Affairs, The University of Minnesota.

---

97 **Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government.** The article defines indirect government as self-government through intermediaries authorized by the people, as opposed to the direct rule of the people. It requires that the people abstain from government after authorizing it, and hence that political debate center on whether or how the government is representative, not on what it should do. Almost all modern government is indirect and based on the indirect question of representation. Hobbes, though not the founder of indirect government, was the founder of the science by which men could be induced to consent to be governed not in accordance with their opinions of good and bad but on the basis of their passions, particularly fear. To achieve a form of consent that was voluntary and yet not based on opinion, he was forced to understand consent almost as resigning to the inevitable, yet his purpose in attempting to expel opinions from politics was to clear away divisions of opinion, especially religious opinion, and thus remove the obstacle to progress in human power. Hobbes' doctrine and modern representative government must both be understood from the historical standpoint of Hobbes' hostility to Christianity.

By Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Professor of Government, Harvard University.

111 **Political Democracy as a Property of Political Institutions.** The paper contends that political democracy is a matter of degree, a variable property of political institutions. An index for this property, Q, measures the extent to which complex institutions approximate a generalized definition of majority-rule (e.g. that losing coalitions must be smaller than winning or blocking ones.) This index for degrees of political democracy is in turn treated as a function of simpler structural variables, such as decision-rule, the sizes of veto groups, the sizes of groups excluded from decision-making, and simple patterns of representation. Finally, it is suggested that there is no necessity that more democracy produce more satisfaction with outcomes, but that this property does set a "maxi-min" constraint on rates of satisfaction: the more democratic an institution, the larger is the smallest possible proportion of a group (or "domain") which can be satisfied with any single (binary) outcome.

By DOUGLAS W. RAE, Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University.

120 **Marijuana Use, Social Discontent, and Political Alienation: A Study of High School Youth.** This paper, based on a statewide survey of 907 Florida high school seniors, reveals that self-reported marijuana use, regardless of cause, has social and political implications, though not at the high level of association suggested by the stereotype of a pot-smoking, hippie, political radical. Demographically, the user is typically an urban white male from a wealthier and better educated family. Marijuana users are differentiated from non-users in their more negative views toward the most proximate authority structures and their desire for changes in laws regulating behaviors commonly associated with youth. Marijuana use was not associated with broader social concerns or political ideology, and was only tenuously associated with political alienation. The relationship between measures of social discontent and political alienation reveals a more homogeneous pattern among users than non-users, thus supporting Goode's "subcommunity" hypothesis.

By JAMES W. CLARKE, Assistant Professor of Government and Acting Director, Policy Analysis Center, Florida State University; and E. LESTER LEVINE, Associate Professor of Government and Associate Director, Institute for Social Research, Florida State University.

131 **Short-Term Fluctuations in U. S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964.** This paper develops several simple multivariate statistical models and applies them to explain fluctuations in the aggregate vote for the United States House of Representatives, over the period 1896-1964. The basic hypothesis underlying these models is that voters are rational in at least the limited sense that their decisions as to whether to vote for an incumbent administration depend on whether its performance has been "satisfactory" according to some simple standard. Because of data limitations, the analysis focuses on measures of economic performance, treating other aspects of an incumbent's performance, such as its handling of foreign affairs, as stochastic perturbations of the underlying relationship to be estimated. (Examination of residuals suggests this assumption is not unreasonable, at least during peacetime.) Possible effects of coattails from presidential races, of incumbency, and of secular trends in the underlying partisanship of the electorate are also taken into account. The models, estimated by maximum-likelihood methods, are found to be successful. Close to two-thirds of the variance in the vote series is accounted for, and the structural coefficients of the models are of the correct signs and of quite reasonable magnitudes. Economic growth, as measured by the changes in real per capita income, is the major economic variable; unemployment or inflation have little independent effect. Presidential coattails are also found to be of some importance.

By GERALD H. KRAMER, Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University.

144 **The Ecology of Peasant Communism in India.** The purpose of this article is to investigate the agrarian base of Indian communism through the use of statistical data and techniques in which the Communist vote over three general elections since 1957 is correlated with 35 largely socio-economic variables taken from Indian census data. The results indicate that two of these variables—landlessness in densely populated areas—explain a significant percentage of the variance in the Indian Communist vote. It is further suggested on the basis of statistical data accumulated by other investigators for Java and the Philippines that the same two variables are highly correlated with Communist strength in other parts of Asia.

The paper then seeks to explain why landlessness in crowded rural areas is more highly correlated with Communist strength than either landlessness or rural population density alone. Various explanations are offered. Most of them focus on the proposition that relations between the landed and the landless are more conflict-ridden in crowded than in sparsely-settled rural areas. And, in the absence of non-communist political parties which address themselves to the sources of peasant unrest in such areas, the peasants turn to the Communists, who are one of the few organized movements pressing for agrarian reform.

Finally, it is suggested that in India, and in other parts of Monsoon Asia, there is a link between the cultivation of irrigated food crops and the two variables found to be highly correlated with Communist strength—landlessness and high population density. That is why such areas are particularly prone to the peasant unrest on which the Communists feed.

By DONALD S. ZAGORIA, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College of the City University of New York.

161 **Ideology and Inconsistency: The Cross-Pressured Nigerian Worker.** In the climate of ethnic insecurity present in Nigeria in 1964, workers tended to support ethnic over labor parties. A small fraction of workers who were cross-pressured between their ethnic and their labor loyalties however, tended to report that they supported both ethnic and labor parties. These are called the "inconsistent." Looking more closely at this group, it was possible to distinguish between those who were descriptively inconsistent (they would describe themselves as supporting an ethnic and a labor party at the same time); and those who were prescriptively inconsistent (they would prescribe support for a labor party while actually supporting an ethnic party). Though descriptive inconsistency varied inversely with political information, prescriptive inconsistency varied directly with it. The immediate political significance of the inconsistents lay in their confusing the predictions of labor leaders who were counting on their support. Beyond that, however, it may be suggested that the inconsistents added to the felt unpredictability of rapidly changing, plural societies such as Nigeria.

By ROBERT MELSON, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Associate of the African Studies Center, Michigan State University.

172 **Toward A Rational Theory of Decentralization: Another View.** This paper observes that analyses of the process of decentralization often fail to recognize that constraints are imposed by the nature of the organization being examined. In particular, the analysis of an organization producing economic goods can be misleading if applied, without qualification, to organizations producing government goods. Taking as its point of departure the analysis of an economic organization, the article focuses on three salient differences in the operation of the two types of organizations. First, in the economic organization both its personnel and its clients agree on the items produced. In the government organization there may be substantial disagreement about what should be produced. Second, in the economic organization the information flows will generally be of a compact numerical form. In the government organization the information flow will often not take a numerical form. Information transmission will be less dense and, therefore, more expensive. Third, in the economic organization prices act as "sufficient statistics," which completely measure the organization's performance of its objective (profit maximization). For many government organizations no such sufficient statistics exist.

By FRANK LEVY, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley; and EDWIN M. TRUMAN, Assistant Professor of Economics, Yale University.

180 **On the "Equilibrium" Division of the Vote.** This research note proposes a model in which an "equilibrium" share of the vote figures as a measurable quantity. Variants of the model are fitted to election data for the U. S. House of Representatives.

By DUFF SPAFFORD, Associate Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of Saskatchewan.

184 **Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy in Japanese Prefectures.** This research note attempts to test the relationship between levels of socio-economic development and variation in political democracy with data gathered in Japanese prefectures. The operational measures of socio-economic development are the levels of urban-industrialism and social overhead capital, which are derived from the results of factor analysis of fifteen socio-economic indicators. Three measures of political democracy are obtained by factor-analyzing political indicators: they are the degrees of political competition, political participation, and representation equality. The analysis of the data reveals weak relationships between the two measures of socio-economic development and the three measures of political democracy. This finding challenges the validity of some generalizations regard-

ing economic-political linkages previously reported in many cross-national studies. In the context of within-nation comparisons, this study suggests the need for a re-evaluation of the relationship between socio-economic development and political democracy.

By CHONG LIM KIM, Assistant Professor of Political Science, The University of Iowa.

187 **Communications from** Thomas W. Casstevens, Gerald H. Kramer, Stephen W. Hartman, John P. Diggins, **and** I. William Zartman.

191 **Book Reviews** of Burns, *Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom,* by Harold F. Gosnell; Fried, *An Anatomy of Values,* by Ralph Ross; Gurr, *Why Men Rebel,* by Ivo K. Feierabend; Miller, *One Hundred Thousand Tractors: The MTS and the Development of Controls in Soviet Agriculture,* by Anna Elizabeth Powell; Ryan, *John Stuart Mill,* by John D. Lewis; Simmons, *French Socialists in Search of a Role, 1956-1967,* by Vincent E. McHale; and Zald, *Organizational Change: The Political Economy of the YMCA,* by Ray E. Johnston.

202 **Book Notes** in Political Theory, History of Political Thought, and Methodology; American Government and Politics; Comparative Government and Politics; and International Politics, Law, and Organization.

239 **Announcements.**

The American
Political Science Review

Vol. LXV MARCH, 1971 No. 1

On Political Theory and Political Action*

KARL W. DEUTSCH
Harvard University

The overwhelming fact of our time is change—rapid large-scale change in politics, societies, technologies, and cultures. Many of these changes are continuing; some are accelerating. From the 1890's onward, most of the political institutions of the world have been shaken or transformed by a chain of wars and revolutions. By 1970, the majority of the world's adults were older than the political systems under which they were living. And there will be more change—both change in the relations among the world's many nations and societies, and change within each of them. We must navigate through the rapids of change or perish in them. We must face change, understand change, and sometimes initiate change in our thoughts; and we must meet change, respond to change, and sometimes initiate change in our actions.

To cope with change—indeed, to recognize it—some things must remain. What must continue for some time or as far as we can see ahead? What should be kept, what can be kept, what will recur? To decide how to act, we must seek answers to these questions; our hopes and our lives may depend on them.

None of this can be done well without some awareness of what we are thinking and doing, and of the larger contexts within which we are acting. It cannot be done, therefore, without political theory and without the courage and the knowledge which the understanding or creation of political theory requires.

In this task, mankind is threathened equally by the risk of two failures: the failure of courage and the failure of imagination. We can be destroyed either by the paralysis of fear or by the failure to think of anything new—to think of anything better than the few poor routines of action that we already know.

The history of mankind is a story of vast successes which have led to even vaster dangers. In our time, now, we must dare to act and know to act. Our lives and our children's lives may depend on our capacity to dare and on our capacity to know.

Fear could stop us not only from action but also from knowledge and discovery. If it does, our remaining actions will be blind. Blind zeal—the automatic acting out of pre-rehearsed routines—may be tolerable, even necessary, for short periods of time, provided that the old routines are not too inappropriate to the new tasks. But the longer such blind zeal is persisted in, the more rigid, narrowing, and eventually destructive and self-destructive it is likely to become.

These dangers exist in all kinds of countries, industrialized or developing, non-Communist or Communist. The struggle for needed new knowledge, for openness and resourcefulness, for new possibilities, discoveries and innovations, cuts across the great organized ideological divisions of our time. What role can political theory play in meeting these dangers and in the conduct of this struggle?

I. What Is Theory?

The ancient Greek word for "theory"—*teoría*—denotes passionate contemplation. It referred to the experience of spectators at a classic tragedy, which would leave them heightened in awareness and shaken and purified in their emotions.[1]

The concept of *theory*, then, has an objective and subjective meaning. In its objective meaning, "theory" implies *perception* of a relatively distant *object* or situation. It means *to see and perceive something outside the observing self,* even though the object of the observation may be within one's own larger personality.

---

* Presidential Address delivered to the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 10, 1970, Los Angeles, California. I am indebted to many colleagues in the United States for questions and ideas, and to Dr. Wolf-Dieter Narr, of the University of Konstanz for comments on a draft—without burdening any of them with any responsibility for the results.

[1] Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), p. 33.

But in its subjective aspect, "theory" means to perceive this object as *relevant* to one's own emotions, needs or desires—even if it were relevant only to one's desire to know or to resolve some inconsistency or dissonance in one's knowledge.

These two sides of theory imply perception of a double *context,* (regardless of whether this context be explicit or implicit, real or imaginary, ready-made or newly constructed).

1. What does this thing, situation or condition mean in a larger context or image of the outside world?

2. What does it mean *to me,* i.e., in the inner context of my personality with its memories, needs and desires?

The study or creation of theories requires first of all an ability to discriminate and recognize: This is the so-called "figure-ground perception"—the capacity to discern a dim figure against an otherwise chaotic background.[1a]

But the creation of theories also requires *care*—care to feel concern or curiosity for the initial question or image of the problem, and to maintain some of this feeling throughout the changes of the perceived problem in the course of the investigation.

Finally, creating theories requires a capacity for *interpretation,* that is, for putting perceptions into contexts. These include both outer and inner contexts, if such contexts are available, or creating such contexts, if they are not.[2]

These contexts must be capable of being *shared.* They must be stateable, retraceable, and reproducible, by operations which can be performed by any one with requisite training. That is to say, they must be formally rational.

The external contexts, at least, also must be capable of being verified, directly or indirectly—that is, either corroborated or disconfirmed—through such impersonally repeatable operations. In this sense, theories must be capable of being made scientific, even though they may have been stated originally in poetic or literary form.[3]

What are the effects of theory? First of all, a good theory offers orientation. It furnishes a model in which future observations and consequences of actions in the outside world can be predicted. This includes both a model of the problem area and of its wider context or environment.

A good theory also furnishes a presentational image of more than one dimension from which several one-dimensional, sequential pathways can be read off. These pathways are to be mutually consistent, so as to reduce or avoid cognitive dissonance. Hence different pathways among parts of the same image should not be incompatible; and in the case of a rigorous theory, the answers should be identical for all such pathways.[4]

It follows that a theory is not a simple proposition but an ensemble or configuration of interrelated propositions. This fact has direct implications for the way in which theories can change. Ordinarily such an ensemble will tend to be more stable than many—or any—of the single propositions which are its members. Most often, progress in knowledge changes our knowledge of single facts or propositions, leaving the larger ensembles and configurations of thought substantially unchanged. When these larger configurations—the major patterns of our thought about some problem area—themselves are changed, we speak of a revolution in our theory, thought, or knowledge. Routine progress in political theory, in short, changes some members of a class of propositions; a revolution in theory changes the class itself; or it may even change a configuration of several such classes.[5]

There is a profound connection between the problem of wisdom and the problem of revolution. Wisdom does not seek answers; it asks what classes of answers are worth seeking. Wisdom asks not what we know but what is worth knowing. It does not deal with propositions but with entire classes, configurations and ensembles of propositions; and it deals particularly with the criteria for selection and preference among such classes or ensembles.[6] Revolutions occur when the old ways have failed in which some kinds of knowledge were preferred over others. They consist not in the reordering of any one structure of politics, society or culture, but in the hierarchical and nearly simultaneous reordering of several interdependent structures at several levels of organization.[7]

[1a] I am indebted to Dr. John P. Spiegel for having drawn my attention to the similarity between figure-ground perception and the perception of new configurations in art or science.

[2] Such contexts are social, as well as psychological and physical. On the problems of interpretation, see Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit,* 2nd ed., (Neuwied a/Rh-Berlin: Luchterhand, 1965); *Erkenntnis und Interesse* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968); "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," in H. P. Dreitzel (ed.), *Recent Sociology No. 2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior,* (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1970); and *Towards a Rational Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), esp. Chap. 5. See now also John R. Platt, *Perception and Change: Projections for Survival* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1971), pp. 25-73.

[3] For the relationship of poetry and rational theory in early Greek philosophy, see Werner Jaeger, *Paideia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), vol. I, pp. 152–153.

[4] For the concept of "presentational" vs. "discursive" communication, see Susan K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key,* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 79–102.

[5] See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

The significance of this process of hierarchical restructuring for political theory will be considered later in somewhat more detail. For now let us only note that such periods of comprehensive reordering of ideas, values and practices occur when an old pattern of wisdom has failed to cope with new but inescapable problems, when it has failed to adapt and respond to them, and a new wisdom is needed. Seen in this way, wisdom and revolution are both aspects of the problem of social learning and of the self-transformation, gradual or sudden, of social and political systems, and of the political theories which help us to think about them.

II. What Kinds of Knowledge Does Theory Produce?

A theory produces knowledge of several kinds. For the sake of convenience, these may be organized under nine headings. The first five of these aspects of theory are primarily cognitive, while the last four are more nearly action-oriented. The nine aspects are:

1. A scheme for the orderly and efficient *storage and retrieval* of memories. In this respect, a theory functions as a coding scheme, and its efficiency can be evaluated in terms of the efficiency of coding.[8]

2. An aid to *insight*, that is, to the perception, labeling of and recognition of previously unrecognized and/or poorly defined patterns of things, events, relations or symbols in the outside world. (This aspect is similar to the well-known experiments in "figure-ground" discrimination mentioned above, in which a dimly outlined pattern is hard to perceive against a disordered background, but is recognized more easily by persons to whom a similar pattern has been shown.)

3. Organization and *strategic simplification* of knowledge. Arabic numerals, positional notation and the number zero are familar examples from mathematics. Each of these symbols or practices reduces the amount of detail that must be remembered.[9] Political concepts, such as "power," "legitimacy," "natural rights," quite apart from their empirical corroboration or disconfirmation, may also serve in such a simplifying function in our processing of information about politics.

4. *Heuristics.*[10] Theories serve as search devices for new observations, experiments and discoveries. The heuristic effectiveness of a theory is the greater the more fruitful it proves to be, that is, the more likely it is to lead to new knowledge and new discoveries, including possibly the creation of new theories that will eventually supersede it.

Any metatheory of science—that is, any theory about scientific theories—must include a theory about the search for new knowledge. In this respect, therefore, it must overlap with the general theory of search. Work on a probabilistic theory of search has been carried on since World War II, and its applications today include the finding of submarines in the ocean, the finding of references in a library, and possibly the finding of new knowledge at the edge of the unknown.[11]

---

[6] To assert an "end of ideology" in a general sense would be to assert an end of the search for wisdom. It would mean an end to the changing goals by individuals and societies, to the choice among conflicting goals, or to the changing of priorities among them. Only if we restrict the term "ideology" to those belief systems which restrict or exclude any control by reality, would it be rational to consider to what extent the class of such forms of reality-distorting or reality-excluding ideologies might decline in frequency and social influence, and under what conditions. For a different point of view, see Daniel Bell *The End of Ideology* (rev. ed.; New York: Free Press, 1966); and for a relevant discussion, see Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," this REVIEW, 60 (March 1966), 5–16. Cf. also Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1947); Chaim Isaac Waxman (ed.), *The-End-of-Ideology Debate,* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969.

[7] John R. Platt, "Hierarchical Restructuring" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* Nov. 1970, pp. 2–4, 46–48; also in *General Systems,* v. 15 (1970), pp. 49–54.

[8] Cf. K. W. Deutsch, "On Theories, Taxonomies, and Models as Communication Codes for Organizing Information," *Behavioral Science,* (Jan. 1966), 1–17.

[9] This point is discussed in K. W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (rev. ed.; New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 251–252. See also the discussion of "etherealisation" in Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History,* (3rd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), Vol. III, pp. 174–192.

[10] As a branch of knowledge, heuristics is the study of finding, or invention, and of the methods and conditions which favor it. The word recalls the reported shout of Archimedes "Heureka!—I have found it!" when he ran naked from his bathtub into the streets of Syracuse, overjoyed by his discovery that the volume of any body, no matter how irregular in shape, can be measured by the amount of fluid it displaces on immersion. See George Polya, *How to Solve It,* second ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), pp. 112–114, 129–134.

[11] See e.g. Philip M. Morse, "On Browsing: The Use

5. *Self-critical cognition.* This aspect of theory stresses the assumptions and biases implicit in operations of verification or corroboration, as well as with other sources of error in any of them. It deals with our need to *know*, in contrast to what we guess at as a mere opinion. To be sure, no theory can be established as ultimately true; any theory can be disconfirmed by reproducible evidence and replaced by a successor theory which fits the evidence better; and this successor theory in turn may be replaced in an open-ended sequence of successions. But at each stage in this process, verification can establish the truth-content of the theory under examination. Every scientific theory contains existential statements of the form "there is . . ." and "if . . . then," referring to empirically verifiable objects or events. Such statements, if vertified, make up its *truth content*; and though the larger theory may prove untenable and be superseded by another, any such successor theory will have to comprise all or most of the verified existential statements included in its predecessor.[12] These lasting elements in the cumulative growth of knowledge are as important as the changing theories in which they are temporarily incorporated. Any self-critical theory, therefore, is not only a first-order theory about reality but also a critical second-order theory about other theories and about itself and its own limitations. The critical search for our own biases and errors, and the no less important critical search for verified items or knowledge, are both essential contributions which theories should make to our thinking.

Self-critical cognition should warn us not only against simple errors of fact but against the subtler errors of bias, of hidden assumptions and omissions, or answers already made likely by the formulations of our questions, or else tacitly excluded at the outset from our search. A wide variety of possible sources of such biases have been pointed out by different writers: logical or epistemological precommitment; the weight of onesidedly selected evidence; plain economic interest of class or group; emotional ties of social association, status or prestige; concerns for promotion and career, or for popularity within one's reference group; the ceaseless bombardment by mass media or by state-made propaganda; or the deeper bonds of tradition, culture, personality and childhood memories.

Biases of all these kinds exist; but even where they do, they are probabilistic and not wholly determined. Men can look to some extent critically at these pressures on their judgment. They can to some extent compensate for them by drawing upon additional information and critical reflection. As far as possible, they can make explicit the elements, assumptions, implications and limits of their thoughts. They can try to specify not only the quantitative aspects of their findings but the threshold values that may decide about the side effects and qualitative aspects of the processes studied. As they can cross-examine external evidence, so they can cross-examine their own biases which are unlikely to be quite consistent, and they can help themselves in this way to see more of the world more nearly as it is. It is not the least among the tasks of theory to increase this chance of critical self-liberation for the specific task of enhancing the power of human beings to know reality and to deal with it.

If it is important to unmask biases and errors, and to revise or discard theories that suffer from them, it is also important to try to do so with some serious respect for the persons with whom we disagree and for the ideas and theories which we reject.

Thinking is invisible work. Thoughts are invisible tools. Theories and knowledge are invisible capital equipment, contributing to the production of decisions. They are equipment to produce guidance for action, including action in search of further knowledge and for a wider range of possible future actions. Corroborated theories and verified knowledge are invisible capital equipment that has been tested and that can be relied on to a higher degree and over a domain of validity that can be more readily identified, at least at its core, and eventually also at its limits.

It follows from this view that discarding a previously accepted theory and creating a new one in its place always involves a cost in time,

---

of Search Theory in the Search for Information," (Cambridge: Technical Report No. 50, Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 1970), mimeographed.

[12] According to the "ether" theory of physics, waves in the invisible "ether" permitted the sending of wireless signals across the Atlantic. The "ether" theory was replaced by relativistic physics after the "ether" had turned out to be non-existent, but the existential statement "there is wireless telegraphy" had to be taken over by the more recent theory. The proposition "there can be wireless telegraphy" was not only capable of being "falsified," as Sir Karl Popper likes to use the verb. It was verified by the building and operating of broadcasting stations and receiving sets, and every serious future theory of physics henceforth had to be compatible with this verified fact. For the concept of truth-content as a test of acceptable successor theories, see K. W. Deutsch "On Methodological Problems of Quantitative Research,,' in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 19–39.

effort and resources. Similar to the case of tangible capital items, this cost of replacement must be measured against the expectable gains in the quantity and quality of future output—here the quantity and quality of future knowledge and decisions to be produced with the aid of the successor theory.

In deciding whether to replace one theory with another, our choice most often will be between a better and a less good one. The obsolescent or otherwise inferior theory, too, is likely to have a significant truth content and some capacity for contributing usefully to the making of decisions. The choice between two theories ordinarily is not between all or nothing but between more or less.

Asking for the truth content of rival theories should help us to guard against arrogance. It is usually an error to think that those of our colleagues who hold an "incorrect" theory cannot possibly obtain any valid results; nor would it be at all realistic to think that our own possession of a better theory—easily mislabeled "*the* correct theory"—will guarantee that all of our own results will be valid, useful or adequate in dealing with our problems. We may believe that theories or scholars with whom we disagree are swayed by biases of culture, ideology or class, but from this view we cannot cogently infer that their findings are entirely devoid of truth. All we can realistically hope is that a better theory will give us a better chance to do a better job. In the search for new discoveries and more effective actions, a better theory will give us most often a greater probability, not a monopoly.

Much as it is rare for a piece of tangible capital equipment to destroy its users or its environment, or to inflict intolerable damage upon them, so it is rare for theories. Yet we know of such pernicious cases from the history of industry, such as some early nineteenth century processes of manufacturing sulphur matches, which poisoned and killed or crippled many of the workers; and we know from our own century how the political theories of fascism and race domination became engines of destruction and self-destruction for many of the governments, groups and individuals who adopted them.

If these five aspects of theory are primarily cognitive, the remaining four aspects bring us closer to the realm of action. In order to act well, we must know what we want; know what we know; know what to do and how to do it; and know what is worth wanting, worth knowing, and worth acting for. Our last four aspects of theory follow from these four requirements.

6. Recognition and continuing awareness of *values* and goals.[13] For both individuals and groups, this includes an awareness of their own preferences and desires, their "utility scales," as economic theorists call them, their "preferred outcomes," their goals toward which they actually are tending to move, as well as their goal images which may represent these real goals only more or less inaccurately. Awareness of values also includes awareness of entire value orientations, which emphasize entire classes of valued outcomes, such as "honor," "power," "wealth," and others, rather than any one particular outcome within any such class. Finally awareness of values also comprises an awareness of coherent value configurations, as these are transmitted by existing philosophies, religions, or normative political theories, or as they may come to be proposed by new ones.

Just this, of course, political theorists have almost always done. In the great tradition of political science and political thought, from Solon and Plato to such diverse minds as Locke, Rousseau, Madison, Pareto, Lenin, and Gandhi, the normative element has played a vital role. Each of these thinkers tried to understand reality, to appraise "what is," but he took his viewpoint and his motivation from his sense of what ought to be. Even Machiavelli, who claimed to describe what men and governments were actually doing, and not what they ought to do, was in fact at least a crypto-moralist: he wanted Italian princes to learn the techniques of power so that one of them in time might make Italy a united, strong and independent country, free from the rule of foreigners. Clearly, it is impossible for us to share all the values of all the political thinkers of the past; they are too different for that. But we must remember that they had them and were moved by them, and that no political theory can be understood without understanding both its overt and its hidden normative aspects.

---

[13] Cf. Anatol Rapoport "Some System Approaches to Political Theory" in David Easton (ed.), *Varieties of Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1966), pp. 129–141. Political theory requires an awareness not only of values but also, and particularly, of human *needs*. A value for a political actor is whatever he happens to desire; a *need* for him is any condition or input which he cannot forgo, or lack, without suffering significant observable damage. Needs and values overlap but imperfectly. Men may value what they do not need, and need what they do not value. Seventeenth century sailors who had never heard of vitamin C still fell ill from scurvy without it. Whether physical or psychic, needs are objective and verifiable, at least in principle, relative to each actor. For an important plea for orienting political theory more closely to human needs, see Christian Bay, "The Cheerful Science of Dismal Politics," in Theodore Roszak, ed., *The Dissenting Academy* (New York: Pantheon Books-Random House, 1968), pp. 208–230.

7. *Empirical knowledge.* Here indeed the study of politics turns into political science, that is, into knowledge that can be tested, verified, and shared among different investigators, regardless of their personalities and preferences. Man is a part of nature, and hence much about his behavior can be known, much as facts about other parts of nature can be known.[14] Insofar as such knowledge is available about political behavior, it can tell us about the possible attainment of political goals: which goals are attainable, under what conditions, within what time, and at what price.

Beyond this, such "objective" knowledge—objective in the sense that it is verifiable and shareable—can tell us about the compatibility or incompatibility of goals under particular conditions, for man in politics usually does not live by one goal alone; and it can tell us about the expectable consistency of the results of actions. It can tell us, therefore, about the viability of goal configurations, and hence of entire systems of politics and governments. Accordingly, such factual knowledge can tell us about the probable feedback effects from means upon ends, and from political actions upon their actors. This last is a knowledge that political zealots have too often slighted when it applied to themselves and to their own organizations and regimes.

Insofar as it is obtainable, this kind of scientific knowledge is "objective" in the sense of being verifiable and shareable—but it is not "free from values" in Max Weber's sense of the terms. Values enter into the selection of our topics of inquiry, of our strategies of research, of our interpretation and evaluation of the implications of our findings, and into our choice of actions by which we respond to them. It follows that holding of particular values can increase or decrease the probability of our discovering some particular items or kinds of knowledge, and of accepting as real their implications. Similarly, our membership in social or cultural groups which encourage the holding of such values can change these probabilities of our discovering, and acting on, such kinds of knowledge. Here, too, however, we are dealing with probability, not with determinism. Often, when we speak of the power of "ideology"—usually in referring to the views of other people—we overestimate the biasing power of social situations, and underestimate the self-correcting capabilities of the ensemble of operational methods of verification which are available to us.

8. *Pragmatic skills.* Already an ancient Greek philospher, Heraclitus, distinguished between "knowing what" and "knowing how."[15] Skill, "know-how," or what we call "practical politics," all these are techniques for mastering reality, or at least for coping with it. They are techniques that can be discovered, learned, described, transmitted. Their test is whether they work. If they do, they may work just as well without being understood, or even better, at least for a time. Often they are taught less well by description than by experience, training and example; and success in their performance may depend less on the equality of step-by-step reasoning and more on the inequality of aptitude.

There is a seemingly ineradicable element of skill and talent in all political activity, and no serious political theory can afford to deny it. Yet what may not be rationally understood by participants may still be understood, at least in part, by observers; and political theory must try to contribute also to our better understanding of the role and the limits of skill, style, timing, and charisma in the political process, and in the success or failure of our own actions.

9. *Wisdom.* As suggested earlier, wisdom is second-order knowledge. It is knowledge about knowledge, a skill about skills, an evaluation of values. It tells us what knowledge to seek, what skills to learn, what values to strive for. In this sense, explicit or implicit wisdom precedes our first theories, for it tells us what to theorize about. But it also follows our theories, by telling us something about the actions which we should take on them.

Generally, wisdom deals with our selection of goals and of priorities among them. It thus deals with changes in our goal configurations—our ways of feeling, thought and life. In the last analysis, it deals with the selection of larger encompassing contexts for our feelings, thoughts and actions. Out of the ensemble of possible alternative contexts of memories and values, which particular context are we to select or construct for the design and interpretation of any particular scientific operation? What context are we to select or construct for the posing of any ethical, intellectual or artistic question, and for our search for an answer to it? What context are we to choose for any political action—for conceiving it, planning it, carrying it through, and evaluating its results?

---

[14] Cf. Immanuel Kant, "*Idee zu* einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht," *Berlinische Monatsschrift,* 1784, pp. 385–411, reprinted in Kant, *Was Ist Aufklärung? Aufsätz zur Geschichte und Philosophie* (Göttingen: Vandenhook Ruprecht, 1967) pp. 40–54.

[15] Heraclitus called the latter type of knowledge "*fronesis*": Werner Jaeger, *Paideia I,* pp. 180, 184.

Context is the basis of all meaning; without context, all such activities would appear meaningless. Surely, we are never wholly free in choosing the contexts in which we think and act. But being human, we are never wholly determined from outside, nor wholly ruled by our own past. We always have some room for choice; and our fate depends on how we use it. But most of our decisions about thought or actions will depend upon the larger context we have chosen, wittingly or unwittingly, from which to draw their meaning for us.

If our choice of context can be perilous in its consequences, it is no less imperilled at its source. For we cannot verify the wisdom by which we choose our context and basis for all meaning. Any operation of verification would presuppose another context which itself cannot be verified as a whole but only corroborated in part within its own framework. At best it can be shown to contain probably more truth than, or at least as much truth as, any other context of which we can here and now conceive. This is the peril of all times of great change in politics, society or culture. We can verify the fact—when it has become a fact—that our old wisdom and our old context have broken down, that they fail to cope with the new problems; but we cannot completely verify our new contexts. We must seek new wisdom at our own risk.

There is one set of tentative considerations that can help us at least somewhat in this risky task. Whatever wisdom we have or adopt at a particular time will not merely guide our selection of theories, but it must also be open to at least partial correction by these theories and by the evidence from reality which our verification procedures may produce. Any wisdom not open to reality correction in this sense would degenerate into mere ideology. In this sense, wisdom is the steering section of science; and it is itself a link in a dynamic cycle which includes the selective creation of theories and the selective search for verification in reality, leading to a modification or transformation of wisdom at the next stage. Such feedback cycles may form an ever-narrowing sequence toward decline, stagnation and sterility, or they may lead to a widening sequence of deeper insights, more fruitful theories, greater amounts of verified knowledge, and growing cognitive and evaluative capabilities. In which of these two directions a proposed version of wisdom will take us cannot be decided in advance with any certainty. Only later may we be able to say more definitely of the results of our risky choices that we have come to know them by their fruits.

III. Theory as an Integrative Process

We have surveyed nine aspects of political theory. But we can also look upon them from another viewpoint. We can recognize them as so many stages in a single production cycle of political knowledge and political action. If any one of these stages is neglected, the entire cycle will suffer and may stop—or someone somewhere will have to make an effort to repair the damage. Memories, insights, organized symbols, self-criticism, heuristic search, consciously held values, verifiable knowledge, practised skills, risk-laden wisdom—all these are essential to political theory and vital to action. Political thought and action have cycled through these stages in the past and will continue to do so in the future. Owing to the diversity of gifts and the division of labor, some of us will concentrate our efforts on some particular stage, but all stages in the process are necessary; none can be omitted if it is to go on. In this common task of keeping political theory alive—of helping men to understand and control their fate as much as possible—all of us, political scientists and political humanists, have need of each other.

Seen from this viewpoint, political theory as a whole is an integrative and partly integrated process. We must become more conscious of its unity and make it stronger, without confusing the unity of theory as an intellectual effort with the presence or absence of unity in the political systems which we analyse.

Already now, to be sure, particular political theories may serve as instruments of integration in the political systems in which they hold sway. Under suitable conditions, a political theory may reduce cognitive dissonance, or it may shift it from the center of political attention to its margins. Such a theory may also reduce cognitive or evaluative conflicts within the personality of individuals, or conflicts between individual and group, or among groups within the state. In this manner, political theory may promote personal singlemindedness and peace of mind, group solidarity, and/or national morale.

If it does these things, then individuals, group leaders, and national governments may prize it highly, even if the particular theory should have degenerated into an ideology, that is, if it should have become substantially inaccessible to reality control. If political theory began as an instrument to apprehend reality, now, turned into an ideology, it becomes an instrument to exclude it from the awareness of its adherents. For a time, both elites and mass believers may enjoy such an intellectual and emotional shelter from unpleasant facts, but eventually the bill for collective self-deception must be paid.[16]

But a theory also can have the opposite effects. It may reveal imbalances or contradictions, disproportionate rates of change. It may highlight elements or aspects of reality that are in conflict with others, and previously were ignored. It may show us an important new context. It may increase our cognitive dissonances or the clash among our values. In practice, it may upset past habits of trust, agreement, cooperation or obedience. It may not bring peace but a sword. Yet it may be an important theory. It may contain important elements of truth and we may ignore it at our peril.

All this seems true for theory in any field of knowledge. But what of the special problems of a theory of politics?

IV. The Central Task of Politics

Politics is the steering sector of society. It deals with the organized effort of society to change the probability of outcomes. In this sense, politics is always the study of *power*, but it is particularly the study of the power of any society *over its own fate*.[17]

Similarly, perhaps, theories of modernization should focus more realistically on the probability of major disproportions and imbalances inherent in the process.[18]

Only secondarily does politics deal with the steering performance and the power of *subsystems* on the society—that is, of individuals and groups, including interest groups, nationalities and classes—relative to their own particular fate and relative to one another. The study of "who gets what, when, how" is indeed a large and crucial fact of the study of politics, but it is not in itself the part that points toward the future. For this future, political science deals inescapably with the collective self-control of human beings—their joint power over their own fate.[19]

Just as information is measured relative to what is already known to the receiving system, so power is measured relative to what is already likely to happen otherwise.[20]

Similarly, steering performance can only be appraised—let alone measured—against the probable course of events in its absence, that is, against the alternative of the political system's mere drifting with its larger social and ecological environment. The performance of politics consists essentially in the difference it makes to the "non-political" sectors of society. How could we judge the steering performance of a helmsman, or a ship, without knowing something about the storms, currents, waves and sandbanks among which they have to seek their course? And how could we judge the performance of any statesman or government in our time without knowing something of the vast changes in population, economic life, cultural and social practices through which all contemporary societies are passing?

To answer such questions, we need a broad array of facts. Many of these data must come from other social sciences, such as economics, demography, sociology, psychology, and psychiatry. Regardless of their disciplinary origin, such data are becoming crucial for political analysis. Basic data about the major developmental trends of the entire society—social, economic, cultural and ecological, and the probability distribution of further developments made likely by their interplay—thus themselves have become an indispensable part of political research and theory. Today studies of such data are not a marginal extension of political analysis; they are becoming inseparable from its core and essence.[21]

---

[16] See the references in note 6, above. For a proposed concept of "extreme" ideology as one closed to reality correction, see K. W. Deutsch, *Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), pp. 9–10.

[17] For a sociological approach compatible with this view, see Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes* (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

[18] Cf. Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958); and A. O. Hirschman and Charles E. Lindblom, "Economic Development, Research and Development, Policy Making: Some Converging Views," *Behavioral Science*, 7:2, April 1962, pp. 211–222; cf. also Etzioni, *op cit*, p. 110. See also Helio Jaguaribe, *Economic and Political Development: A Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); Barrington Moore, Jr., *Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); and, for a different approach, Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

[19] See Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1958); and David Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953).

[20] See Robert A. Dahl "The Concept of Power", *Behavioral Science*, 2 (July 1957), 201–215; cf. also Dahl's *Modern Political Analysis*, (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970).

[21] For examples of such data, see Bruce M. Russett, Hayword R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch and Harold D. Lasswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Charles L. Taylor (ed.), *Aggregate Data Analysis: Political and Social Indicators in Cross-National Research* (Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1968); Michael Hudson and Charles Taylor, *Second World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New

What differences do we find among societies and nations, among regions and classes, groups and individuals—and how much or little is politics contributing to their perpetuation or their change? What are some of the missed opportunities, or the outright failures, in the current steering performance of political systems—West, East, North and South? How much *could* the political steering systems contribute to human betterment, within each context of temporarily given conditions, if large numbers of people would change their behavior? How likely or unlikely would such changes be and what can be done to change these probabilities?

So conceived, our political and social inventories and indicators, our data programs and attitude surveys need not be the mere piling up of sterile information, nor need they be monuments of worship of whatever facts and practices exist. They can help us discover the dynamics of social and political reality, so that we can develop from them a dynamics of possible political and social change toward human self-determination.

V. The Growth of Theory: Can It Be Recognized?

How can we know whether we are making any progress toward this goal? How do we know whether political theory really grows over the years and decades, or whether it just changes much as the fashions in women's dresses change? Will it be amusing to wear radical pessimism this season, and skeptical conservatism next year, and perhaps once again modified consensus the year after that?

There is only one way to know whether our knowledge in fact has grown. No matter how different our theories may look on the surface, by how much has their truth content increased? How many new existential statements do they imply, in addition to the old ones included in their predecessors? How many new facts, relations and possibilities have we discovered, how many earlier conjectures confirmed or even modified, or else refuted? What new predictions can we make and test, what new political, social or legal actions, what new laws or institutions, now seem possible and perhaps worth trying?

In a broader sense, we can test the growth of political theory in regard to each of the nine aspects or stages of the production cycle of theory, which we surveyed earlier. Has there been growth in relevant facts and data to be stored and ordered for recall? Has there been a gain in new insights, in greater awareness of the need to act, in greater sensitivity to the real, practical needs of men and women? Have we found more powerful or efficient ways for organizing our knowledge? Have we sharpened and deepened our critical reflection, and applied it more effectively also to our own thoughts and practices? Has our thinking become more fruitful, more conducive to the making of new discoveries and to their testing and development? Are we developing a clearer awareness of values, value orientations and value configurations—both in the political processes and systems we observe and in our own thoughts and actions? How much actual, dependable, tested knowledge have we gained—knowledge that could be called scientific and shared among scientists? What skills have we discovered, understood, learned and made available for application to research or political practice? And finally, what wisdom, if any, have we gained?

No single theorist, nor any single group of scholars, is likely to make contributions in all these ways. This is why we need each other's help, if political theory is to develop strongly enough and fast enough to match the needs of our time. But even collectively, as a profession, what real progress, if any, have we made in the last few years?

Let us look again at the nine aspects of theory which we listed earlier. Five of these, we recall, related primarily to cognition and only indirectly to action. The remaining four related more directly to the political actions that men take, or the steps that could be taken if we will them. What has been gained in recent years in relation to each of these aspects, and what promising developments are under way?

VI. The Evidence of Recent Years

As regards the first aspect of political theory, its basis of experiences, memories and data with which it has to deal, we find very rapid growth. The universe of politics has grown, to over 140 nation-states, and within each of these states, the public and political sectors of life have grown. In 1959, the expenditures of the public sector—national, state or provincial, and municipal governments, plus social security and public enterprises—accounted for a median

---

Haven: Yale University Press, pub. sched. 1971); J. David Singer, *The Wages of War* (New York: Wiley, pub. sched. 1971): J. D. Singer (ed.), *Quantitative International Politics: Insight and Evidence* (New York: Free Press-Macmillan, 1968); and *Beyond Conjecture: Data-Based Research in Political Science* (with Susan Jones), (Chicago: Peacock Publishing Co., pub. sched. 1971); Raymond Bauer (ed.), *Social Indicators* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966). For a careful and comprehensive discussion, see Richard L. Merritt, *Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970).

share of about 34 percent in the 28 countries for which data were available.[22] There is some reason to think that in many countries, this public sector has grown still further during the 1960s.

Not only the quantity but also the diversity of political experience has grown. By 1970, there were 14 Communist countries in the world, ruled by party regimes committed to at least four distinct varieties of communist ideology—the Soviet Russian, Chinese, Yugoslav and Cuban types, with a fifth type, the Czechoslovak, being forcibly subordinated to the Russian version in 1968, and with Rumanian, Albanian, Polish and North Vietnamese varieties still preserving some degree of distinctiveness. The variety of private enterprise systems also grew, or at the very least persisted, ranging from oligarchies and laissez-faire economies in parts of Latin America to the welfare states and mixed economies of Scandinavia and other parts of Western Europe. Under these conditions, social and economic systems are no longer simple givens, to be treated as a "non-political" background of politics. The social order itself has become a variable for political research, much as it has become an object of political contention in the practice of many countries. We now can compare the working of political institutions and the political behavior of people under different social systems, as well as against the contrasting backgrounds of rich and poor countries, and of Western and non-Western culture.[23] Together, these contrasts and possible comparisons offer us a range of possible political experience far beyond anything that Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau or Pareto could have included in their theories.

Simultaneous with this expansion of our universe of political experiences, there has been a vast expansion of the political memories and data available to political scientists; and this growth of data is continuing. Such data include mass opinion surveys; elite biographies and interviews; voting statistics at national and local levels; legislative rollcall votes; aggregative statistics of political, social and economic indicators; data from content analysis; data about wars and other historical events; data from other social sciences; and mathematical and statistical routines, ratios, and other secondary data.[24] In 1966–67, the present author estimated that for the field of political science alone, the stock of such relevant data may have totalled in 1965 about 16 million punched card equivalents, with annual additions coming in at the rate of more than 2.5 million card equivalents per year. By 1975, it was then estimated, the stock of political science data would have grown to more than 30 million card equivalents, and the annual additions to more than 5 million card equivalents.[25] Today, in 1970, it appears that these estimates were, if anything, too low.

We may consider this vast enlargement of the information base of political science as "'a nightmare," and we may reject the systematic analysis of large amounts of such data simply as irrelevant for the understanding of politics, as some distinguished senior political scientists of a tradition-oriented historical and literary cast of mind have suggested.[26] But what would have become of medicine if physicians had refused to consider the statistics of epidemics and the evidence of millions of case histories? What would have become of chemistry if chemists had become afraid of the large number of compounds, what of biology if biologists had feared the large number of data about different molecules and cells, what of astronomy if astronomers had become frightened of the multitude of stars?

There is no reason for political scientists to become fearful of the large amounts of evidence of how people act in politics. Modern methods of information storage and retrieval, and of electronic computation, make it possible to deal with large amounts of data—if we know what we want to do with them, and therefore, if we have an adequate political theory to help us formulate our questions and to interpret the answers we obtain.

---

[22] See Bruce M. Russett, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch and Harold D. Lasswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,* p. 63.

[23] See Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., (ed.), *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970); Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1966); and Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969), for discussions of intra-national as well as international comparisons.

[24] See the literature cited in note 20.

[25] Karl W. Deutsch, "The Impact of Complex Data Bases on the Social Sciences," in Ralph L. Bisco (ed.), *Data Bases, Computers, and the Social Sciences* (New York: Wiley, 1970), pp. 19–41, esp. p. 30. See also, Heinz Eulau and James G. March, eds., *Political Science,* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 58.

[26] Cf. Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics: Anarchy and Order in the World Society* (7th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. viii, n.l.; Hans Morgenthau, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* (July 1965); For an opposite approach, see James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy,* revised ed. (New York: Free Press-Macmillan, 1969), and the collections edited by J. David Singer (note 20, above).

Computers cannot be used as substitutes for thought, nor can data replace values. But computers can help us to carry out the analyses which our thoughts and theories suggest. Data can help us decide whether the world of facts at some particular time and place has been moving in line with our values or against them, and they can help us estimate the scale of the effort needed to change the trend of events in accordance with our desires. In this manner, the availability of large masses of relevant data, and of computer methods for their processing, offers a broader and deeper foundation for political theory, at the same time that it confronts theory with larger and more complex tasks.

The changes in the quantitative data base of political theory have been matched only in part by changes in awareness and insight. Here, too, however, the changes have been marked. The 1960s have been the second decade of what some psychologists might call "sensitivity training" for the American people. The 1930s were the first such decade. Then it was the poor whites, the unemployed and those white migrants in whose lives John Steinbeck saw a ripening harvest of the grapes of wrath.[27]

Today it is the black Americans and the Chicanos, who now stand out as lie detectors in our society, together with other poor people, with many of the young, and with many of the men and women in that growing sector of our society which includes our universities, our scientific and research organizations, our intellectuals, our mass media, and generally our knowledge-processing industries and occupations.

It is most often from these varied backgrounds that people have spoken out in protest against what they felt was wrong with some or many of the institutions and processes of our society. And we have learned from them, as well as from the seemingly unemotional work of social scientists and fact-minded researchers. Thanks to this difficult but very real communication between the protestors and the scholars, the poets and the behavioral scientists—a communication which continues within the mind of almost every one of us—we know now a little more about some real problems that for too long used to be overlooked or slighted.

By now, we know a little more about the problems of exclusion and discrimination, about cultural deprivation, about the growth or stifling of human pride and motivation for effort and achievement. We know a little more about the quality of our schools and our environment, about alienation, withdrawals, protests, and the difficulties of bringing about even a limited amount of real change. We know enough to know that all these problems constitute increasingly crucial aspects of the performance of governments and of the integration of political communities.

A good deal of recent work in political science has made contributions to this unending task of pattern recognition. In its form it may be historical or descriptive, or essayistic, literary and philosophical. Regardless of form it offers us in its substance the recognition of patterns, new or old, which in the past we have failed to recognize adequately, and which now demand our attention. Thus Thomas Schelling has drawn our attention to the common interests and the cooperative and coordinating aspects implicit in all situations of threat. Philip Green has identified the "deadly logic" implicit in so much of the seemingly rational rhetoric of deterrence policy.[28] Herbert Marcuse—with whom I generally and emphatically disagree—has reminded us that even tolerance can be repressive if it is joined to a persistent denial of real attention and to a lack of adequate response.[29] Seymour Martin Lipset has traced the elements of authoritarianism in the attitudes and behavior of working people; Michael Harrington has shown how the poor are forced to pay more, while Robert Lane has highlighted the fear of equality found in the minds of many voters who themselves are in many ways disadvantaged in our society.[30]

These scholars I have referred to represent a wide variety of political viewpoints and scholarly methods. Yet we can learn one thing from considering their work. Careful, deep-probing description and critical reflection are not old-fashioned methods in political science, out-of-date and soon to be discarded for the new beauties of computer tape. They are indispensable methods, permanently necessary to restore our contact with the real world in which we live, with its real human beings with their needs, their hopes, and their emotions. It is these methods of recognition, reflection, and description that must tell us about the quality of political events, before we can even begin to study their quantitative aspects.

---

[27] An example for the potential fruitfulness of this interplay for the widening of the perceptions of social scientists is the appearance of two valuable new chapters, on inequality and on problems of the environment, in the 8th edition of the classic textbook by Paul A. Samuelson, *Economics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

[28] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Philip Green, *Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966).

[29] Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); Robert Paul Wolff, Herbert Marcuse and Barrington Moore, Jr., *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).

[30] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960) and *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures* (New York: Basic Books, 1968); Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963); Robert E. Lane,

To be sure, we shall need to know which descriptions are more realistic, which reflections contain a larger element of truth. It is then that we cannot remain content with the haunting quality of poetic or artistic vision, or with the impact of mere rhetoric or plausibility. We shall have to use every suitable method of verification available to us, so as to test the descriptions or assertions before us for their consistency within themselves and with external evidence. We shall then use, if need be, every relevant method of science at our command, including the newer skills of survey research, opinion measurement, social indicators, quantitative data, and mathematical and statistical analysis. But we cannot test or measure anything that we have not recognized first.

A third major function of theory is the *organization* of knowledge for quick and efficient storage and retrieval, and for ready extrapolation and unambiguous prediction beyond the original basis of data and experiences. Here concepts and conceptual schemes are playing their well-known roles. They permit us to collect and compare new categories of qualitative data, such as the concepts of "associative" and "dissociative" behavior in politics, of "achievement motivation," of "free-floating aggression," of the "authoritarian personality," of "other-directedness" or of "cognitive dissonance." Often they also permit us to try to compile and compare new measurements and quantitative data, such as the "military participation ratio," the "government ratio" (i.e., the proportion of the public sector to the GNP), the "rate of social mobilization," the "foreign trade ratio," the changing proportions of elite groups, elite recruitment and elite turnover, and many more. Experience may compel us to refine these concepts, or to modify or abandon some of them. In their turn, indeed, new qualitative concepts often lead to new quantitative measurements.

Some of these new categories and ratios may lead us to new insights and new dependable knowledge. Others may yield more ambiguous results. The concepts of any clear-cut opposition between "middle class" and "working class" in the United States, of "middle America" as the alleged opposite of most groups desiring political and social change; of "totalitarianism" and its alleged opposite the "free world" in an allegedly unending "cold war"; the notions of the "balance of power," the "vacuum of power," and the "domino effect" all these have turned out to be largely chaotic and unverifiable in theory, and sometimes deadly and disastrous in practice.

We need concepts and theories that are less misleading, and above all, that are not sterile. The heuristic search for new discoveries and greater fruitfulness of our political theories is becoming a more urgent aspect of our work. We may define a "breakthrough" in any of the social sciences as a contribution which has a large impact on a field, and which furthermore either discovers an important fact or relationship previously unknown and/or enables us to do something important in the way of a research operation which we could not carry out before in a repeatable and verifiable manner. Such breakthroughs can be identified; in the period 1900–1965 a recent count for all social sciences (except history) shows 62, or almost one per year. This count excludes several borderline cases which may yet turn out to have been breakthroughs, in the light of the later effects that still may flow from them. Among these breakthroughs, political science has its full share.[31]

We must ask, therefore, of each political theory: "To what discoveries is it likely to lead? What new facts or questions does it point to? What new scientific operations—repeatable and verifiable regardless of person—could be developed with its aid?"

Heuristics is the search for new knowledge. As a search, it can operate even by intuition, suggestion or surmise. But eventually we must find out whether the surmised knowledge is indeed knowledge, whether what we suspected is true, whether we are dealing with poetry or science, whether we are in the presence of a faith healer or a physician.

Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man believes what he does (New York: Free Press, 1962). For a recent study of some aspects of the politics of poverty in a single State, see Samuel H. Beer and Richard E. Barringer, eds., *The State and the Poor* (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1970).

[31] Karl W. Deutsch, John R. Platt and Dieter Senghaas, *Major Advances in Social Science Since 1900: An Analysis of Conditions and Effects of Creativity* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Mental Health Research Institute, The University of Michigan, 1970), Communication 273, lithoprinted: and for an abridged version, *Science*, (February 5, 1971), pp. 450–459.

On a 17th Century fresco in an old palace in Bavaria I read the words: *"Fides certiora ratione"*—"Faith is more certain than reason." It was a slogan characteristic of the Counter-Reformation and the police state of that bygone age. It would be a tragedy if the same anti-rational and anti-scientific slogan should reappear as a motto of a misguided pseudo-radicalism in our own time.

The subjective, personal certainties of any faith—political, economic or ideological—are a great temptation, regardless of their cognitive content. But mankind's need for truth is greater; our commitment to truth remains paramount, overriding all others. Only subject to this control by the truth-seeking and truth-testing methods of science can political theory makes its heuristic contribution.

How can we make it more likely that our new ideas contain truth, and that our verified discoveries contain novelty? These questions bring us to the fifth task of political theory, a task which too often in the past has been neglected, particularly in such large and powerful countries as the United States and the Soviet Union. This too often neglected task is the task of *critical reflection.* It is the serious effort to reexamine and think through, at every time and place, the glib assumptions of the prevailing political ideology and culture—assumptions which we may unknowingly share and take for granted, so that we may remain as ignorant of them as the herring are of the salt content of the sea in which they are swimming. Are our industrial societies really as affluent, our political and social developments as progressive, our poverty areas as steadily improving, our efforts at economic aid to foreign nations as generous and as successful, our armaments as conducive to national and world security, as we are invited to believe?

The more seriously we take this task of critical reflection, the more difficult and demanding it becomes. For it must include a critical awareness of the hidden weaknesses and biases in our research methods, in our data, our logic, our statistics and our mathematical models whenever we use them. Here we need not a peasant-like sense of brooding suspicion against the fast-talking stranger from the big city of scientific research; rather, we need critical competence at the highest technical level—such as in Anatol Rapoport's criticism of the misuse of probability estimates by some writers on strategic deterrence.[32]

But criticism of cognitive assumptions is not enough. In addition, we also need a critical awareness of values, including our own values, and of the extent to which these values change the perceptions and the reasoning of those persons who hold them.

All of us are prejudiced in some ways and in some directions. What counts is not only what our prejudices are but, more important, how strong they are, how greatly they distort our perceptions of reality, and how effectively they cut us off from any chance of self-correction through new information about reality and about the real consequences of our actions. Striving to open our minds and hearts, we know that most of us cannot succeed entirely, but we can use political theory to move in the direction of greater openness, more effective self-criticism and greater capacity for learning, mutual understanding and common survival.

A good deal of the theoretical, philosophical and analytic work of such writers as Robert Lynd, David Riesman, Theodor W. Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, Erik Erikson, Alexander Mitscherlich and many younger scholars in many countries is helping us to move in this direction.[33] None of these writers, it seems safe to say, has solved the problem, but their work demonstrates that the critical examination of values and of cognitive assumptions now are once again an expanding frontier of political theory. Here, too, political theory is not merely a legacy of the eminent dead but an active concern of the living.

The self-critical tasks of theory can be summed up in a phrase once used by the economist Jacob Marschak: it must help us to *know what we know,* and to keep this knowledge distinct from the no less important task of *knowing what we want.*[34] What we then do will derive from the interplay of our perceptions and our desires, but for effective actions these two essential elements must be kept separate at first if they are to be combined later for effective action.

---

[32] Anatol Rapoport, *Strategy and Conscience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

[33] Robert Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* New York: Grove Press, 1964); David Riesman, *Abundance for What? And Other Essays* (New York: Doubleday, (1964); Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialeklik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966); Alexander Mitscherlich, *Toward Society Without a Father* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1964); *Die Idee des Friedens und die menschliche Aggressivität* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970) and *Versuch, die Welt besser zu bestehen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970); Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969); Michael Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse* (New York; Random House, 1969) William Connolly (ed.), *The Bias of Pluralism* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969). Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie und Praxis* (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1963), and works listed in note 2, above.

[34] Jacob Marschak, "Probability in the Social Sciences," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, ed., *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 166–215.

Here political theory meets with the philosophy of science and the development, criticism and refinement of research methods. The work of such political scientists as Harold Lasswell, Gabriel Almond, Heinz Eulau, Johan Galtung and a host of younger scholars shows the vigor of the efforts to strengthen political theory and research in this respect; and the contributions of several leaders in neighboring disciplines will leave their mark on the political theories of the future.[35]

It is characteristic of practically all the scholars just referred to that they have combined their contribution to critical analysis and methodology with an equal or stronger concern for the substance of political science. To none of these scholars could one apply the old British epigram which might fit, I fear, some other writers: "You use the snaffle and the curb all right, but where's the bloody horse?"

If critical knowledge is to grow, there must be some knowledge to be criticized. If growth is to continue, new knowledge will have to be discovered, either by the piecemeal accumulation of small items or by the larger advances on even breakthroughs to entire new classes of facts and areas of knowledge.

VII. From Theory to Action

The remaining four aspects of political theory—the last four stages in its production and reproduction cycle—are more closely oriented toward political action. Here, too, much has been learned but our main tasks still are waiting to be done; and they are so waiting at a time when our mounting dangers will not wait.

Our concern for values begins as an empirical enquiry. Who values what, how highly, in preference to what alternatives, under what contingencies? By what conditions and processes are such values and value patterns created and maintained? Is there an ecology of values, and if so, what creates it and keeps it alive? When, how and how fast do some values decline in their hold upon the minds of people? What is the half-life of a prejudice, that is, the time during which it loses one-half of its supporters? How are old value patterns transformed, and how are new value configurations created?

Already Plato in his *Republic* offered a model of a Greek city state with a succession of political and social regimes that would lead from an aristocratic culture exalting the values of honor and courage to a "timocracy" exalting wealth, and to a democracy, preferring rapid gratifications of the changing moods and desires of its people; and he advocated the replacement of all these by a new caste society ruled by philosophers and devoted to the paramount value of philosophic contemplation by a highly trained and gifted few.[36]

We recognize once again historic value orientations in Shakespeare's spokesmen of an aristocratic age, such as his King Henry V who confesses. "But if it be a sin to covet honor, I am the most offending soul alive,"[37] or Shakespeare's Hotspur who longs "to pluck bright honor from the pale-faced monn,"[38]—an ambition adopted by broader strata in a later age, and eventually fulfilled by three members of the federal bureaucracy of the United States in 1969.

In our own time, striking value contrasts and value changes can be observed from country to country and from decade to decade. Political and social scientists have gathered substantial data on such value changes and have made a beginning in their interpretation.[39]

To examine the ecology of values and value patterns, as well as their changes and transformation, is to study these matters as it were from the outside, from their past and their environment. But we can also study them, so to speak, from the inside, in their structure and consistency, or lack of it. Which values are compatible with each other? What kinds of pursuit of which values are *legitimate?* That is to say, which means and strategies in pursuing one value may be expected not to inflict intolerable damage upon other values which are also important to the acting individual or group? In terms of internal consistency or environmental adaptation, which value patterns are *viable?*

---

[35] Harold D. Lasswell, *The Future of Political Science* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963); Heinz Eulau, *Micro-Macro Political Analysis: Accents of Inquiry* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969); Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Robert T. Golembiewski, William A. Welsh and William J. Crotty, *A Methodological Primer for Political Scientists* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1969); Talcott Parsons, *Politics and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press-Macmillan, 1969); Jean Piaget, *Le structuralisme* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968); G. A. Almond, *Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

[36] *The Republic of Plato* translated by Francis MacDonald Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 265 ff.

[37] *Henry V*, Act 4:3, 29–30.

[38] *King Henry IV*, Part 1, Act 1:3, 201–202.

[39] See Robert E. Lane, *Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind* (Chicago: Markham, 1969). Erik H. Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth*, New York: Norton, 1969). Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Margaret Mead, *New Lives for Old: Cultural Transformation-Manus* (New York: Morrow, 1956); Jules Henry, *Culture Against Man* (New York: Random House-Vintage Books, 1965); Florence R. Kluckhohn and Fred R. Stoodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1961); Paul Roazen, *Freud: Political and Social Thought* (New York: Random House-Vintage Books, 1970); Daniel Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," *The Public Interest*, no. 21, Fall 1970, pp. 16–43.

The answers to these last questions are likely to be plural. More than one value pattern is likely to prove legitimate and viable, but their number is not likely to be large. Game theory has shown for many games the number of winning strategies is larger than one, but that it is usually quite limited, while many more strategies will lead to loss or defeat.[40] These considerations suggest a world of pluralism, tolerance and possible coexistence, but not of indifference. Several different ways of government and life may all be viable and legitimated, but others, such as Fascism, chattel slavery, nuclear warfare, or continuing United States military intervention is Southeast Asia, may not be.[41]

But we need not limit our analysis to value patterns that exist now or that existed in the past. We can treat values themselves as variables, and we can do the same to their priorities within a value pattern. What would happen if in an existing social and political system some major values would change? Making the experiment on paper or in thought, we may find ourselves constructing a political utopia or dystopia, a vision of conceivable new political arrangements, based on these changed values—arrangements which could appear much better or much worse in terms of other values or of their overall configuration.[42]

All such imaginative constructs have to be confronted with our knowledge of the world of facts. Here we enter upon the seventh aspect of theory: actual dependable, potentially scientific knowledge, utilizing the point of view of systems analysis.

Now we must ask about the target of our interest: what is the situation in its rich interconnectedness? How is it changing and where is it moving to? What is the autonomous probability distribution of its expectable outcomes in the absence of our intervention? How and to what extent could this distribution of outcomes be changed by a change in any of those of its surrounding conditions over which we have some control?

Our resources for answering these questions have been increasing rapidly, compared to what we had before, but much more slowly compared to the magnitude of our task. An important step forward on the part of some political scientists has been the partial reception of the style of thought of economic theory and econometrics, while at the same time some leading economists have moved toward a more explicit consideration of political problems. Albert O. Hirschman's book *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* will prove, I believe, an outstanding contribution also to political theory; and political scientists may find it profitable to pay attention to Robert Triffin's[43] plan for a new type of representation through several tiers of small flexible "affinity groups" which individuals may enter and leave at any time in accordance with their changing subjective interests and interpersonal relations. Such subjective representation through freely chosen "affinity groups" may offer a useful supplement, and in some situations, substitute, for the more rigid representation by external categories, such as residence or place of work.[44]

For the further development of appropriate theories, we must combine a rich clinical, historical, cultural and descriptive knowledge of the situation with substantial quantitative data, and wherever possible, with appropriate mathematical models and methods of computer simulation.[45]

---

[40] See John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947); Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1960).

[41] For the last-named, see Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York: David McKay, 1969); Telford Taylor, *Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy* (Chicago. Quadrangle Books, 1970); and Seymoure Hersh, *My Lai IV* (New York: Random House, 1970).

[42] Frank Manuel, *Utopias and Utopian Thought* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). The opposite of utopia is technocracy, the adding of mere technological power to an unchanged value structure. For a critical exploration of these problems see Wolf-Dieter Narr, *Theoriebegriffe und Systemtheorie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1969); Claus Koch and Dieter Senghaas (eds.), *Texte zur Technokratiediscussion* (Frankfurt: Europáische Verlagsanstalt, 1970) and the important Czechoslovak contribution by Radovan Richta *et al., Civilizace na rozcestí* (Prague: Svoboda, 1969).

[43] Robert Triffin's proposals are summarized in *Le Monde*, (Paris), July 9, 1968, p. 6.

[44] Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[45] See Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.), *Politics and the Social Sciences* (New York: Oxford University Press,

Such statistical and computer work costs money, but the amounts need not be prohibitive. The cost of copying data and programs from existing tapes is much less than that of assembling them in the first place. Technical improvements can work not only for the *status quo* but at least as much for those who work for its change.

We must ask corresponding questions on the side of the actors, be they individuals, groups or governments. And these actors, actual and potential, may well include ourselves. What, in the light of our values, is to be done? How clear are our own aims? How strong are our motives? Who else might have what motives to help us, deliberately or unwittingly? What coalitions are needed and practically possible, to take the actions required? Who are the groups or agencies who may implement a finding of political science and/or a normative prescription of political philosophy, so as to make it a basis of policy and practice?

In these regards, the recent work of American political scientists has been somewhat one-sided. A fair amount of serious work has been done to provide policy advice for governments or their agencies, but much less has been done to provide specific policy information and proposals for non-governmental reform groups, civic organizations, labor unions, and the general public. This contrasts with the work of American political science near the beginning of this century when the generation of the "muckrakers" produced many reform proposals and some significant reform legislation through reform agitation at the municipal and state level. A revival of this activist and reforming use of the professional skills of political scientists might help us to make our value preferences more effective.

These last points—coalition building, implementation agencies and procedures, and specific substantive proposals for reform—all raise the problem of *skill*. Does political theory tell us only what to do, or can it also tell us something about *how* to do it? Machiavelli's *Prince* was both a major work of theory and a "how to . . ." book. In our own time, theories of urban planning are in part also such "how to . . ." theories. Can we develop other "know-how" theories for our own time?

Up to this point, we have treated theories as tools to attain the goals and values which we have. But now we must ask political theory also to tell us whether we ought to have these goals, or whether to change them. Here political theory returns to political philosophy and political wisdom. The call for a reordering of priorities in the national agenda of the United States is at bottom a call for some new wisdom no less than it is a call for some redistribution of public attention, social prestige, economic resources and political power.

In this process of reordering our values and priorities, we have real need of whatever wisdom political theory can contribute. What contexts of memories and values should we select, assemble or construct for the design and interpretation of any scientific operation in our field —out of the ensemble of possible contexts? Which goals should we prefer for ourselves, our country and mankind? What viable goal configurations can we identify, and which of these should we prefer and develop? We have seen that there are, in principle, discoverable and verifiable limits to the range of acceptable choices in these matters, but that within

---

1970); Robert P. Abelson, *Simulation of Social Behavior* (New Haven: Yale University, 1969) (mimeographed pub. forthcoming); Bruce M. Russett, *What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense* (New Haven, Conn.; Yale University Press, 1970), and Bruce M. Russett (ed.), *Economic Theories of International Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968); Robert Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970); Hayward R. Alker, Jr., *Mathematics and Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965); William Coplin, *Simulation in the Study of Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1968); Harold Guetzkow (ed.), *Simulation in Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Harold Guetzkow, Chadwick F. Alger, Richard A. Brody, Robert C. North and Richard C. Snyder, *Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson and Samuel L. Popkin, *Candidates, Issues and Strategies: A Computer Simulation in the 1960 and 1964 Presidential Elections* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965); Dusan Sidjanski, ed., *Méthodes quantitatives et integration européenne* (Geneva: Institut universitaire d'études européennes, 1970).

See also some of the papers read at the 8th World Congress of Political Science, Munich, September 1970, mimeographed: Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Multivariate Methods in Political Science: A Review, Critique and Some Further Suggestions," Richard W. Chadwick, "Steps Toward a Probabilistic Systems Theory of Political Behavior, with Special Reference to Integration Theory," Raymond F. Hopkins. "Mathematical Modeling of Mobilization/Assimilation Processes," Gerald H. Kramer, "Theory of Electoral Systems," Anatol Rapoport, "Threat Games: A Comparison of Performance of Danish and American Subjects," William H. Riker and Peter Ordeshook. "A Theory of the Number of Political Parties: The Case of India," Paul Smoker, "International Relations Simulations: A Summary," and Harrison C. White, "Congestion, Decoupling and Freedom: Some Implications of Queue Models for Control and Spontaneity in Social Systems.

these limits our choice cannot be scientific but must be humanistic, existential and fraught with risk. How much of a consensus, if any, has been emerging in our profession in regard to these choices?

To ask these questions is to remind ourselves how little we have done in these respects and how much more work here is needed. And yet there are perhaps some common landmarks that many of us can discern. Two large issues, it seems to me, will have a priority claim on our thoughts and actions from now on and for the next three or four decades. These two issues are the abolition of poverty in the highly industrialized countries[46] and the abolition of large-scale war in the entire world. Much as the abolition of the more than thousand year-old practice of chattel slavery claimed many of the thoughts and sacrifices of people between the 1820s and the 1870s (and as it was accomplished for most of the world during that short period), so the abolition of poverty and war is the paramount task of our time. Now, as then, the accomplishment of a task of such magnitude will require a large increase of human effort and a significant expansion of human freedom.

Let us ask ourselves, how much recent political theory has contributed to this task? How many new discoveries, insights and philosophic conceptions, relevant to these tasks, have been promised or announced, how many have been demonstrated and delivered, and how much remains to be done?

Measured against our tasks, our knowledge and our skills are in desperately short supply. The world is better supplied with irate citizens and with zealous partisans of competing varieties of ignorance than it is with professional competence in political and social science.

We can and must realize the cognitive power which is potentially ours in the professional study of political science. Rarely, if ever in its history, has mankind needed it as much as now. If we do not develop this cognitive power in political theory and political science, no one else will do it for us.

Yet, at the frontiers of cognition and verification, and sometimes beyond these frontiers in times of crisis, we must take our stand and hold to it. When we must choose our values and our risks as a profession, I think we should choose a commitment to truth and to compassion. I believe that we have chosen this commitment, and that it will be honored.

---

[46] The attack on the minority poverty in the highly industrialized countries should go hand-in-hand, of course, with an attack on the mass poverty in the world's less developed regions. The latter task, the abolition of poverty on world scale, will stretch well into the next century, but in the highly developed countries it ought to be completed in this one.

Party Systems and Government Stability*

MICHAEL TAYLOR
University of Essex and Yale University

AND

V. M. HERMAN
University of Essex

More than seventy years ago, A. Lawrence Lowell argued that the lower house of a national parliament must contain "two parties, and two parties only . . . in order that the parliamentary form of government should permanently produce good results."[1] 'Good results' depended in turn upon stability. His argument had two simple parts. First, that the *government* must consist of only one party:

> It is, indeed, an axiom in politics that, except under very peculiar circumstances, coalition ministries are short-lived compared with homogeneous ones.
>
> . . . the larger the number of discordant groups that form the majority, the harder the task of pleasing them all, and the more feeble and unstable the position of the cabinet.

Second, that the *opposition* must also consist of only one party:

> . . . the parliamentary system will give the country a strong and efficient government only in case the majority consists of a single party. But this is not all. The opposition must also be united. So long as the ministry stands, the composition of the minority is, indeed, of little consequence; but when that minority becomes a majority, it must in turn be a single party, or the weakness of a coalition ministry cannot be avoided.[2]

The thesis is that the numerical structure of the party system in the lower house is a determinant of the stability of the cabinet, and it has been frequently restated since Lowell's time. Yet it has remained, as it was for Lowell, an unverified "axiom." It might have been a little premature for Lowell, at the end of the last century, to have attempted an empirical test, but it now seems possible to go beyond common-sense and casual observation, and to make preliminary statistical tests of Lowell's "axiom" and some related hypotheses.

We shall do this by examining the 196 governments which have occurred in all those countries of the world that have experienced competitive elections and uninterrupted parliamentary government in the post-war period—more precisely, from the formation of the first post-war government following free elections up to January 1st, 1969. These governments are shown in Table 1.[3] In what follows, the unit is always the single government, and in all the reported correlations the number of observations is therefore 196.

We shall first examine the relation between the duration of cabinets and the "fragmentation" of the party system in the whole of the lower house: the more fragmented is the party system, the more unstable we expect the cabinets to be. Still following Lowell, we shall next test the hypothesis that the more fragmented the parties in the government (the cabinet-supporting coalition), the more unstable the cabinets. We shall also examine the relation between cabinet stability and the fragmentation of the opposition.

Finally, we shall look at the effects of ideological differences between parties, testing in particular the widely-held belief that the presence of large 'anti-system' parties is a cause of instability. Of course, we are not asserting that these various (mainly numerical) aspects of party systems are the *only* causes of cabinet instability: some of the factors which we have excluded, such as internal, organisational aspects of the parties, can be operationalized and their covariation with cabinet stability analysed; but it seems likely that quite a lot of the variation in cabinet stability is due to "random disturbances from the environment," which it will be

---

* We should like to thank Douglas Rae for his valuable suggestions during our research and his comments on an earlier draft.

[1] A. Lawrence Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1896), pp. 73–74.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 70 and 73.

[3] Parliamentary governments in countries whose elections were not fully competitive *throughout* this period are excluded. The data for Chile and Uruguay are not as comparably reliable as those used here. Switzerland and the United States are, of course, excluded by definition, since their executive is not dependent on the legislature. Our data are from *Keesing's Contemporary Archives.*

Table 1: Governments Used in the Analysis

Country	*No. of Govts.*	*Country*	*No. of Govts.*	*Country*	*No. of Govts.*
Sweden	3	U.K.	6	Denmark	11
Australia	4	Germany	6	Japan	12
Canada	5	Luxembourg	8	Belgium	15
New Zealand	5	Iceland	8	Italy	20
Austria	5	Israel	10	Finland	23
Ireland	6	Netherlands	10	France	34
Norway	6				

very difficult to account for in a systematic way.

I. Government Stability

The indicator used here of government stability, the variable which we are attempting to explain, is *the duration of the government in days*. Our definition of a government follows Blondel's:[4]

> ". . . any administration was considered as one government which fulfilled two conditions: that of being headed by the same prime minister, and that of relying on the support of the same party or parties in the Chamber."

This is, of course, only one special kind of political stability, and may vary independently of other kinds, as the example of Fourth Republic France shows. While Macridis[5] speaks of "a traditional pattern of instability" (characterized by a high rate of cabinet turnover, with the constant dislocation and regrouping of the same majority), Siegfried[6] describes the same Fourth Republic as a case of "stable instability." He points out that in this period French politics did not lack continuity; the day-to-day administration continued without interruption, no civil servants were dismissed, a high percentage of members of each defunct cabinet continued into office in the new one, and the average life of key ministers was almost twice as long as that of the prime minister, and of the cabinet as a collective entity. The Fourth Republic, he concludes, displayed "the paradox of stable policy with unstable cabinets."

It is not clear, then, that cabinet stability can be used, as Lijphart suggests, as one of "a number of gross indicators . . . to measure the health of the system."[7] A considerable empirical study would be necessary before it could be said that it was an indicator of *anything*. The present analysis, however, does not rest upon any assumptions about the consequences or concomitants of cabinet stability, although its results would be of greater interest if Siegfried's observation that the instability of the Fourth Republic made no difference to public policy-making were found to be untrue of instability generally.

Our independent variables are measures of various aspects of the parliamentary party system, the government, and the opposition. All of these variables remain constant throughout the period between two general elections. A single observation of one of these variables is the value it takes during one government, so that, if the inter-election period spans several governments in some country, then each one of these variables has the same value for each of the governments. Occasionally, however, a government remains unchanged after an election. In such a case, the value of each party-system variable for that government period is defined as a weighted average of its values in the periods before and after the election, the weights corresponding to the lengths of those periods. An example makes this clear. Suppose that a single government lasts for a total of 150 days, 100 of them before a general election, and 50 after it, and suppose that the variable in question is F_P (the fractionalisation of the parliamentary party system, to be defined below), which takes the value .75 before the election, but .80 after it (the election having increased the fragmentation of the party system). Then, for this government, F_P takes the value $.75 \times 100/150 + .80 \times 50/150 = .77$.

---

[4] Jean Blondel, "Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 1 (1968), 180–203. This appears to be the only empirical comparative study to date of the relation between party systems and governmental stability; but no measures of the fragmentation of the pary system were used, so that correlational analyses were not possible, and only *averages* (over a twenty-year post-war period) were compared. In fact, if cardinal measures of fragmentation were used, the correlation of their over-time averages with the average duration of cabinets is found to be quite high, but we cannot make the desired inferences from this about the stability of single governments.

[5] Roy C. Macridis, "Cabinet Instability in the Fourth Republic," *Journal of Politics*, 14 (1959), 643–658.

[6] André Siegfried, "Stable Instability in France," *Foreign Affairs*, 34 (1956), 394–404. See also Herbert Luethy, *France Against Herself*, Trans. E. Mossbacher (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1957).

[7] Arendt Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 72.

II. The Parliamentary Party System

A first, crude indicator of the fragmentation of the parliamentary party system is simply *the number-of-parties with seats in the parliament,* which we denote by N_P.[8] This variable is, in fact, still frequently used as a basis for the many typologies of party systems to be found in the literature. Since this variable does not even take into account the size of the parties, we do not expect it to explain much of the variation in cabinet stability, but our first hypothesis,

> H.1. *Governmental stability is negatively correlated with the number of parties holding seats in the parliament,*

is upheld, the correlation between the two variables being $r = -.39$[9] Squaring this coefficient, we see that N_P explains almost a tenth of the variance of stability. Lijphart's assertion that "there is no empirical relationship between the number of parties in the system and its stability" seems unwarranted.[10]

We should expect cabinet stability to depend not only on the number of parties but also on their relative sizes; accordingly, we need an indicator of the fragmentation of the party system—the amount of 'multi-partism' in the Chamber—which takes account of both number and size. Initially, we assume that the differences between political parties are merely nominal (as opposed to ordinal or cardinal); that is, we do not assume (yet) that the ideological or other differences between the parties of a given parliament can be measured at the cardinal level, or even that the parties can be ranked (as they are often assumed to be) along a 'left-right' dimension. Later, we shall introduce measures of partisan disagreement based on assumptions about the ideological orderings of the parties, and we shall then be in a position to see whether ideological disagreements explain more of the variation in governmental stability than do merely 'nominal' disagreements.

For this purpose, we shall use a measure, called fractionalisation, already used by Rae as an indicator of party system fragmentation.[11] If N is the number of parties, n is the total number of seats, and $f_1, f_2, \ldots, f_N$ are the numbers held by each of the N parties, then fractionalisation is defined as:

$$F = 1 - \frac{1}{n(n-1)} \sum_{i=1}^{N} f_i(f_i - 1)$$

If none of the f_i's is small, then a good approximation is given by:

$$F = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i^2,$$

where p_i $(= f_i/n)$ is the proportion of the seats held by the i^{th} party.

For the moment we are interested in *parliamentary fractionalisation,* that is, F defined for all the parties in the lower house. We denote this by F_P. In this case, the N in the above formulae is replaced by N_P. F varies from a minimum of zero, when there is only one party, to a maximum of one, when there is an infinite number of parties. To give two examples, if the seats are shared between two parties in the ratio 60:40, then F has the value 0.48; and if the seats are shared between three parties in the ratio 40:40:20 then F = 0.64. In our universe of 196 governments, the smallest value of F_P was .432 for the parliamentary system during the Diefenbaker government in Canada from June 1957 to April 1963, and the largest value of .834 was attained by several governments during the second parliament of the Fourth French Republic. The interpretation of F is straightforward: it is equal to the probability that two deputies drawn at random from all the deputies (with replacement of the first drawn) belong to different parties.

---

[8] Only those parties holding at least two percent of the total seats in the parliament were included in this variable, and in all other party-system variables used below, except those which measure some aspect of the *government,* in which case parties with less than two percent of the seats which entered into the government were taken into account. Where figures for "others" and "independents" were reported with no further information, these were also excluded; very rarely did the size of such categories exceed the two per-cent level. We are aware of the dangers, in some types of analyses, of using a rigid cut-off point for minor parties. Sartori cites the example of the Italian Republican Party, which has had an average return since the War of less than two percent, yet has made up the majority in several government coalitions. See Giovanni Sartori, "The Typology of Party Systems," in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 325 and footnote 5. However, the inclusion of these parties would not have changed the decisions made on any of our hypotheses.

[9] This correlation is significant at the .01 level. All simple correlations in the paper are significant at least at the .01 level, unless stated otherwise. It should be remembered that the number of observations in every case is 196.

[10] Arendt Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic System," *Comparative Political Studies,* 1 (1968), 3–44. We would agree with Sartori (*op. cit.,* p. 347 and footnote 59) that it is an example of the dangers of "predicting regularities on the basis of exceptions." But in any case, we submit, the establishment of precise empirical relationships of fairly general validity is not materially helped by the use of mere typologies (of party systems), such as those proposed by Lijphart or Sartori himself.

[11] Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 53–58. See also Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor, *An Analysis of Political Cleavages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), chapter 2.

Our second hypothesis is, then:

H.2. *Government stability is negatively correlated with parliamentary fractionalisation.*

The correlation here is found to be $r = -.448$, which is quite strong, bearing in mind that the unit of our analysis is the single government. Since $r^2 = .201$, we see that parliamentary fractionalisation explains one fifth of the variation in government stability—twice as much as that explained by the number-of-parties variable alone.

III. The Cabinet Coalition

Our first two hypotheses were concerned with Lowell's overall assertion about the effects of the parliamentary party system. Our next group of hypotheses is concerned with the first part of his supporting argument—concerning the number of parties in the government. He began, it will be recalled, with the "axiom" that "coalition ministries are short-lived compared with homogeneous ones." Let us define a dichotomous variable, C, which takes the value 0 when the government consists of a single party, and the value 1 when the government is a *coalition* of two or more parties. We can formulate Lowell's axiom as the following hypothesis.

H.3. *One-party governments are more stable than coalition governments.*

There were 137 coalition governments with a mean duration of 624.5 days, and 59 one-party governments with a mean duration of 1107.9 days. An analysis of variance showed that the relationship between stability and the dichotomous variable C is significant at the .001 level: H.3 is well confirmed.

Let us take this hypothesis a step further and test Lowell's claim that ". . . the larger the number of discordant groups that form the majority, the harder the task of pleasing them all, and the more feeble and unstable the position of the cabinet," or:

H.4. *Government stability is negatively correlated with the number of parties in the government.*

This is indeed the case, the correlation being $r = -.307$.

As with the parliamentary party system, so with the parties in the government, we would expect this relation to be strengthened when the relative sizes of the parties are taken into account in addition to their number. For this purpose we again use the variable F defined earlier, though now of course only the parties in the government are used in the calculations. It will be denoted by F_G and referred to as *governmental fractionalisation.* Our next hypothesis is then:

H.5. *Government stability is negatively correlated with governmental fractionalisation.*

But the correlation coefficient $(r = -.302)$ is found to be almost identical with the previous one, where only the number of parties was considered.

Our final hypothesis in this section is:

H.6. *Majority governments are more stable than minority governments.*

This was tested by an analysis of variance of the dependence of the stability variable on the majority/minority government dichotomy. There were 159 majority governments with a mean duration of 838.8 days, and 37 minority governments with a mean duration of 501.3 days. The analysis revealed that the relationship is significant at only the .05 level, so that H.6 is confirmed, but not very strongly.

Minority governments are often 'crisis' governments, coming to power when no majority can be found. In a multi-party system with a dominant party, a general election may deprive the dominant party of its absolute majority after a series of one-party majority governments, and the other parties, finding themselves with an unexpected combined majority, may be unable to agree on the formation of a coalition, in which case the dominant party may continue in office for some time. Its position, however, will be precarious, as it usually will have to rely on the support of a small party to provide a legislative majority. This supporting party will often be a party of the extreme left or the extreme right, assisting a moderate left or moderate right government party; entering into a legislative coalition with such an extreme party may gain a majority for the governing party in the life of one legislature, but is likely to cause it to lose the support of its moderates at the next election. For this reason it may not wish to make legislative compromises with the small party, in which case it may be faced with divisions with the combined votes of all the other parties, who might force its resignation.[12]

---

[12] Cf. Otto Kirchheimer, "Majorities and Minorities in Western European Governments," *Western Political Quarterly,* 12 (1959), 492–510.

Against this it can be argued that minority governments are predominantly one-party governments, whereas in the countries considered here majority governments are predominantly coalition governments; and, as we have seen in H.3, H.4 and H.5, the latter tend to be less stable than the former. Thus, majority governments will be *less* stable than minority governments.

In view of these opposing arguments, it should not be surprising that H.6 is confirmed at only a low level of significance, and that the correlation between stability and the *size* of the government, defined as the proportion of seats held by all the government parties, is very close to zero.

IV. The Opposition

Lowell appears to have believed that a one-party *opposition* is also essential to cabinet stability. His argument is extended by Duverger:

> In a two-party system the unified opposition remains however a moderate opposition; the very conditions of political warfare which imply a certain alternation between the parties, and the possibility that today's opposition will tomorrow assume the sole responsibility of office, preserve it from any exaggerated demagogy which might react to its disadvantage. . . . On the other hand in a multi-party system the oppositions tend naturally to be demagogic as a result of a converse process. . . . The definiteness of the opposition seems to constitute an essential factor for its effectiveness as well as for the strength of the democratic regime.[13]

One-party opposition, according to this argument, is more moderate than multi-party opposition, so that we should expect governments facing fragmented oppositions to be less stable than those facing unified oppositions. This gives rise to the following two hypotheses, analogous to those stated for governmental fragmentation:[14]

H.7. *Governmental stability is negatively correlated with the number of parties in the opposition;*

H.8. *Governmental stability is negatively correlated with the fractionalisation of the opposition parties (F_0).*

In H.8, 'fractionalisation' refers again to the variable F defined earlier.

The two correlations have the signs hypothesised but have low values: for H.7, r = −.103 and for H.8, r = −.114 (neither of which is significant at the .01 level). One plausible reason for this—a counter to the arguments of Lowell and Duverger—lies in the relevance of the dictum, "divide and rule." Surely, it may be argued, the more divided the opposition, the easier it is to rule. Although, as Duverger has remarked, "it is easier to secure agreement *in opposition* to a policy than *in support* of a policy,"[15] nevertheless the more fragmented is the opposition, the harder it becomes to secure such agreement. In fact, the more fragmented the opposition parties are, the harder it is for them to cooperate strategically for any purpose.

The two sides of the argument—fragmented oppositions are less moderate and therefore conduce to cabinet instability, but they are also less efficient, which conduces to stability—seem equally plausible, and together would account for the near-zero correlations in H.7 and H.8.

Our final hypothesis in this section concerns the combined effects of governmental fractionalisation and opposition fractionalisation:

H.9. *Opposition fractionalisation explains a significant proportion of the variation in governmental stability which is unaccounted for by government fractionalisation.*

To test the hypothesis that stability is a linear function of F_G and F_0, the following regression equation was estimated:

$$S = b_0 + b_1F_G + b_2F_0 + u,$$

where S denotes stability, b_0, b_1 and b_2 the regression coefficients, and u is an error term (assumed to be normally distributed, with zero mean and constant variance). The multiple correlation coefficient was found to be R = .340, which is not very much higher than the simple correlation between stability and F_G. An F-ratio test shows that R^2 is highly significant at the .001 level, i.e., that the overall fit of the equation is good. T-tests on the regression coefficients show that b_1 is highly significant at the .001 level, but b_2 is significant at only the .05 level (though almost at .01). This last test is the one in which we are most interested, as it tests whether the addition of the F_0 variable explains much of the variance *not already explained by* F_G—and the t-test shows that it does (i.e., that H.9 is confirmed), but at a not very high level of significance.

V. The Effects of Ideological Differences on Cabinet Stability

So far, we have not been in a position to assess the importance of "ideology" as a factor explaining variations in governmental stability, since we have made no assumptions about ideological differences between parties, but assumed rather that they are all "equally unalike." In this section, two kinds of ideological differences will be examined: first, it will be assumed that all the parties in a given parliament can be ordered (from 'left' to 'right') in one dimension; second, we shall assume that the parties in a given parliament can be ordered (from 'left' to 'right') in one dimension; second we shall assume that the parties in a parliament can be partitioned into two groups—'anti-system' parties (mainly communist parties, but including some extreme right-wing parties) and the others, which we call 'pro-system' parties. In this second category, we shall be interested in the effects on stability of the size of the anti-system parties.

---

[13] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, Trans. R. and B. North (London: Methuen, 1954), p. 415.

[14] "The opposition" is defined simply as all the parties not in the government.

[15] Duverger, *loc. cit.*

The variable F used above is a measure of the probability that two deputies, drawn at random, belong to different parties, or, to put it another way, that they disagree with respect to party. We need now a measure of partisan disagreement which takes into account the ideological positions of the parties. As a start, we assume that, in each parliament, the parties can be ordered along a single liberal-conservative dimension. We are fully aware that this is a strong, often unrealistic assumption: policy differences between parties are multi-dimensional; these dimensions have different "saliences" for different parties; the dimensions and their saliences change over time; some conflicts between parties cannot be represented as spatial policy differences at all; and so on.[16] Despite these objections, our data show that this single left-right dimension is used, much of the time, as a basis for choosing government coalition partners; so that, if the parties themselves use this dimension to distinguish the other parties (as they appear to do), it seems reasonable to suppose that it has some effect on the duration of the cabinets.

Two measures will be used which take account of these left-right differences. The first of these assumes only that the parties are ranked, without making any assumptions about the relative sizes of the intervals between them. We call this measure *ordinal disagreement*, and denote it by D (subscripts P, G and O will be used for Parliament, Government and Opposition respectively, as they were for the measure F).[17] As before, suppose that the numbers of seats held by the N parties are $f_1, f_2, \ldots, f_N$, listed in order from left' to 'right' (f_1 is the number of seats held by the most left-wing party and so on). The seat proportions f_i/n, where n is the total number of seats, are now cumulated to produce the cumulative proportions CF_i:

$$CF_i = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{j\leq i} f_i$$

We now define:

$$\begin{aligned} d_i &= CF_i \qquad \text{if } CF_i \leq \tfrac{1}{2} \\ &= 1 - CF_i \qquad \text{otherwise.} \end{aligned}$$

Ordinal disagreement is then defined as:

$$D = \sum_{i=1}^{N} d_i$$

As with F, D is zero for a one-party system. It is not bounded above by 1; but its unit is irrelevant as it will only be used to obtain correlation coefficients. We give two numerical examples: in each of two parliaments there are four parties; in Parliament A the distribution of 100 seats among the parties is, from left to right, 50:10:10:3:; in Parliament B it is 10:10:30:50. These two parliamentary party systems have identical F values, but clearly we should want to say that A was more 'disagreed' than B if the left-right ordering is taken into account: A is more polarised, the left and right being strong and the centre relatively weak. In fact, the values of D for these two cases are 1.2 for A and 0.8 for B.

As with F_P, F_G and F_0, we calculated the value of D for the whole parliamentary system, for the government and for the opposition in each one of the 196 governments. If there were, for example, nine parties a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i (listed in their 'left-right' order) holding seats in the parliament, and the government coalition contained parties d,f and g, then of course D_G was computed on the basis of the ordering (d,f,g) and D_0 was computed on the basis of the ordering (a,b,c,e,h,i).

---

[16] See, for example, Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), 368–377; and Phillip E. Converse, "The Problem of Party Distance in Models of Voting Change," in Kent M. Jennings and Harmon L. Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 175–207.

Later, we shall make an assumption about the distances between the parties along this single left-right dimension. This part of the analysis could (quite easily, in principle) be extended to incorporate multi-dimensional ideological spaces, with no restriction that the number of dimensions be the same in each country. For example, Leiserson, in testing coalition theories against data on cabinet coalitions in three European countries, used a one-dimensional space in Sweden, two dimensions in Italy, and three in France. See Michael Leiserson, *Coalitions in Politics* (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, 1966), chapter 7. But the identification of these ideological dimensions for every one of our 19 countries over the 24 years period is a task we shall not attempt here.

[17] D is adapted from a measure proposed by Robert M. Leik, "A Measure of Ordinal Consensus," *Pacific Journal of Sociology*, 9 (1968), 85–90.

Table 2. Ideological Differences and Stability

	Ordinal disagreement (D)	Variance (V)	Fractionalisation (F)
Parliament	−.417	−.339	−.448
Government	−.253	−.227	−.302
Opposition	−.135	−.135	−.114
Government+Opposition	.322	.243	.340

We emphasise again that the measure D requires no assumptions about the intervals between the parties. It is clear that the parties in a given parliament are not all spaced at equal intervals; in many parliaments, for example, the interval between the communist party and a socialist party will be large in comparison with that between the socialists and a 'liberal' party. But even if the parties could be placed on a single dimension at all, it would be extremely difficult to assign numbers to the intervals between them, and even more difficult to compare these intervals across countries. Nevertheless, as a first, admittedly crude step (and as an alternative to D) we shall use a measure based on the assumption of equal intervals between the parties, when they are ordered from the left to right. The measure we propose to use here is the usual *variance* statistic, denoted by V. Again, values of V were computed for the whole parliament (V_P), for the government (V_G), and for the opposition (V_0), for each of the 196 governments.

V is defined as folows:

$$V = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{N} f_i(x_i - \bar{x})^2,$$

where n is the total number of seats, N is the number of parties, $f_1, f_2, \ldots, f_N$ are the numbers of seats held by the N parties (listed in 'left-right' order), $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N$ are their respective ideological positions on the 'left-right' scale, and x is the mean of the seat distribution. Any set of numbers for $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N$ will give the same value of V, providing that they are at equal intervals; the simplest set for computational purposes is clearly 1,2,3,. . . . Thus for example, the values of V for parliament A (with 100 seats distributed as 50:10:10:30) mentioned above is

$$V = \frac{1}{100}[50(1-2.2)^2 + 10(2-2.2)^2 + 10(3-2.2)^2 + 30(4-2.2)^2] = 1.76$$

since $\bar{x}$ is found to be 2.2.

In calculating V_G and V_0, we proceeded as in the following example. Suppose again that there are nine parties a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i (in order) in the parliament. In computing V_P, their ideological positions are scored 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9. If the government coalition consisted of three ideologically-adjacent parties d,e,f, then in computing V_G the three parties retain their original x_i scores 4,5,6, (or they can be re-scored 1,2,3, without affecting the value of V_G). If the government parties are *not* adjacent in the left-right order, then they still retain their original x_i scores: for example, if the government comprises parties d,f,g then they are scored 4,6,7 (or equivalently 1,3,4) in computing V_G. Thus V_G (unlike D_G) is sensitive to the disagreements inherent in the formation of a coalition of ideologically non-adjacent partners. A similar procedure was followed in the computation of the V_0 values.

The question now is whether these two measures, D and V, when used in place of F, will improve on any of the above correlations involving F, indicating thereby that ideological differences (as opposed to the merely 'nominal' differences captured by F) do affect governmental stability. If the word 'fractionalisation' (F) is replaced, first by 'ordinal disagreement' (D), then by 'variance' (V), in hypotheses H.2, H.5, H.8 and H.9 above, we have two sets of new hypotheses. Instead of enunciating all eight hypotheses, we have collected the corresponding correlation coefficients in Table 2. The first entry in this Table ($r = -.417$), for example, is the correlation between governmental stability and parliamentary ordinal disagreement (D_P). The last row contains multiple correlations (R). To facilitate comparison, we have inserted as the last column the results for fractionalisation (F) already reported.

It is immediately apparent that ideology does not play a very important role in our explanation of governmental stability. None of the new correlations is significantly different from the corresponding correlation involving the fractionalisation measure. Only in the case of the opposition are the correlations between stability and D and V actually higher than the correlation between stability and F, but since they are still very small (insignificant at the .01 level, in fact) this is of no account. In each of the three other cases (parliament, government, and government-plus-opposition) it can be seen from Table 2 that the correlations *decrease* as we move from the assumption of a nominal level of partisan disagreement (F) through the ordinal level (D) to the cardinal or interval level (V). If D and V are appropriate measures, then we have shown that *purely nominal disagreements between parties have more effect on governmental stability than (one-dimensional) ideological disagreements.*

It is especially interesting that the correlation between stability and opposition fragmentation is approximately the same whichever one of F, D or V is used to measure fragmentation. This is because V, unlike F and D, is sensitive to distances between parties, and therefore distinguishes nicely between ideologically compact (or "uni-lateral") oppositions and ideologically split (or "bi-lateral") oppositions—a distinction with consequences for cabinet stability. The parties of an ideologically compact opposition are all on one side of the government and therefore find it easier to cooperate against the government in divisions and to form an alternative government; on the other hand, the parties of an ideologically split opposition are spatially separated by the government into two groups, each of which finds it easier to support the government than to combine with the other opposition group.[18] The measures F and D ignore the space created by the government in this second category, but V is very sensitive to it. Now, the "divide and rule" argument given earlier as a possible explanation for the failure of H.8 ("stability is negatively correlated with the fractionalisation of the opposition") becomes even more powerful when the opposition is ideologically split: the more "split" the opposition (the larger V_0 becomes) the more *stable* the government. For this reason, we might expect the correlation between stability and opposition fragmentation to be quite different when V is used than it is when F or D is used; in the former case, we might even expect it to be positive. The three coefficients, however, are not significantly different from each other.

The kind of ideological differences we are dealing with here are disagreements about *policies;* and in effect we have been assuming that the parties can be ordered according to their policy preferences. But there is a more fundamental kind of ideological disagreement, and that is disagreement about the constitution or the "rules of the game." This is a disagreement between anti-system parties (mainly communists and neo-fascists) and pro-system parties. Political warfare in France and Italy, writes Duverger, "is not concerned with subsidiary principles but with the very foundations of the state and the nature of the regime"; and between the communists and the other parties "rivalry assumes the character, not of a sporting fight between two rival teams but of a struggle to the death. . . ."[19] This is to put it rather strongly, perhaps; the post-war European communist parties have not pursued exclusively revolutionary strategies of opposition, but rather, like the other parties, they have concentrated on the usual peaceful, democratic strategies of attempting to win seats in parliament, to become part of a government coalition, and, by bargaining with the government parties and by other means, to obtain favourable legislation.[20] Although their willingness to work within "the rules of the game" has been increasing throughout the period studied here, nevertheless they are still dedicated to making major changes in the political system, and at times prefer to bring about the defeat of the government in divisions and to encourage cabinet instability generally, even at the expense of gaining favourable legislation. The following hypothesis is well-known; with the data we have assembled we are now in a position to test it:

H.10. *Governmental stability is negatively correlated with the total proportion of seats held by the anti-system parties.*

The correlation between stability and the size of the anti-system parties is found to be $r = -.450$, the strongest relation found so far. Squaring this coefficient, we find that the proportion of the variation in stability explained by this variable is just over 20%. In a large proportion of the cases, "anti-system parties" means simply "communist party," there being no extreme right-wing party or other anti-system party with seats in the parliament. In no case was there a neo-fascist party with more than five percent of the seats, while the communist party share in this period has been has high as 30%. Other anti-system parties were either very small or, like the Poujadists, short-lived. Since the "proportion of seats held by the anti-system parties" variable is empirically almost identical with "the proportion of seats held by the communist party" variable (their intercorrelation is .956), the correlations between these two variables and governmental stability should be similar. In fact, the correlation between stability and the size of the communist parties is slightly higher: r = −.456. This is a quite remarkable result: independently of how seats are distributed amongst the remaining parties (from which the government coalition usually must be drawn), and independently of the numerical structure of the government (although, as we shall see, the size of the communist party places limits on this), the communist parties account for more than a fifth of the variance in cabinet stability.

---

[18] Cf. Sartori, *op. cit.*

[19] Duverger, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

[20] Cf. Robert A. Dahl, "Patterns of Opposition," in Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 344–347; and Sartori, *op. cit.*

One way, not yet discussed, in which the presence of large anti-system parties makes government difficult, is that they usually restrict the ideological and numerical area from which governments can be formed. As the share of the seats held by the anti-system parties at the extremes increases, the size of the 'centre' decreases, and the task of building a government coalition becomes more difficult. To take a simplified example, in a parliamentary party system consisting of a communist party and four pro-system parties, each with 20% of the seats, if a majority government is to be formed, and if the communists are to be excluded from this government, it is necessary that at least three of the four pro-system parties agree on the formation of a coalition. And the presence of a neo-fascist party, however small, could make matters more difficult.

Communist parties have not, of course, been excluded from governments throughout the period studied here. In Belgium, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy and Luxembourg, the Communist party was a member of cabinet coalitions in the two or three years immediately after the War. In Iceland, they returned to the cabinet from 1956 to 1958, and in Finland they were included in governments from 1966 to the end of our period.

If, in addition to the constraints imposed by the presence of large anti-system parties at the coalition-formation stage, and in addition to being hampered by the anti-system parties when in office, the government is also a highly fragmented one, then we should expect it to be even more unstable (though not very much more, since only 9% of the variation in stability is explained by governmental fractionalisation alone, as we saw in H.5 above). In other words, the size of the anti-system parties and the fractionalisation of the government have a *combined* effect on stability. More formally, we hypothesize:

H.11. *Government fractionalisation explains a significant proportion of the variation in governmental stability which is unaccounted for by the size of the anti-system parties.*

We test this hypothesis by estimating the regression equation:

$$S = b_0 + b_1 A + b_2 F_G + u,$$

where S denotes stability, b_0,b_1 and b_2 are regression coefficients, A is the proportion of seats held by anti-system parties, F_G is government fractionalisation, and u is an error term (assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance). The overall fit of the equation is good (R = .467, so that R^2 = .218, which is very significant at the .001 level), and t-tests on the individual regression coefficients reveal that A's influence on stability is significant at the .001 level, while the amount of additional variance explained by the introduction of F_G is significant only at the .05 level. H.11, then, is confirmed, but at a low level of significance.

Furthermore, the same pattern emerges even more strongly when the variables D_G and V_G are used in place of F_G: the additional amounts of variance in stability explained by the introduction of government fragmentation are even smaller when D or V is used than when F is used.

H.11 is concerned with the problems, in the face of large anti-system parties, of fragmented governments, once they are formed. We have already mentioned that the presence of a large anti-system party creates difficulties at the stage of the formation of the government coalition. We argue now that these difficulties are compounded if the pro-system parties (from which the government must be built) are fragmented. Our last two hypotheses are thus:

H.12. *Governmental stability is negatively correlated with the fractionalisation of the pro-system parties;*

H.13. *The fractionalisation of the pro-system parties explains a significant proportion of the variation in government stability which is unaccounted for by the size of the anti-system parties.*

H.12 is supported by our data, the correlation being r = −.354, which improves slightly on the coefficient obtained for the fractionalisation of the *government*. For H.13, we estimated the regression equation:

$$S = b_0 + b_1 A + b_2 F_S + u,$$

where F_S denotes the fractionalisation of the pro-system parties. Again, the overall fit of the equation is good: R = .496, so that R^2 = .246, which is very significant at the .001 level and shows that almost a quarter of the variation in governmental stability is explained by the combined linear influence of these two variables. Furthermore, t-tests reveal that *both* of the regression coefficients, b_1 and b_2, are significant at the .001 level. Thus, H.13 is strongly supported by our data: a significant amount of *additional* variance is explained by the introduction of the fractionalisation of the pro-system parties. As before, the relation is strengthened when the size of the anti-system parties is replaced by the size of the communist party alone, the multiple correlation being then $R = .506$.

VI. Concluding Remarks

We have presented arguments for, and sometimes against, a series of hypotheses about the influence of the party system on the stability of governments, and have tested them against data on the 196 governments which have held office in all those countries of the world holding democratic elections throughout the post-war period. Our conclusions can be summarised as follows. (1) A fairly strong relation exists between governmental stability and the fractionalisation of the parliamentary party system. A weaker, but still significant relation exists between stability and each of the following variables: the number of parties in parliament, the number of parties in the government, and the fractionalisation of the government. (2) One-party governments were very significantly more stable than coalition governments. (3) Majority governments were significantly more stable than minority governments. (4) Neither the number of parties in the opposition nor the fractionalisation of the opposition significantly affected governmental stability. (5) Measures of fragmentation which also took account of an assumed 'left-right' ordering of the parties were no better predictors of governmental stability than fractionalisation, which is based upon only the number and sizes of the parties. (6) Nevertheless, the ideological division of the parliament into 'pro-system' and "anti-system' parties had important consequences for stability. The proportion of seats held by anti-system parties was the best single indicator of governmental stability. Even more of the variance in stability was explained by the combined linear influence of the size of the anti-system parties and the fractionalisation of the government. Further, the fractionalisation of the pro-system parties significantly affects stability. And, finally, our best explanation of government stability was the combined linear influence of the size of the anti-system parties and the fractionalisation of the pro-system parties.

Our hypotheses have attempted to explain cabinet instability in terms of various kinds of partisan disagreement—in the parliament as a whole, in the government, in the opposition, and between anti-system and pro-system parties. In the case of coalition governments, a promising alternative approach is to use the predictions of various coalition theories. These theories are of two kinds: those which focus on predicting which coalition will form, and those which focus on predicting the 'payoffs' to the coalition's members (which, in the present context, will principally be control over Ministries and over the government's policies). All of the theories of the second kind (which are based on the theory of n-person games) and most of those of the first kind are 'rational choice' theories: they assume that the parties are utility-maximisers. Thus (to crudely conflate nearly a dozen theories), they predict that the coalition which forms (or the distribution of payoffs between its members) will be "in equilibrium," in the sense that there is no alternative coalition with the power to govern which can guarantee to all its members no less than they obtained in the original situation. "Equilibrium" can be made precise in several ways; the main point, though, is that the parties in an equilibrium situation can not find a more satisfactory situation. Thus, it seems reasonable to hypothesise that cabinet coalitions which are in equilibrium will last longer than those which are not.[21] This alternative approach will be explored in detail elsewhere.

---

[21] Axelrod has proposed a similar hypothesis, although his is derived from a theory of coalition formation which is not of the "rational choice" variety. From the assumption that the less "conflict of interest" there is in a coalition, the more likely it is to form and the longer it will last, together with his definition of "conflict of interest," he derives the proposition that "minimal connected winning" (MCW) coalitions will form and will last longer than those which are not MCW. A coalition is "connected" if it consists of ideologically-adjacent members. Both parts of this proposition are successful when tested against Italian cabinet coalitions from 1953 to 1969, but no other data are examined. See Robert Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), chapter 8. If we assume that the parties can be distributed along a single ideological dimension, and if we assume a cardinal measure of the distance between the parties on this dimension, then Axelrod shows (*op. cit.*, chapter 7) that his measure of "conflict of interest" is identical with the variance of the distribution. Conflict of interest inside the government coalition is therefore the same as the variable V_G which we used in our analysis (although, unlike Axelrod, we assumed that the parties are spaced at equal intervals along the ideological dimension). Thus, Axelrod's hypothesis, that coalitions which are MCW (and therefore have minimum conflict of interest) last longer than those which are not, is similar to our hypothesis that there is a correlation between V_G and the duration of cabinets.

Scientific Communication, Ethical Argument, and Public Policy*

DUNCAN MACRAE, JR.
University of Chicago

Political science is both a practical and a theoretical discipline. The recent increase in concern with the practical relevance of the social sciences reminds us, if need be, of the former aspect.[1] The theoretical character of the discipline then returns us to the question of how its relevance is to be judged, to what practical problems it should relate, and how we are to distinguish desirable relevance from undesirable. Radicals and traditionalists alike have joined to disparage the detachment of pure science; but while both might direct us to the same questions, they would diverge in their answers. Both would agree, for example, that the mere study of behavior under existing regimes may divert our attention from the question of whether those regimes are superior or inferior to others that might exist. But this comparison of regimes requires criteria of comparison, and cannot be accomplished—at least with any claim to theoretical adequacy—by a mere sympathy or antipathy toward existing regimes.

I. Ethical Discourse in the Social Sciences

This comparison of regimes, as well as the evaluation of authorities and policies within those regimes, is an ethical question. The discussion of such questions within an academic discipline carries special requirements that it be informed, systematic, and clear. We are here concerned with the valuative foundations of public policy and of other political choices. For these valuative aspects, insofar as we can separate them from the factual, information is less important but clarity and organization are essential.

Ethical choices have always been intimately involved in the analysis of society and politics—even when that analysis has come to be called "social science." In the disciplines known by this name, some of their discourse is (at least in intention) free of ethical or valuative statements; other parts of it are more explicitly concerned with ethical choices. The question as to what norms should govern this ethical discussion is a continuing one; it arose, for example, when Max Weber assumed the editorship of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* in 1904. But the position that Weber took then—and which has been a predominant one in social science since his time—did not foster the systematic discussion of ethical fundamentals, even though it acknowledged the possibility of such discussion. While admitting the possibility of dialectical criticism of value judgments, and of "testing of . . . ideals according to the postulate of . . . internal consistency," he pointed out that

> As to whether the person expressing these value-judgments should adhere to [his] ultimate standards is his personal affair; it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge.[2]

In the subsequent practice of the social sciences, Weber's statement has been given a negative rather than a positive interpretation. Since Weber's time, social scientists have striven for value-free discourse and de-emphasized reasoned discussion of particular as well as ultimate values. In doing so, they have tended to treat evaluations of policy as deriving from particular personal preferences, and to consider the social and psychological sources of these preferences rather than to evaluate them for consistency or to criticize them dialectically.

This de-emphasis on the discussion of values has also been furthered by an emulation of certain aspects of natural science. According to this view, the advances of natural science have resulted not merely from precision of language and symbolism, but also from elimination of propositions not testable by scientific proce-

---

* Revised version of paper presented to the graduate students' Political Science Association, University of Chicago, October 17, 1969. I am indebted to Gordon Tullock, Richard E. Flathman, E. Wood Kelley, Nathan Leites, Alan Gewirth, Gerhard Casper and Frank H. Knight for helpful comments on a previous draft.

[1] The problem of practical relevance is discussed in David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," this REVIEW, 63 (December 1969), 1051–1061. The character of political theory is discussed in Sheldon S. Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," *ibid.*, 1062–1082, but with a more humanistic and less scientific definition of "theory" than we shall use here.

[2] See Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949), Chap. II; on the possibility of critical ethical discussion, see *ibid.*, p. 54. A critique of this aspect of Weber's thought is presented in Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), Chap. II, but that critique would probably be directed in some degree at the argument of the present paper as well.

dures. Thus sentences inadmissible to observational test were considered meaningless and dismissed from "positive" social science.[3] It was proper to eliminate propositions that purported to be testable empirically, but could not conceivably be tested. But the dismissal of other sentences—particularly ethical sentences—from the recognized discourse of most of the social sciences has left these disciplines without sufficient guidance in dealing with valuative problems or resolving conflicts of values. These conflicts include those between the values of science and external values such as the disvalues of expenditures on unpredictable and sometimes harmful enterprises, the invasion of privacy, and the manipulation of human actions.

This problem has been recognized for some time by philosophers, and the positivistic enthusiasm for clearing out metaphysical rubbish has given way, at least in the field of ethics, to a renewed search for means of rational discussion.[4] This renewal of concern is a sign of health as regards the potential relation between the university, or the learned disciplines, and the society or polity outside. But in order for this concern to realize its full potentialities, it must be shared at least by the social sciences, if not by other university disciplines.

The social science disciplines cannot easily escape valuative discourse; but if their practitioners wish to engage in it in a systematic fashion, they must discard some of the assumptions involved in their treatment of it in the past. One source of difficulty is the assumption, noted above, that evaluations are to be considered chiefly in light of their origins in the evaluator's life-history. This approach not only transmutes the "ought" into an "is"—a doubtful advantage—but inclines social scientists to think of valuations as discrete and specific, rather than systematically organized. Insofar as we put forward judgments on this basis, we risk their being inconsistent and restricted to the matter at hand.

If we then add the requirement of consistency on the part of each evaluator, the policies recommended by any such system will be more coherent. But human fallibility may still leave errors in these individual systems; and even a highly polished system, subscribed to by only a single individual, may have few policy consequences. For both these reasons it will be useful if these individual systems are compared with one another by critical procedures such as those that characterize scientific and academic disciplines.

Within the social sciences, the opportunity for such discourse is greatest in political science. This discipline has customarily included explicitly valuative discourse under the rubric of "political philosophy" or "normative political theory." The present paper aims to contribute to this type of discourse by setting forth a set of rules for its conduct, related to the rules of scientific communication, which it is hoped will encourage reasoned discussion of the ethical foundations of public policy. Related problems have been considered by political thinkers of the past, and are now discussed by philosophers. But while I wish to draw on this discussion, I wish especially to connect systematic ethical discussion more closely with policy-oriented research.

Social scientists are often guided by valuative considerations in their choices of research problems; and these considerations have a particular relevance in social science, even though they may lead away from the sort of guidance by paradigms that is common in natural science.[5] In addition, in spite of the ostensible quest for value-free discourse, valuative terms are continually used in the discussion of research itself. The characteristic process by which valuations are introduced involves what Hare has called "secondarily evaluative terms."[6] Words like "industrious" or "courageous," he points out, normally have a prescriptive or evaluative meaning as well as a descriptive one. Some well-known terms of this sort in various social sciences include "stable democracy," "development," "per capita welfare expenditures," "real national income," "social mobility," "personal adjustment," and (in a negative sense) "prejudice." We might add, if we wished, Marx's use of "exploitation" and "surplus value." Each of these terms has a valuative connotation, though with care we can speak of it as though it did not; but it also has a descriptive meaning, which corresponds to observations as well as to usage in a disciplinary literature. Because of the descriptive meaning of such terms, studies of propositions involving them are considered legitimate in the corresponding discipline, while the researcher can feel at the same time that he is contributing to useful, i.e., value-relevant, knowledge.

---

[3] See Alfred J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic,* 1st ed. (London: Gollancz, 1936); Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951), Chap. 17. This view was also reflected in welfare economics, as in the notion that "interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning:" Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: Wiley, 1951), p. 9. The history of this development is traced in Arnold Brecht, *Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

[4] See for example Richard E. Flathman, *The Public Interest* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. x–xi.

[5] See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* vol. II, No. 2, of the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, rev. ed., 1970), p. 164. A complementary argument, that the social sciences are and ought to be guided by fundamental intellectual concerns, is presented in Henry W. Riecken, "Social Sciences and Social Problems," *Social Science Information,* 8 #1 (February 1969), 101–129.

[6] R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (New York: Oxford, 1953), p. 25.

This indirect introduction of valuative terms, though it departs from the ideal of pure science,[7] does permit the scientist to exercise some selectivity and choice in treating policy problems. It is insufficient for reasoned analysis of policy, however, because these secondarily evaluative terms are not related systematically to one another, or to primarily evaluative terms such as "good" and "right." It allows social scientists to deal with isolated aspects of policy, but not with coherent programs connecting various policies that relate to different secondarily evaluative terms. The narrowness and compartmentalization of disciplinary factual knowledge is thus enhanced, for policy purposes, by a fragmented and unsystematized valuative vocabulary.

The natural sciences, in contrast, have remained largely value-free and could not easily be imagined otherwise. The terms of physics are scarcely ever secondarily evaluative; even "nuclear fission" can be used in a neutral or positively valued sense. In the biological sciences, especially when terms are used to refer to man, "health" and "disease" are generally secondarily evaluative; but the proportion of terms that have this property is presumably still less than in the social sciences. As a result, we cannot seriously suggest that the natural sciences incorporate valuative discourse in their central professional communications, as I shall propose for the social sciences. Natural scientists' movements of concern for social responsibility and the assertion of valuations have been kept more clearly outside their disciplines' professional journals and meetings. This separation protects the highly developed conceptual schemes and theories of natural science from valuative controversy;[8] but insofar as the practical application of natural science is to be discussed within an academic framework, this discussion may depend on the valuative discourse that can occur in the social sciences. I shall propose to *model* ethical discourse on certain aspects of the discourse of the natural sciences, but to *conduct* it within the social science disciplines.

The norms I shall propose for ethical discussion are analogous to those that govern the discussion of scientific theories or hypotheses. Central to them will be the requirement, for a particular realm of interdisciplinary communication within the social sciences, that before anyone enters into ethical argument he first render his own ethical system clear, consistent, and general—modifying it in detail if necessary. Argument deriving from such a system will be free from one common weakness of ethical argument—reliance on a collection of vague and mutually inconsistent principles, which can be used for *ad hoc* rationalizations rather than genuinely pointing to a single clear implication in a particular case. I shall first consider some arguments for and against this approach, in relation to linguistic usage in everyday life, science, law, and policy analysis. I shall then specify the proposed norms more precisely, and finally review some existing ethical systems that might confront one another in this type of argument.

II. Everyday Linguistic Usage

Valuative assertions in much of the discourse of social science have been made in passing, as it were, and thus without close attention to their clarity and consistency. As a result, they have some of the characteristics of the use of language in everyday life—a usage which is vague and contains numerous potential contradictions, especially in contrast with scientific usage.

In everyday usage, words and sentences are interpreted with the aid of information about their context, i.e., about the speaker's past history, his motives, his present circumstances, and his relation to the audience. This type of interpretation is commonly used in both factual and valuative discourse. In everyday discussion of facts, we may be armed with a variety of approximate principles that apply in *ceteris paribus* fashion, but which would not do for scientific discussion of the same subjects.[9] In ordinary discussion of ethical matters, we also typically apply a variety of rules concerning right and wrong, but without advance specification as to what is right in situations where they conflict. By allowing flexibility in the meaning of words or statements, we manage to preserve the form of the statements themselves; we can thus feel more confidence in familiar statements, but at the expense of being able to derive from them clear choices of policy.[10] The precision of scientific usage, on the other hand, might require us more often to reject these statements or to modify them explicitly.

---

[7] The argument for removing valuative discourse from social science has been made (e.g.) in John G. Kemeny, "A Philosopher Looks at Political Science," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 4 (September 1960), 292–302.

[8] A case study of the politicization of natural science is given in Zhores A. Medvedev, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*, trans. by I. Michael Lerner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

[9] The distinction between science and common sense is discussed in Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), pp. 1–14.

The discourse of everyday life has been studied extensively by Garfinkel, who has characterized some of the typical practices involved in everyday communication and interpretation. One such practice he refers to as "et cetera," i.e., the assumption that the statement of a general principle carries with it the provision, accepted by members of the communicating group, that one can never enumerate *all* conditions under which the principle applies; there will always be others that can be added later. A second he denotes as "unless": a principle is expected to hold unless some later unspecified conditions obtain—the naming of the conditions, and the acceptance of their legitimacy being reserved for a future occasion and the possible bases of exceptions being unnamed in advance. A third is "let it pass": an apparent exception or violation of a principle is observed, but it is not viewed as a true exception, for reasons that are sufficient to the participating group.[11]

Participants in a communication system typically carry with them a stock of implicit conditions for interpretation of messages or statements, and for the generation of "legitimate exceptions." A trivial example is suggested by Bittner: "[When inside a church, one normally uncovers his head, but it would be distinctly foolish to remove one's cast if one's skull were recently fractured."[12] Similar qualifications surround the exercise of political rights. In scientific discourse, interpretation of this kind also sometimes occurs: for example, the departure of a result from expectation may be small, the experimenter unskilled (as seen after the event), or the circumstances (as seen afterward) inappropriate for a true example of the principle to be observed.[13] But even though such interpretive principles are sometimes necessary, even among scientists, the normative regulation of scientific discourse reduces their incidence considerably. This possibility of constraint may be due partly to the fact that science is practiced "on the side," apart from the practical considerations of everyday life.[14] The separation between the research laboratory and the world of practice, or between the academy and the world of political controversy, finds some justification in this relation between the separateness of science and its autonomous regulation of its discourse.

These studies of the transactions of ordinary life are both similar and dissimilar to the work of ordinary-language philosophers. They are similar in that they eschew the artificial for the real, and focus on the domain of the commonplace. They differ, however, in the degree to which they see everyday discourse as a model from which significant conclusions can be drawn. In ordinary-language philosophy, it is sometimes considered that careful reflection on the usage of words will reveal a clarity of meaning that will be instructive—even refreshing in comparison with the artificiality of previous work in philosophy. Garfinkel's work, however, stresses another aspect of the procedures of everyday life: that they are intrinsically different from the ideal procedures of science, involve meanings that are subject to continuous modification, and are immersed in a context with a past history and a future perspective.

The rise of ordinary-language philosophy has helped to rescue ethical discourse from the neglect it suffered in the heyday of positivism, and has stimulated linguistic analysis in legal and political philosophy.[15] It has not, however, always conduced to the development of new and more precise linguistic usages. Most linguistic philosophers (perhaps like Socrates in the Platonic dialogues) consider that the close examination of languages as they *are* used is both necessary and desirable for a clear understanding of words. The languages to which they direct attention, however, are not usually the technical ones created by natural or social scientists. Still, terms from these technical languages move into ordinary language, whether through the spread of technical devices or through the publicizing of specialists' categories such as "power structure." It seems hard to justify excluding these new elements of language from study, except for the difficulty of mastering multiple specialties. But once we study them in comparison with previous usage, it is only one step further to ask which is better to use and under what circumstances.

---

[10] This flexible persistence of everyday factual assertions is noted in Nagel, *loc. cit.*; a similar persistence in the valuative symbols of ideologies is noted in Francis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kaysen, and James Tobin, *The American Business Creed* (New York: Schocken, 1962), pp. 264, 391.

[11] Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), Chap. 1. This work derives in part from that of Alfred Schutz, a bibliography of whose work is given in *ibid.*, Chap. 2.

[12] Egon Bittner, "Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (December 1963), 930. In law and philosophy, this property of principles is known as "defeasibility."

[13] An example of interpretive work of this kind in natural science was the interpretation of the results of the Michelson-Morley experiment as "zero ether drift" when initially they revealed a small non-zero value. See Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 12–14.

[14] See Bittner, *op. cit.*, p. 931; Kuhn, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

[15] For an introduction to this approach see Vere C. Chappell (ed.), *Ordinary Language* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964). Applications to law and politics include H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); Hanna F. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); and Flathman, *op. cit.*

In defense of a position similar to mine, Mates has argued that the dialogue intended to discover the meaning of a word can often alter that meaning. Cavell, in reply, has suggested that the contextual specification of a meaning can end in a finite time, and that its end point may be a set of specified rules or directions.[16] My view here is simply that we should make every effort to write down those rules or directions for applying terms before we enter into a serious argument about the ethical foundations of policy.

My position in this paper differs from both that of Garfinkel and that of the ordinary-language philosophers, in that it stresses the artificial reconstruction of meanings of words—not limitless or arbitrary, but departing from the meanings of everyday life if these meanings need to be changed. In another sense my position is intermediate between the two just described. It sees the contextual limitation of everyday meanings as partly remediable by the norms of scientific communication, and thus departs from the pessimism that one might derive from Garfinkel's approach. On the other hand, it sees the meanings of everyday discourse as intrinsically ambiguous and its principles as potentially contradictory. It thus despairs of the efforts to discover clear and consistent meanings of major terms in social science and ethics from everyday usage. They are to be created, not simply discovered. Yet, as we shall see, if an adequately clear and consistent meaning for "right" or "ought" *could* be found in everyday usage, it would not be barred from discussion by the rules I propose.

III. The Guidance of Discourse by Norms of Communication

The linguistic usage of ordinary life is constrained by a complex system of norms, and the uses of words in the published discourse of an academic discipline are presumably further constrained. Nevertheless, the valuative discourse of the social sciences requires still further guidance or regulation. As models to supply such guidance we may consider more highly regulated realms of discourse, such as those of science and law. I shall speak of the distinction between everyday discourse and regulated discourse as a dichotomy, even though actual types of discourse differ only by degree in their contrasting attributes—such as the use of precise definitions, the stress on written rather than oral communication, and the limitation of meaning to what has been specified in advance.

In such a regulated realm of discourse, a statement can be given a precise and delimited interpretation by any of a large body of hearers or readers without being supplemented, interpreted, or explained. For example, a scientific article published by an unknown but properly trained author can direct the activities of similarly trained readers so that its assertions are testable in their laboratories. And while the testing procedure cannot be reduced to the determinacy of a computer program, it still involves a high degree of "predictiveness," i.e., identification of a specified set of observations from written or oral directions.

This degree of predictiveness is attained in scientific discourse because in any scientific discipline there exists a corresponding group of trained specialists who communicate with one another about a special subject-matter, largely in writing, under particular normative constraints. A specialized vocabulary and syntax—in its ideal form, mathematical or logical—is used by such a group. The propositions asserted are set off from their context. Specific citation of previous work combines with precision of definition to reduce the chance that similar propositions will be phrased in different terms without systematic relation to one another. The procedures to be used for identifying an instance of a concept with descriptive meaning are also specified in precise ways, known to readers who have been properly trained. These constraints on communication, having proved useful in the natural sciences, have been proposed for the social sciences as well. The social sciences have thus been led, in varying degrees, to greater use of formal propositions and mathematical expressions to state hypotheses.[17]

A different but related type of constraint is observed in legal discourse. A codified body of law, together with a specialized profession whose members interpret it, allows a type of predictability that might not exist under other forms of the administration of justice.[18] Thus rational law, like the hypotheses of science, provides a relatively precise directive as to how forms of words are to be applied in particular situations. And even though this precision is not complete, it is far greater than in ordinary discourse that is unaided by such systematic bodies of codified material with their attendant professions.

---

[16] Benson Mates, "On the Verification of Statements About Ordinary Language," *Inquiry*, 1 (Spring 1958), 161–171; Stanley Cavell, "Must We Mean What We Say?" *ibid.*, 172–212; reprinted (the latter in revised version) in Chappell (ed.), *op. cit.* The relevant pages in the latter volume are 73 and 89.

[17] See William H. Kruskal (ed.), *Mathematical Sciences and Social Sciences* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

Discourse that is regulated or constrained in these ways should not, however, be expected to be perfectly objective, in the sense that it could be reduced to a computational algorithm or program. It has been pointed out that the aspiration to a completely objective scientific language would be utopian, even within disciplines whose communication is most closely constrained and most highly "predictive." In the domain of the law, for example, while codification and professional training have taken us far from the "khadi-justice" referred to by Weber, students of legal reasoning still argue forcefully that computerized justice is both impossible and undesirable.[19] And in statistics, the domain of objective decision procedures, it has been argued by Tukey that the good investigator's judgment, particularly when choosing among clearly formalized techniques of analysis, is frequently superior to inflexible decision procedures.[20]

A second qualification concerning the development of such constrained systems of ethical discourse is that the precision required may take time to obtain. Short-run practical decisions should be expected to be made within a different realm of discourse—linked to ethical theory, nevertheless, as applied science is to fundamental science. In science a separation of roles between the more fundamental and the more applied has long been recognized. In the relations between science and government, this distinction has been referred to by Price as the "spectrum from truth to power";[21] but it need not and should not be the same time a distinction between value-free and value-laden discourse.

A third problem related to precise formulations in ethics is that even if we were able to specify clearly the conditions under which one state of affairs is better than another, we might have difficulty knowing whether these conditions were met in the real world. This is a common problem in ethics; many social groups are tempted to try to solve it by stating that certain acts or policies are right or wrong *regardless* of their consequences. In political science, this difficulty has encouraged a stress on the importance of adhering to certain observable political processes or procedures, rather than on the less certain effects of policies. The emphasis on political processes has been accompanied in recent analyses of the American political system by a doctrine that the interrelations of groups tend to produce beneficent results through a sort of "invisible hand" mechanism. But as Schick has pointed out, the process approach and the accompanying pluralist outlook have been unnecessarily apologetic for "outcomes resulting from the established process."[22] For this reason, an effort toward precision in the evaluation of policy seems worthwhile.

IV. The Norms of Scientific Communication

I wish to transfer to valuative discourse some of the norms that a well-organized scientific community imposes on its own communications. These norms have been summarized by Parsons:

> The basic norms of scientific knowledge are perhaps four, empirical validity, logical clarity or precision of the particular proposition, logical consistency or precision of the mutual implications of propositions, and generality of the 'principles' involved, which may perhaps be interpreted to mean range of mutually verified propositions.[23]

Ethical discourse cannot submit to a test of empirical validity or verification in the scientific sense; we thus omit the first of these four norms and modify the last. What remains are requirements of clarity, consistency, and generality, whose detailed meaning we must now explain. To these we add another prevalent norm: that each contributor to the literature take into account what has gone before, and not capriciously restate or contradict previous contributions.[24]

---

[18] See Max Rheinstein (ed.), *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society,* trans. by Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1954), Chaps. 8, 9, 11. Legal terms, however, can change in meaning in a way that scientific terms cannot.

[19] On "khadi-justice" see *ibid.,* p. 244. On legal reasoning see Gidon Gottlieb, *The Logic of Choice* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 16; Hart, *op. cit.,* pp. 125–127; Edward H. Levi, *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

[20] John W. Tukey, in lecture at the University of Chicago, June 12, 1969; personal communication, January 23, 1970. A subjective element is also introduced into statistical decision theory by the Bayesian approach to consideration of prior probabilities.

[21] Don K. Price, *The Scientific Estate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), Chap. 5.

[22] Allen Schick, "Systems Politics and System Budgeting," *Public Administration Review,* 29 (March-April 1969), 137–151. The process approach is represented by Charles A. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York: Free Press, 1965). An appeal for "juridical democracy" in contrast to a pluralist liberalism is also contained in Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969).

[23] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 335.

To advocate the transfer of the norms of science to other domains implies that these norms have contributed to desirable features of scientific communication. But this argument requires a distinction between the discovery of empirical uniformities, on the one hand, and the coordination of the activities of scientists, on the other. It is only the latter advantage that I shall claim to transfer.

The value of a systematic "methodology," or codification of the norms of science, for scientific discovery has indeed been questioned; Kuhn, for example, contends that research in the history of science has revealed "the insufficiency of methodological directives, by themselves, to dictate a unique substantive conclusion to many sorts of scientific questions." He goes on to contend that the paradigms of science, "past achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice," take precedence over any rules for research that might be discovered. This he asserts because of "the severe difficulty of discovering the rules that have guided particular normal-scientific traditions," and the fact that scientists "never learn concepts, laws, and theories in the abstract and by themselves," but learn them with particular applications. He notes, however, that "rules should . . . become more important and the characteristic unconcern with them should vanish wherever paradigms or models are felt to be insecure."[25] A similar caution is suggested by Kaplan, who warns against "*a myth of methodology,* the notion that the most serious difficulties which confront behavioral science are 'methodological,' and that if only we hit upon the right methodology, progress will be rapid and sure."[26] His analysis, like Kuhn's, suggests that empirical validity is the key to scientific advance, or at least that the practicing scientist's pursuit of truth is prior to, and should itself guide, any generalizations that outsiders make about the rules of science.

But because we are concerned here with coordinating communication, rather than with discovery, these arguments are less relevant to our present purpose. They may also be less relevant to the social sciences than the natural, as social scientists cannot rely so easily on clear, elegant, replicable findings as a guide. But the propriety of methodology in the social sciences need not concern us here, for in the realm of ethics it is doubtful whether observation of society can do more than place broad limits on the types of ethical systems we may wish to advocate.[27]

Even in natural science, the norms we shall consider are more important for communicating discoveries than for making them initially. Individual scientists in every generation might be able to repeat the discoveries of their predecessors independently with equal inspiration, with no particular provisions for scientific communication. But the cumulation and interrelation of these discoveries, and the guiding of scientists in distant laboratories to the same crucial problems in a given period, require precise and impersonal communication that defines the important problems and tells how the previous results have been reached. The norms of scientific communication may thus be justified not simply as a key to scientific progress, but also as an orderly means of coordinating the activities of diverse human beings in various parts of the world, and of building on the findings of the past.[28]

The problems of applying these norms in ethics are considerable, as actual ethical discourse often departs from them widely, and the reference point of objective observation is absent. Nevertheless, these problems are mitigated by a possible restriction of ethical discussion. In clarifying our ethical systems and comparing one with another, we can restrict ourselves to a realm of "pure ethics" by assuming that we have all the necessary information about the choices under consideration. Ambiguities and conflicts in ethical systems can thus be examined with the aid of real or hypothetical choice-situations in which there need be no disagreement as to the facts. The ethical systems thus refined can then be applied to real problems of practical decision; there we shall be confronted with the usual problems of characterizing a situation, or of predicting the future, but these problems will not contribute to the ambiguity of the ethics itself.[29]

---

[24] The conservative aspects of this last norm are brought out in Willmoore Kendall, "The Open Society and Its Fallacies," this REVIEW, 54 (December 1960), 979.

[25] Kuhn, *op. cit.,* pp. 3, 10, 46, 47. The notion of "paradigm" is also clarified in "Postscript—1969," pp. 174–210.

[26] Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 24, italics in the original.

[27] Two directions that such efforts have taken are the search for universal prerequisites for a society's continued existence, and for values or norms shared by diverse societies. For the former approach see David F. Aberle, Albert K. Cohen, Arthur K. Davis, Marion J. Levy, and Francis X. Sutton, "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society," *Ethics,* 60 (January 1950), 100–111; for the latter see Hart, *op. cit.,* pp. 188–189.

[28] See John Ziman, *Public Knowledge* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1968).

We take natural science as an example, therefore, not to banish ethical discourse from social science, but to encourage this discourse under constraints similar to those of scientific discourse. The constraints that we propose are for trained academic specialists, not necessarily for the practitioner or the layman. There are certainly many occasions when the everyday style of communication is more economical, less embarrassing, and esthetically more pleasing than scientific communication about the same matters. But a major function of the academy and its disciplines is to deal in general principles that *direct* our attention to particular matters, and which do not simply adjust themselves, with a flexible ambiguity, to new situations.

I now define the norms of scientific communication more fully, by contrasting them with their opposites. "Clarity" refers to the capacity of a verbal or symbolic expression to indicate precisely those observations or actions to which it would and would not apply, independently of the speaker, the listener, or subsequent explanation. "Consistency" refers to the capacity of a set of principles to withstand searching scrutiny and to reveal no instances in which its implications are contradictory.[30] "Generality" refers to breadth of application, perhaps in relation to economy of expression if this latter norm of scientific theorizing is to apply.

For our present purpose, the opposite of "clarity" is dependence on context.[31] A word or sentence whose meaning is continually contingent on a succession of explanations, related to the particular speaker and audience, their past histories and their intentions, is highly dependent on its context. If a scientific experiment apparently contradicted a general hypothesis, but we were able to remove this contradiction by re-interpreting the results, the interpretation would be dependent on the context. While such reinterpretations do occur in the exact sciences, the principles of reinterpretation in those disciplines are less peculiar to the occasion and more clearly known in advance than in everyday usage. In the social sciences, the opportunity for particular reinterpretations is greater.

The opposite of consistency would appear to be inconsistency. But inconsistencies are less evident when they are concealed in the indirect implications of a set of principles. It is clear that the assertion of a statement, followed immediately by its opposite, is an inconsistency; but it is of a sort that is so obvious as to be of no concern to us here. But what about such an assertion a hundred pages later in a book? Or an assertion which according to dictionary rules (not contradicted by special definitions in the text) would negate an earlier assertion? Or —and this is the most important condition—a principle whose implications is some particular case, not brought explicitly to our attention, contradict an earlier principle? The scientific norm with which we are here concerned is that of seeking out extreme or limiting cases to put our principles to the test. It assumes that principles apply without restriction, unless restrictions have been explicitly stated in advance. We accordingly seek out the most difficult cases, assuming the stated principle applies to them. This is the opposite of a procedure common in everyday transactions: not to seek out exceptional cases until they are presented to us, and then to explain or justify the exceptions with *ad hoc* principles, themselves drawn from a family of principles not systematically constrained to consistency. It is also the opposite of the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, which avoids ruling on general principles when it can resolve a case by more specific ones. These customary practices no doubt reduce dissension, but for the fundamental (and properly "academic") ethical discourse that underlies policy, they seem inappropriate.

If we are to test the consistency of a set of principles by seeking difficult cases and potential conflicts, the principles themselves must be clear and general. They must not be susceptible of multiple interpretations; for if they were, we could not easily discover these cases in which they conflicted and which required changes in the principles. They must also be general, i.e., extend to cover the widest possible range of actual or conceivable situations, so as to increase the chance that we will discover inconsistency among them.

V. A Normative Meta-Ethics

The rules for ethical argument which we shall specify, modeled after the norms of scientific communication, may be considered a normative meta-ethics. Typically, meta-ethics deals with problems of higher abstraction involved in ethical discourse, such as "What is the logic of a moral reasoning and of reasoning about value?"[32] But while discussion in this field usually limits itself to analysis and observation, I wish to *prescribe* certain rules for the conduct of ethical argument; in this respect I am asserting valuations analogous to the prescriptive norms of science.[33] These rules themselves require justification or at least persuasion; but to avoid an infinite regress and get on with the job, I simply appeal to those who esteem this type of discourse to join in.

---

[29] A similar distinction is made in Levi, *op. cit.*, p. v, between appellate cases and those that pass through the fact-finding stage of the trial court. A descriptive account of legal or ethical reasoning would have to include the latter, but there may still be advantages in setting off the ascertainment of facts for separate consideration. An alternative to this separation, involving the consistent organization of factual and valuative statements together, would be the description of ideal political systems; David Easton suggests this as a means of clarifying values in *The Political System* (New York: Knopf, 1953), pp. 230 ff.

[30] See Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), pp. 91–92.

[31] I ignore further differences such as that between ambiguity and vagueness.

The rules I propose are as follows:

(1) Ethical argument is to be conducted between the proponents of ethical systems that are specified in writing in advance; I shall call such systems "ethical hypotheses." This specification is intended to support the norm of clarity, and can include definitions specified in ways other than those of ordinary usage, propositions set off from context, and logical or mathematical symbols. We consider the case of only two discussants at a time, though the procedure may possibly be generalized.

(2) Each discussant shall have equal opportunity to argue for his own system, and against the opposing one, by pointing out presumed shortcomings in the other system. These shortcomings can be of several kinds:

(a) Lack of generality. The proposed system fails to apply to a choice about which both discussants have moral convictions,[34] and to which the critic's system does apply.
(b) Internal inconsistency. The proposed system makes contradictory prescriptions in a situation suggested by the critic, in which the critic's system is self-consistent.
(c) Inconsistency with presumably shared moral convictions. The proposed system makes a prescription which, in a specified "conflict situation," conflicts with moral convictions presumably shared by the discussants, while the critic's system does not lead to such conflict.

It is expected that an internally consistent ethical system, specified in this way, will not be consistent with all the particular moral convictions of its proponents; the aim of this procedure is to test whether the system must be modified, or whether particular convictions must be suppressed, as a basis for further argument.

(3) After each such opportunity to present conflict situations, the proponent of the ethical system under criticism shall decide whether he wishes to alter his ethical system, or make the choice dictated by it.

A principal reason for instituting these rules is to eliminate a common tactic in ethical argument, which appears to militate against consistent ethical systems but in fact derives from an inconsistent basis. This tactic is to point out that a proposed ethical system conflicts, in a particular situation, with a shared moral conviction. But since it is unlikely that all these shared moral convictions can themselves be reconciled with any consistent ethical system, this tactic gives the critic an unfair advantage. Once it is recognized that criticisms must themselves be justified in terms of a consistent system, the excessive requirements implied by this type of argument will be removed.[35]

A second advantage expected from the use of these rules is that the insistence on generality will increase the applicability of ethical systems to future problems—not merely problems that have been widely recognized in the past or present. In an age of social and technological change, it is important to anticipate future problems and possibilities, and to consider these possibilities before they give rise to major dislocations.

Comparison of ethical systems in the way we propose has been rather rare; the *ad hoc* type of criticism based on particular principles rather than on a consistent system is far more frequent. The formulation of ethical systems in completely consistent fashion, on the other hand, sharply restricts the bases of criticism;

---

[32] William K. Frankena, *Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 79.

[33] A disparity between the two has been noted and criticized in Alan Gewirth, "Positive 'Ethics' and Normative 'Science,'" *Philosophical Review*, 69 (July 1960), 311–330; see also Hans Lenk, "Der 'Ordinary Language Approach' und die Neutralitätsthese der Metaethik," in Hans-Georg Gadamer (ed.), *Das Problem der Sprache* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1967), 183–206.

[34] By "moral convictions" I mean any beliefs that can be expressed in terms of "ought," "right," or their equivalents. A rule of this kind is relevant to the controversy about cardinal economic welfare and interpersonal comparison; see John C. Harsanyi, "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," *Journal of Political Economy*, 63 (August 1955), 309–321; also reprinted in Kenneth J. Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky (eds.), *Readings in Welfare Economics* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1969).

[35] I am in effect suggesting a general "impossibility theorem" about the dictates of the moral conscience—unprovable, of course, until those dictates are specified. But I shall contend that Arrow's (*op. cit.*) "impossibility theorem" is a special instance of this general principle, in which economists' convictions about cardinality, interpersonal comparison, and proper professional conduct play a central role. The observation that particular moral convictions, as we have learned them, or "sympathy and antipathy," ought not to be an ultimate and unshakable criterion for judgment of ethical systems was made by Jeremy Bentham in *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (New York: Hafner, 1948), pp. 15–17.

possible examples are various ethics of maximization, or hierarchical arrangements of principles with strict orders of precedence. The central concepts of such systems may vary; for example, properties of states of affairs ("goodness"), of acts ("rightness"), or of persons ("virtues") may be stressed.[36] But whatever central concept is chosen, other valuative terms must be related to it in a determinate way. One of the chief tasks in formulation of an ethical system will thus be a reduction in the multiplicity of independent valuative terms.

Having indicated the proposed rules for ethical discourse, we shall now consider some existing systems that are simple enough in logical structure to give promise of internal consistency, and thus to enter into the kind of argument I propose. Such a listing can hardly be exhaustive, but may be considered an invitation for proponents of other views to put forward equally systematic formulations. Undoubtedly the bases of other such "ethical hypotheses" also exist in the literature; and some, like legal systems, may be complex and detailed rather than simple in logical structure. I shall emphasize ethical systems closely related to the social sciences. My aim is simply to show that such systems exist, and that argument within the proposed rules can proceed.

We shall be concerned with two major types of ethical systems, which we shall call "individualistic" and "relational" respectively. "Individualistic" ethical systems concern the combination of individual choices or experiences into a "social welfare function"; discussion of systems of this type has been conducted largely in philosophy and economics, though some of it has also taken place in political science. "Relational" ethical systems concern not individuals' preferences or experiences but relations, such as those of influence and power, between individuals. In these ethical systems, concepts such as "tyranny," "freedom," and "equality" occupy a more important place.

VI. "Individualistic" Ethical Systems

We consider first that family of ethical systems that decide whether acts are right or wrong, or states of affairs better or worse, by combining values for individuals. A completely consistent ethical system relates various value terms to one another in a precise fashion, and one simple way to accomplish this is through the maximization of a single function or quantity. When this approach is used, there is in effect only a single scale on which acts (or states of affairs) are compared.

The sorts of values that are combined for individuals vary among various versions of "individualistic" ethics. The Benthamite criterion of "happiness" designates one type of value, presumably related to the *experiences* of individuals;[37] though Bentham's addition of a hedonistic psychology, taking pleasure and pain to be central motives as well as valued qualities, confused the issue unnecessarily by implying that motives, or choices in advance of the action, might be equivalent as a value-criterion. An alternative type of value is that of *choice* or *preference,* which differs from "happiness" in stressing more the opportunity of the individual to make his own mistakes. An ethics of preference is perhaps more egalitarian in its implications, less likely to lead to technocratic solutions, than is an ethics of happiness. On the other hand, the sovereignty of individual preferences is likely to elevate unreflective choice to the level of reflective or expert choice, and to de-emphasize education and leadership.[38]

Within economics, the special field of "welfare economics" has developed,[39] and is centered about the choices of individuals rather than their experiences. Since choices are central to the analysis of economic behavior, there is a certain disciplinary convenience in assuming that it is choices, or preferences, that are to be considered in formulating criteria of valuation.

Welfare economics diverged early from the type of ethical criterion based on maximization of a quantitative function, as it was generally accepted that no such quantitative function was necessary for—or indeed discoverable from—the analysis of economic behavior. The choices and preferences of individuals could adequately be described by specifying rankings alone, without any cardinal or measurable utility function, and without any necessary comparability of choices or utilities among individuals. But despite this severe limitation in generality of application, economists have developed an extensive literature dealing with the conditions under which it may be said that the general welfare has been improved or impaired. There has remained a continuing question whether the failure of such conclusions to deal with interpersonal transfers can be remedied; one response has been to propose that "social welfare functions," while being non-scientific expressions of the preferences of the observer, might be specified in detail as a preliminary to further valuative analysis.[40]

---

[36] See Abraham Edel, *Science and the Structure of Ethics, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,* vol. II, no. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 50 ff. The possible emphasis on characteristics of persons might also direct our attention to ethical systems prevalent among psychologists or psychotherapists.

[37] A systematic argument for the location of intrinsic value in experience was made by Clarence I. Lewis in *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1946); see esp. p. 387.

[38] The distinction between preference and welfare is discussed in David Braybrooke, *Three Tests for Democracy: Personal Rights, Human Welfare, Collective Preference* (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 121–145.

[39] A selection of major articles in the field is Arrow and Scitovsky (eds.), *op. cit.*

I would suggest that these welfare functions constitute a type of ethical systems that may be compared and evaluated according to our proposed rules. This evaluation will be most useful if it takes place across disciplinary boundaries. One example of such discussion is the philosophical critique of Arrow's approach by Brandt, who points out that not all preferences should count alike in social decision processes, but that choices based on individuals' personal welfare should be distinguished from those based on moral principles.[41]

Some economists, however, have contributed to the development of cost-benefit analysis (planning-programming-budgeting), in which cardinal value criteria are added and multipled without the welfare economist's fear of these departures from "positive economic science."[42] Just as individual income figures are added in the computation of national income, in cost-benefit analysis the values of benefits to various persons, often in monetary form, are also added to appraise the economic desirability of projects or programs. In effect, interpersonal comparison of utility is assumed, and carried out by the use of a monetary measuring standard. The resulting systems of valuation tend to be specific to the problem at hand, whether it be the evaluation of military alternatives, water resources policy, or educational policy. The principles underlying these choices are more general, however, and might well be compared with other ethical systems according to our proposed rules.

A similar approach, also more practical than philosophical in orientation, is manifested in the "social indicators" movement. It has been proposed that the Federal government collect and publish periodic statistics on certain secondarily evaluative quantities measuring the state of the nation's health, income, public order, education, and the like.[43] These quantities, like the gross national product, are to be computed as sums, averages, or percentages for the population without fear of the unscientific aspects of interpersonal comparison. The criteria in terms of which they are to be weighed against one another, however, are not specified, and the change in political relations that these indices might entail requires systematic examination.[44] The proposal for social indicators provides another occasion for the formulation of underlying ethical principles and for the systematic critical discussion of these principles.

To return to "individualistic" ethical systems generally, there remains another important distinction among them that has been stressed primarily by philosophers. It has long been recognized that Benthamite utilitarianism runs counter to widely held moral convictions in certain conceivable choices concerning promises, equality, justice, and the taking of human life.[45] This conflict has led to a tension between the particular moral convictions concerning these values, and the more general conviction that acts ought to be evaluated in terms of their consequences. There has been a widespread effort to resolve this dilemma, with the aid of a distinction between choices among particular acts, on the one hand, and choices among rules, on the other. According to this approach, particular acts are to be judged in terms of the moral rules that apply to them (such as the rule concerning promises), while choices among rules themselves are to be judged in terms of the utility (happiness, etc.) expected from having one rule or another. The type of ethical system that makes this distinction has been referred to as "rule-utilitarianism," in distinction to the more nearly Benthamite version, judging each individual act in terms of its expected consequences, which is known as "act-utilitarianism."[46] The comparison of these two types of

---

[40] See J. de V. Graaff, *Theoretical Welfare Economics* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 8 ff.

[41] Richard B. Brandt, "Personal Values and the Justification of Institutions," in Sidney Hook (ed.), *Human Values and Economic Policy* (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 27. An earlier critique is that of Joseph Cropsey, "What Is Welfare Economics?," *Ethics,* 55 (January 1955), 116–125.

[42] See Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller (eds.), *Planning Programming Budgeting: A Systems Approach to Management* (Chicago: Markham, 1968); Lionel Robbins, *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (London: Macmillan, 1937), p. 141.

[43] U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Toward a Social Report* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969).

[44] See Peter J. Henriot, "Political Questions About Social Indicators," *Western Political Quarterly,* 23 (June 1970), 235–255.

[45] These arguments are summarized, for example, in David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 212–213.

[46] See John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," *Philosophical Review,* 44 (January 1955). A critique of rule-utilitarianism is given in Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Utilitarian Ethics and Social Change," *Ethics,* 78 (April 1968), 188–198, with additional references.

5-9428
72-4398

utilitarianism may well also be carried out according to our proposed rules.

VII. "Relational" Ethical Systems

I use the term "relational" to refer to certain ethical systems that may be contrasted with the "individualistic" ones just discussed. These systems find their values in *relations* between individuals, such as those indicated by the terms "equality," "freedom," "democracy," and "tyranny"; to apply them to particular choices we must consider relations between individuals rather than individuals separately.

The "relational" ethics we shall consider here are ones that have been formulated so as to be most nearly amenable to the meta-ethical rules I have proposed. The examples, however, neglect a major tradition of political philosophy, whose existence provides an important legitimation for valuative discourse in political science. It is to be hoped that the ethical positions of major political philosophers can be compared with other systems under our rules, either as the authors themselves stated their views or as they have been interpreted by others.

The first set of "relational" ethical systems we shall consider were presented by Dahl in *A Preface to Democratic Theory*.[47] In this volume he presented systematic versions of justifications for various aspects of democracy. The central terms in these justifications are sometimes individualistic and sometimes relational. For "Madisonian democracy," the central term is "tyranny,"[48] and for "populistic democracy" it is "equality"[49]—both relational terms. In either case, we are led to the analysis—difficult for any ethical system—of what governmental institutions are most likely to bring about the desired good or avoid the corresponding disvalue. Arguments about majorities and about voting enter; but we need only point out that these arguments lead in a different direction if they center about relational values from that which they would take if centered about individualistic values. But in fact, in Dahl's discussion they are mixed, for "populistic democracy" deals with preferences as well as with equality;[50] the condition of equality provides a basis for interpersonal comparison, and converts a system otherwise resembling welfare economics without this feature into a more nearly determinate one. Another step in this direction is taken later when Dahl examines the implications of considering preferences that differ in "intensity"—a possibility that also leads toward a cardinal and Benthamite ethics. Again the problems of converting general ethical systems into evaluations of particular political institutions are formidable, but they are not our concern here. Rather, I wish to stress the particularly relational values introduced by Dahl, but at the same time his efforts to reconcile and relate them to more nearly individualistic criteria. This debate, again, might be conducted according to the rules I have proposed, and might confront political with economic ethics.

A second relational ethical system is that proposed by Bay in *The Structure of Freedom*.[51] In this volume he proposes three definitions of aspects of an individual's freedom: (a) degree of harmony between basic motives and overt behavior; (b) the relative absence of perceived external restraints on individual behavior; and (c) the relative absence of unperceived external restraints on individual behavior.[52] To be discussed according to our rules, these three values would have to be reconciled with one another; but our present purpose is to illustrate the types of central values that have been proposed in ethical systems. The first of Bay's three values is akin to certain values that have been proposed by psychologists, and relates primarily to personality structure. The second and third are more relational; to assess their attainment requires examination of the constraints placed on individuals by one another.

A third ethical system of this type has been proposed by Gerwirth.[53] On the basis of a logical argument—a meta-ethics different from the one I propose—he puts forward the "Principle of Categorial Consistency [PCC]: Apply to your recipient the same categorial rules of action that you apply to yourself." More specifically, "(1) In acting toward a recipient do not coerce him, that is, do not make him participate in the interaction with you against his will, or involuntarily, or against his consent. (2) In acting toward a recipient do not frustrate his purposes, that is, do not diminish or remove something that seems to him to be some good of his."[54]

These rules, like Bay's three definitions, need to be reconciled with one another; moreover, they are phrased in absolute terms rather than as matters of degree, so that in particular situations there might be no alternative acts, or several, that satisfied such principles. But as Gewirth later elaborates them, they have the character of an ethics of maximization:

---

[47] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[51] Christian Bay, *The Structure of Freedom* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958).

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 88, 95.

[53] Alan Gewirth, "Categorial Consistency in Ethics," *Philosophical Quarterly*, 17 (October 1967), 289–299.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 292.

> The PCC puts a premium on freedom and on mutual accommodation of wants or purposes; these have an obvious application in the socio-political sphere as the principles of consent and of common good or public interest.[55]

In addition, he interprets his ethic in a spirit akin to rule-utilitarianism:

> [A]ny particular act must be in accord with the PCC unless the act is in accord with a specific rule which itself is in accord with the PCC.[56]

Thus we see in outline another ethical criterion, more relational than individualistic in its concern with equality and consent, emphasizing freedom but less concerned with intrapsychic freedom than Bay's ethic.

The type of comparative argument that I am proposing, between "ethical hypotheses" such as those sketched, could be expected to have several advantages. It would be based, in the first place, on moral convictions shared by persons in various disciplines rather than on the narrower framework of any one discipline. It might lead to greater consensus through the reconciliation of differences among ethical systems; but failing this, it would at least clarify these differences. Even in this event, the sharpening of differences might be greatest only for hypothetical conflict-situations; the examination of actual or expected choices might reveal that, for societies as we know or anticipate them, various types of maximization ethics may lead to similar designations of right acts or best policies.

VII. Ethical Theories and Policy Analysis

We have dealt with some of the foundations of policy analysis, not with policy analysis itself. To make recommendations on particular policies one must consider specific facts as well as valuations, and perhaps assume a more responsible and less academic role. He must, in other words, traverse Price's "spectrum from truth to power." Along this spectrum there may be different organizations, languages, and skills.[57] But the academic end of the spectrum, concerned with "truth," must include a concern with ethical or valuative questions. Such a concern is necessary even if it does not lead to the same degree of disciplinary consensus that is possible in assertions about facts.

I thus propose that another vital element be included in the discourse of policy analysis: the systematic relation of policies to general ethical theories. These ethical theories themselves will be tested and criticized in a particular sort of regulated communication.

This element is not entirely new in policy analysis, since political theorists throughout history have been concerned with policy decisions. The study of political philosophy has always conduced to a broad perspective on contemporary problems, by directing attention to major valuative issues. It has not, however, always been related to research directed at aiding policy choices, and the desiderata of earlier political ethics seem not to have been so precisely and uniquely stated as to conform to the metaethical rules I advocate. Whether this is an advantage may be debated. Many elements in the Western tradition of political thought run counter to my proposals—from Aristotle's admonition not to try to specify ethical terms too precisely, to the tradition of rights that are considered to be plural absolutes. My argument has derived more from the values of science than from that tradition; but it is aimed, of course, at remedying a major defect of past approaches based on science.

Regardless of which of these alternatives is taken for the promotion of rational ethical discourse—the formalization of "ethical hypotheses" or the careful study of the work of major political philosophers—some of the same advantages for policy debate will be realized. The disparate goals and values sought in particular policy studies will be linked together, and those who study public policy will acquire special competence in analyzing these interrelations. This discourse may also aid the cooperation among academic disciplines that is necessary for intelligent policy advice on major questions. With this stimulation the universities may become more nearly inner-directed in their work on policy matters, rather than simply hired servants of power or passive observers of policy formation.

---

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 297.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

[57] See Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Social Science and the Sources of Policy," *P.S.*, (Summer 1970), 394–309.

Theories in Search of a Curve: A Contextual Interpretation of Left Vote*

ADAM PRZEWORSKI AND GLAUCIO A. D. SOARES
Washington University, St. Louis

Electoral behavior in general and Communist voting in particular have been subject to extensive theoretical and statistical analyses.[1] But while most studies of electoral behavior have dealt with the nature of variables that relate to voting behavior, few have addressed themselves to the questions of the *form* of relationships between these variables and the vote. In general, these studies implicitly accepted the assumption that the relationships are additive and thus linear.

A major break in this tradition was made by the study of Soares and Hamblin of the 1952 vote for Allende in Chile.[2] In this study, the authors discovered that a multiplicative regression equation better predicts the observed distribution than does a linear equation. This finding was theoretically interpreted on the basis of a psychophysiological theory. The reasoning of the authors was the following: (1) the vote for Allende in 1952 was aggressive behavior; (2) aggression is an involuntary response to alienation; (3) involuntary responses grow exponentially as the strength of the stimuli increases (Stevens' law); therefore, (4) the vote for Allende should be an exponential function of socio-economic alienation.

This theory fits the data well, explaining 85 percent of variance. The authors in their comments strongly emphasized the importance of the proper form of the function used for explanation. They said:

> Finding the variables which affect the outcome of an election is, of course, an important theoretical problem but so is the discovery of how the effects combine. Suppose that Galileo had erred. In his famous law of falling bodies, instead of $D = AT^2$, suppose he had concluded $D = A + T^2$. In the latter case, even though all of the correct variables have been present . . . the theory would have been grossly inaccurate, the error variance would have been very large.[3]

---

* This article could not have been written without the help of our colleague John D. Sprague whose scrutinizing eye and technical skills prevented us from several blunders. His criticisms of several drafts and his continued encouragement were essential for our work and while only we are responsible for what follows, he is responsible for the very fact that this article was completed. We are indebted to Professor Raymond Boudon of the Sorbonne for the initial discussions of this topic.

[1] The study of Communist voting can be formulated at two levels of analysis of which only one will be of concern here. Several studies have examined the determinants of the aggregate strength of the Communist movement under different socio-economic conditions. Communist strength has been said to depend upon the degree of industrialization, upon legitimacy and efficiency of a government, degree of massification of a society, extent of anti-industrial sentiments prevailing among the population, and the gap between economic and social development. It has been frequently suggested that the strength of the Communist movement is curvilinearily related to the socio-economic factors. Soares hypothesized that historically and cross-nationally this relationship may well fit a second degree curve. Ulam has observed that the reactions to industrial society which generate support for radical movements take place during the early stages of industrialization. Kornhauser pointed out that the discontinuities emerging during the early stages of industrialization favor mass politics, Communism included. Recently, two studies have reached the conclusion that the relationship between economic development and Communism is curvilinear. Using cross-national data, the authors of these studies observed that the highest degree of Communist support occurs at the intermediate stages of economic development. Although these two studies do not agree as to exactly when the peak is likely to occur, they share the view that in both highly industrial and highly traditional societies Communist strength is low. However, our concern is strictly limited to the explanation of the *voting behavior of individuals under given socio-economic conditions*. We are *not* concerned here with the explanation of the aggregate strength of the Communist movement under changing conditions. See G. A. D. Soares, "Desenvolvimento Economico e Radicalismo Politico: O teste de uma hipotese (Chile)," *America Latina*, 5 (1962); Adam Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1960); William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960); R. M. Marsh and W. L. Paris "Modernization and Communism: A Retest of Lipset's Hypotheses," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965); R. W. Benjamin and J. H. Kautsky, "Communism and Economic Development," this REVIEW, 62 (1968).

[2] Glaucio Soares and Robert L. Hamblin, "Socio-Economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952," this REVIEW, 61 (1967). A new study by W. D. Burnham and J. D. Sprague follows the general problems raised by Soares and Hamblin and discusses in general terms the relative merits of the linear and power functions. W. D. Burnham and J. D. Sprague, "Additive and Multiplicative Models of the Voting Universe: The Case of Pennsylvania, 1960–68," this REVIEW, 64 (1970). Voting models based on interaction were developed earlier by Raymond Boudon, *L'Analyse Mathématique de Faits Sociaux*, (Paris: Plon, 1967), pp. 183–196, and by J. S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1964), Chapter 11, section 5.

[3] Soares and Hamblin, *op. cit.*, p. 1064.

This is the concern underlying this paper. Although the questions of substance—finding the variables which are relevant—cannot be divorced from the problems of form, we shall focus here on the formal aspects of theories of voting. We shall show in particular that a formal statement of a theory is necessary if a choice is to be made among competing theories and that the results of testing are highly dependent upon the ranges of the dependent and the independent variables. This paper is predicated on the belief that curve fitting is an inconclusive and often misleading procedure of formulation of general theories. Explicit and formal theories putting equal emphasis on the form as on substance are necessary for the derivation of general statements concerning voting behavior.

Since political science suffers a dearth of formal theories, the results of Soares and Hamblin should leave us jubilant. But, as we know, identical conclusions can be derived from different assumptions and, even worse, true sentences can be derived from premises that are false. Thus the fact that predictions derived from a particular theory fit well the observed distribution is not the *sole* criterion for evaluating the overall credibility of this theory. Other theories may still provide equally good or even better predictions. In this situation, the overall value of a theory must be evaluated on the bases of other criteria, such as comprehensiveness and generality, parsimony, deductive power, and particularly, its consonance with other things we know about reality.[4]

The Lockean assumptions of democratic theory are clearly at variance with what we know about political behavior.[5] However, the view that voting is not a fully voluntary and autonomous act of an individual is not married to the "conditioned stimulus-non-voluntary response" law. There are mechanisms which introduce determinism into individual behavior other than psychophysiological reactions. Particularly interesting are those influences which originate from the context of social interaction.

The curvilinear finding of Soares and Hamblin is based on the statistical concept of interaction among variables. The authors treat several variables as indicators of alienation and traditionalism, and they find that the effects of these variables combine interactively in producing the effect on left voting.

Our main hypothesis is formulated in terms of interaction among *individuals* and the effects of interaction on the vote. In particular, the central subject of our study is the propensity of an individual to vote for a party of the left given the social context of his interactions.[6] We are thus interested in the conditional probability that an individual belonging to a certain group behaves in a certain way given the general state of his social environment. What we should like to propose is an alternative explanation of the curvilinear form of the theories of voting. We are not arguing at this stage that the theories proposed below are better in terms of the criteria listed above than the approach of Soares and Hamblin. We merely intend to show a diametrically different theoretical possibility for interpreting this finding. However, since the issue is undoubtedly more general than the 1952 elections in Chile, we will treat both the theoretical discussions and the examples more broadly.

I. Class-Consciousness

The contextual theories which will be discussed below take as the crucial independent variable the behavior of a particular group in the population of an electoral district. These theories apply to any group which has some objective basis for subjective self-identification and which is socially somewhat isolated from other groups. Thus, such a group can consist of inhabitants of a certain region (Madrases in India), persons of common ethnic origins (French Canadians), peasants, ethnic groups in American cities, or "small shopkeepers and artisans." Clearly, the basis for self-identification is not the same in all these examples. Most importantly, some of these bases are of a functional nature and some are of a cultural nature. Groups in which members identify themselves on functional bases will be termed "classes" (in Marxist, not stratificational terms[7]). We will denote the group under consideration in a particular investigation as X, and the ratio of members of group X to the entire adult population of a particular electoral district i as X_i.

---

[4] For a discussion of some criteria for evaluating theories see C. G. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science* (New York: Free Press, 1965); see particularly the title essay.

[5] An excellent discussion of the invalidity of the Lockean assumptions is contained in E. H. Carr, *The New Society* (London: Macmillan, 1951).

[6] The literature on what is variously called "structural," "compositional," or "contextual" effects is quite extensive and growing rapidly, but we cannot review it here. For general statements of the problems of contextual influences see P. L. Kendal and B. F. Lazersfeld (eds.), *Studies in Scope and Method of the 'American Soldier'* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955); P. M. Blau, "Formal Organizations: Dimensions of Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, 58 (1957); and Raymond Boudon, "Prioprietés individuelles et prioprietés collectives," *Revue française de sociologie*, 4 (1963). Techniques for identification of contextual effects have been developed by J. A. Davis *et al.*, "Technique for Analyzing the Effects of Group Composition," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), and were further discussed and modified by A. S. Tannenbaum and J. G. Bachman, "Structural versus Individual Effects," *American Journal of Sociology*, 69 (1964), and by Papani Valkonen, "Individual Effects in Ecological Research," in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969). Several other articles in this volume also discuss the problem from a theoretical perspective, particularly the articles by Erik Allardt and by Erwin Scheuch. Applications of contextual formulations to the study of political behavior can be found in P. H. Ennis, "The Contextual Dimension in Voting," in W. N. McPhee and W. A. Glaser, (eds.) *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections*, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962) and in R. D. Putnam, "Political Attitudes and the Local Community," this REVIEW, 60 (1966). This list is incomplete and concerns only the texts which treat the problem from the theoretical rather than from the data analysis point of view. Several additional discussions of contextual effects can also be found in the literature concerning the problem of "ecological inferences."

This focus on the behavior of particular groups is motivated by the observation that in most political systems parties appeal to some groups more than to others. We refer to such parties as "class parties," "ethnic parties," "regional parties," or sometimes "protest parties." Let Y be the symbol for the party which directs its appeal mainly and nearly exclusively to members of group X. Then Y_i will represent the ratio of votes for party Y to all votes cast in a district i.[8]

The most general assumption made here limits the scope of the contextual theories to such situations in which the rate with which the *members of group X give support to party Y* is importantly different from the rate with which other persons, 1-X, support this party. In other words, we assume that if party Y indeed appeals to and represents the interests of persons who are X, we can expect that these persons will vote for party Y with a higher propensity than members of other groups. We will first discuss some theories based exclusively on the behavior of persons X and then analyze some consequences of the behavior of members of other groups.

While this conceptualization is sufficiently general to encompass all groups which satisfy the condition of self-identification and isolation, we will think from now on of X as industrial workers and Y as the party of the left. In Marxist terms, one can say that voting for the left party represents class-based behavior of the members of the working class. From the point of view of this tradition, we are concerned here with a set of persons who share their objectively defined social situation and thus constitute a class as an aggregate or a "class-in-itself." To the extent to which members of this class support "their" party, this class is a group or a "class-in-itself." Since Marxism contains a theory of the *transformation* of a class from an aggregate to a group or, in other words, a theory of acquisition of "class-consciousness," we will rely on this body of theory in the subsequent discussion. Thus, while our conceptualization is general, the theory proposed below is specific to the working class.

In the most frequently studied case, it is assumed that interaction with others has no effect on the rate with which a member of the working class votes for the left party. Social context has no effect on class-consciousness. The rate at which workers vote for the left party is the same across all districts and independent of the interactions taking place within them. As a result, the total vote for the left party is predicted to increase as a linear function of the proportion of workers in a given district. This model can be represented by the following three equations:[9]

1.1 Class-consciousness of $X = Y' = p$,

1.2. Total vote for $Y = Y = a + pX$,

where a is the vote for party Y in a district in which no members of X are present,

1.3. Extent of class voting $= Y_x/X = p$.

This model is most familiar to students of voting behavior and it has been shown in several instances to give a good prediction of the vote.[10] However, the test to which this model is subjected—correlation significantly different from zero—is so weak that it is easily passed by many competing theories. We will, therefore, propose some models based on alternative assumptions concerning interaction and its effects on class-consciousness.

---

[7] According to Dahrendorf, the main difference between the stratificational and the Marxist concept of class is that the first approach treats classes as characteristics of continuous distributions while the latter views them in nominal terms. We follow here the second usage of this concept. See Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959).

[8] Note that one of the simplifying assumptions of this theory is that there is only one party which appeals to the particular group. This theory will not explain the distribution of working class vote among the reformist Socialist, traditional Communist, and revolutionary left wing parties.

[9] A mathematically minded reader will recognize Y′ as the first derivative of Y with regard to X.

[10] G. A. D. Soares, "Desarrollo Economico y Radicalismo Politico," in J. A. Kahl (ed.), *La Industrialización en America Latina* (Mexico, D.F., 1965).

However, before we proceed to the discussion of the contextual models a few comments must be made concerning the interpretation of the concept of "class-consciousness." In the linear model the rate of change of the left vote is equal to the proportion of workers who vote for the left party. As the proportion of workers grows by a certain amount, the proportion of the left vote contributed by the workers grows by p times this amount. And for any proportion of workers in the population, X, a constant proportion of the workers, p, votes for the left party. However, this will not always be true.

If we assume that interaction takes place with some significant effects, the rate of change of the left vote among workers will not equal the proportion of workers who vote left. Thus, there are at least two ways in which the concept of class-consciousness can be interpreted. Intuitively, it seems that class-consciousness, as the term is used, connotes the extent to which the workers vote for the working class party, or more exactly, the proportion of the workers who vote for this party. But this kind of an interpretation does not convey two essential features of Marx's theory. First, this interpretation would imply that consciousness of a class is simply an aggregate of consciousness of individuals. Some individuals are class-conscious—they vote for the party of their class—and the class is conscious of itself to the extent to which individuals who are conscious frequently occur within this class. This seems to be a Lockean rather than a Marxian vision of group characteristics. For Marx the consciousness of an individual is determined by the consciousness of his class, not vice versa. Secondly, since Marx's theory is thoroughly dynamic, it seems more appropriate to treat class consciousness as a nascent concept rather than as a characteristic of a state.[11] A class has a high level of consciousness when it is capable of generating class-conscious behavior among newly available members. If many workers vote left but the increases in the proportion of workers result in decreased left vote, then the working class is not class-conscious. Thus, we choose to treat class-consciousness as the rate of change of the left vote among workers when new workers appear:

$$\text{class consciousness} = \frac{\text{change of left vote}}{\text{change of proportion of workers}} = Y'.$$

It should be emphasized that "class-consciousness" is a theoretical construct and cannot be directly observed. Only the proportion of workers (X) and the proportion of the left vote (Y) are directly observable. Class-consciousness is inferred on the basis of the particular sets of assumptions and the rules of differential calculus. Thus defined, class-consciousness is an attribute of a *class*, not of individuals within it. But the consciousness of a class by definition affects the behavior of the individuals and in the following text we will sometimes refer to individuals as being "class-conscious" or behaving in a "class-conscious manner." In this case we mean no more than the fact that an individual who is a member of X voted for Y or an individual who is not an X voted for a party other than Y.

The proportion of the working class which votes left is also theoretically interesting, since it indicates the implications of different processes through which class-consciousness can be acquired. This proportion which, following Alford, we will call the "extent of class voting," will be defined as

$$\text{extent of class voting of individuals} = \frac{\text{left vote contributed by workers}}{\text{proportion of workers}} = Y_x/X.$$

While "class-consciousness" is an attribute of a class, the "extent of class-voting" is an aggregate of individual behaviors. Class voting is a measure of the frequency with which individuals who belong to a class behave as members of this class (in a "class-conscious" manner). Class voting depends obviously upon class-consciousness and the distribution of X. It is, therefore, not a construct but an observable parameter.[12]

II. Contextual Interpretations of the Left Vote: Behavior of Workers

People do not live alone, isolated from their peers. They interact and communicate. This interaction modifies individual predispositions and results in changes in behavior. This is particularly true when a group has an objective basis for self-identification and when the interests of this group are contrary to the interests of other groups in a society.

---

[11] This discussion of the concept of "class-consciousness" should not be treated as an attempt to find "what Marx really meant." Arguments about correct interpretation can rarely be solved, even after a careful analysis of the content. The definition introduced here is greatly arbitrary, although we hope that it is consonant with Marx's methodology.

[12] Among empirical analyses of class voting see R. R. Alford, "Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems," and several other articles in S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkhan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives,* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

Since membership in group X represents the objectively given social situation of an individual and since behaving in a way Y indicates his consciousness of being a member of group X, a theory relating these two variables concerns the conditions under which classes acquire consciousness. According to Marx, two processes are crucial for this change: (1) political organization of a class by the leadership, (2) development of communication among the members of a class. It is crucial that the behavior of the members of a class depends upon the *relative size* of this class in the population. The behavior of an individual is not the same when he is one of a few members of a group and when this group constitutes a large portion of the population. Actually, some Finnish data indicate that the rate with which the Swedes vote for the Swedish People's Party in the Finnish communes is a function of the percentage of the Swedes in the commune.[13]

In particular, one of Marx's predictions is that the consciousness of the workers will increase as their relative number in the population increases. This part of Marx's argument is not based directly on the observation of the importance of interaction among the workers but is derived indirectly from the auxiliary theory stating that as industrialization proceeds, the relative misery of the workers increases, and this misery enhances class-consciousness. However, the notion that increased numbers give the workers a feeling of political strength and eventually lead to political organization and political communication among the working class is a cornerstone of Marx's argument.

This simple assumption, stating that the increase in the proportion of workers in the population results in the increase of their class-consciousness, implies that class-consciousness is no longer a constant as in model 1, but that now it equals

$$Y' = 2pX,$$

where 2p measures the effect of interaction on class-consciousness. This assumption is formalized in terms of 2p rather than p merely for the sake of convenience and does not affect the theoretical argument. If class-consciousness grows as a linear function of the proportion of workers, then the total vote for the left party increases as a quadratic function of X. This model can again be represented by three equations:

2.1. Class-consciousness of $X = Y' = 2pX$

2.2. Total vote for $Y = Y = pX^2 + a$.

2.3. Extent of class voting $= Y_x/X = pX$.

Equation 2.2. partitions the total vote for Y into two components.[14] The intercept, a, indicates the proportion of the vote for Y contributed by persons other than workers. It is assumed that this proportion does not depend upon the proportion of workers and that nonworkers do not interact with workers (or that interaction has no effect). The term pX^2 represents the vote for Y due to the interaction among workers. Since X represents the proportion of workers, it can be interpreted as a probability that a randomly drawn person is a worker. Then $(X)(X) = X^2$ shows the probability of two workers meeting each other under the assumption of random mixing. Coefficient p can then be interpreted as the probability that an encounter between two workers will result in an additional vote for the left party.

However, the size of the working class in itself is less important as a determinant of class-consciousness than the proportion of the persons who already vote left. If contextual effects arise out of interaction, it is insufficient to observe that class-consciousness changes as the proportion of workers changes—that every meeting between two workers results in a certain number of votes for Y. Changes in class-consciousness take place not as a result of an encounter between any two workers but as a result of an encounter between two persons of whom one is a left voter and one is not. Thus, the effect of interaction on class-consciousness is a function of the proportion of the population already voting left (Y) rather than a direct function of the proportion of the working class (X). However, *changes in the effect of interaction on class-consciousness occur as the proportion of working class increases.* Thus, they are relative to changes in X.

In general, social context can influence political behavior in at least two ways. In one case, class-consciousness depends upon the concentration of workers, X. In the other case, class-

---

[13] Erik Allardt and Pertti Pesonnen, "Cleavages in Finnish Politics," in Stein Rokkan and S. M. Lipset, *op. cit.*

[14] Actually a part of class consciousness may be independent of the social context: it may be a result of internalization of norms. The we would have

$$Y' = 2pX + b,$$

where b represents the strength of the "core" component of consciousness, and

$$Y = pX^2 + bX + a$$

This is the general form of the model.

consciousness depends upon the concentration of left voters in general, Y, or left-voting workers is particular, Y_x. Left vote changes in both cases as the concentration of workers changes. The amount of the change of left vote depends upon the amount of change in the concentration of workers (dX). But in the first case the change of left vote depends additionally upon the *proportion of workers* at the point when change occurs. In the second case, the change of left vote depends upon the *political conditions* at the moment when the concentration of workers changes. This second class of models seems particularly apt for the less deterministic versions of Marxist theory—those versions which recognize that the long-term objective conditions (X) define the political situation, but the direction and magnitude of political change (Y′) depend upon the political situation of the moment (Y).[15]

What we need to identify in order to construct a model based on the above assumption is the effect of an encounter between a Y and a non-Y on class consciousness *as X changes.* Equivalently, we can pose the problem as one of identifying the probability of an encounter between a Y and a non-Y resulting in an additional vote for Y as X changes. Since these notions are quite complex, we must make the mathematical apparatus more explicit than we have thus far. We are discussing the impact of Y on the change in Y, relative to change in X, or

$$Y' = \frac{dY}{dX} = f'(Y),$$

where Y is not yet a known function of X.

It should be emphasized that this is a different assumption from the one made above in model 2, where we assumed that

$$Y' = \frac{dY}{dX} = f'(X),$$

and $f(X)$ is a known function, pX^2.

Let us simply assume, as we have done in model 2, that the effect of Y grows as Y grows:

$$Y' = \frac{dY}{dX} = pY.$$

Since the only function which satisfies this assumption is $Y = ae^{px}$, this model can be represented by the following equations:

3.1. Class-consciousness $= Y' = pae^{pX}$,

3.2. Total vote for $Y = Y = ae^{pX}$.

3.3. Extent of class voting $= \left(\frac{1}{X}\right)a(e^{pX} - 1)$.[16]

The probability of conversion upon encounter equals pa. Since $Y = a$ when $X = 0$, a is the intercept of the function 3.2, and it represents the contribution of non-workers to the total vote for party Y. We are assuming here that this contribution does not vary from district to district and, most importantly, it does not depend upon the proportion of workers. In other words, this model assumes that a certain part of non-workers vote for the party of the left but that, in general, the non-workers, whether they are voters for Y or not, do not interact with workers and if they interact with each other, this interaction has no effect on their propensity to vote for Y. [17] It should be noted that formally this prediction of the vote for Y may yield results similar to the Soares and Hamblin model.

However, it seems too strong to assume that the change in the effect of context on class-consciousness is an increasing function in the entire range of the variable. This argument can be presented in a twofold manner. First, leaders will be less motivated to compete for the political support of the members of a class once they have the votes necessary to exert political influence. The exact proportion of the electorate necessary for this purpose will vary from system to system and from situation to situation, at times reaching high values. However, at some point the returns for the activities of the leadership in a particular district will become diminishing. At this point the leaders of the party will either scale down their exhortations or re-allocate their efforts to a different district. Secondly, the effectiveness of the interaction between the left voters and the persons recruitable to left voting will diminish as the proportion of the left voters increases, because it will be more likely that a random encounter will put face to face a pair of persons who are already voting for Y and thus no additional persons will become converted. These conditions of the contextual theory are similar to the models of epidemic diffusion.[18]

---

[15] See in particular Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince* (New York: International Publishers, 1957); and *Il Materialismo Storico e La Filosofia Di Benedetto Croce,* (Torino: Einaudi, 1949).

[16] Since $Y_x = Y -$ (Contribution of non-workers) $= ae^{px} - ae^{po} = a\ (e^{px} - 1)$.

[17] However, note that even this simple model has one non-intuitive consequence. Class-consciousness depends upon a, the extent to which others vote for the left party when no workers are present. This model implies that, with p given, the effectiveness of interaction is higher in a congenial atmosphere in which non-workers tend to vote for the left party. This consequence is contrary to the situations contained in the Marxist model discussed below.

If we add the assumption of decreasing effects of interaction to model 3, the changes in left voting will depend not only upon the proportion already voting for Y, but also upon the proportion of not yet voting left and the limit to the vote for Y. These assumptions can be formally represented in several ways and since different formal representations have substantive meaning it is important to discuss their implications.

Let us first assume that for reasons to be discussed later a certain part of the working class will never vote for the left party. Even in a population composed exclusively of workers, some members of group X will not vote for party Y. This assumption introduces the limit of left vote, c, which is reached technically as X approaches infinity.[19]

Under this assumption, the population of a given district can be partitioned into those who already vote for Y and those who do not. Then, under the assumption of random mixing, the probability of an encounter between a left voter and a person not voting left but potentially recruitable is given by Y(c-Y). But again not all of the encounters will be effective in recruiting additional voters. Let the probability of conversion upon encounter be p/c: the lower the available pool of recruits, the more effective the encounters. Then, the probability of recruiting an additional voter will be given by

$$4.1. \qquad Y' = \frac{p}{c} Y(c - Y).$$

In order to determine what prediction concerning the total vote is implied by this assumption, we must find a function which satisfies the above equality. This function is given by[20]

$$4.2. \quad Y = \frac{c}{1 + ae^{-pX}}, \qquad a, c, p > 0.$$

Graphical analysis may be helpful in understanding the model. When the proportion of workers grows from zero, class-consciousness changes at an accelerating pace originating at zero and reaching cp/4 when X = ln a/(p). After this point the effect of increases in the proportion of workers on class-consciousness diminishes, finally dropping to zero.



Figure 1

When no workers are present in a given district the left vote is contributed by others and its amount is given by c/(1+a). When workers appear, the "logistic" curve generated by function 4.1. (a) grows relatively slowly in the ini-



Figure 2

---

[18] See D. J. Bartholomew, *Stochastic Models for Social Processes* (New York: Wiley, 1967), Chapter 8.

[19] This interpretation of c makes it theoretically awkward. Clearly, values of $c > 1.00$ must be rejected on a priori grounds. But also rejected should be those models which do not exhibit limiting behavior in the $0 < X < 1$ interval. In such cases the exponential rather than the logistic model is appropriate.

[20] It must be noted that the p which appears in the models in which class-consciousness, Y!, depends upon Y cannot be interpreted as a probability in its original form. This is due to the fact that we are operating on proportions rather than on the absolute numbers. Strictly speaking we should have written,

$$\frac{1}{100} Y' = \frac{p}{c} Y(c - Y),$$

and

$$Y' = \frac{100p}{c} Y(c - Y).$$

Thus, if p is to be interpreted as a probability its value must be 100 times lower than the estimated value of this parameter.

The mathematical treatment of the logistic function is based on Tadeusz Czechowski, *Rachunek rozniczkowy i calkowy*, (PWN, Waraszawa, 1966). The solution of the equation 4.1. in terms of 4.2. is given by R. G. D. Allen, *Mathematical Analysis for Economists* (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 419, example 3.

tial segment of the values of X, (b) grows at a faster pace in the middle range of X, and (c) levels off in the final segment.

If we think again of the vote of non-workers as constant, then their contribution will be given by the value of the intercept. Under this interpretation, the extent of class voting of the workers is given by

$$4.3. \quad Y_x/X = \frac{1}{X}\,\frac{ca(1 - e^{-pX})}{(1 + a)(1 + ae^{-pX})}\,.$$

These three elementary models illustrate some of the theoretical concerns which can be studied on the hypothesis that social context in different ways influences individual behavior. The above models are based on the common assumption that interaction takes place as the social context changes, but they distinguish between changes in left voting dependent upon the distribution of group membership and the distribution of political behavior.

III. Behavior of "Others" and Its Consequences

So far we have been concerned exclusively with the behavior of workers and the effects of interaction among them on the total vote for the left party. Even in the models based on interaction between voters for Y and those who do not vote for Y, we have assumed that only the workers interact and that the contribution of nonworkers to the vote for the left party is constant. Below we will suggest some models involving the behavior of persons other than workers.

In the linear case, when no contextual effects are operative, the vote for the left party can be simply represented as the sum of the proportion contributed by workers and by others:[21]

$$Y = p_x X + p_{1-x}(1 - X).$$

This model is identifiable since after regrouping we obtain

$$Y = X(p_x - p_{1-x}) + p_{1-x},$$

where P_{1-x} gives the intercept. It should be noted that now we are concerned with class-consciousness of two classes. Class-consciousness of the workers is represented by the rate of change of the left vote contributed by the workers. Let Y_x represent the part of the vote for the left party contributed by the workers. Then, Y'_x which in this case equals p_x indicates the class-consciousness of the workers. Class-consciousness of others is represented by the propensity with which they vote for parties other than Y, the party of the left. If Y_{1-x} represents the share of the vote for the left party contributed by non-workers, then $(1-Y'_{1-x})$ indicates the class-consciousness of non-workers. In other words, if Y'_{1-x} represents the propensity of non-workers to vote for the left party, then the complement of this propensity represents their class-consciousness.

The linear model can again be represented by the three equations:

5.1. Effect of the proportion of workers on the vote for $Y = Y' = p_x - p_{1-x},$

5.2. Total vote for $Y = Y = (p_x - p_{1-x})X + p_{1-x}.$

5.3. Extent of workers' class voting $= Y_x/X = px.$

Since now we have two groups which may be involved in interactions, it is possible for four types of encounters to take place:

(1) an encounter of a worker with a worker, (X) (X);

(2) an encounter of a worker with a non-worker, (X) (1-X);

(3) an encounter of a non-worker with a worker, (1-X) (X);

(4) an encounter between two non-workers, (1-X) (1-X).

If we assume random mixing, i.e., that the probability of an encounter between any two persons is equally likely, regardless whether one is a worker or not, then the probabilities of the specific kinds of encounters will be given by the respective products of the proportions of the workers and non-workers in the population of a given district. Thus, for example, the probability of an encounter between two workers in a district in which the proportion of the workers in the population equals X is given by X^2.

However, in order to determine the probability of a vote for the left party in a given district, it is not sufficient to specify the nature and the probabilities of interactions. It is also necessary to determine what happens upon an encounter of a given nature, i.e., what is the probability of an encounter between two given persons producing an additional vote for the left party. Since this probability is independent of the probability of an encounter, it follows that the total vote for Y will be a sum of products representing the probabilities of particular types of encounters and their effects for the vote for the left party. For example, if we assume that the only relevant type of interaction is the encounters between workers and non-workers and that every time such an encounter takes place the vote for Y will be increased by p, $0 \leqslant p \leqslant 1$, then the probability of a vote for Y will be given by

---

[21] This model is based on Boudon, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–184. Boudon's text, to which we have repeatedly referred here, is fascinating both in its theoretical richness and its treatment of logical conditions imposed on a theory. However, Boudon's method of developing the contextual models is based on direct substitution of a contextual hypothesis in place of the regression coefficient in a linear model. This method yields results identical to ours when the effect of context is made dependent upon X but cannot be used to treat hypotheses of dependence upon Y.

$$Y = pX(1 - X),$$

where X(1-X) is the probability of an encounter between an X and a non-X, and p is the probability of conversion to voting for Y upon encounter.

It is obvious, however, that the interactions need not be restricted to any of the above types at a particular point of time. It is likely that several kinds of interactions take place simultaneously. Even if we assume that there is no need to distinguish between interactions X(1-X) and (1-X)X, it will still be possible for six types of interactions to take place, two persons at a time:

(1) (X) (X),
(2) (X) (1-X),
(3) (1-X) (1-X)
(4) (X) (X) + (X) (1-X),
(5) (X) (1-X) + (1-X) (1-X),
(6) (X) (X) + X(1-X) + (1-X) (1-X).

In the preceding section we studied some of the interactions of type (1). In this section we shall focus on the interactions of types (2) and (4). Interactions of type (6) have been studied by Coleman.[22]

Even these six types do not exhaust, however, all of the possible types of interactions that may occur within a district. Societies are indeed complex. First, it is too restrictive to assume that all encounters take place between two persons. There may be other encounters, involving 3, 4, . . . ,N persons. They are obviously less likely but they may be more convincing. For example, let us assume that the rate of change of the left vote changes as a function of the encounters between workers and non-workers:

$$6.1. \qquad Y' = pX(1 - X).$$

In other words, every time two persons, of whom one is a worker and one is not, meet, the rate of change of the left vote changes by p. Then the total vote for Y will equal:

$$6.2. \quad Y = pX^2/2 - pX^3/3 = \frac{p}{6} X^2 + \frac{p}{3} X^2(1 - X).$$

In other words, the probability of a vote going to the left party is a sum of the probability of an encounter between two workers resulting in p/6 votes for Y, and the probability of an encounter among two workers and one non-worker resulting in p/3 votes for Y. Clearly, an encounter between two workers (X^2) is more likely than an encounter between two workers and a non-worker, $X^2(1-X)$, but the effect of the latter encounter on the vote for Y is greater. This model is worth noting, since it gives predictions formally very similar to model 4.

One further complication of the patterns of interactions is necessary. Thus far we have focused on the interactions among persons defined with regard to their class status. But interesting kinds of interactions take place, as we have seen previously, between those who are already prone to vote for the left party and those who are not yet prone to do so. The probability of an encounter of such a nature is, of course, Y(1-Y).

Since we are not concerned with the effects of interaction in general, but only in those interactions which affect the vote for the left party, we shall study below only two theories, chosen on the basis of their theoretical relevance to the explanation of left voting.

Two competitive theories will be developed based on different hypotheses concerning relations between classes. A theory based on orthodox Marxist assumptions would postulate that as the extent of class-consciousness increases among workers, class-consciousness will also increase among non-workers, leading to the polarization of the political system along class lines. According to model 2, class-consciousness of the workers grew as a linear function of the proportion of workers. Let us retain this assumption adding a new parameter, c. It should be remembered that, according to Marx, class-consciousness of the workers grows as a result of class-conflict, which in turn increases as the proportion of workers increases. Let us temporarily introduce a variable representing the intensity of class-conflict, C. Then, we can assume that the extent of class-conflict is a linear function of the proportion of workers:

$$C = cX,$$

where c is the rate of change of class-conflict as the proportion of workers increases.

In order to determine the behavior of non-workers, we must first ask what would be their class-consciousness in a district in which there are no workers. We will assume that if there are no workers in a given district, the left party will not be present. But we will still assume that some of the non-workers are prone to vote for the party of the left, had such a party competed in the elections. Thus the propensity of the non-workers to vote for the party of the left in a district with no workers is a hypothetical construct but not a vacuous one—there are some persons who would have voted for this party had it been present. For the sake of convenience we will express the propensity of non-workers to vote for the left party in a district in which there are no workers as a multiple of p. Then,

---

[22] J. S. Coleman, *op. cit.*, Chap. 16.

$$Y'_{1-X} = ap, \qquad \text{when } X = 0, \quad 0 \leq a \leq 1.$$

The parameter a indicates what is the state of class-consciousness of non-workers before workers are present in a given district. If a equals zero, none of the non-workers are prone to vote for the left party—they are already perfectly class-conscious. If a equals 1, then the non-workers totally lack class-consciousness, since they are prone to vote for the left party with the same rate as the workers in a district composed exclusively of workers.

Since class-consciousness of the non-workers increases as class-consciousness of workers increases, the non-workers become less prone to vote for the left party. Thus,

$$Y'_{1-X} = ap - aY'_x = ap - a(2pX + c).$$

The rate of change of the total vote for the left party equals, therefore.

$$7.1. \qquad Y' = Y'_x + Y'_{1-x} = 2pX(1-a) + c(1-a) + ap.$$

We can now determine the total vote for the left party under the assumptions that interaction among workers increases their class-consciousness, that the propensity of non-workers to vote for the left party decreases as class-consciousness of the workers increases, and that both of these processes are accelerated by the growth of class-conflict.

$$7.2. \qquad \begin{aligned} Y &= pX^2(1-a) + X[c(1-a) + ap] \\ &= pX^2 + apX(1-X) + c(1-a)X. \end{aligned}$$

where

pX_2 is the part of the vote for the left party resulting from the encounters between workers, effective with the probability p;

$apX(1-X)$ is the part of the vote resulting from the encounters between workers and non-workers, where the effectiveness of these encounters depends upon the original propensity of the non-workers to vote for the left party;

$c(1-a)X$ is the part of the vote resulting from the increase in the class-consciousness of the workers (X) due to class-conflict.

It seems particularly interesting to compare the results of this theory with the results of the theory in which the contribution of non-workers was treated as a constant and no class-conflict was present (model 2). Specifically, let us compare the vote for the left party in the districts composed exclusively of workers. When non-workers were not involved in interactions, then the proportion of workers voting for the left party equaled p, when $X = 1$. (Since $Y = pX^2$). But now the proportion of the workers voting for the left party equals $(p + c(1\text{-}a))$, when $X = 1$. The proportion of the left vote due to interaction among workers equals p, the proportion contributed by interactions between workers and non-workers equals zero (since there are no non-workers), but an additional proportion of the working class votes for the left party as the result of experiences stemming from the presence of class-conflict in the society. This proportion equals $c(1\text{-}a)$, where c is a rate of increase of class-conflict and a indicates how much resistance the workers encountered from the non-workers as the proportion of workers increased. Thus, this model seems to represent accurately Marx's theoretical hypotheses.[23]



Figure 3

---

[23] This model greatly oversimplifies Marx's theory. We are merely attempting to represent formally the situation concerning the influence of class conflict on class consciousness. However, the assumption that class conflict is linear on the proportion of workers represents at best a Marxist theory in its crudest formulations. Marxist theory of class consciousness is so complex that even a half-way attempt to formalize it would greatly exceed the limitations of space, not to speak of mathematics which we know.

A theory competing with the Marxist model constructed above would assume that as the extent of class voting increases among the working class, persons other than workers are *more* likely to vote for the working class party. Indeed, this is what actually seems to have happened in several countries. As the workers became more class-conscious, other persons began to vote for the growing party of the left.[24] These changes in the class composition of radical left parties increased their electoral strength and the chances of winning, thereby influencing the leadership and forcing them to take into consideration the views of non-workers. As a result, the working class parties broadened their appeal from narrowly based revolutionary to broadly based reformist movements. But as this change took place, it often happened that a wing of the left party or another political organization established itself independently, narrowing its appeal to workers and adopting a more purist revolutionary position. Thus while a part of the non-workers joined the left party, some of the workers left this party moving further left. As a result, the reformist left party established a heterogeneous social base and ceased to grow systematically in electoral strength. This cycle seems to have characterized several Communist parties in Latin America, and the birth of intransigent revolutionary organizations, such as the MIR.

The assumptions of the "reformist" theory can be represented formally in several ways. Model 6 discussed above represents these assumptions, since it states that the vote for the left party increases as the result of encounters between workers and non-workers, and particularly, that left vote arises from interaction among workers and from interaction between workers and non-workers. This model exhibits limiting behavior in the $O \leqslant V \leqslant 1$ interval, but this limiting behavior is due to the fact that the contribution of non-workers decreases as the proportion of workers increases. Thus this model does not represent the fact that the workers themselves are less likely to vote for the left party when non-workers vote for it.

The reformist theory assumes that the rate of change of the left vote among workers increases proportionately to the proportion of workers but decreases as non-workers vote for the left party. Formally, we assume that

$$Y'_x = 2pX - aY_{1-x},$$

where Y'_x represents the rate of change of left vote among workers,

- 2p indicates the importance of the interaction among workers for the rate of change of their vote,
- a shows the extent to which the rate of change of workers' vote for the left party decreases as the result of non-workers' vote for this party,

Y_{1-x} is the vote for the left party which is contributed by non-workers. Let us now assume that the non-workers' vote for the left party also changes proportionately to the proportion of workers:

$$Y'_{1-x} = bX.$$

Then the total vote of non-workers for the left party equals

$$Y_{1-x} = bX^2/2.$$

After substitution the rate of change of workers' vote can be defined as

$$Y'_x = 2pX - abX^2/2$$

The total rate of change of the left vote is given by

$$\begin{aligned} Y' &= Y'_x + Y'_{1-x} \\ &= 2pX - abX^2/2 + bX. \end{aligned}$$

Then, the total vote for the left party is the following function of the proportion of workers:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= pX^2 - abX^3/6 + bX^2/2 \\ &= pX^2 + \frac{bX^2}{2}(1 - aX/3). \end{aligned}$$

However, the behavior of this function in the interval $0 \leqslant X \leqslant 1$ does not correspond to the patterns which we are trying to reconstruct, since the rate of change of the left vote will begin to decrease only after $X > 1$—a value undefined in our theory. Clearly, the reason why this model yields unreasonable results is the assumption concerning the rate of change of the left vote among non-workers.

The reformist theory must be based on the assumption that the rate of change of the left vote among non-workers depends directly upon the proportion of the vote given to the left party, not upon the proportion of workers. While we should retain the assumption concerning the rate of change of the left vote among workers, the assumptions concerning the rate of change of the vote of non-workers must be formulated as

$$Y'_{1-x} = bY.$$

Thus, a theory predicting increasing heterogeneity of the social base of left parties and attempting to portray the gradual evolution of the left parties from narrowly based revolutionary to broadly based reformist movements must be based on the following assumptions:

---

[24] See, for example, Rokkan's data on class voting in Norway. Stein Rokkan, "Geography, Religion, and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics," in Lipset and Rokkan, *op. cit.*, pp. 430–431.

(1) the rate of change of the left vote among workers is proportional to the proportion of workers, and it depends negatively upon the proportion of the left vote contributed by the non-workers;

(2) the rate of change of the left vote among non-workers depends upon the proportion of the total vote given to the left party;

(3) when the left party achieves a certain degree of heterogeneity in its social base, it ceases to grow.

In other words, we are hypothesizing that workers vote for the left party as their proportion increases, that non-workers join the party which grows in electoral strength, and that workers leave the left party as its social base becomes heterogeneous.

These assumptions seem very simple. But their consequences are so complex that a formal treatment of this model would require an amount of space exceeding the limits of this paper. We will not provide an explicit solution to this model but merely sketch some aspects of the desired results.[25]

The consequences of the "reformist" theory can be best portrayed diagramatically. Figure 4 presents the left vote as the function of the proportion of workers. As we see, the left vote grows in the initial range of the independent variable. Subsequently, it decreases slightly and oscillates around a constant value. Actually, some oscillations will be present throughout the entire range of the independent variable. One of the desired results is that when Y reaches the stationary value, the ratio of the left vote contributed by workers to the vote contributed by non-workers reaches a constant and also remains at this value. Thus, when $Y = Y^*$,

$$Y_x/Y_{1-x} = I.$$

Particularly interesting is the value of X for which the proportion of workers voting for the left party is equal to the proportion of non-workers voting for this party:

$$Y_x/X = Y_{1-x}/(1-X).$$

When this tautology is true we reach the realm of "classless politics," "end of ideology," or whatever else one chooses to call it. For example, if the stationary value of the left vote equals .40, and the ratio of Y_x/Y_{1-x} equals 3, then the social base of the left party will become perfectly heterogeneous when $X = .75$. Figure 4a illustrates some data which behave in accordance with this model when studied with respect to time.



Figure 4

IV. Some Theoretical Implications of the Contextual Models

As we have seen above, the contextual models provide predictions concerning the total vote for the left party, the vote for this party among members of X, and the extent of class voting. However, these are not the only results of theoretical interest.

Let us first study a function Y* such that Y* is the value of Y when X = 1.00. This value shows what the vote for party Y would be if the voting population of a district was composed exclusively of workers. For most models it indicates, therefore, the maximal proportion of vote which can be obtained by the left party in a given political system. This function is of general interest and can be studied for several theories. If the value of Y* is lower than 1.00, it is clear that some factors other than class membership operate to impose restrictions on class-conscious behavior. This value indicates, therefore, the influence of cultural factors on the voting behavior of the working class. The meaning of Y* casts some light on the interpretation of "determinism" of Marxist theory.

It has been stated frequently that cultural factors, underestimated in Marx's theory, impose a limit on the class-consciousness of the workers. As Dogan shows, it is highly unlikely that an uneducated working class widow will ever vote for the French Communist Party—the influence of the Church mediated by the social environment makes this virtually impossible.[26] Several other cultural influences operate against behaving on a class basis, to cite the "deferential" origin of the working class conservatism in Great Britain[27] or caste identification in India. The discovery of the fact that not all workers vote for the left parties is so startling for some authors that they are led to the rejection of the class approach.[28] Indeed, not all workers vote as members of the working class. In most Western European countries this proportion varies between "only" 66 and 80 percent. But, first, no theory will explain all behaviors. A good theory merely provides a gain in information, and class theories do explain variance. And, more importantly, the relevant aggregate test of Marx's premises is not the average extent of class voting but the maximum of the function Y_x/X.

---

[25] In order to obtain an explicit solution for Y, one must solve two first order differential equations given by the hypotheses concerning the rates of change of left vote among workers and non-workers:

(1) $Y'_x = 2pX - aY_{1-x}'$

(2) $Y'_{1-x} = bY.$

Since Y is unknown, the solution becomes very complex. Generally, it seems that the way to proceed is to formulate a second order differential equation for $Y'\,'_{1-x}$ and then work backwards by substitutions. However, we have not attempted to obtain the exact solution, and the results discussed here are purely intuitive.

Sartori, utterly convinced that he is developing an alternative theory, rediscovers Marx's own hypotheses. Political organization of the class and communication among members precede, according to Marx (and Sartori), the class-conscious behavior of the workers. Precisely for this reason, the hypothesis that workers will vote for "their" party is for Marx *conditional* upon the political development of the working class. If Marx believed that workers would vote for the left parties regardless of their class situation, there would be no need for the theory of the dynamics of class-conflict and class-consciousness. But this theory was developed precisely to delimit the conditions under which workers will become class-conscious and will vote for the left parties.

Thus the distinction between the *average* extent of class voting and the *maximal* extent of class voting is of major importance for understanding the approach to voting behavior derived from Marx's theory. The working class achieves the fullest degree of political development as a class when the maximal proportion of workers votes for the working class parties. In theories other than the logistic and the reformist models the function $Y(X)/X$ will reach maximum (in the $0 \leqslant X \leqslant 1$ interval), when $X = 1.00$ (see Table 1). In the logistic model the proportion of workers who vote for the party of the left will reach maximum when $X = (\ln a/p)$.

Since the maximum of the function $Y(X)/X$ may not be observable in a particular country if the range of the observable values of X is limited, determination of the exact form of this function is of crucial importance. But once this function is identified, the maximum can be determined, and it is possible to state what the extent of class voting would be in a given political system, *if* the working class achieved the maximal level of political development as a class. And if this *maximal* level is not higher than the levels predicted by other social cleavages, then Marx's theory indeed does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the voting behavior.

The maximal value of $Y(X)$ and the value of $Y(X)$ when $X = 1.00$ are *structural conditions* of a given socio-political system. Even if the mechanisms by which a member of the working class is determined to vote for the left party are invariant from system to system, the aggregate vote for party Y will depend upon (1) the total size and the distribution of the working class in the population, and (2) the maximum of the function relating membership in group X to vote for party Y. Thus, from the descriptive point of view, a social system can be characterized by (1) its social structure—especially the distribution of the working class, and (2) an element of its culture—the maximal extent of class voting by the working class. Both the distribution of the population into groups and the maximum value of class voting constitute *structural characteristics in the sense that they determine in a manner stable over long periods of time the aggregate parameters of the social processes taking place within a system.*

The theory proposed here is described as "contextual" since the social context of individual interactions is treated as the determinant of individual behavior. The importance of this context is indicated by the value of the coefficient p. Actually, within the general class of contextual models p can be viewed as the probability that a random encounter will result in persuasion of an individual toward class-consciousness. Thus one interesting consequence of this theory concerns the meaning of class-consciousness. Soares and Hamblin strongly emphasized the deterministic, "involuntary" nature of the voting decisions, rejecting the Lockean assumptions of rationality and free choice. The contextual theories do not treat the vote as an "involuntary response" to a set of stimuli nor as an autonomous choice as an individual, but as an expression of consciousness of a *class*. *It is apparent from our interpretation that consciousness of a class does not presuppose consciousness of individual members of that class.* The vote is determined by the given socio-economic situation of an individual and to this extent by his perception of his interests. But it is also determined by the extent to which an individual is influenced by the interaction with other members of his class. The decision of an individual is not autonomous—it is not made individually. Thus, classes may behave in a way which can be called class conscious by objective standards even when individual members are not class conscious. Indeed, to the extent to which p is high and the voting curve deviates from a straight line, the contextual influences operate on the individual behavior, and there is a discrepancy between individual and group behavior.

---

[26] Mattei Dogan, "Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy," in Rokkan and Lipset, *op. cit.*

[27] Robert T. McKenzie and Allan Silver, "The Delicate Experiment: Industralism, Conservatism, and Working Class Tories in England," in Rokkan and Lipset, *op. cit.*

[28] Giovanni Sartori, "The Sociology of Parties, A Critical Review," in *Party Systems, Party Organizations, and the Politics of New Masses* (Berlin: Committee on Political Sociology of the I.S.A., 1968).

V. Explanation of the Left Vote in Chile in 1952

In order to provide some empirical meaning to the abstract discussion of the preceding sections, let us return to the vote for Allende in 1952. As we remember, the involuntary response theory of Soares and Hamblin interprets this vote as a result of alienation, while contextual theories treat it as an expression of class-consciousness of the working class. The involuntary response theory explains 85% variance using six variables representing the stimuli. The linear prediction in which the vote for Allende is regressed on the proportion of the population in industry and mining explains 39% of variance. Among the contextual theories the logistic (4) and the cubic (6) models best fit the data. We will compare the exponential prediction of Soares and Hamblin with the logistic model derived from contextual assumptions.

The logistic prediction explains 45% of variance of the vote for Allende when this vote is analyzed as the function of the proportion of the population in mining and industry.[29] Thus the logistic model fares slightly better than the linear model but not as well as the multiplicative model based on six predictors. However, this comparison becomes much more supportive of the logistic model after one examines the scatter diagram.



Figure 5

It is apparent upon inspection that two observations, the mining provinces of Arauco and Atacama, greatly deviate from the predictions based on any univariate theory. Whether one attempts to fit a linear, an exponential, or a logistic function of the population in mining and industry, these two observations do not fit the prediction. One strategy which can be used in this case is to keep adding new variables until the two deviant cases also become explained. This strategy has obviously been followed by Soares and Hamblin and is generally followed



Figure 6

---

[29] Note that the proportion of the labor force in industry and mining is treated as a measure of the relative size of the working class, not as an indicator of the level of development, as in the Soares and Hamblin analysis.

in multiple regression approaches. However, the alternative strategy is to eliminate the deviant cases from the domain of the theory. One may, and one should, speculate why these two observations behave in a manner highly different from the other 23 cases.[30] But it seems quite clear that a highly parsimonious theory is sufficient to explain the majority of the cases and that as many as five variables must be added to explain the two additional observations. Whatever is the theory explaining the 23 observations, this theory does not apply to Arauco and Atacama. Indeed, if the vote for Allende was an involuntary response to socio-economic stimuli, it was clearly either a different response to stimuli, or a response to different stimuli, in these two provinces than in the majority of the provinces.

Once these two cases are eliminated, the contextual theory explains 86% of variance with *one* independent variable.[31] Moreover, the diagram indicates that the limiting behavior is present, and actually the limit is very low. The percentage of the vote for Allende tends to 10 until the percentage of workers reaches 36. Subsequently it fails to increase.

This evidence is obviously insufficient to make any choice between the two theories since the number of observations and the range of the independent variable are greatly limited. Indeed, even a straight line gives a good prediction of the vote. All one can say at this moment is that several theories explain this vote well.

In order to portray a situation which would well exhibit the characteristics of the logistic curve, we have searched for sets of data which contain an extensive range of the independent variable. Unfortunately, the level of aggregation of most easily available data is so high that the percentages of workers in the population of a district do not show much variation. The best set of data which we found is the vote for the Socialist Party in Stockholm in 1932.[32] The vote is given for precincts, and a wide range of the independent variable is present. The curve displays the characteristics predicted by the logistic and the cubic models. Most importantly, even though the number of observations in the upper range of X is still insufficient, the limiting behavior can be observed when the independent variable reaches .80. The critical point, at which the curve begins to rise at a lower pace, can also be observed after the value of the independent variable reaches .50.

Clearly, these data do not permit us to choose either between the involuntary response theory and the contextual theory or among the contextual theories. Only after several sets of data containing a wide range of variation are examined, will an evaluation of particular theories of left vote become feasible. However, evaluation of theories involves several problems of a general nature which need to be discussed at this point.

VI. Theories and Data

Including the "involuntary response" theory and varying the assumptions about the patterns and the effects of interaction, we obtained as the result nine theories explaining the vote for the left party. These theories are summarized briefly in Table 1.

The results of testing these theories will obvi-



Figure 7

---

[30] Arauco is the center of the Chilean coal mining and has long traditions of left-wing radicalism. Atacama is a province dominated by copper mining. Both Arauco and Atacama have an exceedingly high percentage of trade union members among the working class, but it seems that the influence of the unions operates in different directions in these two provinces. We suspect that different unions operate in the two provinces, bu we do not have this information.

[31] The logistic curve was fitted by an iterative procedure and thus the solution obtained may not be optimal. An analytical procedure for estimation is discussed in J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 49–50, and in G. Tintner, *Econometrics* (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 208–211.

[32] Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behavior* (Totawa, N.J.: The Bedminister Press, 1963), pp. 178–179.

Table 1. Nine Theories of Left Vote

Assumptions	General Prediction	Extent of Class Voting
0. Effects of variables combine interactively in invoking involuntary responses	$Y=aX_1^{m_1}X_2^{m_2}$	concepts not relevant
1. Constant propensity of voting for Y among X, no interaction effects	$Y=a+pX$	p
2. Interaction effective at a rate proportional to the proportion of workers, only among X	$Y=a+pX^2$	pX
3. Interaction between voters for Y and others, only among X, no limit	$Y=ae^{pX}$	$\frac{1}{X}a(e^{pX}-1)$
4. Interaction between voters for Y and others, only among X, with limit	$Y=\frac{c}{1+ae^{-pX}}$	$\frac{1}{X}\left(\frac{c}{1+ae^{-pX}}-\frac{c}{1+a}\right)$
5. Separate contribution of X and non-X, no interaction effects	$Y=p_xX+p_{1-x}(1-X)$	px
6. Interaction among workers and of workers with non-workers, effects proportional to X	$Y=p(X^2/2-X^3/3)$	$pX/6$
7. Interaction among workers and of workers with non-workers, effects inversely related and dependent upon class conflict	$Y=pX^2+apX(1-X)+c(1-a)X$	$pX+c(1-a)$
8. Interaction among workers and between voters for Y and non-workers, with interdependent effects	no explicit solution	unknown

ously depend upon the number of observations and the range of the independent variable. A technical analysis of the conditions under which choice can be made between specific pairs of competing theories exceeds the limits of this study. However, some general problems are instructive.

It should be first noted that since aggregate data are usually available for units of relatively large size, typically only narrow ranges of the independent variable can be observed. It is often difficult to choose among competing theories. This obviously biases the results of testing toward linear models. For, in general, whenever the range of the independent variable is low, a linear prediction will provide a good fit. Actually, a short segment of any smooth curve can be approximated by a straight line. These diagrams show that theoretically unmotivated curve fitting may lead to results which are meaningless, unless the full range of the independent variable has been observed.

The conditions for choosing among competing theories on the basis of their fit are therefore quite stringent. First, these theories must be formalized in a manner allowing the deduction of predictions which can be studied with regard to fit. Theories which state that "Y increases as X increases" are clearly insufficient without full specification of the functional form of this relationship. Indeed, the expression "Y depends upon X" is not a sentence in the logical sense of the word. Unless the form of the function is specified, one can never show that Y does not depend upon X.

Secondly, even if an extensive range of the independent variable is observable, the choice between some theories may be quite difficult. Clearly, if two theories yield predictions which are drastically different, the choice on the basis of fit may be quite easy. One does not even need powerful statistics: sometimes a simple table will be sufficient.

However, often the predictions derived from very different assumptions will be sufficiently similar to make the choice on the basis of fit quite difficult. If the theory of Soares and Hamblin fits the data equally well as model 3, the choice will indeed be quite difficult. Formally, these theories generate similar predictions since they may simultaneously provide a good fit with regard to a specific set of data. If the involuntary response theory is multivariate, we can fall back on the criterion of parsimony. Since model 3 would then require the loss of fewer degrees of freedom, parsimony would lead us to choose this model over the Soares and Hamblin theory in the case of equally good fit. But in the case when only one variable is used to indicate stimuli, and this variable is X, we have 0.3. $Y = aX^m$, and 3.3. $Y = ae^{pX}$.

Since the number of degrees of freedom will be the same in this case, the parsimony criterion will give us no aid. In this situation, the test of fit applied to a specific set of data may be indeterminate.

It is not surprising that a general test of fit will often leave us in the situation in which no choice can be made among theories. If these theories are at all complex, either because they involve several variables or because the function is a complicated one, they will provide a good fit. Correlation coefficients or for that matter any tests of general fit (percentage of variance explained) are so weak that most complex theories will pass these tests at the required levels of significance. Only when the theories yield distinctly different predictions will a correlation coefficient provide a test strong enough to permit the choice among them. Otherwise, we must look for some tests which are based on the specific predictions of the theories—what Bush and Mosteller term the "fine grain structure."[33]

These general observations become apparent when one examines the structure of models 4 and 6. Both predict a rapid growth of the vote for Y as X grows, and both predict that this growth declines as X tends to 1.00. Indeed, it is not difficult to find some values of the parameter for which these two predictions nearly coincide. In this situation, the percentage of variance explained is not a sufficient test for most sets of data. One must examine the specific features of the two theories: (see Table 2).



Figure 8

In general, since the predictions generated by the theories discussed here are deterministic and concern only the central tendency, several competing theories may simultaneously provide good fit. When these theories provide equally good fit and when they absorb the same number of degrees of freedom, the radical empiricist guidelines for basing evaluation of theories on the tests of fit do not take us very far. Evaluation of theories involves much more than tests of fit with regard to specific sets of data. Consistency with other things we know ultimately becomes the decisive criterion for a temporary acceptance of a particular theory. The preoccupation of political scientists with analyzing the ever growing numbers of observations seems to be greatly misplaced from the point of view of accumulation of knowledge. Only when several quite credible theories are available concerning the same class of phenomena do the fine tests of fit, applied to carefully made observations, advance our knowledge. *The fact that some function fits significantly to some observations is not particularly significant for a systematic knowledge of politics.*[34]

The most important aspect of this analysis is its implication for the role of theories in the analysis of data. Frequently in political research data precede a theory. Numerous inferences are made from statements about a specific set of observations to statements theoretical in nature. We have attempted to demonstrate that such inferences may be misleading and are illegitimate. But even when the theories are formulated explicitly, they frequently constitute inventories of the relevant independent variables, to be tested for linear fit. It is rarely emphasized that the "relevance" of a particular in-

---

[33] R. R. Bush and Frederick Mosteller, "A Comparison of Eight Models," in P. F. Lazersfeld and N. W. Henry (eds.), *Readings in Mathematical Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966). This is an interesting article, since it provides a concrete example of the meta-theoretical issues discussed here. The authors introduce the article by arguing that "In the testing of a scientific model or theory, one rarely has a general measure of goodness-of-fit, a universal yardstick, by which one accepts or rejects the model. Indeed, science does not and should not work this way; a theory is kept until a better one is found. One way that science does work is by comparing two or more theories to determine their relative merits in handling relevant data." Page 335.

[34] We cannot do better at this point than refer to William Feller's observations concerning the "law of logistic growth." Having cited the extensive theoretical, empirical, and practical preoccupations with the logistic functions applied to the analysis of growth, Feller concludes: "The only trouble with the theory is that not only the logistic distributions can be fitted to the *same material with the same or better goodness-of-fit.* In this competition the logistic distribution plays no distinguished role whatever; most contradictory theoretical models can be supported by the same observational material." William Feller, *An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications*, Volume II, (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 52.

Table 2. A Comparison of Models 4 and 6

	Model 4	Model 6
General Prediction	$Y=\dfrac{c}{1+ae^{-pX}}$	$Y=p(X^2/2-X^3/3)$
Intercept	$c/(1+a)$	0
$Y^*=Y_{X=1.00}$	$c/(1+ae^{-p})$	$p/6$
Critical point[a]	$(1n\ a)/\mathrm{p}$	$1/2$

[a] The critical point is the value of X at which the rate of change of Y is maximal, i.e., the point at which the second derivative of Y equals zero.

dependent variable for explaining a given class of phenomena depends upon the *form* of relationship. The prescriptions for construction of theories given by sociologists and political scientists typically concern the methods for making lists of large numbers of independent variables and determining their internal structure.[35] But as we have seen here, the concern with the form of functions is at least as necessary as the concern with choosing proper variables. We have constructed eight theories, some of which are quite different, using only one independent variable; and one could easily, and reasonably, extend this list much further. The predictions concerning the form of the functions must be derived from theoretical hypotheses and assumptions. Then and only then can the validity of theoretical statements be evaluated. Otherwise, regardless of the sophistication of the statistical analysis, all one can utter is a singular historical proposition about a specific distribution observed in one place and at one time.

---

[35] It is interesting to note that the problems of form of prediction are nearly completely absent from the otherwise instructive new book on theory construction by H. M. Blalock, Jr., *Theory Construction from Verbal to Mathematical Formulations,* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969). "Propositional inventories," even from the best literature, are no substitute for theory.

The Division of Political Labor Between Mothers and Fathers*

M. KENT JENNINGS
University of Michigan
AND
RICHARD G. NIEMI
University of Rochester

Primary groups are of undoubted importance in shaping and mediating the political behavior of individuals. Of all primary groups, the nuclear family is of special significance. A person's family of origin and family of procreation serve as important socialization agents and reference groups throughout the life cycle. As with most groups there is a division of labor within the family. This is most obvious with respect to parental versus offspring roles. Although exceptions come to mind, parents are typically the major political actors in the family. By the same token parents usually introduce their children into the political world rather than vice versa.

Less obvious, perhaps, is the possibility that some division of labor also exists between marital partners. Some tasks may be shared rather equally while others may be performed much more by one partner than the other. Such a division would condition the political behavior of adults; it would also condition the socialization of children. This article looks at the degree to which political tasks are divided within couples, the relative superiority of one partner over the other, and the contingencies affecting differential behavior.

I. Theory and Method

Even a passing glance at the American nuclear family reveals a wide assortment of sex-related familial roles. In many instances this means a sharp definition between the performance of mothers versus fathers. The clearest examples, of course, lie in the economic and child-rearing domains. Despite the increasing number of full and part-time working mothers, the male role of primary breadwinner continues to maintain its long-established tradition. By the same token, the singular child-rearing and domestic functions of women are still paramount. From these twin roles some sociologists have, in fact, argued that a universal role differentiation exists within the family along a single dimension—instrumental-adaptive to the extra-familial world, and expressive-nurturant vis-a-vis the family.[1]

While not gainsaying the importance of the division of social labor within the family, other observers have argued that the instrumental-expressive axis is a caricature, especially in modern societies. That is, instrumental acts are by no means confined to fathers, and expressive acts not limited to mothers.[2] Rather, role flexibility and, to some extent, interchangeability characterize the newer patterns of family life. In short, it is suggested that two dimensions exist, one instrumental and the other expressive; and the locations of one parent on these dimensions are not necessarily dependent on the locations of the other.

The introduction of role theory provides an opening wedge into a discussion of conjugal patterns of political behavior. In the measure that participation in matters political represents an instrumental action vis-a-vis the outside world, then clearly the role differentiation model points toward fathers rather than mothers as the chief actors. That is, fathers would be serving as the representatives in the larger political community and as mediators between the political community and the family.[3] Conversely,

---

* We express our thanks to the Danforth Foundation for supporting the collection of the data on which this paper is based, to the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health for support while the paper was written, and to George Moyser for his assistance in the preparation of the article.

[1] Morris Zelditch, "Role Differentiation in the Nuclear Family," in Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales, et al., *Family, Socialization, and Interaction Process* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 339–242.

[2] Philip Slater, "Parental Role Differentiation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 67 (1961), 296–311.

[3] Rose Laub Coser, "Authority and Structural Ambivalence in the Middle-Class Family," in Rose Laub Coser (ed.), *The Family: Its Structure and Functions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1964), pp. 374–383. The most intensive study of labor division in the household is that by Robert O. Blood and Donald M. Wolfe, *Husbands and Wives: The Dynamics of Married Living* (New York: The Free Press, 1960). See also Mirra Komarovsky, *Blue Collar Marriage* (Rev. Ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1967).

the role-sharing model suggests that fathers have no necessary monopoly on instrumental and adaptive political behavior, that sharing may occur within a family or that patterns vary from family to family.

The prominence of one or the other of these models carries two implications of concern to us. First, the place of married women in the political system varies dramatically according to these two models. In the one case they are relegated to supplying affective tone and supportive behavior for the more determinative and instrumental activities of their husbands. Under the role-sharing model they are not so confined. Not only does it follow that the "self-fulfillment" of mothers in an important area of life increases, but also that the sum total of inputs into the political system carries more female preferences and demands. Second, the place of each parent as an agent of political socialization also varies depending upon which model more nearly approaches reality. The single instrumental-expressive dimension points toward fathers serving as the principal cue-givers because they are the dominant actors. On the other hand, the role-sharing perspective obviously brings mothers into the picture. Thus children being reared in a system with greater role sharing more often have the opportunity of modeling politically active mothers in addition to or instead of fathers. To the extent that mothers and fathers differ in their political orientations, the end product of the socialization process may be rather different than under father-dominant conditions.

The American family appears to have some properties of each perspective. Conventional wisdom and most research tends to view conjugal pairs as relatively homogeneous in political orientations. This is reflected in retrospective inquiries about one's "parents" in a collective sense or in relying on data about one's father on the assumption that this fairly well describes the mother also. The view is also manifested in commonplace findings linking social characteristics shared by men and women—e.g., social class—to levels of political behavior common to each sex. But conventional wisdom also sees politics as a man's world, and this view is supported by evidence of greater male participation at the mass level and preponderant occupancy of political positions at the elite level.[4] These findings, when transferred to the family context, implicitly support the notion that husbands are the dominant figures when political inequalities do exist among couples.[5]

Our report will not seriously undercut the assumptions of frequent couple homogeneity and of male dominance in its absence. To this extent it bolsters traditional views and refines them by documenting variations in levels of homogeneity and male dominance across a variety of political activities.

The thrust of our report, however, consists of filling in what remains unsaid after such documentation and refinement. These gaps are two in number: 1) why and under what circumstances are couples more or less homogeneous; 2) why and under what circumstances are mothers equally or more politicized than their mates. Stated more formally, under what conditions does conjugal political role sharing flourish and under what conditions is the father's greater instrumental-adaptive orientation reduced? Each of these topics forms a segment of the analysis, with greater emphasis given to the latter.

The data drawn upon were gathered in 1965 as part of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's study of political socialization among high school seniors. The core of the study was a national probability sample of 1669 seniors distributed among 97 public and nonpublic secondary schools. In order to make use of independently gathered information about parents, one-third of the seniors were randomly designated for mother-only interviews, one-third for father-only interviews, and one-third for both mother and father. It is the latter group that we make use of here. Due largely to the anticipated loss from one-parent families, interviews were completed with mother and father pairs of 26% of the students, or 430 pairs in all. The response rate for parents was 93%. While the raw number of pairs is 430, we shall be working with a weighted N of 531. This adjustment is a correction for unavoidably imprecise estimates of senior class sizes made when the sampling frame was constructed. With this correction, the sample can be treated as a representative cross-section of pairs of mothers and fathers of high school seniors. It should be noted that the sample has some class bias since high school dropouts were not included in the student sample, and an age bias since most of the parents are between the ages of 35–55.

---

[4] For documentation see the references cited in M. Kent Jennings and Norman Thomas, "Men and Women in Party Elites: Social Roles and Political Resources," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 12 (1968), 469–492, at pp. 469–470; and Fred I Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), Chap. 6.

[5] This is not to be confused with recent findings pointing toward maternal equality in terms of whether offspring take on the political coloration of mothers or fathers under conditions of mother-father disagreement. See M. Kent Jennings and Kenneth P. Langton, "Mothers vs. Fathers: The Formation of Political Orientations Among Young Americans" *Journal of Politics,* 31 (1969), 329–358.

The Variety of Political Activities. The first objective in assessing parental political relationships is to specify the sorts of political acts to be examined. While the domain of political acts could be sectioned according to several dimensions, we find it useful to think in terms of three major ones. Multiple measures are available in each dimension. The measures are discussed below and referenced in the Appendix.

First, there are the political tools and resources which one brings to a political act. Rather than being a participation dimension per se, this might be better termed a participation resource dimension. For example, the person who brings a wealth of information or high feelings of efficacy to the stage of deciding whether and how to participate can be distinguished from the person having but meager resources. Similarly, parental pairs may be characterized by the degree to which they have varying amounts of equality with respect to these resources and by which parent has superior political funds. The three resources used in our analysis are 1) political knowledge; 2) recognition and understanding of ideological differences between the parties; and 3) political efficacy.

A second dimension consists of what is sometimes called spectator politicization, so named because it refers to behavior vis-a-vis the mass media. Large segments of the American public confine most of their political behavior to such modes. There are, to be sure, sharp gradients among people according to the content of what they consume and the level of concentration and skills necessitated. Nevertheless, the act of mass media exposure is essentially passive; it involves little or no transactions with actors outside the family. In a larger sense, no "inputs" into the political system are directly associated with media behavior. Multiple measures in this dimension include 1) general interest in public affairs; 2) frequency of exposure to politics in newspapers, magazines, and on television; 3) main media used for following politics, by level of difficulty.[6]

Perhaps the most obvious dimension of political action is that of manifest forms of behavior. Here we have in mind goal-oriented behavior that ordinarily requires a direct transaction with some units or actors in the political system. Such transactions can take the form of voting, communicating with public officials, mass confrontations and demonstrations, or a myriad of other activities which typically involve an exchange or transaction between the individual and some institution within the political system. For our purposes manifest behavior levels were gauged for 1) electoral activities; 2) community affairs; and 3) school matters.

II. Homogeneity Among Parental Pairs

In measuring similarity between marital partners we rely primarily on rank order correlations showing the degree of association between the orderings of each mate in a parental pair. We are still faced with the problem of evaluating the correlations. What level of association should be regarded as denoting high similarity and what should constitute dissimilarity? Inevitably the answers to such questions involve some subjective as well as objective criteria, some feeling as to what constitutes homogeneity plus some statistical constraints commonly observed by social scientists. Rather than elaborate on what the criteria and expectations should be, we will instead offer some commonly-used non-political measures as reference points against which the political measures may be compared.

Certainly one of the most crucial factors affecting family life is that of education. The gamma correlation on education for husband-wife pairs is .69. Similarly, subjective social class shows a pair correlation of .58. Since many of our key measures deal with participation it seems appropriate to use a non-political activity as another point of comparison. In this case it is church attendance, where the correlation is .77. By most standards and given most of the reports in the literature of family roles and structure these associations would be viewed as showing high intra-couple similarity.[7] Except for situations in which the attribute of one partner is logically contingent upon the same attribute in the spouse, these levels of association probably approach the high marks for standard social characteristics.

With these remarks as a backdrop, we may now consider a number of political variables. Table 1 shows measures of agreement between spouses for eleven indicators of politicization.

---

[6] Level of difficulty was ordered into five categories: magazines, newspapers, television, radio, no media at all. Although some error may be involved in placing magazines above newspapers on the difficulty dimension, analysis of media habits suggests that more elite strata in the population do rely on magazines more than newspapers, at least with respect to news and analytic magazines. See, e.g., John P. Robinson, *Public Information About World Affairs* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, 1967).

[7] See, for example, Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 354–355.

Table 1. Mother-Father Similarity for Eleven Indicators of Politicization

Measures of Politicization	Correlations (gamma) Between Father's and Mother's Responses
Political Resources	
Political knowledge	.58 (530)[a]
Understanding party differences	.39 (517)
Political efficacy	.28 (529)
Spectator Politics	
Reading magazines	.65 (531)
Reading newspapers	.50 (527)
Watching television	.50 (519)
Interest in governmental affairs	.44 (528)
Main media used (by difficulty level)	.32 (522)
Political Participation	
Election activities	.52 (531)
School affairs	.49 (530)
Community affairs	.45 (530)

[a] *N*'s are given in parentheses.

The size of these correlations, though somewhat lower than those for education, subjective class, and church attendance, show that homogeneity rather than heterogeneity prevails. There are at least two reasons why homogeneity is the rule. First, there is a moderate amount of assortative mating at the outset. Partners find each other on a non-random basis, and at least some of these bases are connected to forms of political behavior. For example, we noted the .69 correlation between the education of each party to the marriage. Assortativeness also extends in some measure to the characteristics of the parents of the marital partners. The association between the occupational status of the fathers attached to the pairs is .34; that for the educational level of the fathers is .31; and that for the perceived social class of the families of origin is .76.[8] Finally, there is a correlation of .61 in terms of the size of community in which the couples were reared. To some extent, then, likes do marry likes with respect to matters that have some political consequences.

Another factor, of course, is that each partner is influencing the other over time in the marriage relationship. There is little published evidence that couples do become more similar politically as the marriage grows older, but mutual socialization in political behavior would seem to be in order.[9] Since most of our couples have been married for at least eighteen years, they have had ample opportunity to have been affected by a process of "creeping similarity."

Although all of the relationships in Table 1 are positive, there are some marked differences among them. It is instructive that the highest associations come on measures that are rather "hard" indicators of behavior. The political knowledge scale rests on right or wrong answers about factual data, and the electoral activities index derives from responses to seven questions about concrete acts which might or might not have been performed during campaigns and elections. Similarly, specific media usage is relatively well-anchored in concrete behaviors. To a greater degree the other indicators necessitate self-judgments, self-evaluations, or preferences not found among the prior attributes. What we are suggesting is that the lower levels of similarity observed in Table 1 can be traced in part to the amorphous character of the variables involved. Unlike the more specific indicators, there is no way in which husband and wife regularly compare, say, their degree of political efficacy. In the absence of such comparisons, mutual influence and adjustment flow less easily.

These modest-to-strong agreement patterns have significant implications for the socialization process. One of the prime lessons of learning behavior research is that the stronger, the more frequent, and the more respected are the stimuli, the more likely will the desired behavior be realized. One should therefore expect homogeneous parents to exert a cumulative punch in the socialization of their offspring. Our work with student-mother-father triads indicates that this is usually the case.[10]

But it is evident that heterogeneity is also present across all the political dimensions employed here. Indeed, it can be argued that in some families the child is faced by so little similarity between his parents that a conflict situation develops. In the face of such conflict it is not a simple matter to predict or test for parental effects. Children may be drawn inexorably toward one parent in some families, while in others they may "split the difference," winding up in between the parental positions. Initial exploration of this subject is undertaken elsewhere.[11]

---

[8] These figures are based on recall data gathered from the husbands and wives. Analysis of similar data indicates that this type of information is likely to be highly accurate. See Richard G. Niemi, "A Methodological Study of Political Socialization in the Family," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1967).

[9] Research on nonpolitical values and marriage roles suggests little or no improvement in consensus over time. See Jerrold Heiss (ed), *Family Roles: An Anthology* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1968), pp. 155–156 for a short discussion and references to the literature.

[10] M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, *Families, Schools and Political Learning* (Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, forthcoming).

Correlates of Homogeneity. The varying ranges of similarity between parents are remarkably resistant to change according to some commonly used indicators of marital relationships and political behavior. To be specific, the basic mother-father relationships were reexamined using, among others, the following controls: occupational status, employment versus nonemployment of mothers, length of marriage, marital compatibility, and a variety of straightforward educational controls.[12] While these controls occasionally affect couple congruity, it would exaggerate the case to say that they alter the associations consistently or dramatically.

Some significant variations are revealed, however, by making use of the direct relationship between education and conventional political activity. With occasional exceptions, rising education accompanies higher performance levels. Since these patterns have been found to hold for both men and women—with women being more drastically affected by increments of higher education than are men—it should follow that parental pairs would also exhibit the customary education-participation relationship.[13]

Bearing this in mind, we can test for the impact of the education mix by categorizing couples according to their degree of educational similarity. This procedure (described in more detail later) results in classifying mates according to whether they had equal education attainment, whether the father exceeded the mother, or whether the mother exceeded the father. If education is powerfully related to most forms of political expression, this should mean that couples who are homogeneous educationally should also be more homogeneous politically.

There is strong support for the hypothesis in the area of spectator politics, as the correlations in Table 2 show:

Table 2. Education Mix and Spectator Politics

	Education Mix		
	Mother < Father	Mother = Father	Mother > Father
Interest in government affairs	.28	.56	.41
Main media used	.27	.42	.25
Magazine reading	.61	.74	.64
Newspaper reading	.36	.71	.30
Watching television	.52	.55	.40

In each instance the correlation is higher when educational parity exists. Other forms of politicization do not yield a consistent pattern. The uniqueness of the media usage findings probably flow from the fact that the opportunities to use certain media are constrained to some extent by joint availability to each spouse.

Additional evidence for the importance of educational similarity comes by taking the combined education levels of husbands and wives and then observing the fluctuation in their combined political behavior scores. For each of the eleven measures (save television viewing) there is a steady monotonic decrease in the behavioral scores as the educational level of the parental pair decreases. While the range is greater on some indicators than on others and the distance between scores varies among education categories, the basic pattern is strong and convincing. Clearly the standard findings on educational effects found among cross-section samples of adults also hold for parental pairs.

To sum up, the evidence for the role-sharing view of political participation is rather marked. Many other political systems would obviously exhibit much less role-sharing, while a few others would probably have more. By the same token, the configuration has undoubtedly changed in American society over time. At the present juncture societal forces would appear to be pushing toward even greater overlapping of parental roles along the instrumental-adaptive dimension as it relates to politics.

III. The Relative Advantage Among Parental Pairs

In the previous section we found moderate to high homogeneity across a variety of politicization measures. There are, nonetheless, large numbers of cases in which the husband and wife are dissimilar. Our next task, then, is to assay the arenas of politicization already introduced with the aim of showing the relative advantage of one mate over the other. The most straightforward way of doing this is to utilize the matrices underlying the husband-wife correlations in Table 1. Values lying along the diagonal represent equality between mates; values on one side of the diagonal represent cases where the husband's score is higher than his wife's; and values on the other side of the diagonal represent those where the wife's score is higher than the husband's. The further one moves away from the diagonal, the greater the advantage of one partner over the other. Given the sample size, we shall have to be content with three classifications: mother > father, mother = father, mother < father. These three categories form an ordinal scale, and we shall take advantage of that feature in some of the analyses to follow.

---

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] The occupational status measure used here is that developed by Otis Dudley Duncan and reported in his "A Socioeconomic Index for All Occupations," in Albert J. Reiss, Jr., et. al., *Occupations and Social Status* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 109–138. Marital compatibility was based on responses to the question: "Compared to other families you know, would you say that you and your (wife) (husband) get along extremely well, about average, or not so well?"

[13] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 485–487, 490–491.

Another mode of analysis, however, will be to rely on a "net advantage" score. By subtracting the proportion of cases in which the mother's score exceeds that of father's from those where father's exceeds mother's we have, for any given political characteristic, a measure of the net advantage of males over females. Or: "father higher %-mother higher % = father net advantage %." One merit in this procedure is that it keeps one somewhat closer to the substance of the phenomena, a particularly important aspect since we will be traversing a considerable range of politicization measures. It will also be easier to observe the fluctuation of net advantage scores when control variables are applied to the original relationships.[14]

Table 3 contains the difference scores for eleven measures, divided into the three arenas of resources, spectatorship, and political participation. Also shown are the gamma correlations between sex (men scored "high") and male advantage. In assessing the correlations it should be borne in mind that the substantial proportion of husbands and wives who are "equal" serves to constrain the magnitude of the correlations.

On balance, there is little doubt that males hold a persistent, and sometimes dramatic edge over their spouses. In only three of the eleven indicators does the father's edge change into a deficit, and the size of the deficits are generally smaller than the size of the surpluses. Especially impressive is the male dominance in the arena of political resources.

Table 3. Father's Net Advantage Over Mother for Eleven Politicization Indicators

Measures of Politicization	Father's Net Advantage[a]	Correlation by Sex[b]
Political Resources		
Political knowledge	30%	.33
Understanding party differences	23	.24
Political efficacy	15	.15
Spectator Politics		
Interest in governmental affairs	24	.35
Main media used (by difficulty level)	15	.22
Reading newspapers	9	.18
Watching television	−5	−.09
Reading magazines	−8	−.17
Political Participation		
Election activities	18	.19
Community affairs	0	.02
School affairs	−8	−.19

[a] Entries represent the differences between the "father higher" percentage on the given characteristic minus the "mother higher" percentage.

[b] These gamma correlations show the relationship between sex (men scored high) and the rankings of the respondents on the accompanying measures of politicization.

Spectator behavior presents a somewhat more balanced picture, but again the male advantage is apparent. With regard to overt participation the male edge for electoral activities is what might be expected according to conventional stereotyping. By contrast there is no difference in community affairs, and school affairs shows a feminine advantage. While not overwhelming, these latter two instances clearly belie the traditional assumptions about male dominance. They are, indeed, in accord with James March's speculations of some years ago.[15]

What if the couples had been canvassed for their activities in a larger range of political endeavors? Would the male advantage as represented on general attention levels and electoral participation continue or would it look more like those for community and school affairs? No sure answers can be given, but the modest edge in school affairs probably represents the apex of maternal advantage for public affairs of much consequence at all. Due to the unique mother-child relationship, women take a proprietary interest in the forces having an impact on the child's life. Certainly the school is one such major force; indeed, it is not infrequently seen as the key competitor for the child's attention and affection. In the measure that the mother involves herself with school affairs, she does this as an extension of her mother role. Since few if any other major public institutions would be viewed in this light by the mother, it is unlikely that she would be moved to participate more than her mate in other areas of public life.

---

[14] This measure is sensitive to the number of categories used in defining a particular variable. Therefore, for comparing across variables, as in Table 3 in the text, the measure may be defective (and another measure is provided). However, for detecting the variations in the relative advantage of one parent when controls are applied to the initial relationship, the net advantage score seems appropriate (since the number of categories remains constant). It is in this latter fashion that the scores are used extensively.

[15] James G. March, "Husband-Wife Interaction Over Political Issues," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17 (Winter 1953–54), 461–470.

From this perspective the modest edge for mothers in school affairs becomes even more modest. If mothers exceed their spouses by such a slender margin in the one arena of public life linked most closely to their mother role, then one could hardly expect higher performances in less role-related domains.

Further insight about the relative advantage of one spouse over the other is gained by observing the interrelationships of the measures. Are couples consistent across domains of politicization, are they inconsistent, or does their ordering in one domain have little to do with another? If couples are inconsistent, one might make a strong case for role specialization by domain, with each partner having some area(s) of specialization. If they are highly consistent, one would incline more toward role generalization or domination, with one or the other partner generally exercising somewhat more prerogatives across a variety of domains. If no relationships exist between the relative advantage measures, the interpretation would be that both generalization and sex specialization are occurring.

Since we are here dealing with eleven measures, there are some 55 pairs of interrelationships. All but four of these have positive signs, that is, the ordering of a couple on one indicator resembles the ordering of the same couple on another indicator. The range of the positive correlations is from .01 to .50, with the average being .15. (It should be restated that the high proportions of couples with parity on several of these measures dampens the possible size of the correlations.) Providing the highest similarity are the mass media behaviors (average = .31); if one spouse has the advantage in one media, he/she tends to have it on the others also. This is particularly so with respect to the printed media. Another cluster of moderately related rank orders are the three involving external, overt political behaviors (average = .30). Again, the interpretation is that patterns of dominance are to a moderate extent spread throughout a given domain. A final cluster consists of the political knowledge-party differences pair (.27).

While many of the interrelationships are decidedly modest, the best *single* predictor of how a person will compare with his/her spouse on a politicization measure is usually his/her relative position on some other politicization measure. The overall patterns suggest that couples tend toward consistency in the division of political labor, particularly when the activities are closely related, i.e., all are within one of the three major politicization dimensions. No doubt this makes for a more orderly household if nothing else. Rather than having to establish or let evolve a new behavioral pattern with the advent of each new political stimulus in their life space, couples may fall back on already-existing arrangements. By the same token, the absence of negative associations implies that incongruous, contradictory patterns are avoided, either by foresight or more likely simply by the evolution of behavior over the life span of the marriage. By this, we mean that there is something dissonant—hence disturbing—about a situation in which the relative ordering of activity in one political domain is strongly counteracted by a different ordering in another political sphere. There are certainly many examples of particular couples in our sample where this happens. Yet the more typical pattern is for the relative advantage in one sphere to be either matched in another or for it to make no difference. Whether these configurations emerge early or take some time to develop we cannot be sure.

Although the weak to moderate similarity in orderings across domains is significant, it is also important that they are not more marked. Similarities in this range mean that while dramatic reversals of relative position are the exception rather than the rule, there is considerable movement across the various behaviors. For example, a wife who is distinctly inferior to her husband on matters of political knowledge, may move to a status of equality with respect to media usage. Similarly, a husband who lags behind his wife on school affairs may be her equal or superior in electoral endeavors. Thus "overcrystallization" seldom occurs; wives are not likely to be markedly inferior in a behavioral sense to their husbands across all activities. Among other things this means that the sum total of politicized activities emanating from the home will have an input from each partner, though the advantage for any particular domain would ordinarily rest with the husband. By the same token, the cue-giving and identification processes at work in the socialization of the young are neither one-sided with respect to parental source nor are they tightly uniform along the entire spectrum.

IV. The Effects of Education, Personal Efficacy, and Occupational Status

Fathers on the average exceed their mates in most forms of politicized behaviors and political resources, but the movement in this advantage is so marked in some instances that the overall pattern is reversed, with mothers gaining the advantage. Furthermore, there are persistent themes running throughout these patterns, so that one can say with some confidence that the relative positioning of couples on political participation is embedded in larger socio-political relationships transcending in part the uniqueness of any particular marriage.

Since we are dealing with the relative politicization of spouses, a parallel procedure will be used in examining the factors which help account for the differentiation. That is, couples may be categorized in terms of whether the husband has more of a given attribute, the two possess an "equal" amount, or the wife has a greater amount.

Because of the known contribution of education to levels of politicization, we might well expect the relative education of marital partners to affect their relative politicization. Relative education was determined by first allocating each respondent to one of six educational levels (0–7 grades, 8 grades, 9–11 grades, 12 grades, some college, and college degree or more). Then husband and wife education levels were crossed against each other in the usual fashion, with these results:

Relative Education Distribution

Father>Mother=	29.3%
Father=Mother=	41.0
Father<Mother=	29.7
	100.0% (N=527)

These proportions would obviously fluctuate depending upon the number and fineness of the education categories used; the finer and more numerous the strata, the greater the amount of inequality. In establishing our six categories from which the relative distributions were derived we sought to maximize the number of meaningful or threshold boundaries while at the same time being guided by the marginal distributions for each sex. Although equality is the single most common pattern of the three, and reflects the education correlation reported earlier, there are more couples en toto where inequality is found. The proportions where one sex is higher versus the other being higher are virtually identical.[16]

Knowing the relative education distribution helps disconfirm immediately one possible explanation as to why husbands are usually more politicized than their wives. If greater politicization were simply a function of the educational differential, then fathers on the average would be no more politicized than their wives. This is because each sex has about the same share of the better educated partner. Another way of saying this is that relative education is surely not the only, nor perhaps even the most important factor establishing the division of political labor. Nevertheless, it is one of the most easily observed and significant factors.

We may begin by noting that relative education is positively correlated with all but one of the eleven politicization measures used above, with the gamma coefficients running from .07 to .31. While these are not high associations, it must be remembered that we are now into situations where mates are being compared with each other on the basis of two relative scores. For example, whereas the relationship between education and political efficacy for the entire parent sample is .39, that between *relative* education and *relative* political efficacy is but .18. In the process of summarizing the data and developing comparison scores it is virtually inevitable that the explanatory power of a variable such as education will be reduced. Probably just as important is the fact that we are dealing with intracouple comparisons, not single individuals. The modus vivendi, task allocation, and personality interactions present in the marital situation help erase some of the stronger relationships observed at the individual level.[17] Even with these caveats the importance of relative education is not trivial when it is recalled that the types of measures being used cover a wide variety of dispositions and behaviors.

---

[16] Families where the father is higher are different than for the reverse case. There is a modest positive correlation between occupational status and father superiority (.27), which is to say that the higher the occupational class the more likely will the father's education exceed that of his spouse's. Similarly there is a positive association between father advantage and the combined educational level of the spouses (.33). As the joint educational level rises, the father's educational edge also rises, a finding consistent with Census Bureau data and other social research as well. See Susan R. Orden and Norman M. Bradburn, "Working Wives and Marriage Happiness," *American Journal of Sociology*, 74 (January 1968), 392–407.

[17] In addition this is one point at which the class bias inherent in the design of our sample probably reduces the observed relationship. We will note below that overall social (occupational) class makes little difference on the relative politicization scores. But there are some strong interaction effects, with relative education and politicization more strongly related among working class than middle class couples (see below). Thus having more working class people (as in the population of parents of all 17 and 18 year olds) would probably have sharpened the effects of relative education.

A more graphic way of illustrating the effects of relative education is to present the figures for the father's net advantage as relative education varies (Table 4). With one minor deviation (school affairs) in addition to television, there is a monotonic decrease in the father's net advantage as his relative edge on education decreases. Stated the other way, the mother's position improves as she betters her educational status vis-a-vis her husband. Bearing in mind the constraints on the data, these movements command attention. To overcome the other forces pushing males into the dominant political role, females need the boost supplied by that great differential agent of political activity, greater education. Even in the domains where females start out with equality or with superiority over their husbands, an educational edge makes a difference.

Relative education withstands a number of controls while continuing its impact, but the impact assumes various forms. In some instances an educational advantage operates in an interactive fashion with other attributes while in other situations the process is an additive one. For the present let us consider the matter of personal efficacy. Responses to three "forced-choice" questions were used to form a personal efficacy or ego strength scale (items and scoring given in the Appendix). After crossing husband-wife scores on this four-point scale, these relative efficacy categories emerged:

Relative Personal Efficacy Distribution

Father > Mother = 41.8%
Father = Mother = 27.7
Father < Mother = 30.6
100.1% (N = 528)

Fathers more often outrank mothers than vice versa, but there are plentiful instances in all three categories.

As with relative education, relative personal efficacy exerts a positive effect on all but one of the relative politicization scores. Whereas education has a rather uniform effect on all politicization measures, personal efficacy has particular strength in the area of external political acts. In fact, on the three manifest participation measures and that of the general saliency of politics, relative ego strength plays a stronger role than does relative education. Since the effects of relative ego strength parallel those of relative education it might be thought that the two variables are covariant. Actually, the relationship between the two (.14) is obviously not of a magnitude to warrant the inference that the variables speak for each other.

Now if each of these factors is related to manifest political behavior, while not being appreciably interrelated, we may see how the two jointly affect relative participation. First, it may be observed that when the relative efficacy relationships are arrayed, with a control for relative education, the original relationships are altered but the basic pattern not erased. Second, when the situation is reversed—relative education related to participation controlling for rela-

Table 4. Effects of Relative Education on Father's Net Advantage Over Spouse

Measures of Politization	Father's Net Advantage by Relative Education Levels			Father's Overall Net Advantage
	Father > Mother	Father = Mother	Father < Mother	
Political Resources				
Political knowledge	49%	22%	21%	30%
Understanding party differences	32	21	19	23
Political efficacy	29	14	01	15
Spectator Politics				
Interest in governmental affairs	33	24	14	24
Main media used (by difficulty level)	31	16	01	15
Reading newspapers	23	06	01	09
Watching television	−09	−02	−05	−05
Reading magazines	04	−06	−22	−08
Political Participation				
Election activities	30	19	03	18
Community affairs	08	05	−11	00
School affairs	−06	−05	−14	−08

Table 5. Expected vs. Actual Values for Father's Net Advantage in Electoral Activities, Given Relative Education and Relative Personal Efficacy

		Relative Personal Efficacy				
		Father > Mother	Father = Mother	Father < Mother	Row Net Adv.	Departure from Overall Net Adv.
Relative Education	Father > Mother	[a] 45% 39	24 26	13 16	30%	+12%
	Father = Mother	34 31	13 16	2 8	19	+1
	Father < Mother	18 29	−3 −6	−14 −20	3	−15
Column Net Adv:		33%	12	1		
Departure from Overall Net Adv:		+15%	−6	−17		

Overall Net Advantage =18%

[a] Expected values are in upper half of each cell, actual values in lower half.

tive ego strength—the basic patterns also tend to hold. Thus each variable seems to have independent power, although the separate effect of relative ego strength is somewhat greater.

Of greater interest is the degree to which education and ego strength work together to affect the advantage of one spouse over the other. To illustrate the joint effects, let us take relative electoral activities as the politicization indicator to be examined. With a straightforward application of additivity principles we can generate, as in Table 5, the expected value (upper half of each cell) for father's net advantage. These can be contrasted with the actual values (lower half of the cell). Inspection of the upper and lower entries within each cell of the matrix indicates that the actual values do correspond rather well with those predicted.

The full sweep of such cumulative processes is perhaps better comprehended in graphic form. Figure 1 presents data dealing with the relative amount of attention (general saliency) paid to public affairs. Contained in the figure are two lines, one showing the predicted values if the two independent variables were operating in an additive fashion, the other showing the values actually obtained for that particular combination of relative education and relative personal efficacy. Aside from one deviation in the rank-order of the points, the plotting of the actual percentages for father's net advantage matches rather closely that expected. Furthermore, the range of this net advantage has been extended considerably on both sides of the overall figure of 24%. School and community affairs participation echoes in part these patterns, but the reproducibility of cumulative predictions is not as faithful.

If relative education operates in an additive fashion with relative ego strength, it operates in an interactive way with social class. Overall, occupational status leaves but a minor impression on the relative politicization scores, with relative community participation and newspaper readership being the only areas producing correlations above .15. Nevertheless, when we sort our couples into middle and working class categories, we find that relative education has sharply differential effects. Listed in Table 6 are the correlations involving relative education and ten indicators (omitting television usage) for middle and working class couples separately:[18]

---

[18] Middle and working class terms are used a bit arbitrarily here. The Duncan socio-economic ratings of occupations were used to dichotomize the range of the husband's occupation so that approximately one-half of the sample would be in each category. This means that virtually all of the husbands classified as middle class envelop white collar occupations; a small precentage of husbands classified as working class would ordinarily be included in the middle or lower middle class under more conventional procedures.



Fig. 1 Father's net advantage over mother in relative salience of governmental affairs, by relative education and relative personal efficacy

Table 6. Class and Political Involvement

Relative Scores	Middle Class	Working Class
Political knowledge	.20	.28
Understanding party differences	.01	.15
Political efficacy	.07	.26
Saliency of governmental affairs	.20	.10
Main media used	.18	.26
Reading newspapers	.25	.11
Magazine reading	.24	.40
Electoral activities	.12	.34
Community affairs	.13	.22
School affairs	.01	.15

Relative education continues to make a difference in each occupational stratum, but it is quite apparent that the effect is exaggerated among working class couples. With only two exceptions, this is the pattern found for each politicization measure.

The explanation appears to be in the kind of life styles pursued and political opportunity structures occupied by the two strata. Even when husbands or wives hold an educational edge over their spouses in the upper strata (in contrast to the lower) these spouses are still rather well educated on the average. In most cases they have passed the threshold where lack of sufficient education might be a strong deterrent to political participation. Furthermore, middle class couples tend to live in an ambience conducive to participation if the motivation is present. Each partner would tend to have at hand the skills, resources, and inducements to pay attention to politics as a result of conditions (neighborhood, consumer patterns, secondary associations, occupation-linked friendships) inspired by the husband's high standing. Each might also acquire—if not already present—the activistic, service role prescriptions often associated with being better off in American society. All in all, there are some ceiling effects which hamper the ability of additional characteristics—such as relative education —to alter the positioning of spouses among middle class families.

By contrast it is clear that many of these conditions are absent among working class couples. In general, of course, their education is lower. Many individuals will be below the educational threshold which seems to activate a politicized orientation. In addition, the opportunity structure and the skills with which to exploit it are not as rich for working class couples. Given this configuration, it seems likely that any gradient among working class couples which supplies one of the partners with more resources than the other is going to make more of a difference than a parallel gradient among upper class families. As we have seen this is the result with respect to relative education. In the next section, we shall see another example of this principle.

V. Special Considerations for Mothers: Age of Children and Employment Status

It is commonly held that the mother's home duties act as a constraint on her political activity. There are two ways in which this presumably happens. In the first place, there is the sheer press of obligations and responsibilities: meals must be cooked, rooms cleaned, children waited on, shopping performed, etc. Mothers with pre-school children are especially burdened in this manner. A second way in which being a mother limits political activity is that if she is not employed she will not have the occupational and secondary group associations which often link to political endeavors. Not being "out in the world" may also lessen somewhat her sense of mastery and competence in dealing with the external world of politics. Thus we have two female roles which could conceivably depress the relative level of the mother's politicization.

Given the nature of our sample, we know that there is at least one child in the family around 17 or 18 years of age. By taking the parental reports on the number and ages of other children, we can divide the couples according to the youngest-aged child in the family. Youngest-aged is crucial because the immediate demands and constraints on the mother's time presumably vary inversely with the age of the youngest child, *ceterus paribus.* A mother for whom the youngest child happens to be the high school senior selected in our sample would, then, have the least reasons for being constrained in her outside participation; on the other hand, if the youngest child were a preschooler she would be the most constrained.

The mothers were allocated into four categories, by age of youngest child: 0–5; 6–12; 13–16; 17 or older. According to the hypothesis, the father's advantage should improve as the age of the youngest child declines; conversely, the mother's relative position should improve as the age of the youngest child increases. In practice nothing of the kind happens. Not only are the eleven correlations exceedingly small for the relative politicization variables (none above .11), but five of them are actually in the opposite direction from that hypothesized. One of these is school affairs; the younger the child the *more* active is the mother vis-à-vis her spouse, though even this relationship is barely visible (−.11).[19]

It is possible, of course, that certain familial contexts would alter these slim returns. For example, if the mother is employed the effect of children's ages could be different than if she is not employed. To anticipate our discussion of female employment status, it turns out that the basic relationships between age of youngest child and the mother's relative politicization are not substantially bent according to whether the mother is a homemaker or is employed. Another possibility is that the wife of a middle class husband might be less affected by the children's ages than would the mother with a working class husband. There are some such qualifications, but they do not operate in a consistent fashion, and they adjust the basic associations appreciably in only two cases—saliency of public affairs and community participation.

These last two instances contain the barest hint that as middle class mothers near the end of their child-rearing and heavy responsibility years they begin to shift their orientation somewhat to the political world, to one of more self-identified concern and community involvement. Working class mothers, on the other hand, are actually in a slightly less competitive position with their husbands as this period approaches. What seems to happen is that the middle class mother may have deferred some of her class-associated feelings of responsibility and desire for involvement until this stage in the marital life-cycle. Mothers in working class families—less imbued with and socialized into the participative mode—remain at about the same level as before. More information and data points would be necessary in order to support further these glimmerings.

As a final note, it should be emphasized that virtually all of the mothers with whom we are dealing are between 35–55 years of age. It is certainly possible that the generally null relationships between age of youngest child and relative politicization would change dramatically if one were to consider younger couples. The young mother with two toddlers and another coming is probably more restricted than is the older mother with one teenager, a preteen, and a pre-schooler.

The second distinguishing property of mothers to be taken up—work status—is more consequential. Significantly, however, the effects of being in the *labor market* as opposed to the *home market,* as we shall call it,[20] are mostly indirect and a result of interaction effects with other variables. In fact, at the gross level the presence of the mother in the labor market makes only a small difference in the relative politicization of marital partners. The main effect is to lower slightly the father's relative advantage and, concommitantly of course, to improve the mother's relative position. Being in the labor market is negatively related to father's relative advantage for eight of the eleven attributes under consideration, but the correlations in no instance exceed —.16.

---

[19] One might suspect that while the mother's relative position does not vary as a function of her children's ages, her absolute scores do change in the expected direction. That is, the older the last child, the higher will be her absolute scores. Even this less demanding test, however, fails to be met.

We observed previously that relative education usually exerted more effects among working class than middle class couples. Much the same holds for female employment status. In nine of the eleven areas being considered the effects of the mother's market placement was greater for working class than middle class couples; and now the correlations range as high as —.32 (for electoral activities). While the customary result is to lower the male's advantage, even in those few instances where the overall result improves his advantage (as in school affairs) the effects are still more noticeable among working class than middle class pairs. Again, working class couples seem more vulnerable to the impact of additional factors which serve to increase (or decrease) the resources which each partner brings to the political sphere.

The addition of relative education to the employment and class variables reveals even more fully the complex interaction between female employment and relative politicization. Perhaps the clearest way of showing how the mother's employment status interacts with the other two variables is to correlate relative education with the relative politicization measures, controlling simultaneously for mother's employment status and husband's occupational status. When this is done, two primary results emerge. First, for both home market and labor market wives, relative education continues to exert more influence among working class couples. Of twenty-two parallel comparisons across class lines the correlations are higher for working class couples in fifteen instances. Moreover, relative education is negatively related to relative politicization only once among working class parents, whereas the same is true six times among middle class parents.

The second major finding is that the impact of relative education is more responsive to the "market" placement of wives among working class than middle class couples. Among the former the impact is consistently accentuated for the spectator and participatory dimensions when the wife is in the labor market. If anything, the reverse is true among middle class couples; in fact, the impact of relative education is greatly exaggerated among labor market wives only in the sub-topic of political knowledge.

Just why the strength of relative education is abetted in the working class couples by the presence of labor force wives is not at all clear, and generalization is difficult. For the most part this seems to come about as a result of small decreases in the absolute politicization scores of such wives accompanied by much greater decreases in the absolute scores of their husbands. Being in the labor force tends not to help the working class mother per se, but it does help her vis-a-vis her spouse.[21] We cannot be sure whether this is because her being employed deprives the husband of resources he would ordinarily put into politics or whether there is something inherently different about working class couples in which the wife leaves the home market. In any event, being employed helps the working class mother benefit from an education advantage in the same way that fathers customarily do.

Suggestive as our analysis is, we are unable to make the strongest test for the effects of female employment. To do so would require longitudinal data or an experimental design showing the political juxtaposition of the marital partners during various stages of the mother's participation in the labor force. We also lack direct evidence of whether the mother is employed by choice or by necessity, as well as whether she is employed full- or part-time. Nevertheless, it is apparent that distaff employment has a significant, albeit indirect, impact on the mother's relative politicization. These results parallel what has been found for other aspects of family life, where the consequences of female employment are also of a complex nature.[22]

VI. Conclusions

In this paper we have attempted to bridge two age-old concerns—politics and sex differences—within the network of the nuclear family. Our aim was in part to establish the familial context in which children are socialized into the political world. In this regard the role-sharing model of parental behavior is more appropriate than that of masculine dominance of instrumental-adaptive behavior. Children grow up in homes in which their parents are more alike than unalike in terms of political activities. On the other hand, parental homogeneity varies across domains of political activity, so that the child is exposed to quite divergent patterns of parental similarity. To some extent, educational homogeneity also leads to political homogeneity. In terms of sheer levels of politicization, the tried and true social factor of educational differentiation serves as a vivid demarcation across and within parental pairs.

---

[20] This is a distinction used by Glen G. Cain, *Married Women in the Labor Force: An Economic Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

[21] Since the mother's education is more likely to exceed that of her spouse in the working class (see note 16), the increased relative politicization among labor market wives increases the correlation between the two relative measures.

[22] See e.g., Orden and Bradburn, *loc. cit.*

If our findings demonstrate anything, however, it is that parents are not simply interchangeable with respect to political resources, spectator politics, and active participation. It is this latter point which leads to a second aim embodied in this paper, viz., specification of the conditions surrounding the relative advantage of one spouse over the other. The bedrock of culturally-defined sex roles more often provides a built-in edge for fathers in the nuclear family. These inequalities, as we have observed, lend support to the view of male superiority. Within this framework, however, remarkable variability exists. The division of political labor among conjugal pairs is seriously conditioned by what each spouse brings to the marriage contract and—an especially crucial point—the result of the intersection and interaction of these characteristics. Thus the relative amount of political behavior engaged in by wives of equal education, for example, will vary depending upon whether they have married a husband of higher or lower social class. As we observed, this particular relationship will be more extreme depending upon the wife's location in the home or labor market.

The division of political labor, then, by no means consistently results in the father being the intermediary between and the interpreter of the external world of politics. Even in those cases where the male edge is clearly dominant, there are abundant instances where the distaff side of the family is paramount or the male advantage seriously impaired. What should not be lost in this generalization is that inequalities favoring the mother ordinarily need to exist before this condition occurs with noticeable frequency. She needs whatever additional resources—and the father corresponding encumbrances—which attend the partnership in order to overcome the debilitating effects of prior socialization, extant cultural expectations, and the distribution of resources. To the extent that these effects are overcome, the political life of each partner, and of the family, is altered.

Appendix

The operational indicators summarized in the first part of the text are described or referred to below.

Knowledge. A Guttman scale (CR = .92) based on six factual items. The specific questions are listed in Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum," this REVIEW, 62 (1968), p. 855.

Party Differences. A five-step index measuring the "correctness" and sophistication of responses about political party differences. Developed and reported in Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261.

Efficacy. A Guttman scale (CR = .93) based on four items. The specific questions are those numbered 1, and 3–5 in John P. Robinson, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Kendra B. Head, *Measures of Political Attitudes,* University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, 1968, p. 460.

Interest. A single question, given in Langton and Jennings, *op. cit.,* pp. 855–856.

Media Exposure. Separate questions about newspapers, television, and magazines, given in Langton and Jennings, *op. cit.,* p. 856.

Election Activities. With one change, this is the five-step index developed and reported in Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 155–156. The change was that respondents were asked to report on activities (except voting) in any public election during the last ten years.

Community Activities. What about other local or community matters? Have you taken an active part in any things of that kind?

School Activities. During the past two years or so, would you say that you have taken an active part in any local school matters?

The *Personal Efficacy* measure is a Guttman scale (CR = .90) based on three items listed in Robinson, *et al., op. cit.,* p. 661.

On Comparing Income Maintenance Alternatives*

THEODORE MARMOR

University of Minnesota

Major social policy decisions in America are not made by intellectuals, particularly academic intellectuals. Nonetheless, social critics, particularly academic intellectuals, extensively discuss the problems of income distribution and poverty. The gross national discussion has grown so large, in fact, that it appears we have a new service industry—one that does a lot of thinking about poverty. True, it has yet to *do* much about poverty, but "firms" within this industry write about poverty, argue about poverty, and generate papers for conferences at an accelerating rate and with escalating volume. The industry's growth has so expanded in the last ten years that some find it necessary to identify the division of this intellectual labor. Advocates of the negative income tax (NIT), for instance, are known by some producers of competing ideas as the "nit-wits."

The net effect of research efforts in the sixties was not to create a consensus concerning what ought to be done about poverty. There has been some agreement that the eventual answer would be an income maintenance program, but there has been less agreement about which plan is best. In the summer of 1968 at a joint congressional hearing on income maintenance, no less than two dozen intellectuals appeared before the committee to offer no less than two dozen different schemes on how the income of the poor might be maintained.[1]

Not only is there a proliferation of proposals, they have often been badly presented for intelligent policy choice. Discussion of family allowances, negative income taxes, and other cash transfer programs proceeds, as Lee Rainwater has said, ". . . either in the form of a catalogue of different proposals . . . or short-sighted polemics about the superiority of some one method."[2]

Commonly, plans are grouped according to administrative method even when their social welfare goals are substantially different. For example, negative income tax plans of vastly different scope and benefit levels are grouped under the same rubric even though they are clearly not alternative means to solving the same problem. The proposal identified with Yale economist James Tobin—a major anti-poverty scheme featuring a $2600 guarantee level, universal eligibility, and a $5200 cut-off point—contrasts sharply with low-level negative income tax plans. One such plan, formulated by Robert Lampman to supplement the wages of the working poor, calls for a $750 guarantee and a $3000 cut-off point for a four-person family.[3] The Tobin plan, because of its universal and high benefits, would cost approximately $26 billion, some five times more than the estimated $5.0 billion cost of the Lampman plan. These two plans are alike in administrative mechanism but have little else in common, since they were designed as solutions to different problems.

---

* This article grew out of a paper presented in May 1969 to the Poverty Seminar of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. I want to thank Lee Rainwater, the seminar's chairman, for that opportunity and the Poverty Institute of the University of Wisconsin for financially supporting and intellectually stimulating this research. A number of colleagues have made useful suggestions at various stages of writing. I want to thank particularly Robert Lampman, Burt Weisbrod, Robert Harris, Peter Martin, John Brandl, and Jan Marmor.

[1] Income Maintenance Programs, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee*, Congress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 1, June, 1968.

[2] Lee Rainwater to author, May, 1968. An example of cataloguing income maintenance alternatives can be found in Christopher Green, *Negative Taxes and the Poverty Problem* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967). James Vadakin, *Family Allowances* (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1968) illustrates special pleading for one mechanism of cash transfer, in this case one defined by the age characteristics of the recipients. Variations in the nature of family allowances are substantial; European nations have programs so different that little is gained by grouping them as if they served common ends with comparable efficiency. Milton Friedman has disassociated his version of a welfare-replacing NIT from more generous negative tax plans such as James Tobin's. See *Time*, "Welfare and Illfare: The Alternatives to Poverty," December 13, 1968. For support of the idea that concepts like NIT do not sufficiently describe a class of programs, see "Comment: A Model Negative Income Tax Statute," *Yale Law Journal*, 78 (December 1968), p. 270, n. 6. The editors assert," 'negative income tax' has no precise meaning," and add that, when they refer to "negative income tax," they mean their own proposal.

[3] Tobin, *et al*, "Is a Negative Income Tax Practical," *Yale Law Journal*, 77 (November 1967); and Robert Lampman, *Wisconsin Law Review*, 2 (1969), pp. 543–544. The plan mentioned—Negative Rates Plan for the Working Poor—is but one of many schemes Lampman has put forward. It is used here to illustrate a type of negative income tax, not Lampman's view of the most appropriate scheme.

There are proposals, on the other hand, which employ differing administrative mechanisms to deal with similar problems. Consider the Brazer child allowance scheme which proposes a universal yearly benefit of $600 per child, the elimination of tax exemptions for children, and a special recoupment tax which decreases the net value of child allowances as income increases. In effect, this plan provides a guarantee of $1200 for a family with two children, a cut-off point of more than $10,000, and a net cost of approximately $12 billion. Though more restricted in coverage than the Tobin negative income tax scheme, the Brazer plan would "remove an appreciable proportion of presently poor families" from poverty.[4] Both proposals are substantial anti-poverty measures, and, as such, have more in common than either does with the low-level negative income tax plan which Lampman proposed as a device to supplement wages and thus extend welfare transfers to the working poor.

The task of this paper is set by the confusions which have plagued the debate over cash transfer alternatives. It seeks to clarify choices in income maintenance, making explicit the trade-offs between competing objectives that are required of policymakers, but which are often obscured by polemics about the advantages or disadvantages of particular transfer mechanisms (e.g., negative income taxes, child allowances, demogrants).

The next section distinguishes among the goals of reforming the present system of public assistance, substantially reducing American poverty, and making both the tax system and the social distribution of income more equitable. Then follows a discussion of six criteria for evaluating and comparing alternative measures to one or another of these goals. The paper concludes with an application of the evaluative scheme to the welfare reform alternatives considered by the Nixon Administration in the spring of 1969.

I. Problems of Poverty and Income Distribution

The income maintenance schemes so widely discussed in the 1960s addressed at least three separable clusters of problems: the crisis of the welfare poor, the difficulties of all low-income Americans, and the inequities of the present distribution of income in the United States.

The first set of problems—identified with the crisis of the "welfare poor"—involves persons currently receiving benefits and those eligible for them under federal and state assistance programs. The most controversial programs include Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)[5] and general assistance. Both hostile critics and sympathetic analysts of public assistance seem to agree that there is a "crisis." What this crisis consists of differs from analyst to analyst, but the following issues emerge:[6]

(a) inadequacy of payment levels;

---

[4] Harvey Brazer, "Tax Policy and Children's Allowances," *Children's Allowances and the Economic Welfare of Children,* Report of a Conference. (Citizen's Committee for Children of New York, Inc., 1968), p. 142.

[5] Eligibility for AFDC requires that the family be needy, fatherless (or include an incapacitated father), and include children under 18; that the unemployed parent and or mother accept a job or training for a job if offered (or else lose the benefits); and that, under the "Man in the House" Rule which applied in many states, the mother be moral. "Poverty, Income Sources and Income Maintenance Programs," *The President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs,* (Background Paper No. 2, May 18, 1968), p 11. In 1961, the AFDC-UP program was instituted, permitting benefits to households headed by unemployed, able-bodied men. Only 25 states had adopted this program by 1969, and less than 100,000 families were receiving its benefits. *Poverty Amid Plenty: The American Paradox* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969) p. 47.

[6] For a typical example of (a), see The Advisory Council on Public Welfare,. *Having the Power, We Have the Duty,* Report to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 2, which asserts that "public assistance payments are so low and so uneven that the Government is, by its own standards and definitions, a major source of the poverty on which it has declared unconditional war." For (b) see the discussion of welfare's "inequitable treatment of marginal nonrecipients" in Jacobus tenBroek, "California's Dual System of Family Laws: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status," *Stanford Law Review,* 16 (March 1964), 257–317; (July 1964), 900–981; Vol. 16 (April 1965), 614–682; and William A. Johnson and Robert Rosenkranz, "Public Assistance" in *Cities in Trouble: An Agenda for Urban Research,* Anthony H. Pascal (ed.) (Memorandum RM-5603-RC, the Rand Corp., August, 1968), p. 87. For (c) see Charles A. Reich, "Individuals Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Issues," *Yale Law Journal,* 75 (June 1965). This theme is understandably stressed by welfare rights' groups and raised in almost all discussion of public welfare See also *Having the Power, We Have the Duty,* Advisory Council on Public Welfare, p. 74, for the warning that "there is great urgency for the empathic assertion of public welfare's accountability for the protection of individual rights, and for the scrupulou observance of the individual rights of the people i serves." For (d) see the illustrative remarks by Congresswoman Griffiths in the 1968 *Hearings of the Join Economic Committee, supra,* n. 1; and Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Crises in Welfare," *The Public Interest* No. 10, (Winter, 1968), p. 4. For (e) see Herbert J Gans, "The Negro Family: Reflections on the Moynihan Report," *The Moynihan Report and the Politics o Controversy,* Rainwater and Yancey (eds.) (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 454. For (f see Moynihan, and the work by Lampman, amon others, on how the American system of transfer payments affects the poor. Lampman, *supra,* n. 3.

(b) disparity of payments between one geographical area and another (beyond cost of living differentials), and among various categories of public assistance recipients;
(c) administrative injustices and arbitrariness, including the alleged stigma of being on welfare, which also serves to deter eligible and deserving persons from applying;
(d) the financial costs of increasing the benefits and the number of eligibles who might seek benefits;
(e) the unfortunate effects of public assistance upon family cohesiveness and work behavior;
(f) the social divisiveness and inequity of welfare programs aiding only certain groups of the poor and excluding others, most notably the working poor.

The dimensions of these problems are not agreed upon; "remedies" to these various difficulties are not obviously compatible or complementary. The numerous plans which have been offered as solutions to the welfare crisis have differed markedly in the priorities they set among these issues.

The second set of problems focuses on poverty in America, the number of persons with incomes below the poverty line, and the amount by which their incomes fall short of that standard (the poverty gap).[7] The non-welfare poor comprise the most obvious target from this perspective. Nearly two-thirds of the poor do not qualify for public assistance, which limits benefits to widows, orphans, abandoned families, the aged, sick, and disabled. Most of those whose income falls below the poverty line are those legally ineligible for assistance because of the restrictive categories now used. One substantial group of nonwelfare poor is the long-term unemployed who are bypassed because of limitations in unemployment insurance benefits, or the lack of universal coverage within public assistance.[8] However, most of the nonwelfare poor are from families in which at least one adult member is working.

Discussion of the nonwelfare poor has focused on how to expand or alter the existing categories in order to include those poor who are now ineligible for assistance; and, given the large number of working poor, how to build work incentives into cash transfers directed towards this group. Availability of work is central to discussion surrounding the long-term unemployed, but not the working poor, since that group already participates in the work force. Rather, aiding the working poor raises the issue of how to supplement income without reducing the incentive to work. Robert Lampman's low level negative income tax is one welfare reform plan that expands coverage while retaining work incentives.[9]

The third set of problems involves the unequal distribution of wealth and income in contemporary America. Here the problem of poverty is not only that many Americans are unable to command a subsistence income, or that the public welfare system has built-in indignities and difficulties. Rather, poverty is viewed as relative deprivation, and the critical difficulties are those of an income distribution in which the relative gap between the very poor and the median wage-earner is widening, not narrowing. The ratio of the poverty line to median income has fallen considerably over the past decade. In 1959 the poverty line was 47 percent of median income; in 1968 it was 36 percent.[10]

Those interested in relative poverty are typically concerned with equity questions as well. Not only does the lower one-fifth in the national distribution of income control "too small" a proportion of the nation's wealth, but from this perspective the operation of the tax system also confers benefits which are socially unjustifiable. Two illustrations should make this point clearer. One equity issue is the way tax exemptions (such as child exemptions in the positive income tax) confer benefits in the form of tax savings whose value increases progressively with family income.[11] Another is the privileged treatment (through exemptions and other tax devices) of particular forms of income (the capital gains tax) and of certain forms of economic risk (the oil depletion allowance).[12] These illustrations of privileged tax treatment raise questions of equity which differ sharply from the issues of the welfare and nonwelfare poor. Accordingly, such a focus calls for a range of solutions quite different from those relevant to the problems of the welfare poor and low-income Americans.[13]

---

[7] The official poverty line in 1969 was $3550 for an urban family of four. The poverty gap was $12 billion in 1966; see J. A. Kershaw, *Government Against Poverty*, (Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 148.

[8] For data on the characteristics of the unemployed, see the discussion of employability in *The President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, Background Papers*, pp. 63–66.

[9] See outline in Robert J. Lampman, "Steps to Remove Poverty from America," Paper prepared for delivery at the Wisconsin Symposium, January 13, 1968.

[10] For a definition of poverty in relative terms, see Victor Fuchs, "Redefining Poverty," *The Public Interest*, No. 8 (Summer 1967), 88–95. Martin Rein discusses the difficulties in absolutist, "bread-basket" conceptions of poverty in Louis Ferman, *et. al.*, (eds.), *Poverty in America* (2d. ed., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 116–133. English social critics have recognized the problem of fixed poverty lines for some time. For a cogent critical view (directed against the views of Rowntree), see Peter Townsend, "The Definition of Poverty," Paper presented at the Colloquium on Handicapped Families, Bureau de Recherches Sociales, held under the auspices of UNESCO, (Paris, 10–12, February, 1964), pp. 6–10. For information on income distribution changes, see *Poverty Amid Plenty: An American Paradox*, pp. 38–39.

[11] It is extraordinary how difficult it is to convince the skeptics that tax exemptions are functional equivalents of direct government expenditures. See H. Aaron, "Tax Exemptions—The Artful Dodge," *Trans-Action*, 6 (March 1969), 4–6, for a statement of both the problem and the good reasons one has for treating tax exemptions and direct benefits as fiscal equivalents. It should be added that the *political process* affecting

II. Alternative Income Maintenance Plans: Criteria for Comparison

I now want to turn to six criteria by which alternative means to a given poverty problem might be usefully compared. These criteria, while not exhaustive, represent the major considerations typically raised by American policy makers. Explicitly using them illuminates the choices among competing goals which a particular transfer scheme represents.

Adequacy. One of the most prominent standards of evaluation in any given income transfer program is the *adequacy of the benefit level.* Discussions of adequacy imply prior stipulation of the relevant standard against which benefits are measured. In other words, for any given conception of an appropriate poverty line, the gap between that line and the present income of the poor constitutes the "adequacy problem." Any transfer plan's benefits constitute some more or less adequate means to fill that gap.[14]

At least two indicators of adequacy should be used. The first is the proportion of the national poverty gap filled by a given transfer program. This indicator provides an answer to the question, "how adequate an antipoverty program is a given plan?" This criterion may be referred to as *aggregate program adequacy.* Second, the adequacy of grants to particular beneficiaries—*individual adequacy*—can be measured by guarantee levels.

Commonly, the Social Security Administration's poverty line is adopted as a reference point.[15] Those persons below the line are said to have less than minimally adequate income. The adequacy of a transfer program can then be evaluated from two perspectives: the degree to which benefits lift a recipient to the poverty line, and the extent to which total benefits fill the $12 billion gap between incomes of persons below and above the poverty line. Thus, the poverty line provides a basis for judging the adequacy of benefits directed to the welfare poor or, in a universal program, to all low-income Americans. The concern for adequacy may also be a criterion for tax reform if it fo-

---

the two forms of transfers differs, and that there may be great differences in the legitimacy associated with particular forms. As Aaron says, suppose, "yesterday on the floor of Congress, Senator Blimp introduced legislation to provide cash allowances for most of the aged. Senator Blimp's plan is unique, however, in that it excludes the poor. The largest benefits, $70 per month, are payable to aged couples whose real income exceeds $200,000 per year. The smallest benefits, $14 per month, would be payable to couples with incomes between $1600 and $2600. Widows, widowers, and unmarried aged persons would receive half as much as couples. No benefits would be payable to those with very low incomes." Aaron remarks that "one can hardly imagine any public figure" introducing such legislation, for fear of being derided "in the press, by his constituency, and on the floor of the Congress. So one would think. But this system of 'old age allowances' has actually existed for many years, not as an expenditure program, but as a part of our tax system," through the double exemption granted aged couples.

[12] Tax reform was the subject of extended hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means during the spring of 1969. For the range of reform proposals see *Tax Reform Studies and Proposals,* U.S. Treasury Department, Joint Publication, Committee on Ways and Means, and Committee on Finance, 91st Congress, 1st Session, February 5, 1969, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).

[13] The argument is not that programs related to one problem have no effect on other social ills; they do. But consider the difference between treating changes in children's tax exemptions as a tax reform issue and as an antipoverty remedy. A more equitable treatment of children's tax exemptions would not necessarily involve enough money to relieve poverty substantially.

[14] The differences between reforming welfare and eradicating poverty come out sharply in how analysts regard the adequacy criterion. Some, like the editors of the *Yale Law Journal,* take it as given that desirable programs will have a guarantee level set at the poverty line. Indeed, they question whether the "SSA poverty line—the 'minimum money income required to support an average family . . . at the lowest level consistent with the standard of living prevailing in this country'—" is adequate, "even if it has gained wide acceptance." *Yale Law Journal,* 78 (December 1968), p. 298, n. 91. On the other hand, welfare reforms costing approximately five billion dollars were in 1970 considered by the Congress. It is clearly possible to evaluate such low-adequacy alternatives by other criteria, and this may be very important if budgetary constraints rule out what the *Yale* editors seek.

[15] The poverty index set by the SSA is the minimum income per household of a given size, composition, and nonfarm status. In 1966 the Agriculture Department Economy Food Plan, which is the core of the poverty index, provided for total food expenditures of 75 cents a day per person (in an average four-person family). The index adds twice this amount to cover all family living items other than food. It has been adjusted for price changes since 1959; but has not kept pace with the increase in median income. Consequently, there was a larger absolute gap between median family income and the poverty line in 1969 than in 1959. Mollie Orshansky, "The Shape of Poverty in 1966," *Social Security Bulletin,* U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, (Social Security Administration, March 1968), p. 5.

cuses on the level of benefits for the poor in the form of more generous exemptions and deductions.

Although adequacy is not always the prime consideration in anti-poverty efforts, it is the principal preoccupation with militant welfare rights organizations and welfare reformers, particularly social workers and welfare critics whose perspective is dominated by setting minimum floors of protection against various contingencies of living.[16]

Stigma. The degree of stigma associated with the source, form and administration of income maintenance programs is the second criterion—one that has been emphasized in some criticisms of the current welfare system. Generally speaking, social insurance programs, in which benefits are limited to contributors, have few stigmatizing associations. The recipients of welfare benefits, however, are often stigmatized as lazy, improvident, and content to live off the charity of others; and welfare benefits are conferred after a sometimes degrading investigation of the means and perhaps the morals of the potential recipient. Alvin Schorr has framed this concern in the telling phrase, "a means-tested program is a mean program."[17]

Those who, like Schorr, are preoccupied with reducing stigma typically turn to non-means-tested programs (like Social Security or child allowances) even when this involves less adequate benefits and much higher program costs. Means-tested programs, they argue, fail to reach all those whom the program is intended to serve, since many eligible to receive benefits are reluctant to apply. This underutilization, of course, has the added effect of keeping down the expense of welfare programs: stigma may be viewed as a means of rationing the use of government programs in which conferring benefits to all those eligible would sharply increase government expenditures.[18]

Finally, one must say that knowledge about the extent of stigma and its causes is impressionistic. How obnoxious the "obnoxious means test" really is remains a question needing an answer before this criterion can be intelligently employed.[19] But the lack of knowledge in public policy is seldom a barrier to either strong views or policy action. And so it is in income maintenance debates that allegations about the causes, effects, and ways of eliminating stigma are presented and received as though stigma were precisely understood.

Equitable Efficiency. Weisbrod defines equitable efficiency as the degree to which "actual redistribution of income coincides with the desired redistribution." To illustrate, Weisbrod describes:

> a manpower retraining program which may be intended to benefit the hard core unemployed—those who cannot find regular employment even under 'full employment' conditions. But, as the program is actually administered, it may (1) miss many in the hard core group, while at the same time, (2) aid a number of less needy persons.[20]

Those concerned with efficiency argue that these effects reduce the desirability of a program. Considerations of equitable efficiency bring out how successfully (or unsuccessfully) a given program delivers benefits to a program's target population, and to no one else.

Weisbrod has introduced a useful distinction between two types of efficiency calculations. One efficiency consideration, he says, is the "degree to which programs intended to benefit group A also benefit group B." This might be termed *vertical efficiency*. The second issue is the degree to which "programs intended to benefit group A reach all of this group." Weisbrod refers to this as *horizontal efficiency*.

---

[16] I am indebted to Robert Lampman for a suggested typology of poverty reformers. He distinguishes three perspectives: that of welfare (minimum floors of protection); of social insurance (security against *variability* of income over time through insurance); and of tax and public finance (equity of treatment, work incentives). Lampman emphasizes that each mentality directs attention selectively and ignores issues of great importance to the others. Thus, public finance experts are horrified by the inequitable treatment of welfare beneficiaries in different categories and in different states, and by the high marginal tax rates public assistance formally requires. Such considerations are less salient to welfare reformers who focus on adequacy of benefits, the speed with which destitution is relieved, etc. Social insurance advocates are more likely to evaluate transfers by the sense of entitlement they involve, the predictability of future benefits, and security they offer large classes of Americans, not especially the poor. This suggestive typology has yet to be worked out, but offers a way of comparing transfers that could be added to the approach I am suggesting.

[17] Alvin L. Schorr, *Explorations in Social Policy* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), p. 62.

[18] The experience with the Kerr-Mills Medical Assistance law brings out this point. Generous in theory, only 32 states had workable programs by 1963, three years after enactment. Theodore Marmor, *The Politics of Medicare* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1970).

[19] Some evidence has recently been gathered in Wisconsin indicating that the poor are not as hostile to the means test as commonly asserted. Handler and Hollingsworth found that "the clients reported very little evidence of hostility toward their case-worker or coercion in the administration of social services." Joel F. Handler and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, "The Administration of Social Services in AFDC: The Views of Welfare Recipients," Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, Discussion Paper 37, p. 39.

[20] Burton A. Weisbrod, "Collective Action and the Distribution of Income: A Conceptual Approach," *The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: The PPB System,* Vol. 1, A Compendium of Papers, Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 91st Congress, 1st Session, (Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 184.

a. vertical efficiency. The vertical efficiency of a program may be defined as the ratio of benefits received by intended beneficiaries to total benefits distributed. If payments are made only to intended beneficiaries, the program's vertical efficiency ratio is 1.[21]

Vertical efficiency can be conceived as a measure of cost effectiveness: the greater the vertical efficiency ratio the smaller the per-unit cost of benefits to the target groups. Thus, between two programs that bring equal benefits to a given target group, the program having the higher vertical efficiency ratio, *ceteris paribus*, will be the least costly.

This conception of vertical efficiency implies that benefits to non-needy persons should be given a weight of zero. At least two objections can be made to this interpretation, as Weisbrod points out. First, there may be other than redistributional grounds for wanting to distribute benefits to the nonpoor (administrative simplicity, for example). Secondly, vertical efficiency may conflict with another criterion. For example, the extent to which a program limits benefits to those within the poverty class may contribute to the stigma associated with such a program. This conflict is implicit in Schorr's comment about the meanness of means-tested programs.[22]

The problem of weighting benefits to non-needy persons is more complicated, however, than simply avoiding stigma. A critical objection to programs with less vertical efficiency is that there may be resentment against windfall gains to those outside the target group. One of the objections to negative income tax proposals is that plans for transferring income to the poor must involve sizeable payments to persons who are clearly not poor in order to provide a "meaningful floor of income and to avoid a very high tax on incremental income."[23] (Taxes here refer to the reductions in benefit payments per additional dollar of family income). The magnitude of this difficulty would be revealed by the vertical efficiency ratio, though the revelation of the difficulty in no way resolves it.

b. horizontal efficiency. Horizontal efficiency may be defined as the "ratio of the number of beneficiaries in the target group to the total number of persons in the target group." The smaller the proportion of the target group (all presumably deserving) being aided, the lower the horizontal efficiency ratio.

It ought to be noted, however, that the *horizontal efficiency* criterion differs from the adequacy standard. Clearly inadequate payments could go to all persons within a target group and thus lead one to rank a program high on horizontal efficiency and low on adequacy. The trade-off between these two criteria—at any given dollar cost of a program—is again a problem of weighting yet to be solved.

Incentive Effects: Work and Family. The work incentive effects of cash transfers is a fourth criterion of importance. Regardless of the administrative mechanism, any transfer program must answer three different questions: What shall be the level of the income guarantee (the maximum benefit)? How shall that benefit be reduced as earnings vary from zero (the tax rate)? And what shall be the cut-off point (the earnings level at which no benefits are paid)?[24]

The appropriate level of taxation on cash transfers depends in part on the effort of the tax rate on the work behavior of various groups in the population. That information is not known in any precise way.[25] The result is that analysts work from rules of thumb of the following sort: any income guarantee will reduce some work effort if the marginal tax on earnings is more than zero; or the desire to work is so great in American society that tax rates up to 50 percent will not greatly reduce workforce participation.

The absence of information about work incentives does not reduce the issues's political salience. Indeed, the existence of strong feelings about what the poor (and near poor) will or will not do under various incentive schemes is what prompted the Institute for Research on

---

[21] As Weisbrod says, "a ratio of unity would thus indicate that all resources of the program are being devoted to the target group and do not benefit any others." *Ibid.*, p. 185.

[22] See also D. P. Moynihan's remarks about stigma and community reactions to transfer programs in his "Crises in Welfare," *The Public Interest*, No. 10 (Winter 1968), 3–29.

[23] See Weisbrod., *supra*, n. 19, p. 187.

[24] Outlined in Christopher Green, *op. cit.*, pp. 126–130.

[25] In most of the literature proposing various income maintenance plans, guarantee levels are so low that to consider many heads of four-person families would give up higher incomes to loaf on $1500 or so per year is ludicrous and in violation of our common sense. Yet, for political reasons, there is still concern over incentive effects of such plans.

Poverty at the University of Wisconsin to undertake the Graduated Work Incentive Experiment which involves testing of several negative tax schemes on the work responses of some 800 New Jersey families. Figure 1, representing a moderately high negative income tax plan, illustrates the choices that must be made among (1) guarantee level, (2) tax rate, and (3) cut-off point.[26] A program guaranteeing $2500 when earnings are zero with a "tax" rate of 50 percent entails a cut-off point of $5000. If one specifies any two of the three variables, the value of the third variable is determined. The plan illustrated in the figure below sacrifices vertical efficiency for adequacy and substantial work incentives.



Figure 1. A Negative Income Tax Plan

The concern about work incentives is part of the larger worry about the relation of transfer schemes to economic growth, productive efficiency, and allocative efficiency. Macroeconomic effects might be taken as another criterion of evaluation. In this paper, the work incentives issue is presented as a proxy for those broader concerns, as well as a salient political issue in its own right. All government redistribution involves what Musgrave calls the allocation and stabilization "functions" of the state.[27] The distribution of government goods and services between regions changes both the distribution of income and the allocation of productive resources. Giving money to the poor simply raises this issue more directly and dramatically. What effect will given transfer schemes have on work performance, the mobility of labor, the process of automation in low-wage industries, or the price of labor? All such questions are called for in evaluating transfer programs. And, it should be added here, transfer schemes may promote different family structures by the way the family unit is defined and the treatment of young adult dependents and related adults other than mother and father. These important issues have received most attention from legal scholars.[28]

Program Costs. The costs of a transfer program may refer to total expenditures at all levels of government or the net increment to the federal budget, taking into account savings in other present federal, state, and local income transfer programs.

Program costs to any unit of government are very difficult to predict. Specifying the tax rate, cut-off point, and guarantee level does not tell how workers will behave. Consequently, the number of persons who will be in a specified income range cannot be unambiguously determined from present data on the poor. Nor can the amount of the poverty "gap" be precisely measured, except retrospectively. The best that can be done is to make reasonable assumptions (perhaps alternative assumptions) about the work response to various plans and estimate program costs on that basis.

The allocation of program costs involves both the governmental unit whose expenditures are affected and the taxpayers who finance the program. Minimum federal payment levels for public assistance, for example, are advocated by some as if the purpose is to increase the total payments to public assistance beneficiaries. But, in fact, the demand for such changes comes prominently from beleaguered state and local governments eager to shift the burden of welfare payments to the federal government. Hence, one of the cost issues is which level of the political system will finance what proportion of any given transfer scheme. Program costs can be treated as either a criterion or a constraint. That is, one can ask, what is the cost of plan X compared to plan Y? Or one can ask how plans compare on other dimensions, subject to the constraint that their program costs fall within a specified range.

---

[26] David Wilkinson, "Foxtracks Across Ice," unpublished paper, University of Wisconsin, provides an illustration of this point. He visualizes the plan "as a line from a reel anchored to the top of an economic ladder. The line assures that the family won't drop below a certain rung. At the same time it assists a family moving up the ladder, though with decreasing payout as the family gets closer to the top. The reel and line represent an income assistance system working in conjunction with the family's own efforts to increase total income with earnings. The line won't lift the full weight of the family to the top, but it continues to be of assistance until the family gets there. The maximum vertical length of the line represents the level of support minimally guaranteed. The lift of the line represents the tax rate applied to earnings, with a smaller tax rate producing more lift than a larger rate. The break-even level corresponds to the top of the ladder, the point where all the line is reeled in."

[27] R. Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), ch. 1.

[28] See, for example, W. Klein, "Some Basic Problems of Negative Income Taxation," *Wisconsin Law Review*, (Summer 1966)

Political Support. The relationship between political and economic costs and benefits is widely discussed but not well understood. As with program costs, political costs can be treated as a constraint or a variable. That is, given the political acceptability of two programs, they can be compared on the basis of the other criteria. Or, they can be compared according to the political support (and opposition) they will probably generate. The conceptual and measurement problems involved, however, are extraordinary.

Political support means the nature and extent of approval for a given program. One may speak of mass support and use polling data as an indicator of it. Public opinion polls recently have shown that more than a majority of those with opinions about income maintenance favored guaranteed employment plans, while less than a majority favored income guarantees.[29] Equally important for present purposes is support by governmental elites, particularly congressional elites. There are few ways one can accurately measure such support before decisive tests (like a vote) are taken. Votes on other redistributive issues are one indicator, but not a fully reliable one. Party positions on the questions offer another clue when combined with knowledge of the pattern of party cohesion on redistributive matters.

A good example of noting political costs and benefits, but not taking them into account in comparing the desirability of transfer programs, can be found in the *Yale Law Journal's* comment on

> the relation between the [*Yale Law Journal's* model] NIT proposal and the increasingly urgent demands for a wholesale reform of public assistance. Any modification of public assistance programs that took into account all the serious criticisms of present welfare efforts—as, for example, do the recommendations of the U.S. Advisory Council on Public Welfare—would result in a system of distributing benefits strikingly similar to that outlined in the model statute. The NIT and public assistance reforms are not so much alternative ways of dealing with poverty as they are alternative ways of dealing with Congress, and the choice between them is chiefly one of political strategy. Since the NIT completely escapes the faulty concepts and spotted history of public assistance, it still ranks as the preferable approach.[30]

III. Evaluating Income Maintenance Alternatives: The Nixon Administration's Choice in Welfare Reform, 1969

This concluding section illustrates how one might use the criteria just outlined to compare income maintenance schemes. The two welfare reform proposals chosen for this purpose—the Nathan task force plan and the Finch/Moynihan proposal to extend welfare benefits to poor families with children—had a timely relevance in 1969. They constituted the major options considered by the Republican Administration in the spring of that year. The subsequent developments in welfare reform—the presidential sponsorship of a family assistance plan that differs somewhat from either of the initial options discussed here, the passage of the welfare reform bill in the House of Representatives and the defeat of the bill within the Senate Finance Committee in the summer of 1970—reduce the timeliness, not the analytical significance, of the following illustrative comparison. It should be noted as well that the evaluative criteria could as easily be applied to other classes of cash transfer plans, whether they are addressed to welfare, poverty or income redistribution issues.

Different welfare reform proposals proceed from different views of the present system of public assistance. Before comparing our two illustrative welfare reforms, some preliminary remarks should be made about the demographic, administrative, and financial attributes of contemporary public assistance. Federal assistance goes to five state-federal programs: old age assistance (OAA), aid to families with dependent children (AFDC), aid to blind (AB), aid to the permanently and totally disabled (ATPD), and aid to the medically indigent (Medicaid). There are residual relief programs in each state which are financed wholly by state and/or local funds. The latter programs are collectively referred to as general relief or general assistance and do not receive federal supervision or funding.[31]

---

[29] In response to a question about guaranteeing every family an income of at least $3200 a year (for a family of four), with the government making up the differences the following results were obtained: favor—36%; oppose—58%; no opinion—6%. Results of a question about providing enough work so that each family that has an employable wage earner would be guaranteed a wage of about $60 a week or $3200 a year were: favor—78%; oppose—18%; no opinion—4%. American Institute of Public Opinion, Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 37, July, 1968, pp. 23–24.

[30] *Yale Law Journal,* 78 (December 1968), p. 282.

[31] The following discussion draws on work of the staff of the President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs which presented its final report *Poverty Amid Plenty: The American Paradox,* in November, 1969.

Table 1. Number of Public Assistance Recipients (in thousands)

December of Year	Total	OAA	AFDC	AB	APTD	GA
1945	3,623.5	2,056	943	71.5	—	553
1951	5,657.2	2,701	1,041	97.2	124	694
1957	6,016.0	2,487	2,398	108.0	281	742
1963	7,379.9	2,052	3,930	96.9	464	737
1966	8,073.7	2,073	4,666	83.7	588	663
1967	8,893.0	2,073	5,309	82.6	646	782
1968	9,725.0	2,028	6,086	80.7	702	827

Source: The President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, *Background Papers*, (GPO, 1970), p. 235.

Federal participation in public assistance was originally designed to help states support persons who were unable to work because of age, blindness, or absence of a wage-earner. Since 1950, new groups and purposes have been included. Aid to the partially and totally disabled was enacted in 1950; in 1960, medical assistance for the aged was enacted as the Kerr-Mills program. In the early 1960s, an unemployed parent amendment permitted AFDC benefits to families where the father was in the home and unemployed (AFDC-UP, now operative in 25 states). Two other legislative developments in the 1960s were of importance: in 1962, rehabilitative services were provided under public assistance and, in 1967, new amendments were passed which sought to get AFDC recipients to work through incentives (job training, day care, financial inducements) and sanctions (denying aid to those considered able but unwilling to work). Categorical public assistance, in summary, was designed for the nonworking poor, and only recently has focused upon problems of rehabilitation and employment.

The number of persons receiving public assistance has grown sharply since 1945. Part of the growth is attributable to the inclusion of new categories of assistance, but the AFDC program is clearly the source of most of the growth. The distribution of recipients for one month, by year and type of program, is presented in Table 1.

The growth in AFDC has dominated much of the discussion of public welfare, or "illfare," as *Time* magazine once put it. The distribution of poor persons *within* public assistance, however, does not point up the proportion of the poor excluded. Less than two-fifths of the twenty-five million who were poor in 1968 received aid from any public assistance programs.[32] Public assistance comprises programs for a minority of the poor. The crisis of welfare is thus only a part of the problem of American poverty.

Public assistance provides federal grants-in-aid to all states for cash payments to individuals and families in need. AFDC receives less federal assistance than the other programs, and the federal share under all the programs varies with the income level of the state. Of the $6 billion spent in 1966 on all public assistance programs, including administrative costs, about 60 percent, or $3.5 billion, came from the federal government. The extent of federal participation over time is presented in Table 2.

The administration of public assistance is discretionary, local, and uneven. Eligible persons are "needy" by virtue of destitution. The definition of destitution varies among the states. Moreover, state grants do not typically pay the difference between their definition of "need" and current income. In some states the "need" for a family of four is $280 per month and a family with no income gets that amount. In other states the "need" is $194, but the family with no income receives only $40. States vary in the requirements for granting assistance as well. In some states there were no residence tests; in others, a would-be recipient had to have lived in the state five of the past nine years and the year immediately preceding assistance. However, the 1969 Supreme Court decision in *Shapiro v. Thompson* ruled such residency tests unconstitutional for federally assisted programs.

The above characterization of public assistance entails no obvious reformist perspective. One may applaud or denounce the ex-

---

[32] The President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs. *Poverty Amid Plenty: The American Paradox*, p. 115.

Table 2. Federal Financial Participation in Public Assistance

Year	Total (millions of of dollars)	Percent of Total Federal	State	Local
1945	987.9	40.7	47.8	12.5
1951	2,382.8	47.6	41.6	10.8
1957	3,090.3	51.3	37.0	11.7
1963	4,712.6	55.5	32.7	11.5
1966	6,652.0	58.6	30.7	10.8
1968	9,346.0	56.1	32.1	11.8

Source: President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, *Background Papers,* p. 235.

tent to which states with unequal resources differently define and support their categorically poor. The extraordinary growth of AFDC might, in one view, be evidence that the states are discovering the needs that exist; in another view, it is a sign of moral decay in want of immediate attention. There are those who think the problem with welfare is that we have too much of it; some are worried about too much administration and other are upset about too many recipients. Then, there are those who see the problem as too little public welfare, either in the sense that too few of the poor are eligible or, within the current system, too little is provided the recipients both in cash and incentives to improve their income position.

Critics of welfare often proceed as if everyone agreed on the nature and ranking of these problems. That is simply not true. Despite the fact that most advocates of welfare reform begin with the same opening salvo of objections to public assistance (indeed the criticisms have become clichés through endless listing), the classification of issues does not bring with it a decision rule. This failure occurs because a decision rule requires *both* a classificatory and a weighting scheme, and only the former is available. My thesis is that a weighting scheme also requires clear, explicit presentation of criteria to be weighted. I have tried to do that and now want to apply those criteria to two illustrative welfare reform proposals and make a first step toward a systematic comparative evaluation.

The two proposals were the chief options under discussion by President Nixon's Urban Council during the spring of 1969. Both plans were directed towards reducing inequities within the present welfare system. One, popularly known as the Nathan plan after presidential appointee Richard Nathan, proposed decreasing state variation in benefit levels through a national minimum standard for the present categories of public welfare, to be administered by the present federal-state welfare apparatus. This plan will be referred to as Uniform State Benefits (USB). The second proposal extended income assistance to poor families with children, which would be administered by the Social Security Administration, and will be referred to as Federal Family Benefits (FFB), though it was known more widely as the Finch-Moynihan proposal.

Both plans seek to reduce inequities presently affecting individuals and states. The inequities for individuals arise from the fact that federal matching formulas are insufficient tools to reduce the variation in state treatment of similar welfare recipients. At the lower level, poor states are encouraged, but not required to provide minimum payments that satisfy the barest conception of subsistence income. The wealthier the state (in per capita income) the lower the proportion of federal support for more generous grants. Hence, welfare generosity is a heavy fiscal burden, one which some states (and state legislators) find politically intolerable.

The similarities between proposals USB and FFB are striking. Both would cost the federal government approximately two billion dollars per year. Both would entail savings to financially hard-pressed states. Both provide for a national welfare minimum. The general income support program (FFB), while not universal, provides payments to all families with children and, thus, is much broader in scope than current AFDC and AFDC-UP programs. It is broader in that the income status of the family is the sole criterion of eligibility; this contrasts sharply with the fatherless-family criterion in AFDC and the unemployed father standard of eligibility in AFDC-UP. While both programs establish minimum welfare standards nationwide, their distribution of the federal financial increment (less than two billion dollars) to the poor and to state treasuries differ. Both the similarities and the differences are revealed clearly by evaluating the programs by the six criteria introduced in the second part of this paper, as shown in Table 3.

Adequacy. The first indicator in Table 3 measures the *individual adequacy* of benefit guarantees. By this standard there is no substantial difference between FFB and USB: both guarantee $1500 to a family of four (or about $31 per month for each family member). If one

Table 3. Comparison of Two Welfare Reform Proposals: Uniform State Benefits (USB) and Federal Family Benefits (FFB)

Criteria for Comparison	Indicators	USB	FFB
Adequacy	• 4-person family guarantee • Poverty gap filled	$1500 or 42% of $3500 poverty line * 1.5/12, .7/12	$1500 or 42% of $3500 poverty line 2/12, 1.3/12
Stigma		no improvement	some improvement
Efficiency		.4	.8
Horizontal Vertical	• Ratio of transfer benefits, poor to nonpoor • Amount of poverty gap filled to total benefits	1 7/15	1 13/20
Work Incentive		$30/month income disregard +67% tax rate thereafter	$50/month income disregard +50% tax rate thereafter
Program Cost†	• Federal Cost • State saving	$1.5 billion $800 million	$2 billion $710 million
Political Support	• Mass support for some reform • Bureaucratic support • Congressional support	+ – uncertain	+ + uncertain
Problem Focus		disparity of payments by State and category (b)‡	inequitable exclusion of the poor (the working poor especially) from public assistance (f)‡

* The first ratio compares total federal program costs to the poverty gap: the second is a ratio of only the transfer amount to the $12 billion poverty gap.

† Excluding food and training programs.

‡ See enumeration of welfare issues in Part I.

takes tax rate provisions into account, FFB appears more adequate than USB; since FFB "taxes" earnings less heavily than USB, it would provide higher average payments to recipients earning the same wages.

The second indicator provides two measures of *aggregate program adequacy:* (1) the ratio of total program costs to the $12 billion poverty gap, the ratio being approximately 1.5/12 under USB and 2/12 under FFB; and (2) the ratio of benefits for the poor to the poverty gap, by which standard FFB is somewhat more adequate.

It should be clear that although FFB ranks higher on adequacy than USB, both programs are inadequate when judged by the current poverty standard. The Social Security definition of minimum income for a family of four ($3500) is not approximated in either program. The $1500 guarantee represents 42% of the poverty line, while the higher FFB program costs ($2 billion) represent one-sixth of the poverty income gap. These points alone serve to demonstrate how welfare reform can proceed quite apart from serious efforts to eradicate financial poverty, either individual or aggregate.

Stigma. Neither program represents a major effort to reduce the stigma allegedly associated with public assistance. USB is an effort to make public assistance less inequitable among states and among different categories of beneficiaries. FFB is directed towards the inequitable exclusion of poor, male-headed families with an employed father. But neither program makes public welfare less selective in the sense of transferring income to the nonpoor. On the other hand, FFB proposes that the family benefit be administered by the Social Security Administration, an adminstrative system considered less stigmatized than welfare agencies.

Some reduction of stigma is associated with FFB on this basis. USB, in comparison, promises no substantial change.

a. Vertical Efficiency. Both programs satisfy this criterion because the ratio of benefits received by the poor to total transfer benefits is 1. This is the case only for the transfer portion of the program. That is, nonpoor persons receive no benefits; no "leakage" of that kind takes place. But, taking into account the state "savings" changes the vertical efficiency ratio for each program. For USB, it is 7/15's; for FFB, 13/20's. Another way of expressing the relative poverty intensity is to compare poverty relief to state financial relief: the ratio of poverty relief to state relief in USB is 7/8's; in FFB, 13/7's.

On the first measure, both programs are vertically efficient. On the second, FFB is far more vertically efficient; 65 percent of its costs represent direct expenditures for the poor, compared with 47 percent of USB going directly to the poor. Since the two programs involve similar levels of federal expenditures, the efficiency ratio makes a useful distinction. Knowing that FFB is more vertically efficient than USB does not, however, tell us how important that criterion is—that is, what weight to give it. However, the comparison avoids difficulties that arise in describing two programs of vastly different cost. A $28 billion program with a vertical efficiency ratio of .5 may appear to be far more "efficient," from this perspective, than the $2 billion FFB program with a vertical efficiency ratio of .65. But this is the case only by mixing the adequacy and vertical efficiency criteria.

b. Horizontal efficiency. Program USB is substantially less efficient, horizontally, than FFB. Indeed, increased horizontal efficiency in public welfare is the chief goal of the family benefit program. Since public assistance aids only about 40 percent of the poor, its horizontal efficiency ratio is .4. Since families headed by a man who works account for the major portion of those excluded from assistance, FFB has a much higher horizontal efficiency ratio, approximately .8. Conversely, USB is relatively inefficient on this dimension, since it retains the current categories of public assistance.

USB subordinates horizontal efficiency to financial relief of states. FFB seeks greater horizontal efficiency at the price of somewhat less financial relief to states. However, this is true only when one looks at the cash transfer portion of the programs. Any additional work and food programs would change these comparisons slightly, but, for present purposes, we will ignore that complication.

Work Incentives. USB provides for a continuation of the present Work Incentive Program (WIN) scheme under AFDC. Under WIN there is an earning exemption of $30, a 67 percent tax rate on additional earnings, and a training-employment program exclusively for AFDC recipients. FFB provides more financial incentives to work than USB, but does not compel recipients to seek training or work. The FFB tax rate is 50 percent, which means that the $1500 guarantee is combined with a cut-off point of $3000. In addition, individuals receive $50 per month as a special incentive for taking job training.

FFB also provides incentives to the state to *move* welfare clients into training. It does so because the trainee would continue to receive his family benefit, any amount he might be receiving from the state to supplement that payment, plus the bonus incentive of $50 per month. States giving families additional benefits under FFB (as would surely be the case in the larger industrial states) could gain substantially from widespread use of this training-payment provision. The training program would cost an additional $600 million if 150,000 training positions were created. Currently, there are 88,000 training positions budgeted under the WIN program, of which 35,000 are filled. At an average cost of $4000/position WIN would cost $325 million when fully utilized.

Program Costs. The additional federal cost of FFB, including the adult categories but exclusive of food and training programs, is approximately $2 billion. Of this, approximately $710 million results in savings to the states. The estimated cost of USB is $1.5 billion, of which roughly $800 million represents dollar-for-dollar savings for the states.[33] Neither estimate, of course, takes into account what the states might do with their "savings"; hence, there can be no precise estimate of total governmental costs of the programs plus state supplementary schemes.

---

[33] All of the financial cost estimates are for Fiscal Year 1972. This postponement of program initiation reflects a number of considerations: the administration's budget-cutting in 1969, the political gains of future as against present expenditures, and the assumption that passage of welfare reform would take perhaps two years. It perhaps should be added that USB cost estimates were understated by some $400 million because no allowance was made for increased numbers of beneficiaries, according to OEO economists I interviewed in 1970.

The program costs criterion is more difficult to apply than it appears. If we take only direct transfers into account, the programs involve incomparable federal program costs: $1.5 billion for USB, $2 billion for FFB. Two complications arise, however. The first is the addition of training and food stamp programs which raise federal expenditures to approximately $4 billion. The comparison in Table 3 involves only the cash transfers, and this may confuse more than illuminate. But even for cash transfers, the program costs are very hard to gauge. It is impossible to know what the work response will be and, hence, the federal costs over time. The above estimates are made as if the poor tomorrow would act precisely as they do today. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe the costs are not markedly understated. Few heads of four-person families would voluntarily quit work to receive FFB's $1500 guarantee. And USB does not assist the working poor.

Political Support. Both programs share whatever diffuse political support exists for "doing something about welfare." FFB directs itself toward the AFDC problem and, through a sleight-of-hand name change, would, in the words of one promoter, "eliminate the much criticized AFDC program." USB directs itself to another aspect of the AFDC problem, the migration of welfare clients to large urban centers. FFB hopes to encourage families to leave welfare and also diminishes incentives for divorce and desertion presently found in AFDC programs. USB retains these unfortunate incentives but provides inducements for families in the less wealthy states to stay there. The support for stemming migration and discouraging desertion of fathers is, however, extremely hard to measure. Congressional committees with welfare jurisdiction are well represented with members declaring "widespread" support for doing something about the welfare mess. It is precisely the unspecified extent and nature of support for action that gives discretion to the congressional elites who judge options like USB and FFB.

The mass public's opinions are equally distant from the legislative system. Whatever diffuse hostility exists towards AFDC in the larger public could be used to justify either USB or FFB. Where the two programs differ most sharply—as, for example, on the question of whether geographical inequity is less pressing than the exclusion of the working poor from public assistance—public opinion is unformed and unlikely to be crucial in the decision-making process. Both programs tap other widespread anxieties: the desire for making work more attractive for welfare clients; the financial problems of the states and localities in meeting welfare costs; and the current preoccupation with food programs. Referring back to our six criteria, it is clear that USB and FFB differ most sharply on the weight given to horizontal equity in a welfare reform that does not address itself to eradicating poverty.

The political costs and benefits from improving the horizontal efficiency of public assistance are easiest to estimate at the federal administrative level. The gains of substance are evident from either a welfare or public finance perspective. Professional reformers within the bureaucracy have for some years been seeking universal public assistance based on income criteria rather than the present categorical scheme which defines eligibility in terms of the *cause* of low income (blindness, disability, old age, etc.). If bureaucratic support is the only measure, then FFB without doubt ranks higher. Neither proposal proposes to do away with state administration of other adult programs; hence, one cannot contrast them in terms of the jurisdictional squabbles raised.

A measure of political support, as central as bureaucratic preferences, is the anticipated reactions of Congress. The political costs of USB arise from its failure to deal with the problems of the working poor and its relatively lower horizontal efficiency. Its advocates, however, would argue that the congressional system directly represents the financial interests of states and localities, and that only a minority of the Congress stands for interests of the working poor and welfare efficiency. This argument rests, however, on the assumption that widespread congressional support for each feature of welfare reform is the precondition for enactment (the consensus view of political support). If, in contrast, one assumed sufficient general support for a large class of welfare reforms, the greater equity and efficiency of FFB would be decisive. Bureaucratic support for equity and efficiency would greatly assist in creating the minimum favorable coalition in the finance committees of the Congress. Only if it appeared that a determined majority could develop *against* FFB would one say that the political support criterion dictated selection of USB.[34]

The politics of welfare reform provide a striking illustration of the characteristic political processing of redistributive policies.[35] The role of the bureaucracy in that arena is one of balancing the interests known to be involved in income redistribution. The Congress ratifies or refuses the bargains that are expressed in the legislative initiatives brought to it. The evaluative effort we have been making represents the comparative analysis that was in fact made of USB and FFB within the Nixon Administration in the spring of 1969.[36]

Constrained by a $2 billion budgetary allowance for additional cash transfers, committed to welfare reform, concerned about the pressures to relieve the states of part of their welfare burden, uncertain about what will reduce welfare rolls, federal officials had to compare programs by criteria whose weights are uncertain. If we have been unable to provide those weights and, hence, the basis for a simple decision rule, at least we have isolated some important criteria and discussed some of the issues involved in giving them weights.

IV. Conclusion

This paper has sought to clarify the choices among income maintenance alternatives, not to advocate a particular policy option. It began by distinguishing among the goals of reforming the present welfare system, substantially reducing American poverty, and making both the tax system and the social distribution of income more equitable. The second part set forth six criteria by which the desirability of competing income transfer schemes could be judged. The third section illustrated the use of these evaluative criteria by comparing two welfare reform plans that were before the Nixon Administration in 1969. Overall, the paper has sought to clarify the problems that exist in choosing among income maintenance alternatives and the necessity of giving relative weight to conflicting criteria.

---

[34] Predictions of support for a particular welfare reform proposal cannot be simply inferred from opinions about a program's principles. Politicians choose between proposals in constrained circumstances; the failure to distinguish approval of a program from willingness to support it has confounded predictions about the fate of welfare reform. A recent article, for example, claimed that no "income by right" proposals are "politically feasible in the near future because few people want them." On the basis of interviews with fifty congressmen and an unspecified number of federal officials, Cavala and Wildavsky concluded that few political actors approved of income-by-right plans. Hence, they argued, "the President will not support [such a plan] and the Congress would not pass it if he did." In October, 1969, President Nixon sent to the Congress a $5 billion welfare reform bill, including a negative income tax for families with children similar to FFB. In early 1970 the House Committee on Ways and Means overwhelmingly supported the President's bill (by a vote of 21–3), an action which virtually assured House passage of the Family Assistance Act. No one could have predicted this sequence of events from presidential, congressional, or mass opinions about the desirability of income guarantee plans. The President faced a choice of whether to take action on the crises in public welfare and, subsequently, what type of welfare reform to propose. The Ways and Means Committee was not asked to express views on income guarantees, but to choose whether to support the Nixon welfare reform or some alternative course of action (including inaction). This episode suggests the difficulties of measuring political support for particular, constrained policy options by inquiring of politicians whether they approve of a broad class of policy principles. Bill Cavala and Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Feasibility of Income By Right," *Public Policy*, (Winter 1970), pp. 321, 349.

[35] For a characterization of the redistributive "political arena," see Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics*, 16 (1963–64).

[36] On October 2, 1969, President Nixon sent to the Congress the Family Assistance Act of 1969, a plan modeled after FFB with the addition of a work requirement, child care provisions, somewhat different work incentives, and more than twice the estimated program costs. These changes from the FFB alternative would require a separate discussion of policy developments outside the scope of this paper, but of continuing interest. For a discussion of various aspects of the Nixon Administration's proposed Family Assistance Bill, see *New Generation*, 52 (Winter 1970).

Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR.
Harvard University

Government as men know it today almost everywhere is indirect. It does not admit that it rules the people, for it claims to be the representative of the people; the people govern themselves through their representative. They are not ruled directly by others, because the government has its source in themselves and its legitimacy in fidelity to their purpose, however that may be ascertained. Nor do the people rule themselves directly; their self-government must be accomplished by agents appointed out of themselves and given sovereign powers in an artificial, public status.

To maintain this indirect government, the people must ask political questions in an indirect form. The direct political question is whether the law or the command by an officer of the law that a citizen encounters is decent, good or useful. Instead of this question, or before it, citizens under representative government must ask whether the law or the command is truly representative, that is, whether in some manner it comes from themselves. If it has come from themselves, they can have no complaint or remedy against it unless they challenge the very idea of indirect government. For to complain against a bad law merely because it is bad implies that government ought to rule directly when it knows better than the people what is good, and to have a remedy against a bad law merely because it is bad implies that the people, knowing best what is good for itself, ought to rule itself directly without intermediates. Thus today politics is seen in terms of giving effect to the aspirations of the people at home and abroad for self-realization and self-determination. Citizens criticize their governments, and governments condemn other governments, not primarily for what they do but for failing to represent the people in doing what they do.

It is true that the direct political question is not forgotten. In ordinary times, it is not always deflected or postponed, and in a crisis, it cannot fail to arise. The direct political question cannot be abolished because it must always be answered; governments and citizens must decide on the better course, and to do this, they must distinguish the good from the bad. But today we assume that the direct question is answered best when it is not raised directly as the most urgent question. We believe that the direct question of good and bad must be approached through the indirect question of representation, and that only by this approach can a tolerable or true answer be found.

Hobbes was the first to argue that the indirect question should precede the direct and that representative government, by enforcing this precedence, answers the demand for good government. He made this argument in political science, of which he claimed to be the founder. The problem of this essay is to show how Hobbes, by means of his new political science, substituted the indirect political question we now ask for the direct question that political science or philosophy used to appropriate directly from political disputes.

I. Hobbes and Political Science

Hobbes claimed that political science was only as old as his *De Cive*, published in 1642.[1] Yet he was not the first to advertise his own new discoveries in morals and politics. That man was Machiavelli, and he was followed by several others up to Hobbes, notably Bacon and Descartes; these are commonly regarded as founders (or at least early champions) of modern politics and modern science because they did not fear to claim the glory of men who make new discoveries. In claiming this glory, they did not call themselves "moderns," for they were more than merely members of the movement they founded. They could congratulate their contemporaries on an exceptional opportunity, but they also had to accuse them of exceptional weakness, as did Machiavelli especially, in order to justify the presentation of new discoveries rather than a renaissance of old wisdom. Nevertheless, these founders prepared the later use of the term "modern," after they had captured some of the citadels of authority, to mean self-conscious and self-advertised progress beyond the tradition in politics and science. This use of "modern" is reflexive, derivative by way of both inheritance and opposition from the tradition. One may infer that "modern" thinkers are peculiarly academic because they must explain the tradition in order to show improvement upon it. Their polemic against the tradition makes them present it, instead of some pre-scientific or pre-philosophic view, as the beginning; so their whole argument takes place within science, on the assumption of the superiority of science. In addition, they objected against the tradition that it was too indulgent to the fancies and inconsistencies of common sense. The idea of "modern," deriving from the proclamation of new discoveries, has a general indirectness because of its reflexivity. Academies are not peculiarly modern, nor are commentaries; and the modern thinkers rejected them both as institutions of traditional authority. But the tradition, even in its scholastic complications, had to come to terms with pre-philosophic opinion, whether based on common sense or revelation; it had to confront the direct question of good and bad in politics. The idea of "modern" by itself makes modern thinkers inattentive or hostile to questions arising directly from non-scientific opinion. Even when some of them, from the school of empiricism, seem to rely on opinion or common sense, they reconstruct it and confirm it with science.

---

[1] Hobbes said this in 1646 before he published the *Leviathan*, in which (and not before) his new political science culminates in the theory of representative government. *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, Sir William Molesworth (ed.), 11 vols. (London, 1839–45), hereafter *EW*, I, ix; VII, 470–471; M. M. Goldsmith, *Hobbes' Science of Politics* (New York, 1966), pp. 228–229; Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 1–2. Quentin Skinner has brought to notice a number of Hobbists in Hobbes's time (though not the most prominent one); but he does not justify his claim that Hobbes "represents" a view, since he finds no pre-Hobbesian Hobbist. "The Ideological Context of Hobbes' Political Thought," *Historical Journal*, 9 (1966), 286–317; cf. Michael Oakeshott, Introduction to *Leviathan* (Oxford, 1957), pp. xvi-xvii, liii; John Laird, *Hobbes* (London, 1934), ch. 2; David P. Gauthier, *The Logic of Leviathan* (Oxford, 1969), p. 70.

Before Hobbes, however, the indirectness of modern thought was visible in either the understanding of political things or the science of non-human things, but not in both. While recognizing that discoveries in politics are less welcome than discoveries in physics, Hobbes was the first to advertise novelty in a science of politics.[2] From this alone one can infer his intention to revolutionize the practice of politics. For why would he make his claim so openly unless he meant his science of politics to have new practical effects? More than this, he must have meant novelty itself to enjoy a new and friendlier welcome. Practice now to be based on theory must acquire at least some of the openness to invention characteristic of theory, and practical politicians having seen politics revolutionized by Hobbes's science must lose their fear of revolution arising out of theory. Hobbes's political science is above all and more than any other political science opposed to revolution as rebellion against the sovereign; but to assure this result, the community is opened to revolution from political science itself more than by any previous political science.[3] From this fact the indirectness of his political science may again be inferred. Hobbes wished to operate on political practice through theory.[4] The theoretical question of how to organize the commonwealth then becomes the first in urgency as well as (or rather than) first in dignity. The theoretical question displaces the first practical question, the direct question of good and bad.

II. The Good and the Bad in Politics

Hobbes takes men as equal in the state of nature ("the condition of meer Nature" in the *Leviathan*). Men being so considered, no man is naturally better than another; and especially, no man is a natural ruler of another man. Since man's natural state is non-political, no opinion of good and bad can justify the rule of some men by others. Some men will be better than others in the civilized state, but they cannot support a claim to rule others from this fact. What is primarily natural to man is his original rather than his potential state: that part of his nature which is operative in the state of nature rather than that usually more visible part which flowers or thrives in society. Men's equality in the ability to kill, largely suppressed in civil society, is more fundamental than the inequalities of talents, strength and beauty which remain latent in the state of nature.[5] The claim to rule must be based on the primary equality rather than the subsequently revealed inequalities, because it is government, or a common power, that permits the inequalities to reveal themselves. In providing security necessary for inequalities to develop, the sovereign must favor those talents that do not impair his sovereignty; so his authorization affects the natural inequalities. Before being itself affected by natural inequalities, the government affects them. The better men must be grateful to the sovereign for being allowed to show and profit from their superiority; they are not in a position where they can make claims on other men because of their superiority.[6] This consequence applies to the claims of democrats, when they claim superiority over the privileged few in honesty, moderation or power, as much as to claims of superiority from aristocrats.

---

[2] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, W. G. Pogson Smith (ed.) (Oxford, 1965), *Ep. Ded.*, p. 4; ch. 11, p. 79; ch. 29, p. 251; ch. 30, p. 259; ch. 31, p. 285; *Rev.* p. 557; *De Homine*, XI.9, 11; XII.12; XIII.3, 5–6; Samuel I. Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan* (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 125–126; Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston, 1960), p. 247. Cf. Raymond Polin, *Politique et Philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes* (Paris, 1953), p. 150, who believes that Hobbes was a conservative; see note 3 below.

[3] *Leviathan*, ch. 20, p. 160; ch. 26, p. 212; ch. 30, p. 259; *Rev.*, p. 555; see J. W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes's System of Ideas* (London, 1965), p. 153. Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1260b33–7.

[4] This intention kept him from making a distinction between pure and applied political science, as recently suggested to him by F. S. McNeilly, *The Anatomy of Leviathan* (New York, 1968), p. 190. On the importance of theory for modern representative government, see my article, "Modern and Medieval Representation," *Nomos*, vol. XI (1968), *Representation*, J. R. Pennock and G. Chapman (eds.), pp. 55–82.

[5] *Leviathan*, ch. 8, pp. 52–53; ch. 11, p. 76; ch. 13, pp. 94–95; ch. 15, pp. 117–118; ch. 20, p. 154; ch. 21, p. 166; ch. 37, p. 344; *De Homine*, XIII.5.

Thus, according to Hobbes, all opinion of good and bad is by nature private opinion; coming from naturally equal men, it is no basis on which to claim to rule and carries no public implication. In the state of nature there can be no public opinion, in the sense of an opinion justifying the rule of some men by others, not merely because a public does not yet exist, but because a public has no basis in natural superiority.[7] Public opinion cannot then serve as a means to create the public, as if by arguing from some natural superiority men might establish an approximate artificial superiority: for example, the older established as the wiser. Public opinion, like the public itself, must be created. It follows that political controversy culminating in the conflict of claims to rule does not lead, under philosophic examination, to the discovery of a natural right to rule. The direct question of good and bad in politics implies a claim to rule which is untenable in the state of nature. To ask what is good in politics implies the search for a standard under which some men (one, few or many) would be qualified to rule others. In the state of nature as Hobbes shows it, man has the passions of men as we see them living in a commonwealth, but not necessarily the opinions.[8]

The natural equality of men, properly considered, makes it possible to disjoin their passions from their opinions. In order that men be equal, their opinions must be equal; and opinions will be equal only when they are restrained from pretentions to rule. But opinions found in politics are inherently pretentious in this way: they express man's vanity, his supposing of power in himself from nature or God. They can be restrained only when they are reduced to the passions behind them. Hobbes contrasts the similitude of the passions with the variety and secrecy of the *objects* of the passions.[9] Secrecy in dissembling and lying is the testimony men give to the political character of opinions. Men keep their designs secret because they expect to gain something from other men which they could not get willingly. To prevent this unnatural dominance, Hobbes proposes that political science be based on passions rather than derived from opinions, or the objects of the passions.

The import of this inference can be estimated from a comparison between Hobbes and the chief of incompetent political science, Aristotle. Aristotle said that man is by nature a political animal because man alone of the animals has speech (*logos*) in which he can express the advantageous and the harmful, the just and the unjust, the good and the bad. He contrasted speech with voice (*phoné*), which other animals use to express pain and pleasure. Hobbes denied that man is by nature political, and he was therefore compelled (or rather, enabled) to oppose the view that men must express opinions of good and bad in politics.[10] Hobbes and Aristotle agreed that politics is the realm of opinion or controversy, a specifically human realm where men, lacking the instincts of other animals and the certainties of the gods, must speak to each other. While Aristotle thought this fact points to the naturalness of politics and political controversy, Hobbes supposed, through his (qualified) argument for natural human equality, that political controversy endangers the natural human condition and makes men seek to escape it. For Aristotle, men come to government because political controversy is natural; for Hobbes, men are forced to consent to government to escape the consequences of political controversy.

---

[6] *Leviathan,* ch. 10, pp. 68–70; 73–74; ch. 11, pp. 76–77; ch. 28, pp. 245–246; ch. 29, p. 256; ch. 30, pp. 261, 266, 270; *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic,* F. Tonnies (ed.) (Cambridge, 1929), II.4.9; *De Cive* I.2, *EW,* II, 29.

[7] *Leviathan* ch. 6, p. 41; ch. 18, pp. 136, 139; ch. 20, pp. 158–159; ch. 29, p. 257; Watkins, *op. cit.,* pp. 138, 152.

[8] Macpherson fails to make this distinction, and hence fails to accept the opposition between the state of nature and civil society; he can then conclude that Hobbes's "natural man" reflects his "civilized man" instead of forming the basis for a critique of his contemporary civilization. For Hobbes, it is rather that civilized man as we see him too much reflects natural man as we might find him; but if we find natural man, we will be driven to transform him into civilized man as he might be, living commodiously in peace. As for finding natural man, Macpherson quotes Hobbes's remark that the state of nature was never actual "generally . . . all over the world" to show that the state of nature is a mere logical hypothesis, when in fact it shows the contrary. C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 19–29, 43–45, 101–105; *Leviathan,* ch. 13, pp. 97–98.

[9] *Leviathan, Intro.,* p. 9; ch. 6, p. 44. By moving from the various objects of the passions to the similitude of the passions Hobbes takes refuge, according to Watkins, in "an unfalsifiable metaphysical proposition," since the passions have to be attributed rather than inferred from the evidence of them in their objects. This criticism applies to the extent that Hobbes's "natural man" is a scientific hypothesis, not an actual fact; for Watkins does not deny that the existence of passions can be inferred from passionate behavior. But this psychological uniformity, whether attributed or seen, has for its purpose the anti-metaphysical reduction of soul to body and therewith the exclusion of miraculous irregularity from human consideration. Let Mr. Watkins say whether his openness to "reports of strange goings-on in faraway places" includes "claims to divine inspiration made by seditious preachers." Watkins, *op. cit.,* pp. 107–109.

One must then understand covenant or consent in Hobbes's political science as a bypass of political opinion. It is a means of avoiding the controversies arising from the direct question of good and bad in politics by finding the unspoken basis of opinion in the passions. Consent differs from political opinion in respecting the natural equality of men. Since men are equal, all have an equal right to consent. Political opinion, however, implies a greater fitness of some part of the country to rule the rest, and hence even if that part is the majority, it implies a denial of the equality of men. It might seem that government by consent of the people rests on the political opinion of the people, but Hobbes tried to prevent this consequence. Men in the state of nature must consent to government on the basis of their passions, in which they are equal, not on the basis of their designs for the objects of the passions, which lead them to make political claims. Consent for Hobbes is not mere speech, or the giving of opinions; it is a reconstructed expression of one's passions preceded by a critique of one's opinions. A man consents properly, that is almost unreservedly, to government only after he has placed himself imaginatively in the state of nature, and then allowed his passions to overwhelm his opinions.

"The passions that encline men to Peace," says Hobbes, "are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them."[11] None of these passions issues in a political opinion; on the contrary, all conspire to establish peace by quieting political controversy. Perhaps they are reducible to the fear of death, by which Hobbes means the fear of violent death rather than a general fear of human mortality, for the desire of commodious living is never allowed to interfere with bare preservation. At any rate fear is "the passion to be reckoned upon."[12] As a passion, as the universal and strongest passion, it is responsible for the natural equality of men. Fear and its subordinate passions generate consent, and consent means consent to *be governed*.[13] The right to consent is not a claim to rule. When men consent to be governed, they avoid the controversy that develops from conflicting claims to rule. By acting from fear, they admit they are naturally equal and deny they are naturally qualified to rule. They do not offer themselves for office, but accept it when offered by the consent of a majority. If the sovereign is a democracy, the people make decisions in an assembly dominated by orators. They must still abstain from ruling other men in accordance with their private opinions and they can secure no more liberty for themselves under democracy than under any other form of government. Indeed, Hobbes thought democracy the worst form of government because of the license it gives to vain opinion. Democracy, according to Hobbes, merely multiplies the number who decide on the public opinion, i.e., the civil law. It cannot rest on any alleged political qualification in the people, such as honesty; so it cannot legitimately aim to increase participation in politics. To the extent that democracy does increase participation, it is bad, for it ceases to do the work of sovereignty. Hobbes's argument from the natural equality of men requires absolute sovereignty and prefers absolute monarchy as the best form of sovereignty, but in practice it would be hard to distinguish the preference from the requirement. It is his lesson, like Plato's in the *Republic*, that the strictest equality justifies the greatest inequality. But whereas Plato thought that with equal opportunity natural differences would appear, Hobbes thought that equal opportunity was available only outside society, where natural differences do not appear. An artificial difference must be created by consent.

For Hobbes, then, consent is not a kind of participation in politics; it is, to the contrary, as far as possible an abstention from politics. When men consent to government they restrain themselves from acting on the implication of all political opinion, a claim to rule. Aristotle thought this claim to be a fulfillment of man's nature; Hobbes thought it a perversion. Consent is so different from political opinion for Hobbes that he could base his political science on covenant or consent and yet at the same time oppose all political opinion of his own and previous times. Consent is opinion reduced to passions and reconstructed to lack all political implications; it is synthesized opinion, purified of politics. Hobbes was anxious that government not be derived from consent until he had made clear the meaning of consent. Otherwise his theory of consent could be confused with Puritan democracy and his theory of absolute sovereignty confused with the divine right of kings (though both confusions together might help in practice to bring civil peace). Before consent is loosed, it must be constructed and opinion must be restrained. The instrument of these tasks was Hobbes's political science.

---

[10] Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a2–18; *Leviathan*, ch. 17, p. 130. See Polin, *op. cit.*, ch. 1 and Leo Strauss, "On the Basis of Hobbes's Political Philosophy," in *What is Political Philosophy?* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), pp. 174–178.

[11] *Leviathan*, ch. 13, p. 98.

[12] *Ibid.*, ch. 14, p. 108.

[13] Hobbes rejects the term "consent" in favor of "covenant" unless "consent" is understood to include "subjection." *Ibid.*, ch. 17, pp. 129–131; ch. 18, p. 133; cf. ch. 16, p. 126; *De Cive*, V.4–9, XI.1, *EW* II, 65–69, 143.

It might have seemed from the comparison with Aristotle that Hobbes, by restraining opinion to an unreflective (though not unguided) voice of the passions, was reducing men to brutes. If the nature of man does not authorize the expression of good and bad in politics, if there is no natural public opinion, man would seem to be nothing more than a complicated animal. But Hobbes maintained the difference between men and brutes precisely in the capacity for science. The very instrument that in reducing opinion seems to endanger the special nature of man, rescues it.

At the same time, science resolves man's political problem. Science teaches men to consent to government on the basis of their passions. Thereby men avoid placing reliance on their opinions, which produce conflict and which are necessarily false insofar as they imply a claim to rule. Instead, men imagining themselves in the state of nature may now use their true nature to generate consent. Whereas opinions becloud the truth with deceit and self-interest, consent comes with candor from the passions. Men consenting to government tell the truth about their nature which has been made available to them by Hobbes's science. Since the truth is available to all, it can safely be told by everyone; and if it can safely be told, there is no excuse for not telling it: The truth must be told.[14] No one can argue the necessity of secrecy in a case where some man might not appreciate the truth and so no man can use secrecy in cases where others might appreciate the truth too well.

Since Hobbes finds the fundamental truth about men in their passions, he makes it possible for the truth to be told. Yet everyone must speak the truth at once, or else no one can be sure that his candor will not be taken advantage of. Everyone must first look at everyone else in order to be sure that it is safe to tell the truth about themselves and to consent to government. This critical hesitation reminds us that the direct question of good and bad has been circumvented. Men must not act directly on their opinions of good and bad; they must first look at others to see what they will do. Every moral action must be preceded by a sidelong glance so penetrating that it amounts to a self-revelation of the nature of man. "Covenant" is the case of "contract," according to Hobbes, when one party or both promises to perform later. The essential problem of morality is to guarantee that promise and give assurance to "him that performeth first."[15] Without a common power to guarantee promises, no man can dare, much less be obliged, to become the first performer.

Hobbes's version of the golden rule states the problem of the first performer. It is one of his most celebrated self-proclaimed novelties, for he gives the standard to compare with the revision.[16] The standard says: do to others as you would have them do to you. This means: act on your own notion of the good as if others were to act on the same notion, but do not wait for them to act first. Do not wait for private advantage, but act now for the good. Hobbes's revision says the reverse: be content with as much liberty against other men as you would allow other men against yourself. Do not deal with others as if you were legislating for them with some notion of the good, but be ready to surrender private right for the sake of private advantage when others are willing and as much as they are willing. Do not act on your own notion of the good, but wait until others are ready to act on their own good; then join them.

By obeying the revised golden rule, men authorize the sovereign. In this authorization they tell the truth *about* themselves to one another, and hence *to* themselves. When all men discover, by noting the force and universality of the passions, that men are equal, then all men find their own willingness to restrain themselves. They institute a sovereign representative, an artificial person who serves as the indispensable agent of the general self-awareness. Men are naturally private individuals, and as soon as they realize this fact, they construct an artificial public to restrain themselves. But they will not construct an *artificial* public *until* they realize they have no natural public; they must understand the vanity of opinions in their political implications. As long as they do not understand the necessity of constructing the public, they will rely on a natural public, that is, on natural rule, and will think themselves justified in criticizing all artificial rule on the basis of some supposed natural rule. When men see, however, that all rule is artificial, they will correctly conclude that sovereignty must be absolute. It is because government has no basis in nature, no natural strength, that it must have an absolute artificial power.

---

[14] *Leviathan,* ch. 18, pp. 137–140; ch. 19, p. 146; ch. 30, pp. 260–261, 269; ch. 31, p. 285; ch. 44, p. 473; *Rev.,* pp. 548, 555.

[15] *Ibid.,* ch. 14, p. 105.

[16] *Ibid.,* ch. 14, p. 100; ch. 42, p. 388.

Men consenting to government authorize an authority which binds them by every one of its actions; the author is bound by the authority. Yet the authority is the agent of the author; how does it acquire an absolute power? Hobbes's answer is that anything less than absolute power leaves men still in the state of nature, for they cannot be sure that others will abstain from injustice when they do. The agent can serve only when he has absolute power. He is *the* agent of men, for he makes possible all civilization including every other transaction among men using agents in the ordinary, limited sense of the term.[17] The paradox of the indispensable agent, master of all to whom he is necessary, underlies every non-paradoxical agency. Hobbes's sovereign represents us, not to another body as in the medieval notion of representation, but to ourselves. When we know what we are, we realize that we need to be represented to ourselves. Men cannot tolerate a politics directly expressing their true nature, if their nature is what Hobbes says it is. In his view men are so base that they need either to give themselves the illusion of being agents of an invisible power or to represent the truth about themselves indirectly in the absolute power of an earthly sovereign.

Men authorize absolute power for the sake of an end, to preserve themselves. It is true that when one considers the *end* of authorization, the *formula* of authorization seems to require a limitation for the sake of the end: not absolute power but power "in those things which concern the common peace and safety." But when men aim at this end, they cannot achieve it. Accordingly, the formula of authorization achieves the end by absolutizing the means, that is, the sovereign. It thus prevents men from calculating their obedience merely as means to an end, for by this calculation they might not only run away in an emergency (which Hobbes admits is sometimes just) but also anticipate the need to run away. The near-term end of security for each individual in an emergency can be achieved only as the long-term of "common peace and safety," and this can be achieved only if it disappears from view so that it cannot be calculated.[18]

The representative is the common power constructed by a transfer of every man's natural sovereignty (except in his right of self-defence). Having spoken the truth about himself, every man promises to obey what he has authorized. Hobbes's system depends not on a promise to be good, but on a promise to hold to one's word; and since one's word states the truth about man's nature, the system depends on a promise to tell the truth. A common power is both the condition and the consequence of this promise, and the term "common power" carefully (one could almost say explicitly) avoids reference to a common good. Rather than prefer a certain form of rule because of a certain opinion of the common good, men consent to a "common power" prompted by their passions and instructed by Hobbes's science. So instructed, they use the cleansed language of the passions, which is abstracted from the objects of the passions, or opinions. They say "power" not as power to do something definite but as power to do anything or something indefinite.[19]

Hobbes's reduction of external goods, goods of the body and goods of the soul to "power" in chapter ten of the *Leviathan* reaches its intended conclusion in the purified concept of "common power." Here Hobbes's indirect politics comes to the aid of his indirect ethics: men can be sure that others are good when the common power brings sanctions against a tergiversator or a naysayer; and they can be sure that others will not impose notions of the good when the common power is authorized by themselves. A common power out of oneself that speaks to oneself enforces an ethics that works only when it is universal: Reflected government supports noncommittal morality. Self-government is made necessary by Hobbes's denial of natural rule, but it is made possible by the construction of an artificial sovereign. This sovereign stands as intermediary between oneself as ruler and oneself as ruled. No man can give direct orders to himself![20] If he could, he could also give orders to other men. So self-government is always indirect, through a self-constructed sovereign.

---

[17] *Ibid.*, ch. 19, p. 143; ch. 22, p. 172; ch. 26, p. 204; ch. 38, p. 345; ch. 42, pp. 443, 451.

[18] *Ibid.*, ch. 17, cf. pp. 131 and 132; ch. 23, p. 185; Polin, *op. cit.*, p. xix.

[19] Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953), pp. 194–196.

III. Obligation

Hobbes presents a theory of obligation. One should pause over this fact because not every political philosopher presents a theory of obligation; indeed, Hobbes was the first to do so. Students of his theory might penetrate more deeply to its weaknesses if they allowed themselves to wonder that he had such a theory. Men live in the state of nature without rule; they are naturally free of all political obligation.[21] Yet in this condition they live miserably; so they need government and obligation. Hobbes is required to present a theory of obligation because he has argued away all natural obligation (in the sense of obligation to one's betters). According to him, men have an inalienable right of self-preservation, which amounts to the right to govern themselves; but on the other hand they live miserably when all exercise that right, and so it must be alienated. The problem of obligation becomes *the* problem of political science only if men begin entirely free of obligation. Then they must acquire obligation by their own efforts and against their own inclination.

If, however, men begin with the possibility that some men are better fitted to rule than others, that is, if men begin with a potential obligation, then the question would be not (or not at first) *whether* they have an obligation, but *which*. The issue would be between regimes to decide which is the better way of life and who are the better rulers. Hobbes shows himself relatively indifferent to this issue. What matters is not kinds of commonwealth but commonwealth itself, for every commonwealth, whether monarchy, aristocracy or democracy, provides the same absolute common power. The problem is in constructing a commonwealth, since all authority goes against the grain, not in choosing the kind of commonwealth. It is compounded by the apparent ubiquity of government, for government seems natural since it is so ordinary. Only by imaginative reflection can men be taught to construct obligation from the beginning, instead of choosing between the claimants for obligation that present themselves directly in political controversy.

Thus the weaknesses of Hobbes's theory of obligation appear as tasks he has undertaken to prove his general thesis that all obligation is by consent.[22] He cannot rely on any seemingly natural obligation, for example of children to parents; on the contrary, he must reinterpret every such support of natural rule, first to show that it does not indeed support natural rule and second to reconstruct it artificially on the basis of consent.[23] Hobbes's theory is necessitated by the lack of natural obligation and then beset by the need to explain natural obligation away. Everything must be made anew by consent; so Hobbes must bring to the task all the shifts and devices by which obligation not apparently consensual is reinterpreted to be the result of consent.

The most important device of this kind is

---

[20] ". . . he that is bound to himself onely, is not bound"; and the reason is that he cannot give away his right of defending himself. *Leviathan*, ch. 21, p. 167; ch. 26, p. 204; ch. 28, pp. 238–239.

[21] Obligation in the state of nature exists in a state of suspension, waiting for "validation" (to use Warrender's term) by a common power. Warrender's commendable attempt to show that Hobbes is more than a mere legal positivist unfortunately denies the truth that he used natural law in an attempt to establish the absolute sovereignty of legal positivism. Absolute sovereignty is necessary because natural law cannot operate in the absence of civil law; and this is so because without a common power, the just man, the first performer, will suffer for his justice. Thus he can justly "anticipate" the criminality of the criminal, i.e. become the first aggressor. (*Leviathan*, ch. 13, p. 95) Then the purpose of natural law as it exists in the state of nature is to excuse, not to obligate. Indeed, men will not obligate themselves unless they know they are excused from natural obligation, unless natural law is derived from a natural right. When the state of nature is understood as essentially an excuse for men, and then compared with its Christian equivalent, the result is not favorable to the grounding of obligation upon God's will. Howard Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 63, 70, 105, 147–148, 288; *De Cive*, III.27, XV.7, *EW*, II, 46n, 209.

[22] Leslie Stephen said that Hobbes "would be more consistent, if not more edifying, if he threw the contract overboard altogether." *Hobbes* (New York, 1904), p. 193. But to understand his theory of obligation one must look for a consistent intention that explains its difficulties and inconsistencies. It is perhaps just but surely unedifying to make Hobbes consistent against his will.

[23] *Leviathan*, ch. 13, p. 97; ch. 17, p. 132; ch. 20, p. 153; ch. 22, pp. 178, 180; ch. 27, p. 237; ch. 30, p. 263; *De Cive*, VIII.1, *EW*, II, 109. Schochet says that because the consent of children to parental dominion is tacit, the family rather than the individual remains "the basic social unit for Hobbes." It would be better to say that because the obedience of children to parents in a form of consent, the individual rather than the family remains the basic unit in and outside society. Gordon J. Schochet, "Hobbes on the Family and the State of Nature," *Political Science Quarterly*, 82 (1967), 443–445; Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought," in *Hobbes Studies*, K. C. Brown (ed.) (Oxford, 1965), p. 189.

Hobbes's concept of "voluntary," which we may mention briefly. A voluntary act, he says, is simply an act proceeding from the will, and will "is the last Appetite in Deliberating." Thus an action prompted or even demanded by the passions is nonetheless deliberated or chosen. Hobbes has almost abolished the Aristotelian distinction between voluntary or spontaneous action and choice. From his definition of "voluntary" he draws the political conclusion that a covenant produced by fear is still voluntary consent.[24] As we have seen, it is much better as well as more likely that the covenant be produced by fear than by opinion, since fear produces a more solid and lasting consent. But there is one interesting limitation. A potential sovereign may secure the consent of his potential subjects by threatening them with death if they refuse, but he may not force them by torture to accuse themselves or others. When tortured, men seek ease from the pain rather than truth, and since the most fearful pains are upon them, they lose the aid of fear as a motive to tell the truth.[25] It may be helpful to state baldly that Aristotle's ethics is based on actions, while Hobbes's is based on passions. Hobbes, the first political scientist to argue that all obligation is by consent, had to understand consent as not necessarily deliberated in the old sense. His sovereign by institution or consent closely resembles the sovereign by acquisition or conquest, since men consent through fear of one another and subject themselves through fear of the conqueror. Yet Hobbes must protect the difference between fear and force in the case of torture. His theory of obligation depends on men's knowing and speaking the truth in order to avoid choosing between good and bad. He therefore depreciates the deliberation by which men would choose the good according to their opinions in favor of the science which teaches men to consent without deliberation on opinions.

IV. Nature, Reason, and Government

Men obligate themselves through representation in accordance with the truths of political science, having rejected their pre-scientific opinions of natural obligation. Today the notion of natural obligation has no defenders and few students, though it may still have many pre-scientific believers. The doctrine of artificial obligation by representation has been established both in politics and in the universities which Hobbes thought so potent in determining politics. Yet two objections are currently made against Hobbes's theory: How can men create the common power which enables them to escape the state of nature? If they can, how is obedience to this power morally obligatory?

The first objection asks how men can escape from the state of nature, when to do so they need a common power that, by definition, is absent from the state of nature. Hobbes seems to place men in a vicious circle when he supposes them in the state of nature: a common power is, as was said above, both condition and consequence of the escape.[26] How do men create a common power? They cannot by their prudence, for prudence is bound to past experience and can achieve only a presumption of the future based on a reckoning of probabilities. To have foresight of things to come, men would need the power to cause them to come, which foresight understood supernaturally is prophecy and understood naturally is guessing. But men in the natural state lack this power, and their experience does not contain any sense of it on which prudence might presume for the future.[27]

By happy chance, prudence is not men's only recourse, for they also have reason or science. Men share prudence with other animals, and as with animal traits, they do not differ much among themselves in degree of prudence. Men of the same age have about the same prudence, Hobbes says, if in "different occasions."[28] The unhappy chance of the human problem is resolved by the happy chance of the specifically human faculty. The human problem is man's natural freedom, which brings him to war and leaves him without a guide in nature to lead him to peace under a common power. But he can find a guide in himself, in human nature, the natural law or rule of reason[29] by which men seek peace. This law cannot be based on experience up to now, as the human experience has been war, whether open war in the state of nature or unawakened war[30] in those societies not accepting Hobbes's political science, that is, in every society up to now.

---

[24] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1111b7–11; Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 6, p. 47; ch. 14, p. 107; ch. 21, p. 161; cf. ch. 45, p. 509; *EW*, IV, 243–245, 272–273. See J. Roland Pennock, "Hobbes's Confusing Clarity—The Case of Liberty," *Hobbes Studies*, pp. 107–108; Watkins, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

[25] *Leviathan*, ch. 14, pp. 107–108; ch. 20, p. 153; ch. 46, p. 534.

[26] Stephen, *op. cit.*, pp. 194–195; Warrender, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–7, 141–142, 167; Watkins, *op. cit.*, p. 140; Peter Mayer-Tasch, *Thomas Hobbes und das Widerstandsrecht* (Mainz, 1964), p. 46; John Plamenatz, *Man and Society: Machiavelli through Rousseau* (New York, 1963), pp. 134–136; A. G. Wernham, "Liberty and Obligation in Hobbes," *Hobbes Studies*, pp. 137–138.

[27] *Leviathan*, ch. 3, pp. 20–21; ch. 5, pp. 36–38; ch. 8, pp. 55–56; ch. 13, p. 94; ch. 20, p. 160; ch. 21, p. 165; ch. 25, p. 200; ch. 46, p. 519.

[28] *Ibid.*, ch. 8, p. 55.

[29] *Ibid.*, ch. 14, pp. 99–100; ch. 15, pp. 113, 122–123; ch. 18, p. 137; ch. 20, p. 160; ch. 26, p. 205; ch. 42, pp. 402, 406; *De Cive*, II.1, *EW*, II, 14–16.

Natural law is a rule of reason in the double sense of found by reason and constituted by reason. Men reflect on their own nature, using the specifically human faculty of reason to conceive a new possibility not directly derived from experience. Though imagination is derived from sense, men can compound imaginations to conceive images not found in experience, such as Centaurs.[31] Moreover, this faculty of conceiving is peculiar to humans, as opposed to the search for the cause of an effect, which is not: "When imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it."[32] Men have a faculty of conceiving possibilities beyond the presuming of probabilities, and they can use this faculty to add to their natural power. Animals bound to prudence are bound to their experience, in effect to their instincts. Men are free not only in the negative freedom from instincts but also in the positive freedom to conceive a substitute for instincts.

In his discussion of reason and science in the *Leviathan,* Hobbes notably omits any purely contemplative function for science.[33] Men conceive by imposing names, for the use of names lifts them above particulars or above the facts of experience; and they reason by connecting names. Science is the perfection of reason. It is "the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time. . . ."[34] To illustrate the difference between prudence and science Hobbes gives the example of two fencers, one with great natural dexterity and the other who has, in addition, an acquired science so that he knows every possible posture or guard. The ability of the latter would be infallible, Hobbes says. It is not unrelated to the natural dexterity of the first fencer; indeed, it seems to be an expansion of natural dexterity just as, more generally, science is an expansion of experience. For Hobbes, science, including political science, is general but not *a priori* in the Kantian sense of prior to all experience. Although he divides knowledge into two kinds, science and history, he did not do so with Kantian strictness and hence did not distinguish *a priori* from *a posteriori* science.[35] He did in his way attempt to reach Kant's goal of separating morals and politics from previous experience. For Hobbes, man's end is an escape from, rather than a fulfillment of, his nature.

By the use of reason or science men can construct a common power of which they have no previous experience—which is contrary to their previous experience. In conceiving the common power, men cause it to come into being; they do not have to wait for it to arrive, because it is there when it is conceived. The *form* of this conception is a generalization of each man's natural sovereignty. In the state of nature each man is sovereign. He conceives the power necessary to a common power by generalizing the power he has in the state of nature, for the artificial sovereign merely represents the absolute sovereignty of natural man. His conception has a basis in experience, since he knows from experience what absolute sovereignty is and that it is necessary, and it takes its conclusion from experience that men need to augment their dominion over men. But the means chosen, a conception of artificial sovereignty, is utterly contrary to experience, because the transfer of natural sovereignty to an artificial person requires that it be in large part abandoned.[36] It is by representing the very cause of man's "warre of all against all," his natural sovereignty over all things, that civil peace is achieved. Common power is conceived out of and yet against the natural power of individual men.

Reason is not only the form of this conception in a generalization, but also the *content.* Hobbes believed that reason in its principle of non-contradiction could serve as the content of morals and politics. The content of morals and politics is essentially the same—justice. Justice means keeping one's promises, especially *the* promise which makes every other promise secure and all other virtues possible, the promise to obey the sovereign. Why should one obey the sovereign? It is against the principle of reason not to obey. The promise to obey authorizes as one's own every act of the sovereign's; so the keeping of this promise is merely the recognition of what a man has said. Failure to obey is self-contradiction.

---

[30] *Leviathan,* ch. 18, p. 137.

[31] *Ibid.,* ch. 2, pp. 14–15.

[32] *Ibid.,* ch. 3, p. 21. Speech is not necessarily specifically human, but conceiving is; *Ibid.,* ch. 4, p. 31; *De Homine,* X.1. The specifically human faculty of science is supported by the "singular passion" of curiosity; a lust of the mind for knowing causes, "a perserverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of knowledge." The causes to be known are not things above men which men take pleasure in understanding, but things capable of being manipulated by men for the sake of increasing human power. With their natural curiosity, however, men do not have "curiosity to search natural causes." They are commonly satisfied with supernatural causes, their curiosity misled by their fear of invisible spirits. This Hobbes's science aims to dispel. *Leviathan,* ch. 3, p. 20; ch. 6, p. 44; ch. 8, p. 61; ch. 11, pp. 80–81; ch. 12, pp. 82–83, 86; ch. 37, pp. 343–344.

[33] *Ibid.,* ch. 6, p. 44; ch. 11, p. 75; ch. 35, p. 314.

[34] *Ibid.,* ch. 5, p. 37.

[35] *Ibid.,* ch. 5, p. 38; Warrender, *op. cit.,* p. 269. Frithiof Brandt, *Thomas Hobbes' Mechanical Conception of Nature* (Copenhagen, 1928), pp. 221–228.

[36] *Leviathan,* ch. 14, p. 102; ch. 28, p. 239.

> So that *Injury* or *Injustice*, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of Scholers is called *Absurdity*. For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done.[37]

Justice is truth-telling, avoiding absurdity. It is the operation of the specific human faculty, reason, reasoning on itself and on the fact that it finds reason in other men. Hobbes made the distinction between error and absurdity, the former a mistake in the presumption of fact, the latter a false general inference. Injustice is absurdity because it pertains to the general and infallible theorems of a science, but it may be surmised that it is also error. Just men tell the truth about men as they are in fact as well as in science, so that in justice both senses of truth-telling, or both kinds of knowledge, meet.[38] Justice is the keystone of human knowledge as much for Hobbes as for Socrates, as it is here that human science finds its basis in human nature. But for Hobbes, unlike Socrates, the truth that is told is the primacy (not merely the inevitability) of one's own. One's own does not mean one's own unrestrained opinion. All men have reason, and they can use it, through an authorized representative, to achieve the justice of consistency in actions. Hobbes says that "Good, Evil and Contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them," but he does not say this of just and unjust. There can be no science of good and evil until it is resolved into the science of justice, where equality in the common possession of reason makes possible consistency in the use of it. Yet nothing prevents one's own consistency from being consistent folly.[39]

The science of justice, like all science, is acquired by industry "first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method." As we have seen, it is quite unlike prudence, which comes proportionately with experience and thus to all men of the same age more or less equally, at least in their own affairs. Most men are so far from science that they do not know what it is, and they are wiser only than those who "fall upon false and absurd general rules."[40] Moreover, Hobbes's science of justice transforms *the* rule of thought into *the* rule of justice; it tries to assimilate deeds to reason, asserting that doing what you said you would do is the same as not contradicting yourself. It is in sum a highly intellectual doctrine only recently discovered and never yet applied. Yet it is superior to all traditional political science in its applicability because the motive it uses is less intellectual than the motives of traditional political science. Fear, that is, the fear of punishment, is the motive for being just, and in this fear men are roughly equal. But what makes an action unjust is its being against the principle of reason.[41] Most men can be taught to appreciate vaguely that disobedience is self-contradiction, but they will not feel the wrong of self-contradiction as they will the fear of punishment. Hobbes has raised the principle and lowered the motive of justice; rather, by raising the principle of justice above opinions regarding good and bad he has lowered the motive below such opinions. The more highly intellectual principle produces the more forcible motive.

In this conclusion I have virtually answered the second objection raised to Hobbes's theory, that it does not succeed in creating a *moral* obligation to the common power. Hobbes, it is said, discovered only a *psychological* obligation, but morality is separate from psychology as prescription from description or value from fact. Other scholars who argue that Hobbes did succeed in supporting a theory of moral obligation believe it necessary (and possible) to show that he did not base his morality on his psychology, but on the divine will. Hobbes himself repeatedly equated natural law with moral law. Most commentators today can be divided into those who cannot believe he meant the natural law is moral and those who cannot believe he meant the moral law is natural.[42] But he meant both; he held to natural law in the traditional definition that man's end (which for Hobbes is moral rather than contemplative) is to be derived from man's nature and must be stated in a command. His innovation was not intended to weaken or destroy natural law but to restate it in more effectual form and thus preserve and revive it. With a more forcible motive than the unsupported desire to be reasonable, and with a content of science rather than opinion, natural law will be robust and certain. But it neither collapses into psychology nor ascends to a Kantian *a priori* morality. Hobbes's natural law is moral because it does not merely endorse the bad politics of his day; it counsels and commands that politics be made to conform to the true psychology of human nature. And the moral law is natural because it is derived from human nature in a double sense: from the nature of reason and from the fact that men have reason in their nature. For Hobbes, men act from fear, according to reason. It is confusion to anticipate in this statement solely the positivism or the idealism of our day.

---

[37] *Ibid.*, ch. 14, p. 101; see ch. 15, p. 115; ch. 16, pp. 123–124; ch. 18, pp. 133–135; ch. 27, p. 233; *De Homine*, X.5; *De Cive*, III.3, *EW*, II, 31. See also A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," *Hobbes Studies*, pp. 38–39; Warrender, *op. cit.*, pp. 230–231, 337, who rightly senses the danger to his interpretation from this passage; Watkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 153–154, 161; Wolin, *op. cit.*, p. 267; Polin, *op. cit.*, p. 144; Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, p. 105.

[38] *Leviathan*, ch. 5, pp. 34–35; ch. 13, p. 98. Note that Hobbes does not use the distinction between error and absurdity at ch. 4, pp. 28–29.

[39] *Ibid.*, ch. 6, p. 41; ch. 22, pp. 173–175; ch. 24, p. 196.

[40] *Ibid.*, ch. 5, pp. 36–37.

[41] *Ibid.*, ch. 30, p. 259. The answer to Hume's unanswerable question, "Why are we bound to keep our word?", is that it is against reason not to. Hume, *Essays Moral, Political and Literary* (Oxford, 1963), "Of the Original Contract," p. 468; see Joseph Cropsey, "Hobbes and the Transition to Modernity," in *Ancients and Moderns*, Joseph Cropsey (ed.) (New York, 1964), p. 224.

V. Representation

Obligation takes effect through representation according to Hobbes, and yet while his theory of obligation is under daily review by commentators, his thoughts on representation have been infrequently examined. In the view I have been arguing these thoughts are the root of our contemporary practice of representative government. Representative government is government authorized to make decisions about good or bad in politics, and so it shifts the direction of the political question from the ends of politics to the procedure of authorization. It appears to be government "out of" rather than "for the sake of," and Hobbes believed that "out of" could lead men safely to the "for the sake of."[43] If men could stop disputing the ends of politics and agree on the condition of all ends, they could follow privately those ends whose pursuit is consistent with the same allowance to other ends. Under Hobbes's golden rule, the universe of tolerated ends is defined by the condition of all ends, including the intolerable, and that is civil peace. The end of government thus becomes security for those ends that can be represented.

Hobbes has been completely unsuccessful in keeping political controversy within the limits of his doctrine. Men continue to dispute the ends of politics, though to be sure often in the guise of ways of representation. In this post-Hobbesian disputation, his way of representation has become one among many or one aspect of the whole. Hanna Pitkin, in her fine recent study of representation, calls it "the authorization view."[44] It is "true but partial," for nowadays we also wish to make the representative accountable. Indeed the lack of accountability in Hobbes's understanding of representation would lead many to deny that his system resembles modern representative government. It has no representative institutions as we understand them, renewed by elections, unless the sovereign deigns to permit them,[45] and then, according to Hobbes, it is the sovereign and not his assisting institutions that is the sole representative.

Mrs. Pitkin rebuts this objection with the observation that representatives are authorized by past elections and made accountable by future elections.[46] In both cases, the emphasis is on the formality which creates representatives. She wants to know, in addition, who the representative is and what he does, and her book consists in a search for "substantive representation." Hobbes's argument, however, goes in the other direction, and so, it seems to me, does the genius of modern representative government. His view intends to cover the whole of human concerns and his instrument of relief, the sovereign representative, is authorized to establish opinions of good and bad so that they may be removed from private judgment. It is the necessity of this removal that dominates Hobbes's view of representation. That view is formal and hence narrow because representation cannot state the substance of government directly. To do so is to deny the need for representation, for if the ends of politics could be specified with safety to themselves and to the men pursuing them, men would not need to present their ends to themselves through representatives. They could rule or be ruled in accordance with those ends. But Hobbes saw that the ends of politics cannot be stated so impartially that no one will dispute them, and he believed that it was necessary to prefer an impartial civil peace to a disputable statement of political ends. Thus the ends or the substance of representation have to be inferred from the formality or the process of representation. The formality of the "authorization view," later changes notwithstanding, is simply necessary to the indirectness of representative government.[47]

---

[42] See Watkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–84, 92; Plamenatz, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–125; Richard Peters, *Hobbes* (London, 1956), pp. 170–173; Polin, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–193; Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes's 'Leviathan,'" *Historical Journal*, 7 (1964), 326; Brian Barry, "Warrender and his Critics," *Philosophy*, 43 (1968), 129–130; Gauthier, *The Logic of Leviathan*, p. 98n; and Warrender, *op. cit.*, pp. 93, 98–99, 110; Taylor, *loc. cit.*, pp. 39, 44–45; F. C. Hood, *The Divine Politics of Hobbes* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 4, 29–30; F. S. McNeilly, *The Anatomy of Leviathan*, pp. 183–185, 209–210.

[43] "For whatsoever men are to take knowledge of for Law, not upon other mens words, but every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men; which no Law can be, but the Law of Nature." *Leviathan*, ch. 26, p. 208. So Hegel: "Previously 'ideals', whether it was the Holy Scripture or positive right cited as authority, were laid down; against this Hobbes sought to derive the bond of the state and the nature of its power from the principles that lie within us, that we recognize as our own." G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, G. J. P. J. Bolland (ed.) (Leiden, 1908), p. 915. Speaking of the promise in the contract, Bentham said: "It was still necessary to determine . . . the question men studied to avoid [that of the people's happiness] . . . in order to determine the question they thought to substitute in its room [that of keeping one's promise] . . ." *A Fragment on Government*, *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, John Bowring (ed.), 11 vols. (New York, 1962), I, 269. But the purpose of Hobbes's argument is to determine universally that the people's happiness can be assured by the justice of keeping promises; then the question of their happiness need not arise as such in political disputes.

[44] Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 14–37; 55–59, 113; Wolin, *op. cit.*, p. 279; Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, p. 190n.

[45] *Leviathan*, ch. 19, p. 143; ch. 22, pp. 172–175.

Hobbes did not pretend that the formal principle of non-contradiction might supply the opinions of good and bad which he as little as any man thought possible entirely to abolish in politics.[48] Rather, he supposed that one set of opinions, although latitudinous, must be established, and that this can be done with the device of authorization and an insistence on consistency. Today we add elections to authorization and we do not speak of consistency as the principle of justice, but we practice a similar principle in effect when we suppose that the cure for bad government is more or better representation. In the rhetoric of modern politics it is impermissible to blame the people for the bad government they may originate, and yet they can be excused only by admitting the necessity of perfecting their representation to the point where no one but the people can be blamed.

VI. Conclusion

Hobbes makes it quite clear why he constructed this bizarre system. He wished to suppress private judgments of good and bad in politics because such judgments endanger civil peace. He did not suppose that the sovereign could make these judgments accurately, much less easily.[49] Always hostile to lawyers, he did not elevate law over private judgment because private men are amateurs meddling in the field of experts. Expertise in law implies a standard of law external to the will of the sovereign, such as the common law or the traditional natural law of "right reason." But lawyers are neither the most intractable to the sovereign nor the most dangerous with the people. Under Christianity a class of men exists whose vital interest is to maintain the right of private judgment of good and bad, or of private conscience, since it gives them the right to seize political advantages and to deny political responsibilities.[50] As intermediaries between man and God, priests become the authoritative interpreters of the private conscience, exercising this authority for their own good and to the end of civil confusion.

To foil their designs, Hobbes performed the feat of constructing an external standard, natural law, that is coextensive with the dominant opinions, or positive law.[51] By natural law, men authorize every positive law on the principle of non-contradiction; with their reason, they authorize the opinions about good and bad established by the sovereign. The distinction of reason or science between truth and absurdity is used to generate the public opinion about good and bad. Then it comes as no surprise that Hobbes is compelled to recognize the right of private judgment of truth and absurdity, at least in matters of religion, in order to deny the right of private judgment of good and bad. No man can justly transfer the use of his natural reason; he must have it to use for the authorization of public opinion. He must have it, that is, to deny himself the misguidance of an external standard of good and bad.[52] Such a standard might be the natural right of Aristotle or the revelation of Christianity or Hobbes's elegant combination of Aristotelity, which is Aristotle in scholarly or priestly captivity.[53] The first is denied by Hobbes's natural law of authorization, and the second and third are denied in consequence. Men could not authorize a sole sovereign if they allowed the possibility of private revelation, which could justify an independent priesthood. But the principle of reason used to authorize a sovereign also serves to criticize revelation. Every revelation must pass the test of reason or science, Hobbes says, because there can be no absolute knowledge of past (or future) fact.[54] The test of reason is human as opposed to the divine, as it takes for its principle that men can be held to what they can begin. Hobbes uses the rule of speech in the regulation of deeds by understanding the fundamental deed of covenanting as making. Men deny every external standard by using their natural reason to make an artificial standard for themselves.

---

[46] *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

[47] Gauthier, on the other hand, is so pleased with the "authorization view" that he does not see that its formality was designed to promote a certain content or end; *op. cit.*, ch. 4.

[48] *Leviathan*, ch. 18, pp. 136–137.

[49] *Ibid.*, *Intro.*, p. 10; ch. 25, p. 200; ch. 27, p. 227.

[50] *Ibid.*, ch. 18, p. 139; ch. 29, pp. 250–254; ch. 36, p. 335; ch. 39, pp. 361–363; ch. 40, pp. 370–371; ch. 42, pp. 387, 421–423; 444, 450; ch. 43, pp. 457, 461; ch. 44, 472–477; ch. 47; *Behemoth*, *EW*, VI, 362–363. Taylor concludes that "the only difference" between Hobbes and Thomas Aquinas in this matter is that Aquinas makes the ecclesiastical power the authorized interpreter of Scripture (*loc. cit.*, p. 52). This is a beautiful combination of exaggeration and understatement.

[51] *Leviathan*, ch. 26, p. 205.

Justice would then seem to be truth-telling. Justice means keeping one's promises, which is telling the truth about one's intentions, the subject keeping his promise to obey and the sovereign keeping his promise to provide security. Subject and sovereign, private and public, are connected in the duty of truth-telling. Neither can lie to the other because the basis of common power is the principle of human reason. Justice for Hobbes is not, as for Plato, an inquiry into the good, beginning from opinions about justice and culminating in the discovery of the idea of the good. It is the principle which avoids that inquiry; it is truth-telling rather than truth-seeking, honesty rather than philosophy. If justice is philosophy, it can justify a noble lie told by those closer to those farther from the truth. But Hobbes's justice seems to rest on the common human possession of natural reason, so that community becomes possible when men consent to sovereignty in accordance with the principle of reason. Truth-telling assumes a fundamental equality in the most unequal faculty.

Accordingly, Hobbes decries the use of metaphor in reasoning, as when some men use metaphor disingenuously for "contention, sedition, or contempt."[55] An example is the "conscience," which originally meant common knowledge and as such was dignified and protected in "the plea of conscience"; afterwards the same word was used metaphorically to mean knowledge of men's own secret thoughts so that men could claim reverence for those thoughts.[56] Yet metaphor is less dangerous than rank absurdity because it professes deceit, and perhaps for this reason Hobbes, though exposing the Christian use of metaphor, makes extensive use of it himself without apology. His writings abound in apt metaphors, including the title of his most famous work.[57] It is very fitting that the science of indirect government be expressed indirectly in the metaphor of an artificial man. Representative government thus seems to be a metaphor in which we say that the laws imposed on us come from ourselves, because the artificial man acts for the natural man. We say that laws come from us so that we cannot say they come from God, except indirectly through the authoritative interpretation of the sovereign we create, also called "that Mortall God."[58]

Hobbes invented modern representative government as an attack on Christianity. It is an indirect attack, because he opposes a necessary consequence of Christianity, the independent priesthood, rather than Christianity itself. But he may also have borrowed the idea of indirect government from Christianity. Both Christianity and Hobbes understand human government as a necessary intermediary, either between man and God or man and man.[59] Both make that government the keeper of men's consciences and the interpreter of men's opinions, either by revelation or by science. The connection between them is in Hobbes's use of and remarks on metaphor. He maliciously borrows his central metaphors from Christianity and uses them, like Christianity, to disguise his government.[60] He thereby invented that modern cloud, representative government, which claims to present man to himself and tries to prevent men from asking what is good for themselves. Hobbes undoubtedly thought that representative government is good for man; so it is good for men not to ask directly what is good for them. Thus the good, understood as civil peace, enforces the use of metaphor as well as science on reason. To keep men from raising the direct question, Hobbes's argument transforms civil peace from the condition of all goods into the good simply. The direct question returns when one wonders about the sufficiency of civil or earthly peace.

---

[52] Civil laws are artificial chains "fastened at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears." Hobbes seems to leave the eyes free to see what they must after his instruction. *Leviathan,* ch. 2, pp. 17–18; ch. 12, p. 82; ch. 32, p. 287; ch. 36, pp. 336–337; ch. 42, p. 388; ch. 45, pp. 498–499, 509; ch. 46, pp. 533–534; ch. 47, p. 543. Thus there is no inconsistency in the sovereign's interpreting religion on his own responsibility and deciding good and evil on the responsibility of the subject; cf. Watkns, *op. cit.,* p. 161n.

[53] *Leviathan,* ch. 46, pp. 522–523.

[54] *Ibid.,* ch. 7, pp. 49–50; ch. 36, pp. 335–336.

[55] *Ibid.,* ch. 5, pp. 37–38; see ch. 4, p. 32; ch. 5, p. 36; ch. 7, pp. 50, 52; ch. 8, pp. 53–54; ch. 15, pp. 122–123; ch. 25, pp. 197, 199; ch. 26, p. 215; ch. 34, pp. 303, 307; ch. 35, p. 319; ch. 36, p. 324; ch. 39, p. 361; *Rev.,* p. 555. Joseph Cropsey has recently made this unnoticed aspect of the *Leviathan* the theme of an important study, *loc. cit.,* pp. 220–221.

[56] *Leviathan,* ch. 7, p. 50; ch. 29, p. 249; ch. 30, p. 273.

[57] *Ibid.,* ch. 28, p. 246.

[58] *Ibid.,* ch. 17, p. 132; ch. 45, p. 499; Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes,* p. 28; Watkins, *op. cit.,* p. 75. Dietrich Braun argues that the Mortall God is the consequence of "the absolute positing of one's own reason as God," but he does not appreciate what private reason has to yield, viz., the power of deciding good and bad, to secure its "absolute positing." Dietrich Braun, *Der Sterbliche Gott* (Zurich, 1963), pp. 184, 194, 252.

---

[59] *Leviathan,* ch. 33, pp. 301–302; ch. 35, p. 317; ch. 36, p. 335.

[60] The very idea of representation is traced to transubstantiation, *Ibid.,* ch. 44, pp. 478–479; ch. 45, p. 511. The earthly sovereign "may be called the Image of God"; Hobbes makes him an artificial man; *Ibid.,* ch. 45, p. 508. Cf. Cropsey, *loc. cit.,* p. 225, on the personation of the true God; and on the trinity, cf. *Leviathan,* ch. 16, p. 123 and ch. 42, pp. 383–384.

Political Democracy as a Property of Political Institutions[*]

DOUGLAS W. RAE

Yale University

We quite often write and talk as if political institutions either were or were not democratic. But we understand, at least should understand, that this is a misleading linguistic convenience: some institutions are *more* democratic, others *less* democratic.[1] Some, that is, guarantee decisive authority to articulate majorities over articulate minorities in all events, some give no such assurance, and most fall between these extremes. Moreover, we know that the strength (or weakness) of this assurance is contingent upon a great variety of structural features—group exclusion, factional control, decision rules, minority veto groups, patterns of representation, and the like. And if we are to pursue democratic theory on the (correct) understanding that it is a matter of degree, then a theoretical index must be constructed, its contingent relationships to these structures mapped out, and its implications for the relationship between public wants and policy outcomes defined.

I. an index (*Q*)

Defining an institution broadly, to include both formal and informal rules for policy choice, we may identify what I will call its *core*. An institutional core is a specification of the groups which can and cannot have their ways in policy disputes. More fully, the core defines groups which can, if they form: 1, do nothing (losing coalitions); 2, impose policies (winning coalitions); and 3, prevent others from imposing policies (blocking coalitions).[2] These potential groups are defined by mutual opposition: a winning or blocking coalition implies (in a non-trivial dispute) that another group must be losing. And, in a dynamic world, where doing nothing is doing something, winning and blocking coalitions have a strong theoretical affinity: both are decisive.[3] From this, we obtain the sets of sets shown in Figure 1, and we may think about political democracy as a way of setting limits on their relative sizes.

Figure 1. Groups Defined by Core

	Group Can Succeed	Group Cannot Succeed
Group Seeks to Impose Policy	winning coalition	—losing coalition
Group Seeks to Prevent Imposition of Policy	blocking coalition	
	decisive (D)	Losing (L)

Counting the sizes of core coalitions presupposes a decision about which people should be counted. And, in so far as the concept holds a more than verbal fascination, political democracy is a way of limiting the divergence between rulers and ruled, between members of decisive coalitions and those who live with the policies they impose or block. We may define an institution's *domain* as the set of people who must routinely expect to live with its policies, its "subjects," and it is the entire domain of an institution which must be used in defining coalitions. Most of all, we must be careful not to underestimate the sizes of potential losing coalitions. This means that we cannot safely rely on the convenient formal definitions of institutional domains provided by the territorial bounds of the state and its subunits or by the membership rolls and other formal artifacts of inclusion in other associations. These definitions would lead to an underestimation of losing coalitions arising from: 1, invidious partitions, of the kind found today in Southern Africa; and 2, externalities, in which decisive coalitions within an institution make policies for people who appear formally to be outside its domain, as with corporate decisions in a market economy, the foreign policies of super-powers in the world at large, or the water-use decisions of government units sharing a water basin.

---

[*] I wish to thank the J. S. Guggenheim Memorial Foundation for the leisure spent writing this paper and researching the project of which it is a part. For their comments, I also thank Jay Casper, Michael Taylor, and John Loosemore.

[1] This use of the word democracy is of course a narrow one. Note especially that the associated concept of liberal freedom is omitted, but remember, as Berlin reminds us, that negative freedom is consistent with some kinds of autocracy, and logically independent of democracy. See Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (Oxford: The Clarenden Press, 1958), pp. 14ff. It must also be clear that there exists no deductive relationship between the greatest number and the greatest good, so that majoritarian democracy cannot be said to assure a joint maximization of utility even on the too-optimistic assumption that it leads directly to a maximum individual rate of satisfaction. This point is explored by John Plamnatz, *Man and Society* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1963) pp. 12, 21–36, and Robert A. Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 90–102.

[2] For example, consider three people, *A*, *B*, and *C*, deciding policies by simple majority-rule. The core would then list four winning coalitions *(ABC)*, *(AB)*, *(AC)*, and *(BC)*; four blocking coalitions *(ABC)*, *(AB)*, *(AC)*, and *(BC)*; and four losing coalitions *(A)*, *(B)*, *(C)*, and the empty set ($\emptyset$), included for convenience. These categories are applied in a number of important contemporary works of which three are especially relevant: William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); James Coleman, "Control of Collectivities and the Power of Collectivities to Act," RAND P-3902; and Lloyd S. Shapley, "Simple Games: An Outline of a Descriptive Theory," *Behavioral Science*, 7 (1962), 59–66. The present use of "blocking coalitions" is broader than the use suggested by the game theorists, and my term "core" is different from its sophisticated cousin in that field.

[3] See Y. Murakami, *Logic and Social Choice* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 23 for an elaboration of the concept of decisiveness, and for a formal analysis abundant in suggestive insight. See also P. Bachrach and M. S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," this REVIEW, 56 (1962), 947–952, for an argument substantiating the utility of thinking about decisiveness in both senses (e.g., winning *and* blocking).

It should be obvious that an institution which seems very democratic with respect to its formal domain may, in cases like those just mentioned, be much less democratic with respect to its effective domain and *vice versa*. In what follows, it is therefore assumed that effective domains are considered, and our term, n, refers to the number of people in an effective domain. It should also be noted that the problem of determining institutional domains is, in social systems exhibiting rapid change and high levels of interdependence, a serious challenge. Yet any serious thinking about the real and imagined consequences of political democracy will necessarily depend on just such determinations.

Be that as it may, the interesting questions about politics—the incentives for a concern with political democracy—arise as the members of a domain are divided over questions of policy. Disputes of this kind may divide any domain along almost innumerable lines of cleavage: thinking of binary disputes alone, a domain with n members may be fractured along as many as 2^n distinct lines of division. Each of these is a fresh challenge to the operation of an institution, and if a dispute is nontrivial, some group will have its way and another group will not. Some groups will be decisive and others will be losing. And some groups will be large while others are small. It is from the limits an institution's core puts on the relation between the size and decisiveness of potential coalitions that its degree of political democracy emerges.

Two limits on the sizes of potential coalitions[4] determine the degree to which an institution is democratic. First, we define the largest losing coalition under any given core, $L_{\max}$, as the largest possible number of domain members who might support or oppose a policy without success.[5] Second, we define the smallest decisive coalition under any given core, $D_{\min}$, as the number of domain members contained in the smallest possible winning or blocking coalition.[6] Pure democracy requires that the former limit be lower than the latter. *An institution is thus a pure democracy if and only if the largest possible losing coalition* ($L_{\max}$) *is smaller (by at least one) than the smallest possible decisive coalition* ($D_{\min}$).[7] A moment's reflection will show that this is simply a generalized definition of majority rule—the pattern of rule by majorities as opposed to the structure of majority-rule voting. Our index has this case, pure democracy, as its upper limit (one). The other extreme occurs when a group is dominated by one or more outsiders who impose policies on its members. A group is a pure autocracy if and only if the largest losing coalition ($L_{\max}$) is n persons larger than the smallest decisive coalition ($D_{\min}$).[8] This case defines the lower indes for our index, with a value of zero.

The index takes into account these definitions of its bounds, and also the fact that the maximum range for deviation from pure democracy is $n + 1$ in a domain of n, thus:

---

[4] These limits (and the resulting analysis) are defined only for binary decisions. This is useful if the analysis is to be related to the commonest forms of decision found in nominally democratic institutions. For a useful analysis of such procedures see Robin Farquarson, *Theory of Voting* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).

[5] For example, suppose that an effective domain containing individuals $A, B, \ldots Z$ is governed dictatorially by A. Then the largest possible losing coalition would be $(B, C, \ldots Z)$ and $L_{\max}$ would take the value 25.

[6] For example, if member A dictated policy for a domain of any size, $D_{\min}$ would have a value of 1, since a coalition as small as that could impose (or block) policies. Notice that we are dealing in potentialities here, and it is not asserted that this coalition will in fact form at any given moment.

[7] For example, consider majority rule among three individuals, A, B, and C. The smallest possible decisive coalition contains 2 members (e.g. AB, AC, or BC) and the largest losing coalition contains 1 member, A, B, or C. The condition of pure democracy is satisfied since the former exceeds the latter by one.

[8] Since the largest possible losing coalition contains all the members of the domain, its value is n. And since he is not a domain member, the dictator's potentially decisive coalition contains no members who count, and $n - 0 = n$.

$$\boxed{Q = 1 - \frac{L_{\max} - D_{\min} + 1}{n + 1}} \tag{1}$$

This equation measures the closeness with which an institution approximates the initial condition of pure democracy. Under a direct voting system with full inclusion, exact equality, majority-rule, no factions or veto groups, no special agenda controls, and an odd number of members,[9] we have the limiting case of pure democracy:

$$L_{\max} = \frac{n - 1}{2}$$

$$D_{\min} = \frac{n + 1}{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Q &= 1 - \frac{\frac{n-1}{2} - \frac{n+1}{2} + 1}{n + 1} \\ &= 1 - \frac{(n - 1) - (n + 1) + 2}{2\ (n + 1)} \\ &= 1 - 0 \\ &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

Thus the upper limit of our index, Q, is pure democracy and has a value of one. The lower limit, with pure autocracy, is zero. Thus:

$$L_{\max} = n$$

$D_{\min} = 0$ (e.q. the outside dictator)

And,

$$\begin{aligned} Q &= 1 - \frac{n - 0 + 1}{n + 1} \\ &= 1 - \frac{n + 1}{n + 1} \\ &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

Thus the lower limit is zero and corresponds to the case of pure autocracy.

The index behaves in this way because the right-hand fraction is sensitive to the proportionate deviation of the coalition size limits from the case of pure democracy. We will see momentarily how it behaves for more interesting, less extreme, institutions. But first, an economy may be introduced. Equation (1) may, that is, be transformed to a more straightforward alternative (2):

$$Q = 1 - \frac{L_{\max} - D_{\min} + 1}{n + 1} \tag{1}$$

And, since $(n + 1)/(n + 1)$ equals 1,

$$Q = \frac{(n + 1) - (L_{\max} - D_{\min} + 1)}{n + 1}$$

$$\boxed{Q = \frac{n + D_{\min} - L_{\max}}{n + 1}} \tag{2}$$

I will use this expression throughout the analysis which follows.[10] First a word about interpretation. In a pure democracy, we are sure that the few never prevail over the many. In a slightly less pure democracy, we must recognise that the few may prevail if they are almost as numerous as the many. In a still less pure democracy, this constraint relaxes further... until, finally there is no guarantee at all. Each diminution in the value of Q represents the widening gap between the largest losing and smallest decisive coalition. And the numerical value of Q may thus be seen as proportionate conformity to the limits set by pure democracy. Its norming term is $n + 1$ because this is the maximum possible deviation from the limit as it is defined above.

II. arguments of *Q*

Several structures found in nominally democratic institutions weaken the democratic limi-

---

[9] Since $n/2 + 1$ is a slightly more restrictive requirement than $(n + 1)/2$, the limit is only $n/n + 1$ for n even. This is not an artifact of the measure, but a logical property of numbers as they operate in political institutions. Where n is anything but very small, the resulting difference is trivial. For another instance in which the seemingly trivial fact of an even number of members alters a theoretical value, see Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1963), esp. pp. 14–25.

[10] It is possible to simplify the definition further by eliminating the term $L_{\max}$. Since $D_{\min} + L_{\max}$ must equal n (each member in the domain being included in one of the two), we can substitute $(n - D_{\min})$ for $L_{\max}$ in equation 2, with the result that:

$$\begin{aligned} Q &= \frac{n + D_{\min} + (n - D_{\min})}{n + 1} \\ &= \frac{2D_{\min}}{n + 1} \end{aligned}$$

Because of its less obvious connection with the institutional structures and their political consequences, I have not used this simpler expression in the analysis of Q's structural determinants. It is, however, employed in the appendix.

tation and lower the value of Q accordingly. Here, I will present a series of equations defining functional relationships between these structures and the degree of political democracy as measured by Q. Let me move from simple to complex relations.

Q as a function of decision-rule. Suppose, to begin with, that each member of a domain has one vote, there are no rigid factions, and no members enjoy special control over the agenda. This is simple direct government. Say there are n members, and a decision rule, k, which varies from $n/2$ to n, becoming a more "special" majority as it goes. The more restrictive this rule becomes, the smaller is the blocking coalition which can be decisive,[11] the greater the potential deviation from pure democracy, and the lower value of Q. Thus:

$$D_{\min} = (n - k + 1)$$

$$L_{\max} + (k - 1)$$

Hence, substituting in equation (2) above,

$$Q = \frac{n + (n - k + 1) - (k - 1)}{n + 1}$$

$$\boxed{Q = \frac{2(n + 1 - k)}{n + 1}} \qquad (3)$$

Equation (3) defines the variation of Q with k, and the slopes of the term's arguments are shown in Figure 2. The upper limit is one, with majority rule, and the lower limit is $2/(n + 1)$ with the requirement that all must agree, in which case a single individual may block a policy desired by all the rest.[12] It is important to note that this undemocratic structure is obtained without any formal inequality of voting weights: equality of weights is a necessary though insufficient condition for pure democracy. The sort of inequality which produces the low values for Q here is instead one which advantages those wishing to maintain the *status quo* over those wishing to change it. This sort of inequality is, of course, common in American institutions, and our very common "two-thirds majority" provision lowers the Q index from one to about two-thirds, all else being equal.



Figure 2. Arguments of Q by Decision-Rule (k)

Q as a joint function of group exclusion and decision-rule. Suppose now that we exclude some of the members from voting. The number of excluded voters (j) will, of course, influence the strength of the democratic guarantee for any fixed decision-rule. Restrictive decision-rules and excluded members (k and j) have an essentially additive effect on the deviation of Q from its maximum. We have:

$$D_{\min} = (n - j - k + 1)$$

and

$$L_{\max} = (j + k - 1)$$

provided that $\frac{1}{2}(n - j) \leqslant k \leqslant n - j$.

And, substituting in Equation 2 above:

$$Q = \frac{n + (n - j - k + 1) - (j + k - 1)}{n + 1}$$

---

[11] And this blocking coalition may turn itself into a winning coalition through bargaining. See Brian Barry, "A Theory of the Offensive Veto," in his *Political Argument*, (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 245–249. It is interesting to note that this fact did not escape the attention of a group which produced a number of very important opportunities for small blocking coalitions, the framers of the United States Constitution. See *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention 1787 Reported by James Madison*, reprinted (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966), p. 62.

[12] In a real sense, this requirement dissolves the government: gives no group the authority to bind any other, save through bargaining. Professors Buchanan and Tullock go on to draw the erroneous conclusion from this that the rule of unanimity is to be rejected only on the ground that it leads to excessive decision-making costs. This conclusion would follow only in a world devoid of bargaining and, in effect, devoid of dynamic disturbances in the social environment. See James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 88.

Table 1. Values of Q arrayed Over Values of j and k

$(n=9,\ k \leq (n-j),\ k > (n-j)/2)$

(j) 9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8	2/10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7	—	2/10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6	—	4/10	2/10	—	—	—	—	—	—
5	—	—	4/10	2/10	—	—	—	—	—
4	—	—	6/10	4/10	2/10	—	—	—	—
3	—	—	—	6/10	4/10	2/10	—	—	—
2	—	—	—	8/10	6/10	4/10	2/10	—	—
1	—	—	—	—	8/10	6/10	4/10	2/10	—
0	—	—	—	—	10/10	8/10	6/10	4/10	2/10
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9(k)

Note: j and k have additive effect on Q. Thus any move on the diagonal leaves Q constant as j and k trade-off. Any move up (in j) has the same consequence as a move left (in k).

$$\boxed{Q = \frac{2(n+1-j-k)}{n+1}} \qquad (4)$$

Thus, as the matrix in Table 1 shows, Q is symmetrically depressed by increasing the values of k and j.[13] Thus the function has equal values along the diagonals sloping from upper left to lower right. Here, we are dealing with the jointly depressive consequences of two different kinds of political inequality for degrees of political democracy. That is, we have inequality of voting weights (j votes at zero, $n - j$ votes at one each), and inequality between yea sayers and nay sayers as above. Both are obviously and additively important to deviation from pure democracy and the corresponding diminution of Q. Where everyone is excluded, we have pure autocracy, and $(j = n) \rightarrow (Q = 0)$.

Q as a function of veto group size. Often some sub-set of an institution's domain will be able o veto policies, or, what comes to the same hing, repress items on the agenda. If such a group functions non-responsively with respect o the other members, it may constitute a very small, very undemocratic blocking coalition. If such a group is of size m, we have:

$$D_{\min} = m$$

$$L_{\max} = (n - m)$$

Hence,

$$Q = \frac{n + m - (n - m)}{n+1}$$

$$\boxed{Q = \frac{2m}{n+1}} \qquad (5)$$

If m is less than $(n - k + 1)$, this is a non-trivial diminution of Q. And as m reaches 1, we have $Q = 2/(n + 1)$, a sort of conservative dictatorship, with a very low numerical value for Q.

Q as a function of factional domination. Suppose, still within our direct government, that our group is divided into two or more rigid factions, one of size k or greater. This faction, if it is rigid, now constitutes the only first-order decisive coalition. But, within it, there must be a second-order coalition structure, a second-order regime core if you like. If, say z specific individuals "run" the faction, then we have $Q = 2z/(n+1)$. Or, it may be internally more democratic, with its f members voting on factional policy under rule k_f. Then:

---

[13] That is holding j or k constant, the other variable depresses Q identically be it j or k.

$$D_{\min} = (f - k_f + 1)$$

$$L_{\max} = (n - f + k_f - 1)$$

And, substituting in Equation 2:

$$Q = \frac{n + (f - k_f + 1) - (k_f - 1 + n - f)}{n+1}$$

$$Q = \frac{2(f - k_f + 1)}{n+1} \qquad (6)$$

This is actually equivalent to Equation 4: the "excluded members" (j) now being the people excluded from f, $(n - f = j)$. And, as the rigid faction approaches minimum winning size,[14] $n - f$ approaches $n - k$, and we obtain very low values for Q. Degrees of political democracy may thus be lowered by factionalism. This depends of course, on factional rigidity, on "losers" within the faction resisting cooperation with non-members.

Q and bicameralism. A similar pattern may result from bicameralism. With two chambers, of sizes a and b $(a > b)$, a small blocking coalition within the smaller chamber may be decisive. Thus:

$$D_{\min} = (b - k_b + 1)$$

$$L_{\max} = (a + k_b - 1)$$

$$n = a + b$$

And, by substitution:

$$Q = \frac{a + b + (b - k_b + 1) - (a + k_b - 1)}{n+1}$$

$$Q = \frac{2(b - k_b + 1)}{n+1} \qquad (7)$$

This expression is closely related to equation (3), and has a similar origin: like restrictive decision-rules, bicameralism opens the way to very small blocking coalitions.

Q for simple delegate representation. Representative regimes are more complex, and may be analysed for degrees of political democracy only on fairly specific assumptions. Suppose that n members elect y representatives from y districts of (equal) population x. If the representatives are an unresponsive elite class—then the degree of political democracy is very slight: Equation 4 applies and $j = (n - y)$. Suppose, on the other hand, that representatives routinely respond to district majorities (and that these latter exist).[15] And assume legislative majority rule. Even here, the democratic guarantee is imperfect: groups comprising just over one-fourth may be winning or blocking coalitions. More exactly we have:

$$D_{\min} = \frac{y+1}{2}\,\frac{x+1}{2} = \frac{n + y + x + 1}{4}$$

$$(y \text{ odd}, n = xy)$$

Or,

$$D_{\min} \frac{y}{2} + 1 \,\frac{x+1}{2} = \cdots$$

$$= \frac{n + y + 2x + 2}{4} \qquad (y \text{ even})$$

And,

$$L_{\max} = \frac{y-1}{2}(x) + \frac{y+1}{2}\,\frac{x-1}{2}$$

$$= \frac{3n - x - y - 1}{4} \qquad (y \text{ odd})$$

Or,

$$L_{\max} = \frac{y}{2}(x) + \frac{y}{2}\,\frac{x-1}{2} = \frac{3n - y}{4}$$

$$(y \text{ even})$$

For the case y odd, we obtain

$$\boxed{Q = \frac{n + x + y + 1}{2(n+1)}} \qquad (8)$$

---

[14] Under conditions of strong competition (zero-sum payoffs, with side payments) and perfect information, this should in fact occur. See Riker, *op. cit.*, p. 47, for a theoretical development of the point. For another argument leading to a similar prediction, consult William A. Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), 373–382.

[15] The truth of this assumption is, of course, a majo question in contemporary debate on representative political democracy, and no verified theory to the contrary exists. See Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1967), for a most useful survey of the difficulties and ambiguities entailed by claims that elites do in fac represent publics. For an equally useful survey o theories about the role of parties in such representation, see Austin Ranney, *The Doctrine of Responsibl Party Government* (Urbana: University of Illinoi Press, 1956). Two especially interesting empirica works are Heinz Eulau *et al*, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theor of Edmund Burke," this REVIEW, 53 (1959), 742–756 and Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituenc Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), 45–56

This suggests that Q depends on the number of districts, and the reader will see that it approaches its minimum value (one-half) as y approaches $\sqrt{n}$.[16] It reaches its maximum as y approaches 1, since this raises x to the value of n, and Q to the value 1.0—e.g. we have returned to something like direct majority rule. This is indeed what is obtained by the single-national-district election of the Israeli Knesset, at some price in other variables and on the assumption of simple delegate representation.[17] For districting systems of the order found in the United States, however, Q's value is typically just less than half.

Varieties of Minority Rule. These six analytic relations define an institution's degree of political democracy over some of the most obviously important variables found in nominally democratic regimes. These functions are of some interest, for they delineate the effects which our commonest structural variables exert on degrees of political democracy. And, taken together, they should provide a basis for the analysis of extant institutions.

Our index is sensitive to the stringency with which minority-rule is prescribed by the institutional structures. It is not, however, sensitive to the *kind* of minority rule being proscribed (or permitted). Our definitional categories for the regime core imply three possibilities: 1, *positive* minority rule (winning minorities); 2, *negative* minority rule (blocking minorities); and 3, *general* minority rule (winning and blocking minorities). In the practices common to democratic regimes, only the last two, negative and general minority rule occur: we never find minority coalitions capable of imposing policies which are not also capable of blocking them.

Of the six institutional variables discussed here, three are associated with the degree to which general minority rule is, or is not, proscribed. These are group exclusion, factional control, and delegate representation. These are variables which, at the relevant values, permit the few not only to frustrate the many but also to oppress them. The other three variables, decision-rule, veto group, and bicameralism, are associated only with negative minority rule. The analyst may wish to distinguish between these two classes, and I propose that Q be marked prime (Q'), where its value deviates from one only because of negative minority rule, and be left unmarked where general minority rule is at stake.[18]

Considering both these patterns, it is interesting that nominally democratic institutions vary so widely in what this paper conceives as degrees of political democracy. And this variation offers what may be an interesting avenue of approach to empirical democratic theory. But this analysis is just beginning for the student who wishes to analyse complex institutions, and real difficulties remain. Let me mention two of these. First, most institutions are complex combinations of structures. One must, in these cases, begin by establishing the two limits, $D_{\min}$ and $L_{\max}$, for the combination of structures encountered. This requires analyses more complex than the ones summarized above. For example, suppose one were interested in a community governed by a council elected in equal single member districts, and that a veto group (size m) operates within the council. $D_{\min}$ here would be the number of voters required to elect the m veto group members:

$$D_{\min} = (m)\frac{x+1}{2}$$

And $L_{\max}$ would be the largest number of voters who could be committed to the $y - m$ other councilors:

$$L_{\max} = (y - m)(x)$$

These cumbersome terms seem at first to deny Q whatever parsimony it might possess in simpler cases:

$$Q = \frac{n + \left[m\left(\frac{x+1}{2}\right)\right] - [(y-m)(x)]}{n+1}$$

$$= \frac{n + \frac{mx+m}{2} - (yx - mx)}{n+1}$$

But, remembering the $xy = n$, we return to a fairly parsimonious expression for Q:

$$Q = \frac{2n + mx + m - 2xy + 2mx}{2(n+1)}$$

$$= \frac{m(3x+1)}{2(n+1)}$$

---

[16] An interesting and useful application of a similar analysis appears in Max S. Power, "A Theoretical Analysis of the Electoral College and Proposed Reforms," (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1970), Ch. 2.

[17] Again, a very strong assumption.

[18] This does not, however, seem an *essential* distinction in light of strategic bargaining, and in view of the fact that policy proposals can be and are stated negatively as well as positively.

Not every conceivable combination of structure will be so simple, but all are subject to analytic solution, provided the structural variables are themselves well-defined.

This is, of course, the second and more difficult problem of empirical application. The primitive terms of the analysis ($k, j, m \ldots$) are shorthand expressions for complex actualities. In some cases, these may be well enough defined in the institutional culture itself that numerical values can be inserted straightaway. Often, however, these values may be established only on the basis of painstaking research and sophisticated inference. There is no reason to belabor this point, but one very real possibility must be anticipated.

This is the chance that an institution yields no constant value for the relevant primitives over time or across issue-areas. This is a way of saying that a fixed institutional core may be absent. If this is the case, one must not expect Q to be a static value, but must instead treat it as a dependent variable over these dimensions. In any event, the index will be no better than the empirical research which goes into the establishment of its arguments.

And one must even admit that some politically important processes—notably those which turn on the use of violence, terror, or random events—simply will not be susceptible to analyses of the kind proposed here. This is a real enough limitation, but it is hard to imagine an interest in the analysis of political democracy where ordering structures themselves have broken down. Like democracy itself, the present index is a fragile child of stable institutions.[19]

III. political democracy and public wants

Political democracy is, as Schumpeter[20] argued so convincingly, a morally neutral method for choosing collective policies, or more exactly a property of such "methods." Any justification for political democracy must therefore speak to the *consequences* which may be expected to follow from this property of the "methods"—institutions—by which policies are decided. And it seems likely that universal questions, "Should institutions always be as democratic as possible?," are apt to provoke only unpersuasive answers. More specific questions, relating specific domains, cores, and sequences of issues, are apt to provoke more fruitful replies. And the present analysis suggests a conjecture which may be useful in answering some such questions.

It would be a simpler and kinder world if we could sustain the general proposition that the greater the degree of democracy exhibited by an institution, the more closely will its policies conform to the interests of its subjects. There are, of course, two powerful and immediate objections to this claim: 1, that democratic institutions, like all others, may be used as instruments of aggression and therefore facilitate positive damage to the interests of some members; and 2, that through manipulation, neurosis, ignorance, or "false consciousness," the members of a domain may not, in a given policy choice, know their own interests and may therefore plump for self-damaging outcomes. Even granting the ambiguities raised by these objections, and by the concept of "interest,"[21] one is driven to reject the general proposition, and to hope only for more partial answers.

One may retreat to a much shallower but equally general claim for the consequences of political democracy: the more democratic an institution, the more closely will its policies conform to the conscious *wishes* of its subjects. But even this cannot be sustained. Putting aside the possibility that people may sometimes have no wishes, it remains a fact that no monotonic relationship exists between degrees of political democracy and the proportion of subjects whose wishes are reflected in policy outcomes. The more democratic of two institutions *may*, that is, produce lower proportionate satisfaction with a given outcome or with a whole sequence of outcomes.[22] Thus, there is no freestanding deductive relationship between political democracy and what might be called "popular responsiveness." And this denial stands even if we assume well-formulated binary issues as in the text of this paper. Rates of wish satisfaction depend partly on degrees on political democracy, but also on the nature of disputes and the distribution of disputants over decisive roles in the institutional core. What can be said for the consequences of political democracy?

---

[19] In other words, the analysis depends upon the existence of a regime core, and our structural variables are ways of inferring the core limits.

[20] *Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1947).

[21] Richard E. Flathman, *The Public Interest* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966); and Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).

[22] For example, the more democratic institution could be majority-rule among three individuals, A, B, and C, where the winning coalition AB was formed so that only two members were satisfied. Meanwhile, a dictatorship with A in charge of the same group could form the winning coalition ABC so that all three were satisfied. In general, high consensus with low democracy *may* produce higher frequencies of satisfaction than low degrees of consensus with high degrees of democracy.

The most general claim which can be sustained posits a maxi-min relationship between political democracy and the rate at which outcomes satisfy subjects' wishes: *The more democratic an institution, the larger is the smallest possible proportion of subjects whose wishes can be satisfied by any outcome.* This means, at least for binary issues and on the assumption that members of decisive coalitions must be satisfied, that political democracy forms a sloping floor under the relationship between institutional structure and satisfaction with outcomes.[23] If wish-satisfaction—or popular responsiveness—is the underlying criterion, then this seems to be the strongest general advertisement which may be brought for the property of political democracy in any given case.

If there are cases in which this claim is persuasive, it may be useful to think of political democracy as a variable, for one chooses between extremes like pure democracy and pure autocracy only in history's most dramatic moments and is unlikely to be aware of the choice's extremity even then. More often, it is possible to keep or remove a minority's veto, to include a new group of decision-makers, to alter a pattern of representation. And one may think of these changes as raises in the minimum rate of satisfaction with the outcomes of future issues. Changes in this minimum may be computed as a derivative of our index value Q (see the appendix) and their worth weighed against whatever costs are entailed by a structural change.

I cannot resist the conjecture that more dramatic, more general arguments for political democracy—like those which derive it from the principles of equality and popular sovereignty—give a fundamentally misleading gloss of optimism to democratic ideology. Avoiding as they do a direct recognition that in any non-trivial policy dispute only some of the members of a domain can fulfill their wishes in the outcome, these arguments may leave people surprised when democratic institutions produce outcomes of which they disapprove. Political democracy sets numerical limits on dissatisfaction, but makes no stronger promise than that.

Appendix

The object of this appendix is to establish an analytic relationship between the proportion of a domain satisfied with policy outcomes and degrees of political democracy. This is the "max-min" relationship mentioned above.

On any given issue, some proportion of a domain, S, is able to obtain a desired outcome—imposing or blocking a policy change. At a minimum, this proportion must be $D_{\min}$ over n, and it will quite often be a larger proportion than that. Indeed, its maximum is one—everyone having his way in a trivial dispute. Our task is to establish the limiting values for this proportion S.

Remembering that $D_{\min} + L_{\max} = n$, we can simplify our task by starting with the simplest possible definition of Q:

$$Q = \frac{2D_{\min}}{n+1} \qquad \text{(see note 10)}$$

Which implies that,

$$D_{\min} = \frac{Q(n+1)}{2}$$

And the minimum value of S, $D_{\min}/n$, is therefore established:

$$S_{\min} = \frac{D_{\min}}{n} = \frac{Q(n+1)}{2n}$$

This is the "sloping floor" set by degrees of political democracy under the value of S. Since this is a minimum on the minimum of S and since the slope is positive throughout, we are warranted in claiming that, "The more democratic an institution, the larger is the smallest possible proportion of subjects whose wishes can be satisfied by any outcome." And this same expression allows us to compute changes in the lower limit on S which follow from structural reforms with known effects on Q. The general range of values which may be assumed by S is defined:

$$1 \geq S \geq \frac{Q(n+1)}{2n}$$

And the possibility that more democratic institutions produce lower rates of satisfaction is indicated by the openness of this range: high consensus with low democracy may produce more satisfaction than the converse (as claimed above).

---

[23] See the Appendix.

Marijuana Use, Social Discontent and Political Alienation: A Study of High School Youth*

JAMES W. CLARKE AND E. LESTER LEVINE
Florida State University

Three trends popularly associated with each other appear to be emerging among American youth. One is the political alienation and activism which has grown from the early days of civil rights sit-ins and freedom rides through the McCarthy campaign to massive nationwide protests against the Vietnamese war in particular, and the establishment in general. The second is the phenomenon of withdrawal into more immediate self-related concerns popularized in the expression "doing your own thing" and most apparent in the growing hippie subculture. The third is the already widespread and increasing use of marijuana and other drugs by young people. Coincidental to these trends is the growing disenchantment of substantial numbers of youth with the primary agents of socialization in society—the family, church and school. A number of scholars have observed and discussed these trends among university students.[1] It is now clear that these phenomena are also present among high school students.[2]

In this study we attempt to examine the pattern of relationships between marijuana use and certain social and political orientations among high school seniors. We focus initially on marijuana use because it appears to have been assigned a peculiar political significance as a catalyst of social and political nonconformity among young people. Erich Goode has commented on this point:

> Marijuana can be thought of as a kind of symbol for a complex of other positions, beliefs and activities which are correlated with and compatible with its use. In other words, those who disapprove of marijuana use often feel that he who smokes must, of necessity, also be a political radical, engage in "loose" (from his point of view) sexual practices, and have a somewhat dim view of patriotism. Marijuana use is seen (whether rightly or wrongly) to sum up innumerable facts about the individual, facts which can clearly place him along the liberal-radical dimension in a number of areas of social and political life.[3]

We intend to examine this stereotype by focusing on the pattern of relationships between marijuana use and student views on: 1) their relationship to the most proximate authoritative structures of society, viz., their family, school, religion, and the police; 2) a series of issues associated with contemporary youth; and 3) the extent to which they feel alienated from the political system.

We are mainly concerned with a comparison of marijuana-users' and non-users' views of authority in society—both at a more proximate, personal level and at a less proximate political level.

Goode has observed elsewhere that marijuana use has a "sociogenic" quality in that marijuana is usually smoked with others and less frequently alone. As a consequence of this, Goode suggests that:

> . . . marijuana users form a kind of subcommunity. This does not mean that a powerful bond of identity holds all users together in a closely knit social group. But it *does* mean that users are more likely

---

* This research is part of a larger study supported, in part, by the Florida Youth Advisory Council and the Florida State University Political Research Institute. We are indebted to Joseph Egan, Research Assistant, and the Florida State University Computing Center for their assistance in processing these data.

[1] A good summary of this literature through 1966 may be found in Seymour M. Lipset and Philip G. Altbach, "Student Politics and Higher Education in the United States" in S. M. Lipset (ed.) *Student Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 199–252. Selected studies since that time are referred to in later footnotes.

[2] See, for example, Marc Libarle and Tom Seligson (eds.), *The High School Revolutionaries* (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. xiii–xiv. The editors cite a survey conducted in the spring of 1969 by the National Association of Secondary School Principals, which found that 56 percent of the junior high schools participating in the survey had experienced protest activities and "many who note no protests as yet add they expect it in the near future." Libarle and Seligson conclude that "A majority of young Americans are rejecting age-old American ideals and values; as they proceed through life they are forming new concepts about the meaning of being 'American' and what the 'American way of life' should be." Also, see John Birmingham (ed.), *Our Time is Now: Notes from the High School Underground* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).

[3] Erich Goode, "Marijuana and the Politics of Reality," *Journal of Health and Social Behavior,* 10 (June 1969), 92; also see U. S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Service, "Student Unrest Survey," September, 1969, p. 3, which indicates that in a survey of 17 states and 52 cities, including 101 secondary schools, administrators tended to blame student unrest on "outside agitators, *drugs,* overcrowdedness, and the need for Federal funds." (our italics.)

to identify and interact with other users than with someone who does not smoke marijuana.[4]

Moreover,

> . . . a certain degree of value consensus will obtain . . . [and] a value convergence will occur as a result of progressive group involvement. . . .[5]

This line of reasoning is consistent with Leon Festinger's conception of social comparison theory. Festinger has suggested that the self-selection process that is operative in group interactions and the pressures for within group conformity will be reflected in a greater homogeneity of opinions.[6] If the stereotype described earlier has some empirical validity, then our results should show that marijuana users do express more social and political discontent than nonusers, and the levels and patterns of discontent should reveal a more homogeneous pattern among users than nonusers.

I. Youth and Marijuana

Most of the literature on youth and marijuana use is impressionistic. A great deal has been written about the potential risks involved in smoking marijuana, the laws needed to control its use, and the life styles of users, but there has been very little systematic empirical research on the topic.

Some recent studies bear more directly on our concerns in this study. Armand Mauss, in a survey of 459 high school seniors in three San Francisco Bay Area schools, concludes that marijuana use will be greatest among middle and upper-middle-class males who are anticipating entering college and who claim no formal religious affiliation.[7] Mauss concludes that marijuana use, for these students, is primarily an expression of their desire to conform to the norms of an anticipated collegiate life-style. Richard Brotman *et al.*, observed a similar disdain for religion in a smaller study of affluent high school students in New York City. A comparison of 13 users and 26 nonusers revealed that the users were much less involved in conventional roles.

In addition to their lack of involvement and interest in formal religious concerns, these high school users also expressed greater dissatisfaction and less interest in their family and school affiliations than did nonusers. The authors noted that "the locus of their [the users'] concern and involvement appears at a broader level of society especially the political arena."[8]

Edward A. Suchman, in a survey of 600 students at a western university, also found that drug use was most common among those students who were dissatisfied with their education and unhappy with their parents.[9] In contrast to Brotman, *et al.*, however, marijuana use was more closely associated with attitudes that reflect more immediate personal life-style concerns rather than larger social or political ideals. That is, marijuana use is most closely associated with more permissive attitudes on drug use, sex, and to a lesser degree, alcohol. It is also closely associated with more favorable views of the hippie subculture, keeping abreast of underground opinion and participating in underground events (i.e., "happenings") rather than in civic affairs. These attitudes are pictured as part of a youth-related "hang loose" ethic that is essentially irreverent, anti-establishment and opposed to the Protestant ethic. It is important to note, however, that Suchman found no relationship between marijuana use and an index that appears to measure confidence in people (e.g., "These days a person does not really know whom he can count on"). He concludes that "while it [the 'hang loose' ethic] may represent antagonism to the conventional world, [it] does not appear to create apathy and withdrawal."[10]

A study of high school seniors in Michigan which was closely patterned along the dimensions of Suchman's earlier survey tended to bear out the above findings. In particular marijuana users were less likely to be involved in more conventional activities of church, school, and community. The authors conclude that marijuana users were more likely than nonusers "to prefer . . . activities which are somewhat unconventional and allow broader scope for youth initiative."[11]

---

[4] Erich Goode, "Multiple Drug Use Among Marijuana Smokers," *Social Problems*, 17 (Summer 1969), 55.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[6] Leon Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," *Human Relations*, 7 (May 1954), 117–140.

[7] Armand L. Mauss, "Anticipatory Socialization Toward College as a Factor in Adolescent Marijuana Use," *Social Problems*, 16 (Winter 1969), 357–364.

[8] Richard Brotman, Irving Silverman, and Fred Suffet, "Drug Use Among Affluent High School Youth" in Erich Goode (ed.), *Marijuana* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), pp. 128–136. Goode's book is a current and useful survey of various aspects of the marijuana issue.

[9] Edward A. Suchman, "The 'Hang-Loose' Ethic and the Spirit of Drug Use," *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 9 (June 1968), 146–155. The study considered various types of drug use, but marijuana was, by far, the most common and frequently used.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

[11] Richard A. Bogg, Roy G. Smith, and Susan D. Russell, *Drugs and Michigan High School Students.* The Final Report of a Study Conducted for the Special Committee on Narcotics (Lansing: Michigan House of Representatives, 1968), p. 27.

A national survey of 2,000 college seniors revealed that along with a general dissatisfaction with the status quo there was a trend toward "privatism" or a primary emphasis on self-related concerns rather than social idealism.[12] David Riesman has commented on this phenomenon labelling it a "cult of intimacy."[13] Writing from the perspective of his experiences with youthful psychiatric patients, Seymour Halleck has also observed a growing concern with "style" and "immediacy" which is similar to these other conceptions of privatism and youth-related concerns. Halleck suggests that drugs are becoming popular with these young people because they create "a sense of timelessness and reinforce tendencies to live in the present."[14]

A more limited survey of college students in New England revealed that marijuana smokers could be contrasted to nonusers in that they are "more opposed to external control" than nonusers. Although this objection specifically applies to control over marijuana use, this attitude also is generalized to possible additional controls over more private or personal concerns such as cigarette smoking, regulating parietal hours for undergraduates in college, and regulations concerning premarital sexual behavior.[15]

In perhaps the most ambitious study to date of drug use among students in the San Francisco Bay Area, Blum and Associates found that drug use and political activism on the left were associated. Their study also reported that drug users possessed many of the same characteristics of social discontent observed in other studies, particularly with regard to religion, family relationships and student participation in less conventional activities.[16] Thus with the partial exception of the Brotman, *et al.*, and Blum *et al.*, findings, recent research on marijuana users suggests the prevalence of views that are described as self- or youth-related and to that extent anti-establishment rather than idealistic in a larger social or political sense.

II. Research Design and Measures

The subjects for this study were drawn in an adjusted statewide random sample of 1057 high school seniors in the state of Florida during the spring of 1969.[17] A self-administered mail questionnaire was used. The usable response rate was 86 percent (N = 907). Of this number, 13 percent are self-reported marijuana users.[18]

Four points concerning the administration of this study deserve some comment. The first is that we are relying on self-reported data.[19] Second, principals of the participating schools were asked to administer the questionnaires and to return the questionnaires collectively.[20] Each student was instructed to record his answers anonymously on a separate mark-sense answer sheet. This testing situation may have influenced the response of students who took the test individually or in small groups where they could be more easily identified.[21] Third, students were not given a specific "no opinion" or "don't know" option on the questionnaire. Some students, however, did choose not to respond by leaving a blank, but there was no discernible pattern in this non-response. Finally, marijuana users were designated only by their admission of having smoked marijuana. We have no information on the frequency of use.

---

[12] Jeffrey K. Hadden, "The Private Generation," *Psychology Today*, 3 (October 1969), 32. At first glance this might appear to be contrary to one part of Suchman's conclusions cited above. However, it may be that this "privatism" is based more on confidence in self and commitment to a kind of individualism, rather than apathy.

[13] See, "The Young are Captives of Each Other: A Conversation with David Riesman," *Psychology Today*, 3 (October 1969), 28.

[14] Seymour K. Halleck, "You Can Go to Hell with Style," *Psychology Today*, 3 (November 1969), 71; and "Psychiatric Treatment for the Alienated College Student," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 124 (1967), 642–650.

[15] Francis W. King, "Users and Nonusers of Marijuana: Some Attitudinal and Behavioral Correlates," *College Health*, 18 (February 1970), 213–217.

[16] Richard H. Blum and Associates. *Students and Drugs*. Drugs II. College and High School Observations. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1969), pp. 69–71, 133–134. Unfortunately for our purposes, these conclusions are limited to college students because of the design of the 1966–1967 survey. The Blum chapter discussing high school students is more anecdotal and impressionistic and restricted to summary information on usage patterns within selected Bay Area high schools.

[17] This figure represents an adjusted sample. Our original sample included 1500 students, but some school boards refused to permit high schools under their jurisdiction to cooperate in the study. Excluding the 443 students who were denied the opportunity to participate in the study, the corrected sample size is 1057 students. Of this number, 907 (86 percent) returned the questionnaire. Some of these students did not answer all the questions and for this reason the total response on each question will vary marginally from the totals in the tables which follow.

[18] Although estimating the extent of an illegal activity like marijuana use is highly probabilistic, 13 percent appears to be a reasonable figure. An earlier spring, 1968 survey of 1379 high school seniors in Michigan revealed that 10 percent of the students reported having smoked marijuana. Bogg, *et al., op. cit.*, p. 41. The official national estimate at the Governor's Conference on Narcotics and Drugs was 16 percent of high school youth. This official estimate was made seven months after our survey. A Gallup Poll conducted during the same period revealed that almost one quarter of a nationwide sample of university students had smoked marijuana one or more times. See Erich Goode, "The Marijuana Market," *Columbia Forum*, 12 (Winter 1969), 4.

[19] We do not intend to dwell on this point. In studying deviant or illegal behavior, the researcher has two choices (aside from participant observation): either he can rely on self-reported data, or official records. In using self-reported data, the researcher is relying on the candor of the respondent which, of course, involves some risks. However, the risks involved in using official arrest data are even greater in our view. The problem with official data is that we are relying on official practices which also involve some serious and well-documented risks. One study which compared self-reported "anonymous" responses to responses made during a follow up interview and polygraph examination reported 92.5 percent correspondence between the two answers on the question dealing with narcotic use. See, John P. Clark and Larry L. Tifft, "Polygraph and Interview Validation of Self-Reported Deviant Behavior," *American Sociological Review*, 31 (August 1966) 516–523. For further discussion of this point,

In order to determine the explicit political significance of marijuana use, we included three measures of political attitudes—isolationism, domestic liberalism-conservatism, and political alienation. The first measure, isolationism, consists of a four-item index dealing with the issue of United States involvement in foreign affairs. The items are as follows:

1. Military agreements with other nations are not necessary for the defense of a nation as powerful as the United States.
2. With the shape things are in at home, the U. S. should stay out of wars between other nations.
3. America should take some of its troops out of Europe and let those nations have more responsibility for their own defense.
4. America should care for its own people before giving foreign aid to other nations.[22]

The second measure is composed of four items adapted from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center measures of domestic liberalism-conservatism.[23] Liberalism on these items is reflected in responses favoring greater government intervention or assistance in welfare, employment, housing and schools, and medical care. These items are listed below:

1. The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living.
2. The government ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job.
3. If cities and towns need aid to rebuild houses and schools, the government should help.
4. The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost.

Responses on both the isolationism and domestic liberalism-conservatism measures were dichotomized into agree-disagree categories and summed. Respondents who failed to complete, or had no opinion on any one of the items were excluded.

In order to examine the question of attitudes toward less proximate political objects, a four-item scale of political alienation was developed. Although the concept political alienation occupies a secure place in the literature, its precise meaning remains elusive.[24] From this literature we have found the definitions of Robert Lane and William Gamson to be most instructive for our purposes. Lane has suggested that "Political alienation refers to a person's sense of estrangement from the politics and government of his society."[25]

Following Lane, Gamson also defines political alienation as a subjective state. In his terms, complete political alienation occurs when individual expectations regarding preferred governmental outcomes are zero.[26] Both these definitions are very close to David Easton's conception of regime level support, i.e., the public

---

see Robert K. Merton and M. F. Ashley-Montague, "Crime and the Anthropologist," *American Anthropologist,* 42 (July-September 1940), 284–308; Erich Goode, "Multiple Drug Use Among Marijuana Smokers," *loc. cit.;* and Leroy Gould, "Who Defines Delinquency: A Comparison of Self-Reported and Officially Reported Indices of Delinquency for Three Racial Groups," *Social Problems,* 16 (Winter 1969), 325–336.

[20] Limited resources prevented us from using individual mailouts and returns. In many cases, this chore was turned over to guidance counselors. The administrator had no discretion as to which students were given questionnaires, since he was given names randomly selected from a statewide list of Florida twelfth graders.

[21] It is impossible to predict the direction of this potential bias, given the fear of exposure on the one hand, and on the other, the reported social acceptability of marijuana use in some circles and desire of many young people to shock or impress their elders and peers; especially when this can be done with relative impunity. See footnote 18.

[22] These items were adapted from Thomas Roback, "Attitude Constraint Among Southern Professionals: The Relationship Between the International and Domestic Attitudes of Four Groups" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government, Florida State University, 1969), 140–141. The item-total correlations (gamma) on this index are .82, .94, .89, and .89.

[23] John P. Robinson, Jerrold G. Ruch and Kendra B. Head, *Measures of Political Attitudes* (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, 1969), pp. 519–523. The item-total correlations (gamma) are: .90, .88, .86, and .89.

[24] See, for example, Murray B. Levin, *The Alienated Voter* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960); Edward L. McDill and Jeanne C. Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation, and Political Participation," *American Journal of Sociology,* 68 (September 1962), 205–213; Wayne Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," *Social Forces,* 38 (March 1960), 783–791; Marvin E. Olsen, "Two Categories of Political Alienation," *Social Forces,* 47 (March 1969), 288–299; William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968); and Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 161–162.

[25] Lane, *op. cit.*

[26] Gamson, *op. cit.,* ch. 3.

confidence in the values, norms and structures of authority which comprise the political system.[27] Such a definition also appears to conform well with the sentiments of university radicals as they are expressed in various underground publications.[28] With these considerations in mind, we have defined political alienation as an expressed lack of confidence or trust in the institutions and processes of government. The following four items were either developed or selected to operationalize this definition:[29]

1. The political party system in the United States is tied to an established order that does not serve people without money and influence.
2. The government deserves the respect and support of its citizens regardless of whether certain policies are popular or not.
3. One probably gets out of this system what one puts into it.
4. I do not approve of the way public decisions are made; the rules of the game are unfair, loaded, illegitimate; the Constitution is, in some sense, fraudulent.[30]

Later in this presentation, a series of items dealing with social alienation and youth-related concerns[31] are combined into two separate indices of social discontent. These indices were developed by summing the responses on those questions in the item analysis that revealed statistically significant differences between marijuana users and nonusers.

Given the ex post facto design of the present research, we do not attempt to deal with causality. Rather, we are limited to a consideration of the interaction patterns of association among these variables. More specifically, we want to determine whether these indices of social discontent are associated with general orientations toward the political system, and if such attitudes and orientations are consonant with a deviant (illegal) behavior, viz., smoking marijuana. Simple percentage differences and correlation analysis (gamma)[32] are used to describe the results.

III. Findings

Background Characteristics. The background characteristics of users and nonusers are compared in Table 1. Although marijuana users may be found in all social categories, the most typical marijuana user in Florida high schools tends to be a white male who lives in an urban or suburban area. He is, more often than not, the son of well-educated, reasonably affluent parents. This profile provides some support for more recent observations that marijuana use is increasingly becoming a middle-class phenomenon.[33]

Social Alienation. In Table 2, the perceived social relationships of users and nonusers are compared. We are interested here in indicators of the attitudes these students have toward those individuals and institutions with which they are potentially in closest proximity in their daily lives.

The greatest difference between the two groups is reflected in their attitudes toward the police. Two-thirds of the users object to more punitive police practices as compared to 41 percent of the nonusers. Similarly, on each of the subsequent questions users may be distinguished from nonusers on the basis of perceived political differences with their parents, lack of religious commitment, negativism concerning their teachers and dissatisfaction with their education. These findings are generally consistent with the findings of earlier studies.[34]

It is important to observe here, however, that

---

[27] David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), ch. 12. For an earlier comparable definition of the objects of political support, see William C. Mitchell, *The American Polity* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 16.

[28] Particularly useful in our selection and development of items was a local SDS publication, *Liberation.*

[29] One item from an original five item measure was discarded to achieve a Guttman reproducibility coefficient of .894. The Minimal Marginal Reproducibility is .701. As a further check on the reliability of the measure, the original five items were combined in a summated score which correlated with the Guttman measure at .89. The discarded item was:

Many public officials are self-seeking opportunists who are insensitive to the problems of people.

[30] This item was taken from Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

[31] We are speaking here of views which represent departures from the status quo on laws regulating behavior often associated with youth, viz., marijuana, drugs, alcohol, abortion, sex education and voting requirements. Social alienation is reflected in more negative views of the institutions primarily associated with maintaining the status quo, viz., parents, schools, religion and the police.

[32] Gamma refers to Goodman and Kruskal's coefficient of ordinal association. It is a symmetrical proportional-reductive-in-error statistic. See Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications" *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* 49 (December 1954), 732–764. See also, Herbert L. Costner, "Criteria for Measures of Association," *American Sociological Review,* 30 (June 1965), 341–353; and Linton C. Freeman, *Elementary Applied Statistics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), ch. 8.

[33] See, for example, Mauss, *loc. cit;* and Blum *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 133–134, 336. In the analysis which follow, controls for background variables did not alter the subsequent relationships in any interpretable pattern.

[34] Brotman, *et al., loc. cit.;* Mauss, *loc. cit.;* Suchman, *loc. cit.;* and Blum, *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 71, 133–134, 228.

Table 1. The Background Characteristics of Users and Nonusers

	Users (%)	Nonusers (%)	Total (%)	*N*
Sex				
Male	18	82	100	419
Female	9	91	100	474
*Race**				
White	14	86	100	739
Black	10	90	100	150
Residence				
Large city (greater than 50,000 population)	17	83	100	282
Medium city (25,000–50,000 population)	14	86	100	276
Small city (less than 25,000 population)	9	91	100	204
Rural	8	92	100	125
Father's Education				
College degree	21	79	100	160
Some college or business school	14	86	100	206
High School graduate	12	88	100	211
Less than high school	11	89	100	312
Family Income				
Over $12,000	20	80	100	205
$8,000 to 11,999	12	88	100	301
$4,000 to 7,999	12	88	100	273
Less than $4,000	9	91	100	90

* The "other" category ($N=5$) is included in the subsequent analysis.

Table 2. Social Alienation: Users and Nonusers

	Users	Nonusers	Difference
1. Percentage opposed to the police using more force in order to control crime	66% (122)	41% (777)	25%*
2. Percentage who perceive their parents as being opposed or indifferent to their political views	45% (121)	29% (773)	16%*
3. Percentage who describe themselves as being nonreligious	19% (122)	8% (782)	11%*
4. Percentage who do not admire their teachers	42% (122)	31% (780)	11%*
5. Percentage who are dissatisfied with their education	30% (121)	21% (781)	9%* 9%*

Index of Social Alienation × marijuana use: gamma = −.29**

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the number in each category who responded to the question.

* χ^2, $p<.05$. Because of variations in the number of response categories gamma or Yule's *Q* (the equivalent of gamma in 2×2 relationships) was computed as a check on the chi-square measure. In each of the relationships designated statistically significant, a gamma or *Q* value of at least .24 was obtained. The highest such value in non-significant relationships was .12.

** Marijuana use is treated here and in subsequent tables as a dichotomous variable to meet the ordinal level assumptions of gamma. See footnote 31.

Table 3. Youth-Related Concerns: Marijuana Users and Nonusers

	Users	Nonusers	Difference
1. Percentage favoring the legalization of marijuana	56% (120)	13% (778)	43%*
2. Percentage favoring more lenient drug laws	53% (120)	26% (771)	27%*
3. Percentage favoring a lower drinking age	74% (122)	51% (775)	23%
4. Percentage favoring a lower voting age	84% (122)	73% (777)	11%*
5. Percentage favoring legalized abortion	94% (121)	88% (781)	6% n.s.
6. Percentage favoring sex education in the public schools	87% (122)	84% (779)	3% n.s.
Index of Youth-Related Concerns×marijuana use: gamma = −.55.			

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the number in each category who responded to the question.
* χ^2, $p < .05$.

although there are statistically significant differences in the responses to these questions, there are great similarities between the groups in their response patterns. For example, the only majority-minority split between the responses of users and nonusers occurs on the question concerning law enforcement. On each of the other questions majorities of both groups responded the same way; the differences reflect only the size of the majority in each group.

The responses to these items were summed and combined into a summary index of social alienation which is associated with marijuana use (gamma = −.29). In short, marijuana users are somewhat more likely to express views reflecting discontent with more proximate social institutions, but the relationship is not as convincing as the stereotype suggests. Knowledge of one variable does increase our knowledge of the other, but 71 percent of the variance remains unexplained.

Also, as Suchman has observed elsewhere, we found nothing to suggest that users were more likely than nonusers to feel somewhat apart or isolated from society.[35] In response to a question about whether they felt their views are widely held or shared by only a small minority, only 25 percent of the users perceived themselves as being part of a small minority. A slightly larger percentage of nonusers (28 percent) expressed this feeling.

Youth-related Concerns: In Table 3 we have arrayed answers to questions which deal with issues immediately bearing on the life-styles of youth. An underlying dimension in each of these questions is the desire or advocacy of societal changes that would provide young people with more discretion or responsibility in regulating their own conduct.

Marijuana users can be clearly distinguished from nonusers in response to the questions concerning the regulation of marijuana, other drugs and alcohol. They are much more likely than nonusers to favor changes in these laws.[36] A somewhat larger percentage of users is also inclined to favor a lower voting age but the difference here, although significant, is not as striking. Marginal but directionally consistent responses are shown on the abortion and sex education items. Marijuana users are more likely than nonusers to favor changes on both of these items, but the differences between groups are not great. It appears that an overwhelming majority of high school seniors in Florida favor changes in abortion law and sex education in the schools, whether or not they smoke marijuana.

Despite the fact that the greatest difference between users and nonusers is observed on the

---

[35] Suchman, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

[36] These differences are consistent with Suchman's findings and his description of a "hang loose" ethic among college students who smoke marijuana. See also Blum, *et al., op. cit.*, p. 343.

Table 4. Summary Relationships Between Marijuana Use and Five Measures of Political and Social Orientation*

	Marijuana Use (gamma)	*N*
Foreign Isolationism	.05	900
Domestic Liberalism-Conservatism	.09	900
Political Alienation	−.12	903
Social Alienation (See Table 2)	−.29	904
Youth-Related Concerns (See Table 3)	−.55	904

* An index of attitudes on broader social concerns was not included because the item analysis of these issues revealed no significant differences between the groups (see Table 5).

two questions relating to drug use, the smallest majorities of users favor these changes. Seventy-four percent of marijuana users favor lowering the drinking age, compared to 36 percent who favor the legalization of marijuana and 53 percent who favor more lenient drug laws. Apparently, there is some doubt among users concerning the desirability of more lenient changes in such laws.[37]

The data in Table 4 clearly suggest that views on youth-related issues and marijuana use are closely related. The summary relationship between the two variables is substantial (gamma = −.55). Observe also, that this relationship is much stronger than the relationship between marijuana use and the index of social alienation reported in Table 2 (gamma = −.29).

Broad Social Concerns. We now turn our attention away from more personal youth-related concerns to larger social concerns. These questions deal specifically with race-related issues—housing, employment and integrated schooling for blacks. As shown in Table 5, there are no significant differences between users and nonusers on any of these issues. The differences which do exist suggest a slightly more sympathetic attitude toward blacks among users, but again these differences are quite small.[38]

A comparison of Tables 3 and 5 indicates that although marijuana users do express somewhat more sympathetic racial views, they are clearly more distinguishable from nonusers in their concern with youth-related issues. Moreover, when blacks are excluded, there is an unmistakable status quo orientation among both groups on the broader racial issues.

Political Attitudes. The association between marijuana use and three measures of political attitudes is reported in Table 4. The results show that the relationship between political attitudes and marijuana use is indeed weak. It is possible that for the young, politics is no longer conceived in the same terms as adults. Among most young people there is widespread agreement and acceptance of a more limited foreign policy role for the United States. Users and nonusers cannot be distinguished in their responses to these questions. Furthermore, most young people, regardless of marijuana use, accept the

Table 5. Broad Social Issues: Marijuana Users and Nonusers

	Users	Nonusers	Differences
1. Percentage who think that progress in securing integrated housing for blacks has been too slow	40% (119)	31% (771)	9% n.s.
2. Percentage who think that integration of their schools is a good thing	46% (120)	42% (766)	4% n.s.
3. Percentage who think that the growth in job opportunities for blacks has been too slow	34% (121)	31% (775)	3% n.s.

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the number in each category who responded to the question.

---

[37] There are numerous possible reasons why this apparent discrepancy exists in these responses. One possibility deserves some comment in the interest of further research in this area. It is possible that the responses to these questions vary with the frequency of use. That is, the 56 percent of the users who favor legalization of marijuana and the 53 percent who favor more lenient drug laws may be the most committed or frequent users. Unfortunately, we cannot examine this possibility with the data at hand.

[38] Black students, regardless of other characteristics, think that insufficient progress has been made in both housing and jobs, and they are more inclined to view integration favorably.

Figure 1. Interaction Patterns of Three Attitudinal Indices Among Marijuana Users and Nonusers (Gamma)



realities of greater governmental involvement in response to pressing domestic needs.[39]

If the indices that measure what may be described as more traditional political orientations are not associated with marijuana use among high school students, the association between marijuana use and political alienation also appears to provide little support for the hypothesis that marijuana and politics are related. The relationship is so tenuous that it provides virtually no predictive information. When the reverse question was examined (i.e., what percentage of the politically alienated are marijuana users?), we found that 33 percent (N = 15) of those students in the most extremely alienated category were users. This was the largest percentage of users observed in any category. More significant, however, there was no consistency or pattern in the relationship beyond this single group. We conclude from this that there is a greater likelihood of marijuana use *only* among those who are extremely alienated from the political system. However, and this distinction is important, we have found little support for the view that marijuana users are necessarily politically alienated.

Interaction Patterns. At this point, we have shown that marijuana use is most closely associated with social alienation and youth-related concerns. It is only marginally associated with political alienation. In Figure 1, we have presented the patterns of interactions between social alienation, youth-related concerns, and political alienation. Recall that each of these measures reflects attitudes toward authority in society, i.e., both objects and substantive issues of authority. The anticipated homogeneity of marijuana users can be readily observed. The pattern among nonusers is much less convincing.

The patterns revealed in Figure 1 do provide some support for Goode's observation that marijuana users form a kind of subcommunity in which there is a convergence of values.[40] The ability to predict one attitude from another is at least twice as great among users as it is among nonusers. But, even among marijuana users, it is clear that homogeneity is relative. Considerable variance is left unexplained in their attitudinal relationships.

Alternative Explanations. There are a variety of explanations which may account for the relative homogeneity of views observed among marijuana users, because developmental patterns will vary with individuals. But a few additional comments are in order.

It appears to be a truism that the intensity or extent of personal commitment is expressed ultimately in one's behavior, i.e., one's willingness to act on the basis of his beliefs. In the present case, this means not only expressing discontent with authority but also acting in violation of that authority. Concern with authority in society is not of itself an indication of political alienation. We have shown that social discontent and political alienation are distinct and primarily associated with different objects. As we have witnessed among nonusers, one may express dissatisfaction with more proximate objects and still maintain a supportive orientation toward the political system. However, when negative predispositions are accompanied by a willingness to break the law and show contempt for authorities with whom they disagree by smoking marijuana, we have roughly the difference between working within the system and ignoring or rejecting it. When this level of commitment is reached, it appears that social discontent, or the rejection of socially acceptable standards of conduct and those agencies that enforce these standards, is associated with a more abstract level of distrust in the institutions and processes through which the society is governed.

---

[39] Free and Cantril have observed a similar trend among adult Americans. They found that even most self-identified and ideologically defined conservatives have accepted most of the operationally defined liberal welfare programs of the federal government. See, Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1968), chs. 3–4.

[40] Goode, "Multiple Drug Use . . .", 55.

Recall that marijuana use is most closely associated with dissatisfaction on youth-related issues and only weakly associated with political alienation (see Table 4). Therefore, it is possible that the relationship between youth-related issues and political alienation observed among marijuana users may be explained in terms of dissonance theory. If it is assumed that marijuana use as an illegal act will thereby involve dissonance, it is possible that dissonance is reduced by rationalizing the illegal act through the development of a more general negativism toward the authoritative structures of society at large. In such cases, rationalization would operate as a defense mechanism in which the individual attempts to justify his illegal act by condemning those institutions which define the act as illegal.[41]

This explanation suggests that although marijuana use and indicators of social discontent are associated, they represent two theoretically distinct dimensions—attitudes and behavior. It is only when there is a coincidence of attitudes and behavior that a level of commitment is reached that has political implications. The independent predictive capacity of both variables is quite marginal because the separate manifestation of either the social attitude or the behavior conveys little about the level of commitment of the individual. We are suggesting that it is possible to conceive of an interaction effect in this relationship in which social discontent and deviant behavior combine and are linked to a more abstract and general level of political alienation.

It is also possible that a reverse sequence occurs. Sociologists have argued that the label society attaches to a particular behavior may determine the individual's subsequent behavior patterns and conformity to and deviations from particular norms.[42] If this is the case, then ". . . whenever the actor does experience (or is aware of actual or potential) negative responses, the meanings he himself attaches to the behavior will undergo modification."[43] Earlier we report that although the relationship between marijuana use and political alienation was minimal, marijuana use was greatest among the most extremely politically alienated. Therefore, it is conceivable that a person who is socially or politically alienated may smoke marijuana to show his contempt for authorities who have declared the act illegal.[44]

Further, in view of the relationships we have observed, there are many marijuana users who do not fit into either of these molds. For them marijuana use may be simply fashionable, or it may have the single intrinsic value of giving the user pleasure, or it may be a fortuitous act with no social or political meaning.[45] Samuel Lubell has observed such a trend toward the social acceptability of marijuana use among university students regardless of political ideology.[46]

Although a pattern of association between two indices of social discontent, marijuana use and political alienation is apparent, further analysis reveals that it is impossible to determine the ideological thrust, if any, of this pattern. The pattern is not associated with any of our other measures of larger social concerns or political orientation, i.e., domestic liberalism-conservatism or foreign isolationism. We can say only that the users' attitudes tend to be youth-related and anti-establishment.

---

[41] This is a variation of Festinger's "theory of cognitive dissonance" which argues that dissonance varies inversely with the magnitude of difference between two alternative choices. See, Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1962). In this study, we are assuming that it is the inconsistency between one's self-conception and the social definition of his act which will result in dissonance. For this view of dissonance reduction as a defense mechanism, see Morton Deutsch, R. M. Krauss, and N. Rosenau, "Dissonance or Defensiveness?" *Journal of Personality,* 30 (March 1962), 16–28; and Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss, *Theories in Social Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 74. For a first person account which appears to illustrate this phenomenon see Blum *et al., op. cit.,* p. 343.

[42] Edwin M. Schur, "Reactions to Deviance: A Critical Assessment," *American Journal of Sociology,* 75 (November 1969), 317. This perspective is called the "labelling" or "social reactions" approach to deviant behavior. Representative of this view is Howard S. Becker, *Outsiders* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 9. For similar definitions see, *Edwin M. Lemert, Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), p. 23; and Kai T. Erikson, "Notes on the Sociology of Deviance," *Social Problems,* 9 (Spring 1962), 308; and Albert K. Cohen, "The Sociology of the Deviant Act: Anomie Theory and Beyond," *American Sociological Review,* 30 (February 1965), 13.

[43] Schur, *loc. cit.*

[44] See, for example, Blum, *et al.,* p. 340.

[45] See, for example, Blum, *et al., op. cit.,* pp. 341–342.

[46] Samuel Lubell, "That 'Generation Gap'," in Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol (eds.), *Confrontation* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 64.

IV. Summary and Conclusions

In this study, we have first shown that although high school marijuana users may be found in most population groups, the composite profile or of a user suggests a middle or upper-middle-class white male who lives in an urban or suburban area. Second, we have found rather convincing evidence that marijuana users appear to be distinguishable primarily in their greater concern with issues that immediately affect their personal life styles. This finding is consistent with indications of their greater estrangement from family, church and school; and their opposition to more stringent law enforcement practices. These, after all, are the four major institutions that directly impose and enforce standards of conduct which are contrary to their preferences.

These findings, combined with the absence of any interpretable direct relationship between marijuana use, larger social concerns and political ideology, offer some support for the observations of Hadden, Halleck and Riseman[47] that the major concerns of young people are more limited to immediate private or self-related issues. Although their comments are based on youth in general, and we have found this tendency most manifest among marijuana users, it may mean that the growing popularity of marijuana among young people is an indication of a corresponding, and also growing, rejection of many societal norms. Some support for the latter notion is suggested in the finding that marijuana use and the two indices of social discontent are only tenuously associated with political alienation. A pattern of relationships among these variables does emerge, however, when users and nonusers are compared. Users tend to be more homogeneous and more negative in their social and political views.

The teenage marijuana user in our sample appears to be more likely than his straight counterpart to want to "do his own thing" or to be free from institutional restrictions on his conduct, to resent those who enforce these restrictions, and to combine these attitudes with feelings of political alienation, but only when his attitudes and behavior are congruent. With these qualifications, he probably does, in Suchman's terms, endorse a "hang loose" ethic.[48] If he rejects some accepted norms of middle-class American society as they impinge on *his* life style, this estrangement has not yet been translated into a coherent political orientation, except that it tends to be youth-centered and anti-establishment. Therefore, the stereotype described earlier, as most stereotypes, does bear some resemblance to reality. There are, however, important qualifications which we have described with regard to the political significance of marijuana use.

The possible causal patterns involved in these relationships are complex. Indeed, one is led to question the theoretical importance of causality when such phenomena are being studied.[49] Is marijuana use a response to social or political alienation? Or, since marijuana use increases the probability of a negative reaction from authorities, does this reaction create and reinforce the alienation of the young?

We have shown in this study that marijuana use, regardless of its causes, does have some social and political significance. The growing acceptance of marijuana and other forms of deviant behavior among young people have created a situation in which their behavior and society's response are mutually reinforcing. The patterns we have observed may or may not be causally related. More important is the fact that they do appear to emerge from the same social matrix.

---

[47] *Loc. cit.*

[48] Suchman, *op. cit.*

[49] Martin Oppenheimer has raised this question in his study of *The Urban Guerrilla* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 23.

Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964*

GERALD H. KRAMER

Yale University

I. Introduction

This study is an attempt to employ some simple statistical models, motivated by certain assumptions about voting akin to those discussed by Downs and others,[1] in an attempt to explain short-term fluctuations in the division of the national vote for the U. S. House of Representatives, over the period 1896–1964. The models will yield quantitative estimates of the impact of economic conditions on congressional elections, and of the effects of incumbency and presidential "coattails" as well.

The notion that a vote represents a decision or rational choice between alternatives is an important theme in democratic theory. However, this rationality hypothesis has proved to be difficult to test empirically, particularly with survey data, from which most of our recent knowledge of individual voting behavior is drawn.[2] The present study is an attempt to put a modified form of the rationality hypothesis to a different and in some respects more direct test than is readily possible with survey data.

The analysis bears directly on the substantive question of the relationships between economic conditions and U. S. national election results. National economic decisions frequently involve such considerations as how much price stability must be sacrificed in order to achieve a specified growth rate, and so forth, so clearly, quantitative knowledge of the electoral consequences of varying mixes of growth, price stability, and unemployment is relevant for an incumbent administration wishing to maximize its own chances for reelection; conceivably, such knowledge may also be relevant to the task of achieving a socially optimal mix of policies. Moreover, investigation of these various relationships may also provide a basis for developing new methods of long-range election forecasting to supplement current techniques, based on polls. The specific relationships used in the present study are too aggregative to be of great forecasting value in themselves, but our results do suggest that a more disaggregated and detailed model of the same general type may be of interest in this respect.

Finally, the extent to which congressional election results depend on economic and other external conditions, which cannot be effectively controlled by any particular congressman or campaign organization, is a question of general interest to students of campaigning and elections, and might also have implications for our understanding of the operation of the division of powers in the Federal government.

Several previous studies have considered the question of the effect of economic conditions upon election outcomes, and the principal results should be briefly described here.

W. A. Kerr examined the correlations of various economic indices with the "conservative" presidential vote (defined as the Whig vote prior to 1856, and the combined Republican-Prohibition vote in subsequent years) over a series of elections, in an attempt to test the hypothesis that prosperity increases the conservative vote.[3] The rank-order correlations with a variable identified only as "Index of per capita realized national income (adjusted by cost of living)", averaged over the election year and three preceding years, was .19, over the period 1897–1940. The correlation with "cost of living (corrected for century trend)," similarly averaged, was .17 (for 1837–1936), and with a "wholesale price index," .29 (for 1861–1940). More explicit definitions of the variables or data sources were not given, and most of the other economic series used are not measures of "prosperity" in any usual sense of the term. All in all Kerr's results lend only modest support, at best, to his basic hypothesis.

Pearson and Meyers considered a somewhat different hypothesis, that "the public tends to vote for the continuation of administrations that have been in power during prosperous times and to vote against the incumbent administration when depression marks the approach of election time."[4] They used a "general price level" as their measure of overall prosperity, and found that the presidential candidate of the incumbent party was defeated in 11 of the 13 presidential elections from

---

* The research described in this article was performed at the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University, under grants from the National Science Foundation and the Ford Foundation.

[1] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957).

[2] Though see V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Belknap Harvard, 1966).

[3] W. A. Kerr, "A Quantitative Study of Political Behavior, 1840–1940," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 19 (1944), 273–281.

[4] F. A. Pearson and W. I. Myers, "Prices and Presidents," *Farm Economics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: New York State College of Agriculture, Cornell University), 163 (September 1948), 4210–4218, at p. 4210.

1828 to 1924 which occurred in years of "declining or low prices," and was victorious in 16 of the 18 elections held when prices were "rising or high." The authors were not explicit, however, about what data were used, or about exactly how election years were classified into their two categories.

L. H. Bean considered essentially the same hypothesis, using an index of general business activity "based on Cleveland Trust Co. and Am. Tel. and Tel. indexes."[5] He compared changes in the index, between October of the election year and October two years earlier, with changes in the House membership of the incumbent administration. During nineteen congressional elections between 1854 and 1954 the index declined over the two-year period, and in fifteen of these cases the incumbent party suffered a net loss in House membership. Such losses occurred in all nine midterm elections, but the pattern held for only six of the ten presidential elections considered. Bean concluded that the president's personality and other factors partially offset the impact of economic conditions in presidential years, and that the effect of economic decline was most pronounced in midterm elections. The possibility of the opposite effect—that economic upturn would increase the incumbent's House seats—was also considered, but Bean concluded that this type of effect did not occur with any regularity. The data on which this conclusion rested, however, were presented in a rather fragmentary fashion.

Bean's findings were sharply disputed by Wilkinson and Hart, who also used an index of general business activity (at one point identified as the Cleveland Trust Company index, and at others as "Ayer's index.")[6] Changes in the August–September–October average of the index between the election year and the previous year were found to be completely uncorrelated with the percent of popular presidential vote for the party in power (for presidential elections from 1844 to 1948), and with changes in the House membership of the party in power (for congressional elections from 1856 to 1948); in each case the product-moment correlation was reported as .000. The authors concluded that the "alleged relationship [between prosperity and political victory] is not supported by the facts."[7]

The studies cited above were longitudinal, in the sense of analyzing aggregate national election outcomes over a long series of elections. A second group of studies employed cross-sectional data, by counties or states, over a shorter series of elections. The study by Tibbits was intended to test the thesis that economic decline or upturn would hurt or help the incumbent party in the Congressional elections of 1882 and 1884. The "incumbent" vote was defined separately in each congressional district, according to which party held the district prior to the election. This "incumbent" vote was then aggregated over all the districts in each state, and various procedures, whose rationale is not very clear, were then applied to this statewide "incumbent" vote to "correct" for trend and the influence of presidential elections. Although Tibbits regarded the thesis as verified, the data he presents are not very convincing, and in any event the definitions and procedures employed make it difficult to compare his results with those of other studies.[8]

Gosnell and Coleman investigated the relation between changes in the Democratic presidential vote and changes in economic conditions in some sixty-five Pennsylvania counties, for the elections of 1928, 1932, and 1936. Their economic variable was an index "derived from the amounts of wages and salaries paid in manufacturing enterprises and the value of principal crops . . . [weighted by] the relative importance of agriculture and industry . . . [as measured by] the number of persons gainfully employed in each group [for each county]."[9] Changes in this index between 1928 and 1932 were found to correlate at $-.231$ with changes in the Democratic presidential vote over the same period, and the equivalent correlation from 1932 to 1936 was $+.236$. (Some of the partial correlations, holding constant the rural-nonrural or ethnic-nonethnic composition of the counties, were somewhat higher in magnitude, on the order of .3 to .5). These results support the basic thesis that economic fluctuations affect the incumbent president's vote, though the correlations are small and account for onyl around 6% of the variance of the dependent variable.

A similar study, using counties from several states, was done by Ogburn and Coombs. They used several economic indices, the most relevant of which was based on "average wages of those engaged in manufacturing and in retail and wholesale trade . . . [and] the average value of farm per person engaged in farming . . . [weighted by] the proportion of the population living in towns and on farms [in each county;]".[10] Changes in this index between 1932 and 1936 were correlated across counties with corresponding changes in the Roosevelt vote, with mixed results. The reported correlations were: Illinois, −.15; Indiana, −.23; Ohio, −.03; Pennsylvania, −.04; Kansas, +.39; Iowa, +.01; Nebraska, +.32; and California, +.24.[11] Sizeable positive relationships, consistent with the "incumbency" thesis, were found in only three states, while substantial negative relationships were found in two others. These findings, and indeed most of the other results obtained in the study, do not correspond well with those of Gosnell and Coleman, and create the overall impression of no systematic relationship between changes in prosperity and the Roosevelt vote.

---

[5] Louis H. Bean, *Ballot Behavior* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940), p. 63n.

[6] T. Wilkinson and H. Hart, "Prosperity and Political Victory," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14 (1950), 331–335, at pp. 332, 334.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

[8] Clark Tibbits, "Majority Votes and the Business Cycle," *American Journal of Sociology*, 36 (1931), 596–606.

[9] H. F. Gosnell and W. G. Coleman, "Political Trends in Industrial America: Pennsylvania as an Example," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 4 (1940), 473–484, at p. 475.

In the most recent study by Rees, *et al.*, the relationship between the Republican congressional vote, and "state insured unemployment, as a percent of covered employment," and "net income per farm" were investigated in each of forty-one states during the seven congressional elections from 1946 to 1958. Each of these three variables was expressed in terms of deviations from its thirteen-year (or seven-election) state averages and simple bivariate tabulations were used to see whether below-average unemployment or above-average farm income was associated with an above-average Republican vote, and conversely. The authors found some modest association with unemployment (189 or 289 cases from 1946–58, and 162 of 235 from 1948–58, supported the thesis), but none with farm income. The unemployment relationship was strongest in the twenty-three northeastern and midwestern states.[12]

Finally, there have been several studies based on poll data, rather than election returns. Clark examined the relationship between monthly series on Roosevelt's popularity as President, as measured by Gallup poll results, and national income. He reports a correlation of .57 between these two variables (both expressed as deviations from a linear trend), over the 57-month period from August 1935 to April 1940. (When the popularity figures are computed separately for various economic classes, the correlations range from .78 to .95 for various income classes, and is .33 for persons on relief, over the shorter February 1937–April 1940 period).[13] Durant cites several journalistic investigations in Great Britain during the period 1959–1963 which showed a strong connection between the popularity of the Government, as measured by Gallup polls and by-election results, and the state of the economy according to various measures, particularly the unemployment rate.[14] Results reported in *The American Voter* also suggest that persons concerned with economic problems tended to vote against the incumbent Republicans in 1956.[15]

These various studies, in sum, yield a rather mixed picture. On the basic question of whether economic fluctuations are a major influence on election outcomes, several studies appear to indicate an affirmative answer, but others present equally strong evidence to the opposite effect. Most of these investigations have been primarily directed to the qualitative question of whether a relationship exists, and for the most part have not attempted the quantitative task of estimating it; moreover even when a relationship is found, it is not a strong one, generally accounting for well under ten percent of the variance in votes. Various of these studies have explored the effects of variations in prices, unemployment, or income, but none have attempted to consider these variables simultaneously, to determine their individual effects. Although some of these studies have attempted to "correct" their results by compensating for the effects of incumbency, trend, and the influence of presidential contests upon congressional races, the rationale for these corrections has often been unclear. The analyses themselves have been based on rather simple statistical methods, such as tabulations or simple correlations, and in almost every case no indication is given of the stability or statistical significance of the results obtained.

The present study, which is based on an explicit, multivariate statistical model of the relationship being investigated, is an attempt to overcome some of these difficulties.

II. The Model

To some extent, at least, an individual's vote in a national election represents a choice or judgment between alternative governing "teams." The precise interpretation of this choice depends on the decision rule one assumes voters to follow. One might picture the voter as a rational, information-processing individual who proceeds by collecting information of various kinds—party platforms and policy pronouncements, legislative voting records, and perhaps expert or authoritative opinions on these matters. Such a voter analyzes this information in light of his own self-interest and decides which party presents the "best" package of positions. He then votes accordingly. This view of the voting decision appears in classical democratic theory, and has been subjected to empirical tests in various voting studies (where it generally does not fare very well).

---

[10] W. F. Ogburn and L. C. Coombs, "The Economic Factor in the Roosevelt Elections," this REVIEW, 34 (1940), 719–736, at pp. 719–720.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 724.

[12] Albert Rees, H. Kaufman, S. J. Eldersveld, and F. Freidel, "The Effect of Economic Conditions on Congressional Elections, 1946–58," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 44 (1962), 458–465.

[13] Wesley C. Clark, *Economic Aspects of a President's Popularity* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1943).

[14] Henry Durant, "Indirect Influences on Voting Behavior," *Polls*, 1 (1965), 3–11.

[15] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 381–440.

In a more realistic setting, however, a voter—even a rational, self-interested voter—may not find it practical or efficient to proceed in this manner. For example, there may be no relevant party or "team" platforms to compare; platforms may (indeed, usually do) concentrate on desired ends rather than specific policy proposals; voters may not feel qualified to make a confident *a priori* assessment of the relative merits of positions on subtle technical issues, or they may recognize that platforms are in no sense binding commitments. Other information, such as the detailed legislative voting records of individual candidates, may be very costly to acquire and analyze, and of only limited relevance to the issues at stake in a national campaign.

These considerations suggest that a more relevant decision rule for voters would be based on readily available information. The past performance of the incumbent party in particular gives some indication of what it would do if returned to office, and of the effectiveness of its policies and personnel.

With respect to short-term variations in voting behavior, we shall, therefore, assume that a decision rule of the following type is operative: if the performance of the incumbent party is "satisfactory" according to some simple standard, the voter votes to retain the incumbent governing party in office to enable it to continue its present policies; while if the incumbent's performance is not "satisfactory," the voter votes against the incumbent, to give the opposition party a chance to govern.

On the basis of these assumptions, a simple statistical model can be developed as follows: consider a sequence of elections, numbered $1, 2 \cdots T$, which are contested by two political parties, A and B. For election t, let

y_t be party A's share of the two-party vote

δ_t be $+1$ if A is incumbent
-1 if B is incumbent

Δ_t be the difference between the actual performance of the incumbent party during its just-ending term in office, as measured by some index such as per capita income, and the performance "expected" of it by the electorate.

u_t be a random disturbance, distributed in some partially specified fashion

α, β, V be parameters

With these definitions, a suitable model is of the form

$$y_t = V + \delta_t[\alpha + \beta\Delta_t] + u_t \qquad (2.1)$$

Here, the random variable u_t is interpreted as the net effect of factors not considered explicitly in the model, such as the personalities and campaign tactics of individual candidates running on the party ticket, or the state of foreign affairs. The quantity V is the "normal" long-run average vote for party A; this is the vote A would receive in the absence of incumbency or random effects, and in this sense is a measure of the underlying basic partisanship of the electorate. The parameter β is a measure of the effect of the discrepancy Δ_t between actual and expected performance of the incumbent; from our basic hypothesis, we should expect β to be positive. Finally, α is a measure of the institutional advantage (or disadvantage) of being incumbent.

For an election in which A is incumbent, A will receive its base vote V, plus the net incumbency advantage α, plus the quantity $\beta\Delta_t$ which reflects the effect of its performance in office; when B is incumbent, then the vote for A will be $V-\alpha-\beta\Delta_t$, since the latter two terms associated with the incumbent now add to B's vote. The other factors embodied in the random term u_t also affect the vote, so that the observed relationships will actually be scatters of points around these lines.

If we could observe Δ_t over a series of elections, and if we could make suitable assumptions about the effects of the other factors embodied in the latent variable u_t, it would be possible to fit the model to the data, and estimate its parameters. In particular, if u_t satisfied the standard Gauss-Markoff assumptions, we could estimate V, α and β from an ordinary least-squares regression. The intercept term would be an estimate of V and the coefficients of δ_t and $\delta_t\Delta_t$ would be estimates, respectively, of the advantage of incumbency (α) and of the impact of the incumbent's economic performance (β). It is not possible to observe voters' expectations directly, however, so we must supplement the model with additional hypotheses. A reasonable and convenient hypothesis is that expectations about year t are formed on the basis of experience during the preceding year, $t-1$. With respect to income, for example, we might assume that income is "expected" by the average member of the electorate to grow at some constant rate r from year to year, and that the percentage discrepancy between actual and expected income Y_t and $\hat{Y}_t$ in year t serves as Δ_t in (2.1). Thus, using the relation $\hat{Y}_t=(1+r)Y_{t-1}$ to express this year's expected income in terms of last year's actual income, the relation becomes

$$y_t = V + \delta_t[\alpha + \beta(Y_t - \hat{Y}_t)/\hat{Y}_t] + u_t$$

$$= V + \delta_t\left[\alpha + \frac{\beta}{(1+r)}\left(\frac{Y_t - Y_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} - r\right)\right] + u_t.$$

This relation, however, contains an extra parameter, r, which can be neither observed nor estimated directly. More precisely, the three parameters α, β and r are not identified;[16] unless we have other prior information or other types of data, it is not possible even in principle to disentangle their separate effects. If we simply regress y_t on δ_t and $\delta_t(Y_t - Y_{t-1})/Y_{t-1}$, the coefficients of these variables will be estimates of $\alpha - r\beta/(1+r)$ and $\beta/(1+r) = \beta - r\beta/(1+r)$, respectively, rather than the original parameters α and β. For plausible values of r—say if income is expected to grow at not more than 5% per year—the bias in the case of β is not too serious, since the $-r\beta/(1+r)$ term will result in a negative bias of less than 5% of the true value of β. In the case of α, however, the bias may be more serious. For $r = .05$ and $\beta = .5$, the bias $-r\beta/(1+r)$ will be on the order of $-.02$. If we think of α as the institutional advantage accruing to the incumbent (arising from patronage, better access to the media, and so on), it seems unlikely that this could be more than a few percent of the total vote; hence a bias of two percent is substantial, relative to the true value of α. Thus, the estimated coefficient of δ_t in the regression above must be interpreted as the *net* advantage of being incumbent, which increases with institutional advantages, but decreases when voters have high expectations with respect to income increases.

In applying this framework to the U. S., further complications arise from the fact the model, as described so far, applies to a simple Downsian type of quasi-parliamentary electoral system, in which a voter must decide only between two candidates, who are running primarily as anonymous members of opposing party "teams" (rather than on the basis of their own personal records or policy views) and who are contesting a single office. In the U. S., however, voters must decide separately between candidates for several offices (president, senator, congressman). Because of the lack of party discipline and the fact that different offices are contested at different times and in different constituencies, candidates who are nominally members of the same party frequently do not campaign at all like members of the same electoral "team."

The present analysis will focus on the vote for the House of Representatives, since of the races for national office, House contests come closest to the Downsian case of relatively anonymous candidates competing as members of a common party team. Clearly, individual candidates often do not behave or campaign as loyal members of a party team, and indeed sometimes campaign on the basis of their past or intended future independence of their party's leadership. However there is considerable evidence, at least for recent times, to suggest that such factors count for very little in votes. For example, Stokes and Miller conclude that in the 1958 mid-term election, straight party loyalty was by far the major factor in the vote for congressmen; they also found that well over half the voters did not know either House candidate in their district, and that of those who knew something about either candidate, only a negligible percent mentioned legislative or policy matters.[17] Although individual races may deviate from the overall pattern, in general it seems that most Congressional candidates appear to most voters simply as Democrats or Republicans, and not as clearly defined personalities with their own policy views and records; and hence, variations in the overall popularity of the parties should be a major factor in producing short-term fluctuations in the Congressional vote.

The definition of the "incumbent" party also requires some care, since because of the division of powers it is possible for one party to control either or both houses of Congress, while the other controls the presidency; this situation in fact occurred in eight of the thirty-five national elections from 1896 to 1964. In three of these elections—1896, 1920, and 1932—the division of control was a transitory phenomenon which arose only because the president's term happened not to coincide with the beginning of the electoral tide against his party; the same party had formerly controlled all three institutions of government, and then progressively lost control of all three in the mid-term and following presidential elections. In these cases it seems quite appropriate to regard the party occupying the presidency as the incumbent. The election of 1912, in which control was also divided, was not used in the analysis for other reasons, described below. The remaining four cases—the elections of 1948, 1956, 1958, and 1960—are more complicated, and no definition of "the" incumbent party seems fully satisfactory. Even when control is divided, however, the president has greater control over the machinery of government, and normally has greater initiative in policy matters than does the majority party of either house of congress. The president also is the most prominent member of his party, and the most prominent elected official, while the identity of the party controlling the legislature is much less well known. (According to Stokes and Miller, even in the 1958 election, when the Democrats had controlled the House for four years, less than half the electorate was aware of that fact.)[18] For these reasons, we will take the party which controls the presidency as the incumbent party.

---

[16] For discussion of the identification problem in a somewhat different context, see Tjalling C. Koopmans, "Identification Problems in Economic Model Construction," in W. C. Hood and T. C. Koopmans (eds.), *Studies in Econometric Method* (New York: Wiley, 1953).

[17] Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (1962).

While most of the votes cast in national elections go to the two major parties, various minor parties also compete and regularly manage to win a small fraction of the vote. During the period from 1896 to 1920, minor parties usually received from four to six percent of the total congressional vote, and substantially more in some elections (notably in 1912 and 1914, with the Republican-Progressive split); from 1920 to 1942 the minor-party vote was typically from two to four percent, and since then it has generally run less than two percent of the total. Variations within the above approximate limits have often been substantial relative to the inter-election variation in the major-party vote. Hence we should try to incorporate the minor-party vote into the analysis, rather than lose information by simply ignoring it. Since we have been interpreting short-term fluctuations in the division of votes as expressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the incumbent party, it seems appropriate to interpret the minor-party vote as part of the anti-incumbent vote, and to count it along with the major opposition party. Hence (except where otherwise stated), when we speak of the "Republican" share of the vote, this quantity will consist of the Republican share of the total vote when the Republicans are the incumbent party, and of the Republican plus minor-party share when the Democrats are incumbent. The "Democratic" vote will be treated similarly. This procedure was followed except for the election of 1912, when the incumbent Republican party itself was split. There seems to be no satisfactory way of interpreting the sizeable Progressive vote in that year, so for this reason the 1912 election has been omitted from the analysis.

A final complication which must be considered is the possibility of "coattail" effects from higher-level races. If a candidate in a more prominent and higher-level race runs well ahead of his ticket because of his personal attractiveness and campaigning ability, some of the extra votes he wins may carry over to lower-level congressional races, simply because of the intellectual and physical difficulty of voting a split ticket. Our model should take this type of coattail effect into account, since we are primarily interested in that portion of the vote which reflects the strength of the party "team" as a whole, and not in votes which reflect the personal attractiveness of individual candidates. Because of their variety, it would be difficult to consider separately the possible effects of individual statewide races on the congressional vote. Evidence from other sources indicates that statewide factors in general (including coattail effects from statewide races) have little effect on congressional races, compared to national or local factors,[19] and even if such effects were important in individual states, the overall effect on the total congressional vote would be averaged over several dozen statewide races (where a strong Democratic gubernatorial candidate in one state might be offset by an attractive Republican candidate in another), so that the final net effect would be much smaller. In any event, we shall ignore statewide races, and consider only the possible influence of presidential coattails.

In a mid-term election, where there is no presidential contest, our model is of the form

$$\begin{aligned} y_t^C = \beta_1 X_{1t} + \beta_2 X_{2t} + \cdots \\ + \beta_k X_{kt} + u_t, \end{aligned} \qquad (2.2a)$$

where y^C is the Republican share of the congressional vote (the minor-party vote being treated as described above), and where for example $X_{1t}=1$, to give the intercept term (V in equation (2.1)), X_{2t} is $+1$ if a Republican is president and -1 if a Democrat is, X_{3t} is X_{2t} times the percent increase in per capita income, and so forth. For elections in presidential years, we have two relations,

$$\begin{aligned} y_t^P &= \beta_1 X_{1t} + \cdots + \beta_k X_{kt} \\ &\quad + u_t + v_t, \\ y_t^C &= \beta_1 X_{1t} + \cdots + \beta_k X_{kt} \\ &\quad + u_t + \gamma v_t, \end{aligned} \qquad (2.2b, c)$$

where y_t^P and y_t^C are the Republican shares of the vote for president and congress, respectively. The same exogenous variables X_{it} appear in both relations, with the same coefficients β_i. The random disturbance u_t, which appears in both equations also, represents the net effect of unmeasured factors, such as foreign events, which affect the popularity of the party "team" as a whole. The presidential equation (2.2b) also contains a second disturbance v_t, which represents the effect of the specific candidates and campaign tactics in the presidential race, and in the congressional equation (2.2c), it is assumed that a certain portion γ (where $0 \leq \gamma \leq 1$) of this presidential effect is also carried over into the congressional vote. Thus γv_t is the size of the coattail effect in election t.[20]

---

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] Donald E. Stokes, "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects," in J. L. Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science* (Dallas, Tex.: Southern Methodist University Press, 1965).

If coattail effects were negligible, and if the disturbance u_t satisfied the Gauss-Markoff assumptions, it would be possible to obtain efficient, unbiased estimates of the β_i in (2.2) by simply regressing the Congressional vote y^C on the exogenous variables $X_{1t}, \cdots, X_{kt}$. However if coattail effects are sizeable, then because of the resulting heteroskedasticity the regression estimates would not be efficient, nor would their estimated standard errors or the associated significance tests be accurate; furthermore there would be no way of estimating the coattails parameter γ, which is of some interest in itself. To circumvent these difficulties the disturbances have been assumed to be normally (and independently) distributed, and we used maximum likelihood methods for estimating the models; the procedure is described in detail in Appendix A. Briefly, the likelihood function is maximized in a stepwise fashion, by assuming a value for the coattails parameter γ, then obtaining conditional estimates of the other parameters and a conditional maximum of the likelihood function $\hat{L}(\gamma)$, and then repeating with alternative values of γ until the likelihood is near its maximum. By trying enough values of γ (and spacing them closely enough) the maximizing value $\hat{\gamma}$ can be approximated as closely as desired. In obtaining the results reported below, a relatively coarse grid with a spacing of .05 was used, so that the trial γ-values were 0, .05, .10, etc. (except that when $\hat{\gamma} < .05$, a finer grid with a .01 spacing was used). For any assumed value of γ the conditional estimates of the remaining parameters are obtained by what is in effect a least-squares regression, where the dependent variable is the congressional vote y^C in mid-term observations, and is a weighted sum of y^C and y^P in presidential-year observations, the weights being functions of the coattails parameter γ. With respect to hypothesis testing, for certain purposes—in particular for testing γ or for testing the composite hypothesis that certain subsets of variables are not significant—likelihood ratio tests were performed. In assessing the precision of individual $\hat{\beta}_i$'s, I have simply reported the standard errors as calculated according to the usual least-squares regression formula, for the regression corresponding to the maximizing value of γ. (A better procedure would have been to obtain asymptotic standard errors from the second derivatives of the likelihood function, but this was not done for computational reasons.) The R^2 and Durbin-Watson statistic for the regression corresponding to $\hat{\gamma}$ are also reported. The former is in effect the ratio of "explained" variance to the total variance less the variance attributable to the presidential disturbance v, and as such, gives a general idea of the overall goodness of fit. The Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation of the disturbances is not strictly appropriate here, both because the residuals are not calculated from a simple least-squares regression, and also because the observations are not entirely consecutive, since certain elections were omitted; however, the statistic is still informative concerning the possibility of serial correlation, and is reported in the tabulated results.

III. Results

The variables used for estimation were as follows:

δ,	the incumbency index, $= +1$ if the incumbent President is Republican, -1 otherwise.
Y_0, Y_{-1},	monetary income, = per capita personal income (or prior to 1919, adjusted GNP) in current dollars, for the year of the election (Y_0) and for the preceding year (Y_{-1}).
P_0, P_{-1},	prices, = consumer cost-of-living index, $1929 = 100$, for the current and preceding year.
R_0, R_{-1},	real income, = monetary income deflated by the cost-of-living index, or Y_0/P_0 and Y_{-1}/P_{-1}.
U_0, U_{-1},	unemployment, as a fraction of the civilian labor force, for the current and preceding year.
T,	time, where $T=0$ in 1896, $T=1$ in 1898, $\cdots$, $T=34$ in 1964.

More precise definitions of these variables, and sources, can be found in Appendix B.

As mentioned earlier, the election of 1912 was not used because of the difficulty in interpreting the large progressive vote in that year. The wartime elections of 1918, 1942 and 1944 have also been dropped, since wartime conditions and controls would substantially distort the meanings of our price and income series. The remaining thirty-one elections from 1896 to 1964 were used in obtaining the results reported below.

The simplest version of the model (2.2) would be to use fluctuations in real income to explain fluctuations in the division of the vote; hence, taking the congressional equation (2.2c) as representative of the system (2.2a,b,c) we would have

---

[20] It would also be natural to add a third disturbance, say z_t, to represent the net effect of the personal characteristics of individual congressional candidates. However, as we have already noted, congressional candidates are relatively anonymous to most of their constituents, and congressional campaign efforts are typically much less extensive than those of either statewide or local races; furthermore, this "personal" effect would be averaged over some 400-odd individual races, so the final net effect would be small indeed. Hence we shall ignore it.

$$y^c = \beta_0 + \delta\left[\beta_1 + \beta_2\left(\frac{R_0 - R_{-1}}{R_{-1}}\right)\right] + u + \gamma v$$

A more elaborate version of the model is obtained by adding a term involving T to allow for a trend in partisanship, and other terms to measure the independent effects of price and unemployment fluctuations, e.g.

$$\begin{aligned} y^c = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 T \\ & + \delta\left[B_2 + \beta_3\left(\frac{R_0 - R_{-1}}{R_{-1}}\right)\right. \\ & \left. + \beta_4\left(\frac{P_0 - P_{-1}}{P_0}\right) + \beta_5(U_0 - U_{-1})\right] \\ & + u + \gamma v \end{aligned} \qquad (3.5)$$

Intermediate versions of these models (equations (3.2) and (3.4)) are implicitly defined below. Prices and incomes have grown severalfold over the period, so changes in these variables are expressed in relative terms; unemployment, in contrast, has shown no particular trend, so its changes are expressed in absolute terms. (In fact, alternative expressions were also tried for the unemployment variable, including relative changes and absolute levels; all yielded essentially equivalent results.) Finally, we could replace the expressions involving real income R by similar expressions involving monetary income Y, to investigate the effects of price and monetary-income changes separately; this is done in the equations (3.3) and (3.6), implicitly defined below.

Our basic hypotheses lead us to expect, *a priori*, that increases in income help the incumbent party, so the coefficients of terms involving R and Y should be positive. Rises in prices and unemployment should hurt the incumbent, so that coefficients of terms involving P and U should be negative. It is not clear what the sign of the coefficient of the incumbency variable should be, since it is affected in opposite directions by institutional advantages and income expectations (and may also be affected by expectations concerning prices and unemployment).

The results obtained are presented in tabular form in Table 1. Each column of the table corresponds to an alternative form of the model (such as equations (3.1) and (3.5) above), while in each row are the coefficients of the terms at the left end of the row (provided the equation contains such

Table 1. Models and Data

Coefficient of	Equation						
	(3.1)	(3.2)	(3.3)	(3.4)	(3.5)	(3.6)	
1	.510	.506	.506	.546	.540	.542	(1)
δ	−.0005 (.007)	.0018 (.008)	.0012 (.008)	−.0091 (.006)	−.0069 (.007)	−.0073 (.007)	(2)
$\delta(R_0-R_{-1})/R_{-1}$	.503 (.100)	.546 (.163)		.437 (.089)	.470 (.143)		(3)
$\delta(Y_0-Y_{-1})/Y_{-1}$			.526 (.158)			.455 (.139)	(4)
$\delta(P_0-P_{-1})/P_{-1}$		−.161 (.194)	−.642 (.178)		−.139 (.169)	−.564 (.156)	(5)
$\delta(U_0-U_{-1})$		.200 (.393)	.167 (.386)		.176 (.342)	.138 (.337)	(6)
T				−.002 (.0006)	−.002 (.0006)	−.002 (.0006)	(7)
v	0	0	0	.15	.15	.15	(8)
R^2	.48	.52	.52	.62	.64	.64	(9)
d	1.32	1.38	1.36	1.53	1.60	1.59	(10)

a term). The figures in parentheses are the (conditional) standard errors of the coefficients which appear above them; these were not computed for the coattails parameter (row (8)), and also not for the intercept term (row (1)), because of the way the regression program was set up. The last two rows contain the values of the squared multiple correlation coefficient and the Durbin-Watson statistic from the regression corresponding to $\gamma=\hat{\gamma}$.

All of the equations explain a significant amount of the vote: if we apply a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero except the intercept term and the coefficient of T, each of the equations is significant at better than .01. The equations including a trend account for almost two-thirds of the variance of the vote (after eliminating the estimated effect of the presidential disturbance v), while the others explain about half the variance.

With respect to the individual estimates, the estimated coefficients of the income terms (both monetary and real) are positive in every equation, as expected *a priori;* moreover, judging from their conditional standard errors, they are also highly significant. The price coefficients also have the proper sign (negative) in every case, but are significant only in the equations ((3.3) and (3.6)) which involve monetary income Y. In those equations, fluctuations in prices and monetary incomes have effects which are similar in magnitude, though opposite in sign; when real-income fluctuations are considered, however, price fluctuations apparently have little independent effect. The unemployment coefficient consistently appears with the wrong sign (positive), but it also invariably has a very large standard error, so is never significant. Two of our *a priori* coefficient expectations are therefore confirmed, and the third is at least not refuted.

The fact the unemployment fluctuations have no significant effect is somewhat puzzling. Rees *et al.* found some association between insured unemployment and the Republican vote,[21] and Durant cites several investigations in Britain which found correlations between unemployment and the popularity of the Government during the past decade.[22] However, none of these studies attempted to simultaneously consider the effects of price or income fluctuations in a systematic fashion, so it is difficult to compare their results with ours. As mentioned earlier, alternative forms of the unemployment term were also tried in the various equations; although the corresponding coefficient was sometimes negative (as expected *a priori*), in every case the standard errors were large, and no consistently significant effect could be found. The fact that the unemployment term is somewhat intercorrelated with the income term ($r=-.77$, with income in current dollars) may be part of the problem. Errors in the unemployment series, especially for the pre-World War II period, undoubtedly also play a role. A third factor may be the fact that, at normal unemployment levels, the unemployed consist disproportionately of those types of individuals who tend to be least active politically (often because of racial discrimination or inability to meet residency or poll tax qualifications), and hence may have relatively little direct impact on aggregate vote statistics. In any event, for whatever reason, our results show no significant independent unemployment effect.

The coefficient of the incumbency variable δ is invariably small and insignificant. In view of the substantial income effects in every equation, the most reasonable interpretation is that the institutional advantages of incumbency are approximately offset by high income expectations on the part of the electorate. The trend term T is clearly significant, and important; the underlying partisanship of the electorate was about 54% Republican in 1896, and changed progressively to about 47% at the end of the period. The importance of the trend is also reflected in the Durbin-Watson d statistic, reported in row (10) of Table 1. As noted earlier, the usual critical regions for this statistic are not strictly applicable here (and in any event, all values lie in the inconclusive region); however the statistic is consistently closer to 2 in the equations containing the T term, reflecting a lessening of the apparent serial correlation of the residuals.

In the equations which do not contain the trend term, the estimated coattails parameter is zero (based on a .01 grid). Because of the importance of the trend, the estimates in (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) are more relevant; there, the estimated value is $\hat{\gamma}=.15$ (based on a .05 grid). If we apply a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that $\gamma=0$, though, then in every case the estimate is not significantly different from zero, so our evidence still does not indicate any important coattails effect. However, the manner in which the minor-party vote was treated in obtaining these results has probably biased these estimates downwards. Nationally based minor parties which run presidential candidates usually do not enter candidates in most House races, so the possible coattails of their presidential candidates have little opportunity to manifest themselves; and conversely, in the congressional vote totals, a large part of the minor-party vote comes from independent candidacies, or from state-based minor parties with no national organizations (such as the Liberal party of New York), so that in these cases the possibility of presidential coattails does not even arise. For these (and possibly other) reasons, increases in the minor-party vote have usually been associated with increases in split-ticket voting.[23] Hence we may get a better idea of the magnitude of presidential coattails by deleting the minor-party vote altogether, and considering only the two-party vote totals for congress and president. If the six equations referred to above are reestimated with the dependent variable redefined in this fashion, in every case we find that $\hat{\gamma} = .3$ (based on a .05 grid), and the estimates are now all significantly greater than zero.[24] This implies that around one-third of the votes gained (or lost) because of the specific candidates and campaign tactics of the presidential race carry over to the congressional candidates of the same party. The total variance of the major-party vote (based on equation (3.5), as reestimated here) can be decomposed as follows:

---

[21] Rees *et al, op. cit.*

[22] Durant, *op. cit.*

Table 2. Variance of the Major-Party Vote

Source	Variance	As Percent of Total Variance, in Election for		
		President	Congress (Pres. Year)	Congress (Midterm)
$\Sigma\beta X$	.00123	18%	47%	56%
u	.00097	14%	37%	44%
v	.00451	67%		
γv	.00041		16%	

In congressional elections held in presidential years, presidential coattails account for about one-sixth of the variance of votes, and economic variables for close to half. In presidential elections, by contrast, less than a fifth of the variance is due to these economic factors, while the presidential disturbance v, which represents the effects of such factors as the personalities and campaigning abilities of the candidates themselves, account for two-thirds of the variance. Presidential races are thus substantially less predictable than congressional elections, as expected.

Further insight into the overall performance of the models can be obtained by examination of their predictive ability. In Figure 1 I have plotted the predicted "team" vote (the solid line), based on equation (3.5), and also the actual Republican presidential and congressional votes (circles and triangles, respectively), for each election. (The predictions based on the other equations containing the trend term are quite similar.)

The actual congressional vote is generally within a few percentage points of the predicted vote, except for the 1920s and a few individual years, such as 1898. As noted earlier, the predictions account for about two-thirds of the total variance. Another test of the forecasting performance of a model, frequently used in econometric work, is its ability to predict turning points, or changes in trend. The congressional vote has shown no strong trend over the period considered, and some twenty-two of our elections constitute turning points according to the usual definition, so this test is not useful. However, if we simply consider its ability to predict increases or decreases in the Republican vote share, the model performs reasonably well: if a forecast increase is defined as the difference between the current predicted vote and the actual vote in the preceding election (or in the last election used for estimation), twenty-five of the thirty forecasts are correct in sign. If the difference between current and previous predicted vote is used as the forecast, the sign of the forecast is still correct twenty-four times.

During most of the 1920s, the actual Republican vote was consistently larger than that predicted by the model. The composition of the U. S. electorate changed substantially during this period, as a result of the enfranchisement of women in 1920, and our simple model does not take account of this important factor. With respect to other years, there are substantial residuals in 1898, 1932, 1950 and 1964. In 1898 and in 1950, U. S. troops were involved in hostilities abroad, and in both years the vote for the incumbent was appreciably less than predicted, which is suggestive. (The residuals in the immediate post-war elections of 1920 and 1946, though smaller in magnitude, also follow the same pattern.) The model underestimated the magnitudes of the Democratic landslides of 1932 and 1964, which is not surprising in view of the special circumstances of those elections. Overall, the congressional vote does not deviate from the predicted values in a systematic or inexplicable fashion.

IV. Summary and Conclusions

One basic finding to emerge from this study is that election outcomes are in substantial part responsive to objective changes occurring under the incumbent party; they are not "irrational," or random, or solely the product of past loyalties and habits, or of campaign rhetoric and merchandising. In this respect, our findings support those of Key, based on quite different data.[25]

Economic fluctuations, in particular, are important influences on congressional elections, with economic upturn helping the congressional candidates of the incumbent party, and economic

---

[23] Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Congressmen and the Electorate* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 135ff.

[24] The other parameter estimates are close to those reported in Table 1, though the goodness of fit is somewhat poorer.

[25] Key, *op. cit.*



Figure 1

decline benefitting the opposition. In quantitative terms, a 10% decrease in per capita real personal income would cost the incumbent administration 4 or 5 percent of the congressional vote, other things being equal. With a "swing ratio" of 2, this would translate into a loss of around 40 House seats—a respectable shift. In analysis-of-variance terms, economic fluctuations can account for something like half the variance of the congressional vote, over the period considered. (Presidential elections, however, are substantially less responsive to economic conditions.)

Of the economic variables considered, real personal income seems to be the most important; with real income held constant, changes in unemployment or in the rate of inflation have no significant independent effects. Being of the same party as the incumbent administration is of benefit only to the extent that the administration is successful economically; there is little intrinsic benefit to this type of incumbency in itself. Presidential coattails, however, are important, with perhaps as much as 30% of the extra votes attracted by a strong presidential candidate, who runs well ahead of his ticket, benefitting the congressional candidates of his party.

Appendix A

This discussion of estimation is necessarily somewhat technical. Good introductory expositions to the principles involved can be found in the books by Freeman, and Mood and Graybill; references to the pertinent pages are given below.

Let $y_1{}^t$ and $y_2{}^t$ be the Republican shares of the presidential and congressional votes in election t, observed over T_1 separate presidential elections, and let $X_1{}^t, \cdots, X_k{}^t$, u^t, and v^t, be the values of the k independent and two random variables in that year t. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} y_1{}^t &= \beta_1 X_1{}^t + \beta_2 X_2{}^t + \cdots \\ &\quad + \beta_k X_k{}^t + u^t + v^t \\ y_2{}^t &= \beta_1 X_1{}^t + \cdots \\ &\quad + \beta_k X_k{}^t + u^t + \gamma v^t, \\ t &= 1, 2, \cdots, T_1 \end{aligned} \tag{A.1a, b}$$

For each of the T_2 off-year elections, let $y_3{}^{t'}$ be the congressional vote, and $Z_1{}^{t'}, \cdots, Z_k{}^{t'}$, and $w^{t'}$ be the explanatory and random variables, so that

$$\begin{aligned} y_3{}^{t'} &= \beta_1 Z_1{}^{t'} + \cdots + \beta_k Z_k{}^{t'} + w^{t'}, \\ t' &= 1, 2, \cdots, T_2 \end{aligned} \tag{A.1c}$$

The disturbances are distributed normally and independently of one another, and their moments are assumed to satisfy

$$E(u^t) = E(v^t) = E(w^t) = 0, \quad \text{all } t$$

$$E(u^t u^{t'}) = E(w^t w^{t'}) = \begin{cases} 0, & t \neq t' \\ \sigma_u^2, & t = t' \end{cases}$$

$$E(v^t v^{t'}) = \begin{cases} 0, & t \neq t' \\ \sigma_v^2, & t = t' \end{cases} \tag{A.2}$$

$$E(u^t v^{t'}) = E(u^t w^{t'}) = E(v^t w^{t'}) = 0, \quad \text{all } t, t'$$

In view of these assumptions the conditional joint density of the dependent variables can be written

$$f(y_1^1, \cdots, y_3^{T_2} \mid X_1^1, \cdots, Z_k^{T_2}) = \prod_{t=1}^{T_1} f_1(y_1^t y_2^t \mid X_1^t, \cdots, X_k^t) \cdot \prod_{t'=1}^{T_2} f_2(y_3^{t'} \mid Z_1^{t'}, \cdots, Z_k^{t'}) \tag{A.3}$$

To obtain the likelihood function we first note[26] that

$$\begin{aligned} f_1(y_1^t, y_2^t \mid X^t) &= f(u^t, v^t \mid X^t) \left| \frac{\partial(u, v)}{\partial(y_1, y_2)} \right|_+ \\ &= f(u^t) f(v^t) \left| \frac{\partial(y_1, y_2)}{\partial(u, v)} \right|_+^{-1} \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \frac{1}{\sigma_u} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2} \frac{u_t^2}{\sigma_u^2} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \frac{1}{\sigma_v} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2} \frac{v_t^2}{\sigma_v^2} \right] \begin{vmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & \gamma \end{vmatrix}_+^{-1} \\ &= \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma_u\sigma_v(1-\gamma)} \cdot \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(u^t)^2}{\sigma_u^2} + \frac{(v^t)^2}{\sigma_v^2} \right) \right]. \end{aligned} \tag{A.4a}$$

Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned} f_2(y_2^{t'} \mid Z^{t'}) &= f(w^{t'} \mid Z^{t'}) \left| \frac{\partial v_3}{\partial w} \right|_+^{-1} \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \frac{1}{\sigma_u} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2} \frac{(w^{t'})^2}{\sigma_u^2} \right] \end{aligned} \tag{A.4b}$$

Hence, substituting into (A.3), the density becomes

$$f(y \mid X, Z) = 2\pi^{-(T_1+T_2/2)} \sigma_u^{-(T_1+T_2)} \sigma_v^{-T_2} (1-\gamma)^{-T_1} \cdot \exp\left\{ -\frac{1}{2} \left[\sum^{T_1} \left(\frac{u^2}{\sigma_u^2} + \frac{v^2}{\sigma_v^2} \right) + \sum^{T_2} \frac{w^2}{\sigma_u^2} \right] \right\} \tag{A.5}$$

To express this in terms of the observed variables y, X, Z, we first solve (A.1) to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} u^t &= q^t - (\beta_1 X_1^t + \beta_2 X_2^t + \cdots + \beta_k X_k^t) \\ v^t &= \frac{1}{1-\gamma} (y_1^t - y_2^t) \\ w^{t'} &= y_3^{t'} - (\beta_1 Z_1^{t'} + \cdots + \beta_k Z_k^{t'}), \end{aligned} \tag{A.6a, b, c}$$

where

$$q^t = -\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma} y_1^t + \frac{1}{1-\gamma} y_2^t$$

is a transformation of y_1^t and y_2^t which depends on the unknown structural parameter γ. If we substitute (A.6) into (A.5), the density is expressed entirely in terms of the observed variables and structural parameters; if we then regard the observations as fixed and consider the expression to be a function of the parameters, we obtain the logarithmic likelihood function[27]

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{L} = &-\left(T_1 + \frac{T_2}{2} \right) \ln 2\pi - (T_1 + T_2) \ln \sigma_u \\ &- T_1 \ln \sigma_v - T_1 \ln (1-\gamma) \\ &- \frac{1}{2} \sum_1^{T_1} \frac{(q - \beta_1 X_1 - \cdots - \beta_k X_k)^2}{\sigma_u^2} \\ &- \frac{1}{2} \sum_1^{T_1} \frac{(y_1 - y_2)^2}{(1-\gamma)^2 \sigma_v^2} \\ &- \frac{1}{2} \sum_1^{T_2} \frac{(y_3 - \beta_1 Z_1 - \cdots - \beta_k Z_k}{\sigma_u^2} \end{aligned} \tag{A.8}$$

The joint maximum-likelihood estimates are those values of the parameters $\beta_1, \cdots, \beta_k, \gamma, \sigma_u^2, \sigma_v^2$ which maximize the likelihood. If we attempt to simply apply the usual first-order conditions for a maximum to (A.8), the resulting expressions will be awkwardly nonlinear in the coattails parameter γ, and difficult to solve numerically. However the maximum can be approximated as closely as desired by a simple stepwise procedure, as follows. If the coattails parameter γ were known, or if a value could be assumed for it, maximum likelihood estimates for the remaining parameters are easily obtained. As is readily verified, the resulting estimates $\hat{\beta}_i$ of the β_i are the values that would be obtained from an ordinary least-squares multiple regression with dependent and independent variables being respectively q^t and $X_1{}^t, \cdots, X_k{}^t$ for the T_1 observations of presidential years, and $y_3{}^t$ and $Z_1{}^t, \cdots, Z_k{}^t$ for the remaining T_2 observations. The estimate $\hat{\sigma}_u{}^2$ of the variance of the "team" disturbance u is $\Sigma e^2/(T_1+T_2)$, where Σe^2 denotes the residual sum of squares from the above regression, and the estimate $\hat{\sigma}_v{}^2$ is $\Sigma^{T_1}(y_1-y_2)^2/T_1(1-\gamma^2)$. These estimates are conditional on γ, and as different values of γ are assumed, different estimates will be obtained. If the expressions for $\hat{\beta}_1, \cdots \hat{\beta}_k, \hat{\sigma}_u{}^2, \hat{\sigma}_v{}^2$ are substituted for the corresponding unknown parameters in (A.8), we obtain an expression for the conditional maximum of the likelihood $\mathcal{L}(\gamma)$ of the form $\pounds(\gamma)=K-(T_1+T_2)\Sigma e^2/2$, where K is a term not involving any of the parameters; the likelihood is therefore at a maximum when the residual sum of squares Σe^2 is minimum. Our estimating procedure therefore consists of computing the regression and sum of squares using each of a succession of trial values for γ, e.g. 0, .05, .10, .15, etc., until the value $\hat{\gamma}$ which results in the smallest residual sum of squares has been (approximately) found; since it is known that γ lies in the interval $0 \leq \gamma < 1.0$, this is not difficult computationally. The resulting $\hat{\gamma}$ and associated $\hat{\beta}_1, \cdots, \hat{\beta}_k, \hat{\sigma}_u{}^2, \hat{\sigma}_v{}^2$ are the (unconditional) joint maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters of the model.

---

[26] See Harold Freeman, *Introduction to Statistical Inference* (Reading, Pa.: Addison-Wesley, 1963), pp. 69ff; and A. M. Mood and F. A. Graybill, *Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 220ff.

[27] See Freeman, *op. cit.*, pp. 253c; and Mood and Graybill, *op. cit.* pp. 178ff.

Likelihood ratio tests[28] are readily constructed to test hypotheses on the parameters. The likelihood ratio for the hypothesis that the parameters satisfy r independent linear constraints (such as $\beta_1=0, \cdots, \beta_r=0$) can be shown to be $-(T_1+T_2)[ln\Sigma e^2-ln\Sigma e'^2]$, where $\Sigma e'^2$ is the residual sum of squares from the regression with the constraints imposed, and Σe^2 is defined as before; for large samples this test statistic will be distributed approximately as a chi-square with r degrees of freedom.

Appendix B

The primary data sources used were *Historical Statistics of the United States* (1957), and *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, various issues. These two sources will be referred to as *HSUS* and *SAUS*, respectively, in this appendix.

Population. Total population for 1895–1940 from *HSUS*, p. 7 (values prior to 1899 obtained by linear interpolation between 1889 and 1899 figures); for 1941–1964, *SAUS* (1966), p. 616.

Election returns and incumbency. For 1896–1948, from *HSUS*, pp. 686–89, 691–2. For 1950–64, *SAUS* (1966), p. 368.

Income. Personal income (Dept. of Commerce Concept) for 1929–1964 from Dept. of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business* (August, 1965), pp. 32–33; for 1919–1928, *HSUS*, p. 139. Prior to 1919, based on GNP figures from Kendrick (1961), pp. 298–99, proportionately reduced to agree with the 1919 personal income value, and converted to current dollars with implicit GNP deflators taken from Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Table 62, facing p. 618.

Unemployment. As percent of civilian labor force.

> "Prior to 1940, these figures represent estimates of unemployment on as comparable a basis to current labor force concepts as is presently possible.... Unemployment is calculated as a residual. That is, estimates are first made of the civilian labor force, then of employment; the difference between the two provides the estimates of unemployment." (*HSUS*, p. 68).

After 1940, the unemployment figures are based on field surveys. The figures for 1900–1939 were taken from *HSUS*, p. 73 (prior to 1900, set equal to the 1900–03 average), for 1946–61, from *SAUS* (1962), p. 215, and for 1962–64, from *SAUS* (1966), p. 218.

Prices. For 1913–1964, the series is the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index, from *SAUS* (1966), p. 356.

> "This index . . . measures the average change in prices of goods and services purchased by city wage-earner and clerical-worker families. . . . The weights used in calculating the index are based on studies of actual expenditures by wage earners and workers." (*SAUS* (1966), pp. 349–50, cf. also *HSUS*, pp. 109–10)

For 1895–1912, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York cost-of-living index was used. This index

> "was obtained by splicing together parts of indices already available to approximate a single series. No adjustments were made to the original series other than those necessary to convert to a common base period. . . . For 1890–1909, Paul Douglas' "most Probable Index of the Total Cost of Living for Workingmen", was used. Indexes for 1910–12 were derived from the cost-of-living index for Massachusetts. . . . " (*HSUS*, p. 111)

Figures were obtained from *HSUS*, p. 127, and adjusted to the same base period as the BLS series described above.

---

[28] See Freeman, *op. cit.*, pp. 300ff; and Mood and Graybill, *op. cit.*, pp. 297ff.

The Ecology of Peasant Communism in India*

DONALD S. ZAGORIA
Hunter College, City University of New York

My purpose in this article is to investigate the agrarian base of Indian communism through the use of statistical data and techniques in which the communist vote over three general elections since 1957 is correlated with 35 ecological variables taken from Indian census data. The results indicate that a few of these variables—particularly those having to do with rural population density and land tenure patterns—explain a significant percentage of the variance in the Indian communist vote. It is further suggested on the basis of statistical data accumulated by other investigators for Indonesia and the Philippines that the same ecological variables are highly correlated with communist strength in other parts of Asia.

My explanation for such high correlations is that in many parts of Asia there are cross-cultural demographic and land tenure patterns which are conducive to peasant unrest and, in the absence of non-communist political parties which address themselves to the sources of that unrest, the peasants turn to the communists, who are one of the few organized movements pressing for agrarian reform. Finally, I suggest that in India, and in other parts of Monsoon Asia, there is a link between the cultivation of irrigated food crops, particularly wet-rice on the one hand, and heavy rural population concentrations, tenancy and uneconomic dwarf-holdings on the other, and this is why such areas are particularly prone to the peasant unrest on which the communists feed.

I am interested in the empirical study of the social base of Indian communism, and of communist parties elsewhere in the world, because I believe that the different social bases of the various parties offer an important insight into comparative communist strength. Yet much of the serious literature on communism has explored communism in a social vacuum. The principal subjects for analysis have been the twists and turns of communist strategy or the relationship between a particular communist party and Moscow or Peking. With a few notable exceptions, the scholarly literature has ignored or glossed over the relationship between communism and its particular social and ecological setting.[1] The result has been to leave important questions about the "appeals" of communism, or the relationship between communism and modernization, to extremely broad-gauged theorists who often aim very high and hit very wide.[2]

Moreover, I believe that a comparative study of the social base of communist movements in underdeveloped countries can shed much light on the phenomenon of peasant radicalism, a point to which I shall return.[3]

India was chosen as a "laboratory" for investigating the social sources of peasant communism for several reasons. First, both prerequisites for ecological analysis are present—electoral data on the one hand and adequate census data in a sufficiently large number of data units on the other. The Communists have participated in elections since India gained independence and there is voluminous socio-economic data available for 285 of the more than 300 In-

---

* The early stages of my research were supported by a Guggenheim Foundation grant and by the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University. Later stages were supported by Hunter College and the City University of New York Research Foundation.

[1] Such exceptions, written mainly by political sociologists and political scientists rather than by specialists on communism include: R. V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton: University Press, 1961); Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); Erik Allardt, "Social Sources of Finnish Communism: Traditional and Emerging Radicalism," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 5 (1964); Mattei Dogan, "Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy," in S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1967); Richard Hamilton, *Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); Thomas H. Greene, "The Communist Electorate in France: Testing the Protest Hypothesis," unpublished manuscript.

[2] Stimulating as it is, Adam Ulam's attempt to explain Marxism as the "natural ideology" of a society in transition from a pre-industrial to a modern state, provides scant help in explaining the uneven distribution of communism in the developing countries. See Adam Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1964), particularly chapter 1. The same is true for concepts such as that of "mass society" popularized by William Kornhauser.

[3] Obviously the mere act of voting for the Communists does not by itself signify that the individual peasant is prepared to launch a guerrilla war or to engage in acts of violence. In some cases, and in some areas of India, a vote for the communists may merely indicate a protest against other parties. Nevertheless, the rural areas of India in which the Communists are strong are precisely the areas in which, during the past two years, land seizures by poor peasants are increasing.

dian districts I have chosen to study.[4] Second, as has often been observed, India is more like a continent than a nation-state. There are enormous social, economic and even cultural differences between various regions of India. Thus, it seemed likely that a study of the social base of communism in India would shed light on the social base of communism elsewhere in Asia and would therefore be of greater theoretical interest than a study of the social base of communism in a smaller, more homogeneous country.

In addition, in such a heterogeneous country as India, it is possible to simulate controlled experiments in which the Communist vote can be correlated with a number of independent variables in a variety of settings. For example, it has often been assumed that the Communists are disproportionately strong in Kerala because of the high levels of literacy in Kerala. Others have claimed that the key to communist strength in Kerala is the large number of agricultural laborers. Ecological techniques permit the correlation of literacy or agricultural laborers with the communist vote in other parts of India in order to compare those results with the results in Kerala. It is possible through multivariate analysis, moreover, to hold both literacy and agricultural laborers constant while examining the impact of other variables on the communist vote. Such a technique permits more precise specification of generalizations about the variables which are associated with the strength of the Communists, or of any other Indian political party.

To take but one example of the utility of such an exercise, it is a common belief among specialists on India that Communist strength in that country, which is concentrated in parts of the South, is largely accounted for by caste and linguistic, i.e., cultural, variables, rather than by economic or other social considerations.[5] Yet a mere glance at regional data reveals striking differences between certain areas in the South and other regions of India in terms of rural social structure and population density.[6] The question such considerations raise is whether areas outside the South with similar rural social and demographic patterns also produce high levels of Communist voting. I hope to demonstrate that this is indeed the case.

A third reason for choosing India as a "laboratory" for such investigation is that the uneven distribution of Communist voting strength within India cries out for systematic investigation. It is, for example, well known that Communist electoral strength is considerable in three Indian states—Kerala, West Bengal and Andhra. But it is less well known that communism is much stronger in certain identifiable parts of these three states—the Malabar portions of Kerala, the deltaic districts of West Bengal, and the deltaic and coastal districts of Andhra. Moreover, the Indian Communist vote is strong in many districts of India outside Kerala, West Bengal and Andhra. The 40 districts in which the Communist vote has been highest in three general elections since 1957 are located in no less than 9 of 17 states. While the uneven distribution of Communist strength in India, or in any other country, is attributable to a variety of factors, it is my contention that ecological factors play a critical role in determining that distribution.

Before proceeding with the analysis, however, several important caveats are in order. First, ecological "explanations" are not the same as empirical explanations. I have found several ecological variables highly correlated with the Communist vote in India and, on the basis of that correlation, I have attempted to construct a *logical* explanation of the relationship between ecological variables and communism. But this explanation necessarily hinges on certain hypothesized intervening sociological, economic and political variables which I assume to be associated with the ecological variables in what anthropologists call an "ecosystem." Only empirical investigation in India could actually verify or falsify my hypotheses or help me to choose among them.

---

[4] The accuracy of Indian census data has been questioned by some writers, most vigorously by Daniel and Alice Thorner in *Land and Labour in India* (London: 1962). Nevertheless, there is rather broad agreement between the Thorners' classification of all Indian districts into economic regions and that classification scheme adopted by the former Indian Census Commissioner, Asok Mitra, whose categories are employed here. See A. Mitra (ed.), *Levels of Regional Development in India* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1961), Vol. I, Part I-A (ii) of Census of India, 1961. Mitra followed, and to some extent relied on, similar attempts by others, notably O. H. K. Spate and A. T. A. Learmonth, *India and Pakistan, A General and Regional Geography* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1954). There is, in fact, a surprisingly large amount of agreement between a number of geographers and economists on which Indian districts should be included in which economic regions. Thorner himself calls attenton to the "striking similarity of the three sets of regions" as defined by the Indian Government's Rural Credit Survey, an unpublished monograph by Chen Han-seng and the 1951 Census. See *Land and Labour*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[5] A characteristic of many area specialists is an overemphasis on cultural variables in explaining political or social phenomena. One satisfactory attempt to develop a mode of analysis that combines both cultural and socioeconomic perspectives is "cultural ecology": see Julian Steward, *Theory of Culture Change* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955); and Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), particularly chapter 1. The attempt is to disaggregate "global" cultural variables and to locate the "cultural core," that is, those aspects of the culture "in which functional ties with the natural setting are most explicit. . . ." Geertz, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Similarly, there must be an attempt to locate those selected features of the setting which have functional significance for human adaptation.

[6] Of the 60 districts in India with the highest percentage of agricultural laborers, 30 are in South India, none are in North India and only one is in Central India. Of the 60 districts highest in "pure" tenancy, the South has 19, a distribution not equaled in any other region. Of the 60 districts which have the largest numbers of owners holding less than one acre of land, the South has 21, the North has only three and the West has only two. The average size of a cultivated holding in Kerala is 1.8 acres, in Rajasthan 16 acres, and in the Punjab 13.8 acres.

Second, there is less than a perfect correlation between ecological factors and the Communist vote in India. There are some districts in which the Communists receive a substantial vote but which have different settings from those I have found highly correlated with communism. Conversely, there are some districts which have the ecological characteristics of high Communist districts but which do not have a substantial Communist vote. This indicates that ecological variables can explain only a certain portion of the Communist vote and that any complete explanatory model would have to range beyond such considerations. Nevertheless, the fact that ecological variables can account for about half the variance in the Communist vote seems significant.

In sum, I do not claim to be offering a complete explanation of the dynamics of communism in India. I have omitted any attempt here to explore the urban Communist vote, which accounts for about ¼ of the total Communist vote. And I do not consider the shifting currents of the Indian political scene. In any given election there are a number of transient factors that contribute to the Communist vote. These may include caste alliances, economic and political conditions, personalities, etc. But in addition to such changing factors which go into the web of politics, I believe there are some permanent, structural conditions characteristic of areas in which the communists are already strong or growing, and which are no less "political." It is these structural conditions I wish to analyze here.

I. Data and Techniques

The basic program employed for statistical analysis was the COREGN correlation and regression program which performs multivariate normal correlation and stepwise regression analysis. This program computes regression equations by a stepwise procedure; that is, independent variables are added to the equation one at a time until all variables have been included. The procedure allows us to test the independent "explanatory" power of each variable with all other variables controlled.[7]

The basic data unit for this study is the district. The district is larger than the actual electoral constituency but small enough to comprise an area with an identity and political life of its own. Some states have as many as 40 or 50 districts; others have as few as 8 or 9. The district was chosen as the data unit because it is the smallest unit for which both electoral and census data can be gathered and correlated. Census data is not available for electoral constituencies.

Only 285 of the more than 300 districts of India were included in this study because of the unavailability of sufficient data for about 50 districts. These 285 districts include all the Indian states except Jammu and Kashmir and Nagaland. Centrally administered territories were omitted for lack of data. The electoral data are based on the State Legislative Assembly elections in 1957, 1962 and 1967.

In line with well-known ecological techniques developed by Allardt, Linz, and others,[8] I correlated the communist vote in 1957, 1962 and 1967 in all 285 units with the following variables:

1) total population per square mile
2) land value
3) per capita income
4) literacy
5) urbanization
6) percentage of "pure" tenancy
7) percentage of agricultural laborers
8) percentage of sown area irrigated
9) number of cultivators per 100 acres
10) hired attached workers
11) rice acreage as percentage of total sown area
12) percentage of workers in modernized industry
13) percentage of workers in household industry
14) percentage of unemployed
15) the Congress vote in 1957, 1962 and 1967
16) the Jan Sangh vote in 1957, 1962 and 1967
17) the Swatantra vote in 1962 and 1967
18) the PSP vote in 1957, 1962 and 1967
19) the SSP vote in 1962 and 1967
20) the percentage of wage earners to total workers
21) percentage of wheat acreage

---

[7] I want to acknowledge the advice and help of Joseph Lopatin in preparing my data for computer programming and for advice in interpreting the results.

[8] See in particular Juan Linz, "The Eight Spains" in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

22) percentage of cash crops
23) rice yield per acre
24) percentage of scheduled castes
25) miles of surfaced roads
26) plantation workers
27) voting turnout
28) number of communist candidates put up in 1957, 1962 and 1967 (as an index of communist organization)
29) percent of cultivators owning less than one acre
30) percent of cultivators owning between 1 and 4.9 acres
31) percent of cultivators owning between 5 and 9.9 acres
32) percent of cultivators owning between 10 and 14.9 acres
33) percent of cultivators owning between 15 and 49.9 acres
34) percent of cultivators owning more than 50 acres
35) total number of cultivators.

All the socio-economic variables are computed from the 1961 census. Most of them can be found in the invaluable Volume 1, Part 1-A (ii), *Levels of Regional Development in India.* However, agricultural laborers, wage earners, size of holding and land value were all compiled from other Indian census publications.[9]

The "analytical" units used in this study are of two kinds. First, there are six geographic units: All-India, the Northern Zone, Southern Zone, Central Zone, Eastern Zone and Western Zone. The Northern Zone consists of all districts in Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan; the Southern Zone of all districts in Kerala, Madras, Andhra and Mysore; the Central Zone of all districts in UP and MP; the Eastern Zone of all districts in Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Assam; the Western Zone of all districts in Gujarat and Maharashtra.

A second analytical unit employed is an abstract ecological unit which disregards geographic boundaries and is a pure ecological unit established by "cutoff points." The 285 districts were ranked from highest to lowest for each of the socio-economic variables employed and divided into five groups of approximately equal number. The top fifth would thus constitute the most highly urbanized or literate, etc.

Such a process, as Linz has pointed out, enables the analyst to correlate the vote with a number of variables in a variety of both ecological and geographic settings. The results are of greater theoretical interest than they would be if the variables were tested only in geographic regions. The results of any significant correlation in one geographic or ecological '"region" can be tested in another. If the correlation can be replicated in more than one region, there is greater confidence in its explanatory value. Thus, this approach permits experimentation leading to specification of those variables most intimately connected with the vote in the largest number of geographic and ecological "regions."

II. The Results

The most powerful explanatory variables associated with the rural Communist vote are essentially two: landlessness in combination with high rural population density (See Table 1). Landlessness is a composite of three variables: agricultural laborers as a percentage of all cultivators, tenants as a percentage of all cultivators, and holdings of less than one acre. Regions of high rural population density are those 103 districts of India in which there are more than 45 cultivators per 100 acres. Multivariate analysis shows that these two variables in combination explain 51.2% of the variance in the Communist vote for India as a whole. Moreover, while duplicating this multivariate analysis for five geographic regions of India, I found that the same two variables, landlessness in areas of high rural population density, explain at least 30% of the variance in the Communist vote in four of five geographic regions of India. Such high cross-regional correlations would seem to suggest that these factors contribute to the Communist vote irrespective of cultural variations such as differences in caste and language.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that neither landlessness nor rural population density taken separately are as highly correlated with the Communist vote as the two variables in combination. The landlessness variable is not as highly correlated with the communist vote in all 285 districts of India as it is in the 103 dis-

---

[9] The size of landholdings by district can be found in the *Household Economic Tables,* Part III of the 1961 Census. Data on wage earners and on the total numbers of agricultural laborers can be found in *General Economic Tables,* Part II-B (ii). Figures on land-value were kindly furnished to me by P. S. Sharma. It should be noted that figures on agricultural laborers are not the same as those on "hired attached workers" in the statistical volume edited by Mitra, *Levels, op. cit.* For the total number of agricultural laborers, "casual" laborers must be added to "attached" laborers. The study by Morris-Jones and Das Gupta apparently uses the figures for "attached" laborers only. Also their data does not include figures for holding less than one acre or for land-value, neither of which are included in the volume edited by Mitra. The results of that pioneering study in the ecological analysis of Indian electoral data are therefore unfortunately not comparable with those reported here. See W. H. Morris-Jones and B. Das Gupta, "India's Political Areas: Interim Report on an ecological investigation," *Asian Survey* (June 1969).

Table 1. Ordered Cumulative Multiple Regression of % CP Vote* in India by District and More Than 45 Cultivators per 100 Acres

Step Number	Independent Variable	Cumulative R^2	Contribution of R^2	
1	Landless Labor	.416	.416	Total India
2	Less than 1 acre	.489	.073	$N=103$
3	Tenancy	.512	.023	Total Variance Explained: 51.2%
1	Landless Labor	.589	.589	Southern Zone
2	Less than 1 acre	.615	.026	$N=38$
3	Tenancy	.621	.006	Total Variance Explained: 62.1%
1	Tenancy	.473	.473	Northern Zone
2	Less than 1 acre	.559	.086	$N=7$
3	Landless labor	.559	.000	Total Variance Explained: 55.9%
1	Tenancy	.029	.029	Central Zone
2	Less than 1 acre	.060	.031	$N=27$
3	Landless labor	.060	.000	Total Variance Explained: 6.0%
1	Less than 1 acre	.255	.255	Eastern Zone
2	Landless labor	.284	.029	$N=28$
3	Tenancy	.301	.017	Total Variance Explained: 30.1%
1	Landless labor	.225	.225	Western Zone
2	Tenancy	.386	.161	$N=3$
3	Less than 1 acre	.392	.006	Total Variance Explained: 39.2%

* The figure for the communist vote here and elsewhere is the average vote in three general elections, 1957, 1962 and 1967. It includes the combined vote in 1967 of the CPI and CPM, the two communist parties that compete in elections.

Table 2. Ordered Cumulative Multiple Regression Analysis of % CP Vote in India by District

Step Number	Independent Variable	Cumulative R^2	Contribution of R^2	
1	Less than 1 acre	.214	.214	Total India
2	Landless labor	.304	.090	$N=285$
3	Tenancy	.326	.022	Total Variance Explained: 32.6%
1	Landless labor	.445	.445	Southern Zone
2	Less than 1 acre	.585	.140	$N=58$
3	Tenancy	.589	.004	Total Variance Explained: 58.9%
1	Landless labor	.137	.137	Northern Zone
2	Less than 1 acre	.154	.017	$N=44$
3	Tenancy	.164	.010	Total Variance Explained: 16.4%
1	Less than 1 acre	.058	.058	Central Zone
2	Tenancy	.078	.020	$N=94$
3	Landless labor	.091	.013	Total Variance Explained: 9.1%
1	Less than 1 acre	.223	.223	Eastern Zone
2	Landless labor	.238	.015	$N=48$
3	Tenancy	.262	.024	Total Variance Explained: 26.2%
1	Less than 1 acre	.023	.023	Western Zone
2	Tenancy	.024	.001	$N=41$
3	Landless labor	.024	.000	Total Variance Explained: 2.4%

Table 3. Gross Value of Output per Acre and per Holding

State	Average Size of Holding (1960–61) (acres)	Labor Input per Acre (1960–61) (rs.)	Gross Value of Output per Acre (1960–61) (rs.)	Gross Value of Output per Holding (1960–61) (rs.)
Punjab	11.17	0.19	152.88	1,708
Maharashtra	13.06	0.30	127.68	1,668
Gujarat	11.98	0.25	132.88	1,592
Madhya Pradesh	10.01	0.30	118.63	1,187
Mysore	9.65	0.32	119.56	1,154
Madras	3.89	0.58	280.14	1,090
West Bengal	3.88	0.41	276.29	1,072
Rajasthan	13.79	0.22	75.98	1,062
Andhra	6.64	0.48	159.20	1,057
Assam	4.13	0.65	249.00	1,028
Orissa	4.61	0.40	193.46	892
Jammu-Kashmir	3.87	0.65	223.63	865
Uttar Pradesh	4.60	0.38	152.89	703
Bihar	3.99	0.56	168.99	674
Kerala	1.96	0.75	332.73	652

(Source: B. R. Kalra, "Employment and Productivity of Agricultural Working Force," *Journal of Agricultural Economics*, No. 1, Jan.–Mar. 1966.)

tricts with the highest rural population densities (See Table 2). And rural population density by itself is not correlated at all with the Communist vote. This suggests that the most important key to the Communist vote in the countryside lies neither in non-ownership of land nor in dense rural populations but in some dynamic condition produced by the combination of the two. What then are the possible sociological, economic and political characteristics of districts, or of portions of districts, which combine landlessness and high rural population densities?

One explanation would focus on the style of life of the landless. The landless in densely populated areas may be much worse off than the landless in sparsely populated areas even though the densely populated areas are usually more fertile and more productive in terms of output per acre. Population pressure and inequity of ownership combine to reduce the level of life of the landless in crowded areas to abysmal standards. This possibility is suggested by one characteristic of the crowded rural areas of India: they are rich in terms of output per acre but poor in terms of output per holding. Kerala, for example, has the highest ranking of all Indian states in gross value of output per acre but it has the lowest ranking in terms of gross value of output per holding. States with less densely populated, even though less fertile, rural regions, such as Gujarat and Maharashtra have much higher output per holding despite much lower yields per acre. (See Table 3) This fact suggests another characteristic of crowded areas: the existence of a big surplus which is appropriated by the larger landowners. In sparsely populated areas of extensive farming, there is little agricultural surplus over which to fight. But in crowded, usually more fertile areas, there is a considerable surplus which is very unequally divided.

This consideration leads to what I believe to be the key to the high communist vote in such areas: the conflict-ridden relationship between the landowners and the landless engaged in a desperate struggle for survival. It is not merely that there are gross inequities in the distribution of scarce land. As many studies have demonstrated, inequality has to be perceived in order to be acted upon. Furthermore, great inequality under some conditions merely serves to reenforce the deference of the poor peasants. For inequality to be a great source of strain, there must be no "natural basis of respect" for the landowner and alternatives must be known to the landless.[10]

In regions of large-scale capitalist enterprise, on large plantations, or under any conditions where it is perfectly clear to the landless that they have neither the skills nor the capital to replace the landowner, inequities are not likely to be a source of great resentment.[11] Nor are such inequities likely to be a source of tension where the landowner provides a useful religious, social or economic function for which he receives a commensurate reward.[12] But in situations where it is perfectly clear to the landless that the landowners perform few, if any, useful functions, and that the landless could get along perfectly well without them, landowners are bound to appear superfluous and exploitative. Such is the situation in the densely crowded rural areas of India, and in many other parts of Asia.

---

[10] For a stimulating discussion of the importance of a "natural basis of respect" for the landowner, see Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), particularly pp. 470–471. On the importance of a knowledge of alternatives, and for many other shrewd insights into peasant political behavior based on the interpretation of a large amount of voting data, see the unpublished manuscript of Juan Linz, "Patterns of Land Tenure and Division of Labor and Politics," undated.

To begin with, landlessness in densely populated rural areas often takes the form of sharecropping, the most conflict-ridden form, or other forms of tenancy. Because land is scarce and valuable, a rentier class emerges and land is rented out to or sharecroppers who must surrender 40 to 70% of the crop to the landowner at harvest time. Often the very same rentier is also the money-lender to whom the sharecropper falls into almost perpetual debt. Quite often, the sharecropper not only performs all the work on the land but also provides the seed, the fertilizer and whatever other inputs are necessary. He knows where the crop can be sold as well. The only relationship he has with the landowner is at harvest time, when he must surrender a significant portion of the crop on which he has done all of the work and borne most of the risk. Under such circumstances, as Stinchcombe has pointed out:

> It is perfectly clear to the tenant farmer that he could raise and sell his crops just as well with the landlord gone as with him there. There is no complicated cooperative tillage that seems beyond the view of all but the landlord and his managers, as there may be in manorial, and generally is in large-scale capitalist, agriculture.[13]

In short, under such conditions the landowners do not have the protection of the peasants' ignorance about the enterprise to defend their privileged position.

Also, in India as in many other underdeveloped countries, the sharecropper usually has no security of tenure. He is a "tenant at will" who can be dispossessed any time the owner wishes to repossess the land, regardless of how long or how hard the tenant has worked on the land.[14] Added to this is the fact that many owners who lease land to tenant farmers are absentee owners who live in nearby cities or towns and who have virtually no contact with the tenant.[15] Such considerations suggest why a number of writers have found sharecropping, both historically and in a wide number of contemporary settings, to be the most conflict-ridden form of land tenure.[16] Whether or not a rentier class in the countryside is in a strict economic sense "parasitic," as several non-economists have suggested, or whether rent is capitalized, as some economists argue,[17] the important point is that the rentier class appears parasitic to the peasant.

---

[11] This important insight I first came across in Arthur Stinchcombe, "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations," in Reinhard Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status and Power* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1966).

[12] See Moore, *op. cit.*

[13] Stinchcombe, *op. cit.*

[14] For much interesting information on tenancy and land patterns in India, as well as for a discussion of what classifications were used in the 1961 census, see P. S. Sharma, "A Study of the Structural and Tenurial Aspects of Rural Economy in the Light of 1961 Census," *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics* (New Delhi, Oct.-Dec. 1965); also by the same author, "Patterns of Land Concentration," *The Economic Weekly* (Bombay: Dec. 11, 1965) and "Agricultural Working Force and Cropping Pattern in the Light of 1961 Census," *Agricultural Situation in India* (New Delhi: 1963). Tenants in India can be divided into several categories. There is, first of all, an important distinction between "occupancy" and "nonoccupancy" tenants, depending on whether they have permanent and heritable rights to the land at one extreme or are tenants "at will" on the other who negotiate yearly agreements with the owners, often orally, and so have little protection against eviction. Tenants can also be divided into share or cash tenants depending on whether they pay their rent in kind or in cash. Generally, occupancy tenants pay cash rents and nonoccupancy tenants are sharecroppers. See G. Kotovsky, *Agrarian Reforms in India* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1966), p. 136. Finally, according to Sharma's work on tenancy, *op. cit.*, the 1961 Indian Census, which he helped prepare, divided tenants into "pure" and "mixed" tenants, the distinction being that ". . . in the case of pure tenancy holdings, the cultivated area is held from private persons or institutions whereas in the case of mixed tenancy holdings, it is partly owned or held from Government and partly from private persons or institutions." Throughout the text of this article I make little distinction between sharecropping and other forms of tenancy because sharecropping—or nonoccupancy tenancy—is the predominant form of tenancy in India and because no numerical breakdowns distinguishing sharecropping from other forms of tenancy are available.

[15] The extent of absentee ownership in India is a matter on which no statistical data is available. It is my impression, and that of several informed observers to whom I have talked, including Gunnar Myrdal, that absenteeism is considerable.

[16] Stinchcombe, *op. cit.*, Linz, *Patterns*, *op. cit.*, and Hamilton, *op. cit.*, all present a variety of evidence from voting studies and historical surveys to suggest that sharecropping is the most conflict-ridden form of land tenure. Dogan's work on the Italian Communist Party shows that two-thirds of the tenant farmers in Italy are concentrated in three regions—Emilia, Tuscany, and Umbria—and these three regions give the Communist and socialist parties more than half their votes (Dogan, *op. cit.*, p. 146). According to consider-

Another important consideration is the peculiar nature of the rural proletariat in crowded areas. This is often a three-tiered proletariat, consisting of "dwarf-owners" of less than one acre, sharecroppers or tenant farmers, and completely landless wage-laborers. Very often, however, the same individual combines two or more such roles. That is, the owner of half an acre or less of land, in order to scratch out a living, may also be a sharecropper or wage-laborer part of the time. Tawney, finding this same situation in pre-World War II southern China, appositely called this class a "propertied proletariat."[18]

Without any empirical studies contrasting the political attitudes of a "propertied" and a "pure" propertyless proletariat, it is difficult to generalize about them. However, it seems likely that the propertied proletariat in the countryside has two important characteristics relevant to tensions between it and the landowners. First, it may be peculiarly conscious of its own status ambivalence which provides a clear lesson that there is an alternative to landlessness. Second, the propertied proletariat has a greater degree of independence from the landowners than the propertyless wage-workers. A number of writers have emphasized the importance of the ownership of a house or small plot of land for enabling the peasant to "stand up" to the landowner.[19]

Some confirmation of this hypothesis linking the "propertied proletariat" to greater radicalism than the "pure" proletariat, may be found in the fact that in India, where agricultural laborers are concentrated either in rice or cotton areas,[20] the rice laborers, many of whom are also dwarf-owners, vote much more heavily for the Communists than do the cotton laborers, most of whom are completely propertyless wage workers (see Table 4).

Still another factor maximizing conflict between landowners and landless in crowded areas of India is that the landowners are relatively small and therefore do not command the political or social resources to dominate the landless. In other countries, it has been found that the communists are strong where there is little conservative influence exerted on the peasants by owners. Linz, for example, found that the rural departments of the Massif Central in France most likely to vote communist were both unchurched and lacking any remnants of aristocracy.[21] And Landsberger found that in Northeast Brazil, where Francisco Juliao established his peasant leagues and where the Catholic Chuch has also been organizing peasants, big landowners (in this case sugar growers) were under economic pressure from the more modern sugar industry in São Paulo.[22] What was crucial in both cases was the absence or decline of a landed class able to exert conservative influence on the peasantry.

In the densely crowded areas of India, which are also the most fertile, the landed classes typically are not big estate owners; rather they own

---

able data in Linz, *op. cit.*, the French left also obtains a disproportionately large share of its votes from sharecropping (metayage) regions. And, as I shall suggest further on, one common denominator of communist strength in India, the Philippines and Indonesia, is tenancy in densely populated rural areas.

[17] Eric Wolf argues that in situations where owners maximize monetary returns not by improving the process of production but by collecting rent and interest payments from the poor peasants, such a system "quickly leads to attempts to turn the various titles to income into debt titles." Eric Wolf, *Peasants* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 55. He calls this "rent capitalism." Stanislav Andreski has something very similar in mind when he speaks of the "parasitic involution of capitalism" in areas where the owner derives his income from leasing land to tenants. This, he contends, discourages structural breakthroughs in productivity. See Stanislaw Andreski, *Parasitism and Subversion* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), and *The Uses of Comparative Sociology* (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965). On the other hand, Stanislaw Wellisz, an economist at Columbia University, contends that such arguments make little economic sense because rent is capitalized.

[18] R. H. Tawney, *Land and Labor in China* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[19] Linz, *op. cit.*, cites a study by Diaz del Moral which observes that the most politically conscious laborers in Cordoba, Spain during the 1930s were those laborers who were also small holders and thus had a minimal amount of economic independence. Petras and Zeitlin also report that in Chile it was the "free laborers" not directly attached to the land, and consequently less directly under the dominance of the landowners, who were one of the most radical groups in the countryside. See James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.), *Latin America, Reform or Revolution* (New York: Fawcett, 1968), p. 240.

[20] Rice and cotton are the only two crop areas of India in which the proportion of agricultural laborers to cultivators exceeds 40%.

[21] Linz, *Patterns, op. cit.*

[22] Henry Landsberger, "The Role of Peasant Movements and Revolts in Development: An Analytical Framework," *Reprint Series*, No. 236, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1968).

Table 4. Districts in Which Agricultural Laborers Represent 40% or More of Peasant Cultivators

District	Crop	% AL	Cultivators per 100 Acres	% Total Tenancy	% DW	% CP Vote
1. *Cannanore*-K*	R	71.8	43	86.1	37.4	38.5
2. Amravati-MH	C	65.1	25	19.0	1.0	7.2
3. Palghat-K	R	60.8	58	90.6	21.8	46.0
4. *West Godavari*-AP	R	60.75	64	31.9	13.4	29.8
5. *East Godavari*-AP	R	60.3	73	38.1	18.2	21.9
6. Yeotmal-MH	C	59.9	27	24.7	0.1	4.3
7. Akola-MH	C	59.1	24	18.1	0.6	2.0
8. *Krishna*-AP	R	58.4	50	18.6	11.2	35.8
9. Wardha-MH	C	56.2	23	12.8	0.4	6.95
10. *Alleppey*-K	R	51.6	55	27.1	61.4	38.2
11. Buldhana-MH	C	49.7	26	13.4	0.9	—
12. Kurnool-AP	J	48.9	24	20.1	2.9	13.45
13. Parbhani-MH	J	48.3	21	23.2	0.1	6.5
14. *Trichur*-K	R	47.9	54	81.8	33.0	38.2
15. *Thanjavur*-MD	R	47.4	63	52.7	15.5	16.6
16. Guntur-AP	R	47.2	43	25.3	12.0	29.6
17. *Calicut*-K	R	46.9	30	84.9	35.0	19.9
18. Jalgaon-MH	C	46.1	30	13.4	2.0	5.3
19. Bidar-MY	J-GR	45.4	26	14.9	1.9	7.65
20. *Darbhanga*-B	R	45.3	80	39.0	39.0	7.85
21. Nanded-MH	C	44.9	26	17.4	0.4	9.75
22. Dhulia-MH	J-C	44.2	31	13.1	0.6	6.8
23. Osmanabad-MH	J	44.1	24	18.1	0.3	3.7
24. Broach-G	C	43.7	29	28.6	1.4	—
25. Nellore-AP	R	43.1	45	NA	17.6	25.15
26. *Kottayam*-K	R	43.1	28	23.4	50.4	36.3
27. *Champaran*-B	R	43.0	71	45.0	25.7	10.75
28. Khamman-AP	R	42.0	52	18.5	4.5	40.5
29. *Chingleput*-MD	R	41.9	69	32.6	18.9	1.7
30. *Ernakulam*-K	R	40.6	42	55.2	45.4	34.0
31. Birbhum-WB	R	41.2	40	23.5	9.3	12.0
32. Nalgonda-AP	J-R	40.6	37	16.3	8.7	48.5
33. Trivandrum-K	R	40.5	51	19.2	60.7	38.1
34. Nagpur-MH	J	40.45	27	9.6	0.9	2.0
35. *Howrah*-WB	R	40.05	61	31.6	41.6	23.6
India		19.3	38	18.0	5	8.9

* Districts italicized have above average tenancy *and* dwarf holding as well as 40% laborers.

Crop Symbols

R	Rice
C	Cotton
J	Jowar
GR	Gram

small to medium amounts of land. Huge holdings are more characteristic of the less fertile, more sparsely settled, former princely states. Thus, in the crowded areas, there are no huge "feudal" owners able to prevent the peasantry from being radicalized along class lines.

Finally, the rural proletariat in crowded areas may be more susceptible both to organization and to external ideological influence than the proletariat in sparsely settled areas. Siegfried long ago noted profound differences in psychology between scattered and concentrated rural populations, with the latter much readier for collective enterprises and more susceptible to external influences.[23] Marx and Engels also emphasized the radicalizing effect of concentration, which facilitates the development of class consciousness among workers as a result of frequent and intimate contact with fellow workers. Although they were talking about the industrial working class, the same "concentration effect" undoubtedly radicalizes the rural proletariat as well. Concentration not only contrib-

---

[23] André Siegfried, *Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisième République* (Paris: A. Colin, 1913).

Table 5. Districts in Which Communist Vote Increased by More than 50% from 1957 to 1967

State	District	% CP Vote	Crop	AL %	Cult./ 100 Acres	Dwarf %	% Tot Ten	Land Value
BI	Bhagalpur	20.3	R	39.6	62	17.0	37.7	179
BI	Champaran	15.7	R	43.0	71	25.7	45.0	185
BI	Darbhanga	11.2	R	45.3	80	39.0	39.0	160
BI	Gaya	11.2	R	36.0	70	18.8	26.7	154
BI	Singhbhum	12.9	R	17.4	103	11.7	9.2	212
MH	Dhulia	14.1	C	44.2	31	<5	13.1	105
MH	Ahmednagar	24.1	C	27.2	23	<5	11.7	101
WB	West Dinjapur	14.7	R	25.5	52	<5	41.4	215
WB	Cooch Behar	15.2	R	8.7	43	<5	51.3	264
AS	Sibsagar	14.1	R	2.9	60	14.5	35.5	251
MD	Madurai	12.8	R	34.0	58	11.9	20.7	262
UP	Uttar Khasi	28.3	W	1.0	NA	20.1	34.4	NA
UP	Tehri Garhwal	22.1	WR	1.0	214	28.2	30.0	NA
UP	Varanasi	15.9	R	NA	62	17.6	9.8	167
UP	Banda	15.4	G	23.2	32	<5	18.5	125
UP	Muzaffarnagar	15.5	W	14.9	33	<5	3.1	313
MH	Bhir	37.3	J	35.9	24	<5	15.6	89
WB	Hooghly	31.2	R	39.4	60	20.4	32.7	326
WB	Burdwan	37.5	R	38.4	40	8.8	NA	295
	India	8.9		19.7	38	5	18.0	152

utes to the "we-they" dichotomy that is symptomatic of class consciousness but it also increases the self-confidence of the proletariat. A number of studies have suggested that wherever the rural proletariat outnumbers or comes close to outnumbering the owner class, it often becomes bolder politically.

In sum, the relationship between the landowners and the landless in densely crowded areas of India is particularly conducive to strain because of the absence on the part of the landless of any "natural basis of respect" for the landowners, the knowledge that the landless have of alternatives, the capacity they have to stand up to the landowner, and their susceptibility to external ideological and organizational influence. Finally, the landowners, who are relatively small holders, are unable to exert the conservative influence on the landless that the owners of big estates often can.

Such factors apparently not only help explain where the Indian Communist vote has in the past been strong; they also help explain the trends in that vote. In order to test the characteristics of those districts in which the Communists have been gaining strength over the past three general elections, I singled out the 19 districts of India in which the Communist vote in 1967 was 50% or more higher than it was in 1957, provided the vote in 1957 was 10% or more of the electorate. (The 10% base was arbitrary. It was used to avoid including districts in which the communists went from 1% to 2% or from 4% to 8%.) These 19 districts and their ecological characteristics are shown in Table 5.

Thirteen of the nineteen have higher than average rural population densities. Twelve of the nineteen have higher than average numbers of dwarfowners and tenants. Thus, about two-thirds of the 19 districts in which the communists are gaining fit the syndrome characteristics of districts in which they are already entrenched. The principal targets of opportunity are the Gangetic parts of Bihar and West Bengal, some of the most densely populated, rice-growing areas of India.

II. Other Parts of Asia

I suggested earlier that because India is such a heterogeneous country, the results of any investigation into the social base of communism in India might have some validity for other countries in Asia as well. Because some statistical data is available to test this hypothesis in Indonesia, the Philippines and South Vietnam, I want to turn now to a very brief consideration of the rural base of communism in those three countries.

During the past 15 years Indonesia has had two elections in which the Communists participated. In September, 1955, all-Indonesia elections were held for parliament. From June to November, 1957, local elections for the provincial, kabupaten and city councils were held throughout Java, and later in the outer islands.

Table 6. The PKI Vote, Tenancy and Population Density in the 1957 Kabupaten Elections in Indonesia

PKI Vote, Tenancy and Population Density per Square Km of 0–99 $N=11$	PKI Vote, Tenancy and Population Density per Square Km of 100–399 $N=22$	PKI Vote, Tenancy and Population Density per Square Km of 400–550 $N=32$	PKI Vote, Tenancy and Population Density per Square Km of 551–1154 $N=20$
Gamma = −.158	Gamma = .186	Gamma = .115	Gamma = .630

Source: Data gathered by Mavis Taintor in Indonesia.

The Indonesian Communists participated actively in both elections.

A graduate student at the State University of New York, Mavis Taintor, recently gathered data enabling her to correlate the vote for the PKI in 1957 in 85 kabupatens, most of which were in Java, with eight other variables having to do with crop patterns, aspects of land tenure arrangements and rural population density. She found the PKI vote in Java to be most highly correlated with tenancy in the most densely populated kabupatens. (See Table 6.) Moreover, there was little or no correlation between the PKI vote and tenancy in sparsely settled areas, yet the correlation increased dramatically in the most crowded areas.

Thus, as in India, the most powerful predictor of Communist strength on Java appears to be the *combination* of landlessness and heavy population densities. The island in Indonesia is one of the most densely populated regions of the world and a very large number of the peasantry on Java, particularly in those parts of East and Central Java where the Communists are strongest, constitute a propertied proletariat which ekes out a living through some combination of mini-ownership, sharecropping and wage labor. Moreover, as in the crowded parts of India, the landed classes on Java typically own very small pieces of land. There are no huge "'feudal" owners capable of exerting conservative influence on the landless. In light of all these considerations, it is not hard to understand why the Indonesian Communist party was the largest and fastest growing communist party in the world until 1965, when it was decimated by the Army after an abortive coup whose origins are still the subject of a lively scholarly debate.

In the Philippines, the Huks never participated in an election. However, one writer collected Philippine Constabulary data as of 1967–68 on the strength of the Huks in 57 Central Luzon municipalities and correlated these results with a variety of economic, cultural and demographic variables drawn from the 1939 and 1960 Philippine censuses.[24] He found contiguity, language and tenancy to be the most significant variables. That is, the Huks were most likely to be strong in municipalities surrounded by Huks, in Pampangan-speaking areas, and wherever tenancy was high.

Unfortunately, for comparative purposes, Mitchell did not indicate whether tenancy in more densely populated areas of Central Luzon was more highly correlated with the Huks than tenancy in more sparsely settled areas. Yet it seems likely this is the case. A perusal of Philippine census data shows that Pampanga—the center of Huk strength—is not only very high in tenancy (in the great bulk of the Pampan-

Table 7. Central Luzon Density of Population by Province (1962)

Province	Area*	Population†	Persons‡	Rank
Philippine Total	30,000	29,240	.097	
1. Nueva Ecija	528	655	1.240	26
2. Tarlac	305	465	1.520	18
3. Bulacan	267	600	2.250	9
4. Pampanga	218	667	3.060	4
5. Cavite	129	409	3.170	3

* In thousands sq. hectares.
† In thousands.
‡ Per sq. hectare.
Source: Philippine Economic Atlas, 1965.

---

[24] Edward J. Mitchell, "Some Econometrics of the Huk Rebellion," this REVIEW (December 1969), pp. 1159–1171.

gan-speaking municipalities, owners represent only 5 to 18 percent of all farmers) but is also the most densely populated agrarian province in Central Luzon, a fact unrecorded by Mitchell (See Table 7).

As Table 7 indicates, Pampanga ranks fourth among 55 provinces in density of population despite the fact that it is based on an agrarian economy. It is more crowded than Bulacan to the southeast, which has a mixed industrial-agricultural economy, and is only slightly less densely populated than the industrial province of Cavite lying immediately below metropolitan Manila. It is also growing at a faster rate than the other Central Luzon provinces.[25] In sum, Pampanga, the stronghold of the Huks in Central Luzon, combines both high rates of tenancy and very dense rural populations. Thus in India, Indonesia and the Philippines, the same ecological variables, landlessness in areas of high rural population density, are highly correlated with communist strength despite vast cultural differences.

Finally, we may turn to South Vietnam. The only statistical study available is again one by Mitchell. His research on the Vietnamese war suggests that high tenancy rates and other measures of inequality contributed to the government, not the rebel cause.[26] Yet, as I suggested earlier, and as Mitchell also concludes, this need not be surprising. In "feudal" areas where there are huge landowners, and where inequalities are extreme, the big landowners are in a position to exert a conservative influence on the landless. It is noteworthy in this regard that the high-tenancy areas of South Vietnam which Mitchell finds supporting the government are areas in which there are huge former French estates of more than 100 hectares now primarily run by the Saigon government. It is therefore necessary to distinguish the social and political effects of tenancy in areas dominated by large landowners, where tenancy may reenforce the conservative authority of the landowners, from tenancy in areas where there are no big estates or owners.

What is missing from Mitchell's analysis is any explanation of the sources of peasant unrest which are at the root of Viet Cong rural support.[27] An explanation of this unrest can, however, be found in recent studies of land tenure conditions in South Vietnam carried out by the Stanford Research Institute.[28] The SRI studies confirmed that exploitative forms of tenancy, land shortage, overpopulation and associated evils of agrarian life in South Vietnam were characteristic of certain areas. Both coastal Annam, from which the Viet Minh movement in South Vietnam took off, and parts of the Mekong Delta, where the Viet Cong have had strong areas of support ever since the end of World War II, are areas of tremendous rural population concentration, tenancy, and dwarf-holding. As the SRI fieldwork confirmed in detail:

> . . . to be a tenant in the Mekong Delta meant: to pay an average of 34% of the crop in rent to a landlord who supplied no inputs or support of any description; to exist on the land as a tenant at will or on a year-to-year basis; to bear the predominant risk of a crop-failure, with the rent still due; to have virtually no disposable surplus once the landlord got through. . . .[29]

SRI interviews, moreover, made it clear that "from its beginnings the Vietnamese struggle for independence centered around land" and that this was particularly the case in most of South Vietnam where "there is heavy population pressure on the available tillable land. . . ."[30]

The Viet Minh and its successor, the Viet Cong, had little difficulty in understanding this fact. Already by 1954 they controlled much of the land in South Vietnam and redistributed it. It was hardly surprising, then, that the South Vietnamese peasants did not particularly welcome American and South Vietnamese Army troops "securing" villages when such troops were followed, as they often were, by landlords reasserting control over their former lands.[31]

And incredible as it may seem, one SRI investigator concludes that:

> The Government of Vietnam and the US Mission to Vietnam never seemed to appreciate fully the contribution that could be made to ending the re-

---

[25] See an unpublished paper by Wayne Swanke, "The Origins of Unrest in Central Luzon: a Case Study of Pampanga" (Columbia University: May 31, 1967).

[26] Edward J. Mitchell, "The Significance of Land Tenure in the Vietnamese Insurgency," *Asian Survey* (August 1967); and "Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam," *World Politics* (April 1968).

[27] Both in analyzing the base of the Huks in the Philippines and in analyzing the base of the Viet Cong, Mitchell places an inordinate emphasis on the importance of coercion.

[28] Stanford Research Institute, *Land Reform in Vietnam* (Menlo Park, California: 1968), four volumes. For analyses based on the data, see William Bredo, "Agrarian Reform in Vietnam: Vietcong and Government of Vietnam Strategies in Conflict," *Asian Survey* (August 1970), 738–750. In the same issue, see also Roy L. Prosterman, "Land-to-the-Tiller in South Vietnam: The Tables Turn," pp. 751–764.

[29] Prosterman, *op. cit.*, p. 753.

[30] Bredo, *op. cit.*, pp. 744, 739.

[31] Prosterman, *op. cit.*, p. 755.

Table 8. "Rice Communism": The Communist Vote Correlated with Ecological Variables

	Unemployment	Agric. Labor	Tenancy	$N=285$ Dwarf Holders	Cult/ 100 Acres	Land Values	Irrigation	Rice Acreage	Rice Yields
All India	.48	.40	.31	.46	.10	.32	.29	.25	.27
North	.47	.37	.28	.02	.00	.49	.55	.02	.04
South	.51	.67	.34	.58	.09	.28	.28	.31	.03
West	−.13	.05	−.08	−.15	−.21	−.11	−.14	−.14	−.04
East	.70	.26	.16	.43	−.09	.32	.11	.14	.44
Center	.09	−.16	−.05	.24	.19	.01	.23	.04	−.08
				Rice Acreage Correlated with the Same Variables					
All India	.24	.16	.30	.37	.44	.53	.25		
North	.26	.05	.23	.37	.17	.21	.22		
South	.17	.36	.56	.30	.55	.66	.66		
West	.18	−.22	.38	.56	.73	.46	.29		
East	.02	−.24	−.16	−.31	−.19	.59	.00		
Center	−.09	.07	.06	.32	.40	.13	.01		
				Rice Yields Correlated with the Same Variables					
All India	.31	.29	.20	.21	.14	.60	.32		
North	.37	.44	.44	.23	.10	.58	.39		
South	.07	−.11	.00	.12	.01	.45	.10		
West	.35	−.31	.48	.63	.48	.68	.16		
East	.54	−.12	.19	.07	−.02	.53	.44		
Center	.14	.00	−.45	−.40	−.08	.55	.31		

> bellion and its support from North Vietnam by a full scale and sweeping land redistribution program. . . . The hypothesis was, apparently, that the hearts and minds of the peasants could be won by increasing the supply of fertilizer and pesticides, by introducing IR8 rice, improved hogs and poultry, by improving the credit system, and by providing the farmer with more technical information.[32]

Another writer concludes in a similar vein that:

> The course of this war leads to a pretty fair suspicion that there have been some rather grotesque errors committed along the way, and, unfortunately, the role played by many of those in AID (and its predecessor agency) and the State Department on the land-reform issue was—until early in 1969—one of weakness, vacillation and desperate self-justification.[33]

IV. Communism and Intensive Cultivation

We have seen that in India, and in a number of other Asian countries, communist strength is correlated with high degrees of landlessness in areas of very dense rural populations, that is, with intensive cultivation. Intensive cultivation is often associated with river valleys, low-lying coastal plains, or deltaic areas—all of which have sure supplies of water for purposes of irrigation. In India, for example, of 27 districts in which the communists received more than 20% of the vote in 1962, 20 are either coastal or deltaic districts. (They are West Godavari 25.3%, Krishna 37.9, Nellore 21.3, Guntur 27.2, Cannanore 39.1, Kozhikode 22.9, Palghat 43.8, Trichur 43.2, Ernakulam 31.9, Kottayam 40.6, Quilon 42.7, Alleppey 39.8, Trivandrum 45.8, Puri 21.1, Nadia 24.6, 24 Parganas 31.0, Howrah 21.6, Hooghly 33.0, Midnapore 23.8, West Dinjapur 23.5.)

I now want to suggest that the crop most highly correlated with patterns of intensive cultivation in India, and in many other Asian countries, is wet-rice. (See Table 8) For reasons I shall indicate, wet-rice, high rural population densities, and a large rural proletariat "go together" in India, East Pakistan, East and Central Java, Central Luzon, coastal Annam, the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, as well as in prewar south Korea and south China.

The decisive variable, however, is not wet-rice itself. In India it is perfectly clear that wherever wheat is irrigated, as in the Northern region, it is also correlated with tenancy, dwarf-holding and communism. (See Table 9) Thus, in the Northern, irrigated-wheat regions of India, notably the Punjab, there is the same positive relationship between the Communist vote on the one hand, and landlessness in densely populated areas on the other, as there is in many rice regions of India. Indeed, in the Northern

---

[32] Bredo, *op. cit.*, pp. 743–744.

[33] Prosterman, *op. cit.*, pp. 755–756.

Table 9. "Irrigated Wheat" Communism in North India: Irrigation, Wheat, Tenancy, Dwarf-Holdings and the CP Vote

	Wheat and Irrigation	Wheat and Tenancy	Wheat and Dwarf-Holdings	Wheat and CP Vote	
All India	.00	−.12	−.16	−.21	$N=285$
North	.61	.41	.23	.35	$N=44$
South	−.26	−.08	−.18	−.21	$N=58$
Center	−.20	.10	−.08	.05	$N=94$
East	.13	−.08	.41	−.13	$N=48$
West	−.03	−.18	−.27	−.04	$N=41$

wheat region, as Table 1 indicates, tenancy in densely populated areas explains 47.3% of the variance in the communist vote and tenancy combined with dwarf-holding in densely populated wheat areas explains about 60% of the variance in the communist vote. In short, what is decisive for producing a high communist vote is landlessness in densely populated areas, not rice. Yet there seem to be certain crops more likely to be correlated with both landlessness and dense rural populations than others. Wet-rice is one, irrigated wheat is another.

The reasons for this are not hard to find. Areas with irrigated food crops can sustain more people than areas with either non-irrigated food crops or commercial crops. Over time, such areas probably have attracted higher levels of migration from other areas. Moreover, such areas can more easily resist famine. As a result, irrigated food-crop areas are likely to be the most densely populated areas in most underdeveloped countries.

Unfortunately, I cannot be certain of this connection because there have been few cross-cultural studies of the social and demographic correlates of different crop areas. Yet Geertz has demonstrated convincingly that, in Indonesia at least, swidden agriculture has a "dispersive, inelastic quality" while wet-rice agriculture has a "concentrative, inflatable" quality.[34] He goes so far as to contend that in this difference "lies much of the explanation for the uneven distribution of population in Indonesia and the ineluctable social and cultural quandaries which followed from it."[35] In India, too, there seems little doubt that the irrigated rice and wheat areas are more densely populated than either the non-irrigated food crop or commercial crop areas.[36]

In the specific case of wet-rice, Geertz has shown that there are two sociologically crucial facts which help account for dense rural populations. First, wet-rice is one of the most stable crops known to man. That is, it can produce year after year a virtually undiminished yield. Second, it has both the ability and the tendency to respond to a rising population through intensification, that is, to absorb increased numbers of cultivators on a unit of cultivated land. Thus, while "overpopulation" in other crop areas can result in an overdriving or deterioration of the habitat, "overpopulation" in a wet-rice region can be accommodated within an undamaged habitat.[37]

Well-irrigated food-crop areas, in addition to being densely populated, also have tendencies toward sharecropping and dwarf-holdings. The tendency towards sharecropping probably arises as a result of population pressures that make land scarce. This in turn leads to high rents. Colin Clark has found a direct relationship between population density and high rents in a number of countries both historically and in the contemporary world. He concludes that rents are highest on the most crowded land, provided tenants have nowhere else to go, that is, either to more fortunately situated agricultural land or to industry.[38] Stinchcombe has also pointed out the extraordinary coincidence between high rents, sharecropping, and fertile, crowded land in many Asian countries at various points in time.

The tendency towards small holding is probably a direct result of population pressure. In the fertile, crowded rural areas, there is much greater subdivision of the land than in dry, more sparsely settled agricultural areas.[39] The

---

[34] Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 37.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] Sharma, "Patterns of Land Concentration," *op. cit.*

[37] Geertz, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–32.

[38] Colin Clark and M. R. Haswell, *The Economics of Subsistence Agriculture* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1967), chapter 16.

[39] The Indian economist Amartya Sen has proposed on theoretical grounds a connection between fertility, dense rural populations, and small holdings. The more fertile areas, because they have dense populations, have smaller-sized holdings. This observation seems borne

Table 10. "Feudal" Communism in the West: The Communist Vote Correlated with Size of Holding

Percent of Owners with	South	North	West	East	Center
	(*N*=285)				
Less than 1 acre	.55	−.02	−.17	.28	.11
1–4.9	−.04	−.21	−.32	−.12	.12
5–9.9	−.48	.03	−.50	−.25	−.16
10–14.9	−.29	.26	−.10	−.08	−.19
15–49.9	−.23	.22	.45	−.02	−.10
More than 50	−.12	−.18	.63	.12	−.08

effects of such subdivision are particularly conducive to small holdings in countries such as India where the absence of primogeniture means that the land is divided equally among all male heirs at the death of the father.

Whatever the precise causal links, however, it is clear that in India, and in many other Asian countries, well-irrigated food crops, particularly, but not exclusively, wet-rice "go together" with dense rural populations, sharecropping and very tiny holdings.

V. "Feudal" Communism in India

In attributing a significant part of the variance in rural communist strength in India, and elsewhere in Asia, to landlessness in densely populated areas, I do not mean to suggest that this is the exclusive pattern. My data on India also suggest that in the Western zone, communism correlates with areas in which large landowners predominate (see Table 10). There is an apparent contradiction here to my earlier contention that areas of large "feudal" owners are often conservative because of the ability of large owners to exact deference from the poor peasants. The reasons for this exception in the Western zone of India remain to be explained.[40]

What all this suggests is that the ecological factors discussed here cannot by themselves provide a complete explanatory model for the past or likely future successes of communism in India or elsewhere in Asia. On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence here to suggest that ecological factors—both those I have discussed and others—do play a larger role in the success of Asian communist movements among the peasantry than is generally realized.

VI. Conclusion

The conclusion suggested by this analysis is that in many parts of Asia, the relationship between the landless or semilandless and the landowners is more susceptible to conflict in crowded than in sparsely settled areas provided that land in the crowded areas is inequitably divided. The possible reasons for this can be briefly summarized.

First, the crowded and wet areas of intensive agriculture have a larger surplus than the sparsely settled, dry areas. This means that

---

out in India, as Table II indicates. In most regions of India, the largest size holdings are negatively correlated with irrigation and the smallest holdings are positively correlated. In the South and Center, there are very high correlations between irrigation and holdings less than 10 acres. In the North, there is a correlation between irrigation and holdings less than 15 acres. In all four of these regions, moreover, there is a high negative correlation between irrigation and holdings of more than 50 acres.

[40] The major peasant uprising in India during the past 25 years, that in Telengana, also took place in a "feudal" area, the former princely state of Hyderabad. At the time of the uprising in 1946–48, Telengana was ruled by an autocratic Nizam in alliance with Muslim feudal lords. Most of the underlying peasantry were Hindus. In the critical post-independence years, the Nizam maneuvered to avoid absorption into the new Indian union and this provided the Communists with the opportunity to lead what was in part a struggle of Hindu and Muslim peasants against Muslim overlords, and in part a struggle against the Nizam for accession of largely Hindu Hyderabad to largely Hindu India.

Until mid-1948, the Communist-led peasant movement supported accession to the new Indian Union in defiance of the Nizam. At that time, the peak of its popularity, during which the Communists claimed control of 2000 "liberated" villages, the Telengana movement was, therefore, in large degree a national movement as well as a peasant uprising. The pro-Indian, "national" aspect of the uprising was crucial. Proof of this was the quick collapse of the movement once the Indian army moved into Hyderabad in 1948 and the Communists moved into an alliance with the Nizam against both accession and the new government of India. Once the Communists became "anti-India," they quickly faded. Nevertheless, as a result of their earlier leadership of the peasant movement in Telengana, the Communists have to this day retained a strong traditional base in that area. It is my impression, however, that that base is not growing as speedily as the Communist base in the deltaic, coastal and irrigated areas of India. In any case, all this suggests that even in areas of large "feudal" owners, mobilization of the poor peasantry by the Communists is possible if there is a combination of deep-seated grievances against the big landowners and a "national" issue.

Table 11. Size of Holding Correlated with Irrigation

Percent of Owners with	(*N*=285) India	North	South	West	East	Center
Less than one acre	.23	−.04	.29	−.03	.05	.20
1–4.9	.22	−.10	.49	.13	−.26	.40
5–9.9	−.07	.29	−.35	.23	−.02	−.05
10–14.9	−.22	.40	−.50	−.04	−.03	−.36
15–49.9	−.30	.02	−.54	−.12	.01	−.49
More than 50	−.24	−.32	−.50	−.25	−.03	−.48

when land is inequitably divided, the larger owners are able to extract more of a surplus from the sharecroppers, landless laborers and dwarf owners than in areas where there is much less of a surplus. In short, the possibilities for exploitation of the poor peasants are greater in crowded areas because of the concentration of scarce land and the existence of a large underclass of poor peasants competing for that land. Second, perceived inequality is high in such areas because the larger owners extract much of the surplus without providing any commensurate inputs. As a results, there is no natural basis of respect for the landowners and rentiers. Third, because there are larger concentrations of landless and semilandless peasants in crowded areas than in sparsely settled areas, the poor peasants, particularly those with knowledge of alternatives derived from their own status ambivalence, are preradicalized by the very fact of their numbers. As a result, they are more willing to "stand up" to the owners. They will consequently be more susceptible to organization by radical political parties and to external ideological influence. Fourth, in crowded areas where there is not one or two "feudal" owners dominating the countryside, but a fairly large number of medium owners, often in conflict with each other, there is no source of conservative influence on the poor peasantry. Finally, another factor not previously discussed may be relevant. In densely populated, irrigated food crop areas, where there is a large surplus, there is more penetration by the market than in dry areas with little surplus. Penetration by the market tends to erode traditional relations. It seems possible, for example, that in India, caste sanctions are under greater pressure in wet as opposed to dry areas.

The effects of crowding on the land are much less likely to lead to strain when the poor peasants, however numerous, own small but viable amounts of land. This seems to be the most reasonable explanation for the fact that the Central Zone of India is the only one of five regions in which the ecological variables stressed here are not highly correlated with the communist vote. (See Table 1) The communist vote in this region is concentrated in the eastern part of UP. While this area is one of very dense population concentration and of small holdings, it is not high either in tenants or landless laborers. The typical cultivator is not a rentier, a laborer or a part-owner, part-sharecropper. Rather he is a small but "pure" owner. The main reason for this is that the state of UP is one of the few in India to have carried out significant land reform measures in the 1950's.

All this points to the importance of the combination of three factors—crowding on the land, large inequities in land distribution, and a large underclass of non-owners—as the crucial variables in explaining communist strength in the countryside. These three factors are typically found together in wet areas of intensive agriculture. In areas which combine these factors, the relationship between the landowners and the landless is likely to be very tenuous and the landless or semi-landless may be particularly prone to Communist, or other, appeals for radical land reform.

The fact that the Communists are the principal beneficiaries of discontent on the part of the landless in crowded areas of India and other Asian countries, testifies to the inadequate response of the non-communist parties and elites to the problems created by existing rural inequities.

There are only two possible solutions to the social and economic problems of overcrowded rural areas. Either the excess rural population must be siphoned off into non-agricultural employment or there must be radical land reforms giving land to the landless and security of tenure to the tenants, reducing rents, etc. Such democratic land reforms have been successful in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Bolivia. In the first two instances, however, they were introduced by an alien power not tied to an existing rural elite—in Japan by American Occupation Forces and in Taiwan by the Chinese Nationalists.

Under normal conditions, and even under conditions of civil war, powerful rural elites on whom ruling parties depend can and will resist deep-seated changes in rural stratification patterns. The fact that it took the Saigon government until 1970 to introduce a "Land to the Tiller" bill is indicative of the problem. Unless the Indian government, and other Asian governments, show more foresight than the present government in Saigon, the prospects for Communist-led peasant uprisings in the most crowded rural areas of Asia are likely to grow.

Apart from such political implications of this study, I believe it suggests the existence of a hitherto-neglected link between peasant mobilization and certain ecological factors which have important sociological, economic and political ramifications. My investigations into this link are still at an early stage. While I have identified significant correlations in India and elsewhere in Asia, it is likely that these correlations do not apply universally, so that further empirical and statistical investigation to identify other variables and to account for exceptions is indispensable. Eventually I hope to relate a whole range of ecological, social, cultural and political factors to peasant mobilization and thereby to formulate a richer and more complex model of the sources of peasant radicalism.

Ideology and Inconsistency: The "Cross-Pressured" Nigerian Worker[1]

ROBERT MELSON
Michigan State University

After the nationwide general strike of June 1964, workers in Nigeria gained unprecedented political prominence. The timing of the strike had much to do with this, for only five months hence the Federal elections of December 1964 were to be held and Nigerian politicians became keenly aware of the labor movement. Two kinds of politicians began to compete for the labor vote. On the one hand, there were politically oriented labor leaders who wanted to take the opportunity of the strike and of the elections to form a Nigerian Labor party. They made their appeals to the class-consciousness and self-interest of Nigerian workers defined as workers, not as members of this or that ethnic group. On the other hand there were the politicians of the major political parties who made their appeals to the ethnic loyalties of the workers.[2] Thus between June and December 1964, and for some months after, workers were cross-pressured between their labor and their ethnic loyalties.[3] Working against the effect of the cross-pressures were, first, the appeal to class-consciousness and labor interest of the ethnic parties themselves, and second, the climate of ethnic and national insecurity which raised the saliency of ones' ethnic membership over ones' membership in the working class.

What I shall try to show in this analysis is that the Nigerian worker, like the worker in other countries, tends to support his ethnic group when that group is threatened. This is not surprising and was not surprising to Nigerian labor leaders. What was surprising was the fraction of workers who claimed to support a labor party while *at the same time* supporting ethnic parties. This fraction which we have called "inconsistent respondents" or for short, the "'Inconsistents," played an important role in allowing Nigerian labor leaders to count on more support than they actually had.[4] Beyond that, it would seem that inconsistent respondents in transitional societies such as Nigeria make political predictions difficult and in that sense, they contribute to the felt unpredictability of such societies. Focusing more closely on the Inconsistents I make a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive inconsistency.

The cross-pressured Nigerian worker was likely to be inconsistent in either of two ways. On the one hand, he was likely to describe himself as supporting *both* an ethnic and a labor party. On the other hand, he was likely to prescribe support for a labor party while actually supporting an ethnic party. It may be useful to diagram the hypothesized relationships among the cross-pressured and inconsistent voters, as in Figure 1 below:

---

[1] I have benefitted from suggestions made by Paul Abramson, Rufus Browning, Frederick W. Frey, Paul Hiniker, Willard Johnson, John Kramer, Norman Miller, Lucian Pye, Richard L. Sklar, and Howard Wolpe. As research assistants, Platon Rigos and Ronald Stockton were most helpful. I wish to acknowledge also the assistance of the Department of Political Science and the African Studies Center at Michigan State University. Data collection in Nigeria was financed by grants from the Carnegie and Ford Foundations.

[2] For a discussion of Nigerian politics in the post-independence period, see the following studies: James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958); Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Kenneth W. Post, *The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); and John P. Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966). For a discussion of the problem of ethnic and class-based orientations in Africa, see Max Gluckman, "Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa," in *Cahiers D'Etudes Africaines,* 1 (January 1960), 55–70. Also, A. L. Epstein, *Politics in an Urban African Community* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956). For a recent application of the situational mode of analysis developed by the Rhodes-Livingstone group to the Nigerian scene, see Leonard Plotnicov, *Strangers to the City: Urban Man in Jos, Nigeria* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967).

[3] "Cross Pressures" are "combinations of characteristics which in a given context would tend to lead the individual to vote on both sides of a contest." Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *et al., Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 283.

[4] In the literature on attitude change, two major types of inconsistency may be distinguished. These are the psychological inconsistency between two attitudes, and the psychological inconsistency between an attitude and an action. In each case, the subject of the inconsistency is presumed to be aware or cognizant of the two or more attitudes at variance. In this paper, I draw attention to two kinds of inconsistency, "descriptive" and 'prescriptive," in which the subject may, or may not be aware of maintaining two inconsistent attitudes at the same time. See Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1957). Also see Daniel Lerner's discussion of transitional Turks. "They are persons marked by aspirations for a future which will be better than the past, but they have not yet acquired a comprehensive set of new values to replace the old. Hence they exhibit *ambivalent* feelings about the choices between old and new which must be made along the way. . . . Ambivalence also takes the form of self-contradictory preferences . . . ambivalence often shows itself in incompleteness and inconsistency of attitudinal structures." *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 160–161.



Figure 1. The Relationships Among Cross-Pressured and Inconsistents

We shall observe that the first kind of inconsistency (descriptive) may be due to the voter having too little information to distinguish between ethnic and labor parties and that the second kind of inconsistency (prescriptive) may be due to the unwillingness of the voter to do what he feels he "should" do, that is, support labor against ethnic parties. Both kinds of inconsistency, I shall suggest, tend to confound the predictions of politicians who, like labor leaders, count on the consistent and stable support of their followers.

In what follows we briefly consider, first, the data upon which this analysis is based. We then survey the population of Nigerian workers with which this study is concerned, and analyze the impact of labor and ethnic cross-pressures upon their political behavior.

I. Data and Assumptions

All findings in the present study are based on five non-probabilistic sample surveys. These were (1) a group of 58 trade unionists attending a meeting sponsored by the University of Ibadan in July 1964; (2) a group of 29 workers who attended a training program for trade unionists at the United Labour Congress in Lagos in October 1964; (3) a mail questionnaire (response rate, 43 out of 300) sent out in October and analyzed in December 1964; (4) a group of 89 trade unionists attending two trade union conferences in Lagos in April 1965; and (5) a group of 574 railway workers in the Lagos yards of the Nigerian Railway Corporation in May 1965. For further discussion of the data see footnotes 10, 13 and 14.

In all cases the data on which the results of this study are based were drawn from non-probabilistic samples. However, this should not prevent us from suggesting the presence of inconsistent respondents in a theoretical sense and from building a case for their existence in the wider society. My methodological argument rests on a suggestion made by Zettenberg:

> The relationships expressed in theoretical propositions are presumed to be universally present. They are accordingly, present both in representative and non-representative samples. To disprove or demonstrate their existence is hence, possible in any kind of sample—biased or unbiased.[5]

I suggest, moreover, that in most cases the data *underestimated* the frequency of cross-pressured and “‘descriptively” inconsistent respondents in the Nigerian labor force as a whole. This assumption is based on the characteristics of the samples drawn. In all cases, our respondents were better educated, better paid, longer in the trade union movement, and more likely to be trade union officers than was the labor population as a whole. Consequently, if the results of Tables 4 and 5 are to be believed (where we learn that descriptive inconsistency declines with education and length of exposure to the trade union movement), we would expect that the Nigerian working class population as a whole would tend to be *more* descriptively inconsistent than the results indicate. As for the results of Tables 6, 7, and 9, the high rate of prescriptive inconsistency may be exaggerated if one agrees with the argument that prescriptive inconsistency is more likely the higher the level of education of the respondent.

---

[5] Zettenberg immediately qualifies this assertion by noting that "When using a biased sampling for a verification, we must have assurance that the relationship we want to prove is not introduced into our data by selective sampling. . . . Also, when using a biased sample for verification, we should realize that we have no knowledge of the population to which the result can be safely generalized": Hans L. Zettenberg, *On Theory and Verification in Sociology* (The Bedminster Press, 1965), pp. 128–129.

II. The Workers

In this paper, by "workers," I mean wage-earners. As of 1963 about 800,000 to one million Nigerians were wage-earners; they and their families constituted the majority of Nigeria's urban population.[6]

On the eve of the general strike of 1964, the governments—federal, regional, and local—employed 54 percent and European-owned private firms another 38 percent of the wage-earning population. Any widespread unrest in the labor force would necessarily involve some level of government.[7]

In 1964, there were approximately 300,000 trade union members organized into about 300 unions. Unions were organized into four superordinate central labor body organizations. These were the United Labour Congress (ULC), the Nigerian Workers Council (NWC), the Nigerian Trades Union Congress (NTUC), and the Labour Unity Front (LUF). The leadership of the labor movement during and after the strike consisted largely of the leaders of these four central labor bodies.

Cross-cutting the four central labor bodies were two major factions. One was Marxist, anti-federalist, admiring of Ghana under Nkrumah, and determined to launch a labor party.[8] The other was, on the whole, not explicitly Marxist. It had made its peace with the federalist system and tried strenuously to keep labor out of politics. Although it is an oversimplification, one can identify the Nigerian Trades Union Congress and the Labour Unity Front with the Marxist faction; the United Labour Congress and the Nigerian Workers Council with the non-political faction.

Simple numbers tell a great deal about the political significance of workers. From the perspective of the political elites who needed numbers to win elections, it was clear that workers were an insignificant segment of the population. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that in the full bloom of ethnic politics, workers and their leadership carried little weight compared with peasants in the deliberations of the major parties. To those politicians who had a long-range view of Nigerian development, however, workers were somewhat more important.

To Marxist labor leaders especially, it was clear that in time, the ratio between peasants and workers would shift in favor of workers. For the Marxists, Lagos with its urban working population was a future Nigeria writ small. If they could capture the wage-earning vote in Lagos, they argued, then economic interest, and not the traditionalism of the peasant would be "the coming thing." The strike of 1964 seemed to give the Marxist labor leaders an opportunity to prove their point.

III. The Cross-Pressured Are the Changers

As the wealthy American of Irish descent or the poor American of Yankee descent, the Nigerian worker of whatever nationality was cross-pressured between his loyalty to his ethnic group and loyalty to his economic interest group.[9] Applying this cross-pressure model to the period between the strike of June and the election of December 1964, one would expect that as the election neared, it would make the workers' ethnic groups more salient. His support for his economic interest group, the labor party, would decline and support for the ethnic parties would increase. One would also expect that the number of cross-pressured would decline with the coming of the election. In fact, this is just what happened, as can be seen from Tables 1 and 2.

Thus in July, right after the strike, 88 percent of our sample of workers indicated support for a labor party and 5 percent indicated support for an ethnic party.[10] By December, on

---

[6] The 800,000 to one million figure is reported by the National Manpower Board, *Manpower Situation in Nigeria, 1963* (Lagos, 1963). According to the *Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1963* (Lagos, 1964), approximately four million Nigerians lived in towns of 20,000 or more inhabitants. Thus, one concludes that wage-earners constituted at least one-fourth of the urban population, and that wage-earners plus their families constituted at least half of the urban population.

[7] See Table 3.6 of the *Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1964* (Lagos, 1965).

[8] See Robert Melson, "Marxists in the Nigerian Labor Movement" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967), p. 57.

[9] Berelson estimates that a "quarter to a third" of the American electorate is cross-pressured. See Berelson, *et. al., op. cit.*, p. 320.

[10] The data from which Tables 1 and 2 are derived are based on: 1) a nonprobabilistic survey of 58 trade unionists who attended a meeting sponsored by the University of Ibadan in July 1964; 2) a non-probabilistic survey of 29 workers who attended a training program for trade unionists, sponsored by the United Labour Congress (one of three central labor bodies of the time) in October 1964; and 3) a mail questionnaire whose response rate was 43 out of 300 possible responses. (The figure 300 is based on the estimated number of extant Nigerian trade unions which were listed by the Federal Ministry of Labour.) The mail questionnaire was sent out in October and the responses were analyzed in December 1964. In all three surveys, the questionnaires were self-administered. It should be noted that what is called the "October-December" column in Tables 1 and 2 is based on the aggregation of responses from the second and third surveys above ($N = 72$). In all three surveys, the char-

Table 1. Drop in Labor Party Support Between July and December 1964*

Percentage Who	July	October–December
Indicate some Labor Party support:	88%	41%
Indicate ethnic Party support only:	5	41
Other:	7	17
Total	100 ($N=58$)	99 ($N=72$)

* The July responses were based on the following two questions: (1) "Which party do you think behaved with most friendliness toward the workers during the strike?" (2) "Would you support a labor party?" The October–December responses were based on the following two questions: (1) "Which parties are most helpful to workers in 1964?" (2) "Do you think Mr. Imoudu's labor party is useful for workers?" Note: Imoudu was a popular trade union leader who had been a founder of the Nigerian Labour Party.

Table 2. Cross-Pressured Voters Between July and December 1964*

Percentages who are:	July	October–December
Not cross-pressured (choose only one party):	24%	63%
Cross-pressured (choose at least two competing parties)	69	19
Other:	7	17
Total	100 ($N=58$)	99 ($N=72$)

* See note to Table 1.

the eve of the election, in a similarly constituted sample 41 percent indicated support for a labor party and 41 percent indicated unambiguous support for an ethnic party.

Turning to the question of the cross-pressured, one notes from Table 2 that in July, 69 percent of our respondents indicated, by their choice of competing parties, that they were cross-pressured; by December, only 19 percent of our respondents indicated that they were cross-pressured. This was clearly a significant shift of 50 percent. In effect, this meant that in a four-month period, the labor party lost up to half of its support.

Consider the political market place from the point of view of the labor party boosters. In July, nine out of ten workers would say that they support a labor party, by December only four out of ten workers indicated such support, and out of those four, two would also say that they supported an ethnic party. Thus, what seemed like victory in Lagos in July turned into a rout by December. This result was due in part to the changeability of the cross-pressured and in part, to the expectations of the labor leaders.

IV. "Descriptive" Inconsistency

It has been found in the United States and elsewhere, that cross-pressures lead to a delay in the voting decision and to a higher probability of the voter changing his mind. In this sense then, the cross-pressured voter infuses any election with an element of unpredictability; consequently, the cross-pressured vote can often change victory into defeat.[11] As insightful as the literature on cross-pressures has been, however, it has not distinguished between at least two types of reactions to cross-pressures. The first type, which can be termed the "consistent" reaction, is one in which a person recognizes that he has contradictory loyalties and tries to deal with the contradictions as best as he can. For example, he can delay the choice. He can choose among two options. He can compartmentalize the choice by claiming that one option fits one situation and the second fits other situations.[12] Lastly he can refuse to choose.

A second reaction to cross-pressure, the "inconsistent" reaction, one not reported in the literature on American elections, is the reaction

---

acteristics of the respondents did not differ significantly from those listed under Table 3 below. In terms of validity, we might expect that our respondents overly represented the better educated leadership of the Southern Nigerian trade union movement, and by the same token, underrepresented the uneducated rank-and-file, especially of Northern origin. Since it is estimated that over 90 percent of the rank-and-file both in the South and North were of Southern ethnic origin, the small number of Northern respondents reflects the national makeup of the labor force at the time.

[11] For discussion of the effects of cross-pressures, see Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).

[12] As the Rudolphs note, "Compartmentalization not only physically separates . . . home and family from work place and colleagues, but also prevents the different norms of behavior and belief appropriate to modernity and tradition from colliding and causing conflict in the lives of those who live by both." Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 121–122. Also see Howard Wolpe, "Port Harcourt: Ibo Politics in Microcosm," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7, 3, (September 1969), 469–494.

Table 3. Labor Support for a Political Party*

Option	Percent
1. Trade unionists should form a labor party.	30%
2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of the existing political parties (ethnic).	6
3. Trade unionists as trade unionists should not mix in politics although they may do so as private citizens.	39
4. Inconsistent responses: (a) trade unionists should not mix in politics *and* they should support a labor party; (b) they should not mix in politics *and* they should support an existing party; or (c) they should support a labor party *and* they should support an ethnic party.	19
5. N.A.	6
	100 (N=89)

* Respondents were given the first three options to choose from in this closed item. However, respondents were not asked to choose only one of the three options given, and since this was a self-administered questionnaire, one would expect that some respondents would check more than one item. It turned out that 19 percent of them did.

in which the person either does not recognize the contradiction or can live with it easily. In either case, he does not necessarily delay his decision, he does not compartmentalize, and he does not refuse to choose. Instead, to everyone's confusion, he verbalizes both options at the same time.

For example, workers were asked: "Should trade unionists support a political party?" Responses were distributed as indicated in Table 3.[13] From Table 3 it is seen that, in addition to the respondents who make a party choice, the cross-pressured can be divided into two groups: those who indicated that they "do not mix" their political and workers' roles (option 3) without, however, indicating how they will vote or what party they support, and the inconsistents (option 4) who indicate possibly contradictory opinions. I call the reader's attention to option 4, the "inconsistent" responses.

The frequency varies somewhat, but the pattern remains the same. Ask workers if they support a labor party and a sizeable proportion of those who say "yes" report support for an ethnic party. The relevance of the inconsistents to labor party people lay in their representing a sizeable fraction (19%) of the total distribution. Given the relative division between the respondents who consistently voiced support for the labor party (30%) and those who consistently chose to say that they would not mix in politics as workers (39%), the inconsistents played the role of a potential swing vote in an American election. This changeability of the inconsistents need not have interested the labor politician had the 19 percent swung ultimately in favor of a labor party, but they did not. As we have seen above, by December 1964, the swing was in the direction of ethnic parties.

One would imagine that awareness of the issues and, therefore, consistency would vary with accessibility to information and that such accessibility would be a function of education and English language competency on the one hand, and duration in the labor movement, on the other. Consider the results of Tables 4 and 5. Note that the rate of inconsistents is significantly greater among those with only primary education than it is among those with some secondary education. In Table 5, note that the rate of inconsistents is more than three times as great among those with less than five years experience in the labor movement as it is among those with more than five years experience.

Table 4. Consistency of Political Attitudes by Education*

	Percent Primary Only	Percent Some Secondary
Inconsistent	28%	13%
Consistent	72	87
Total	100 (N=36)	100 (N=46)

$\chi^2=2.2$
$p<.08$

* The group of workers on which Table 4 is based is the same as that on which Table 3 is based. The inconsistent and consistent respondents were derived as in Table 3. The education of the respondent was derived from his response to the question: "What was the last class you attended in school?"

---

[13] The data on which Table 3 is based are derived from a non-probabilistic survey of trade unionists attending two national conferences in Lagos in April 1965. More information about the respondents' characteristics is available from the author on request.

Table 5. Consistency of Political Attitudes by Duration in a Trade Union*

	Percent Under Five Years	Percent Five Years and Over
Inconsistent	36	10
Consistent	64	90
Total	100 ($N=30$)	100 ($N=52$)

$\chi^2=7.2$
$p<.01$

* The group of workers on which Table 5 is based is the same as that on which Tables 3 and 4 are based. The inconsistent and consistent respondents were derived in Table 3. Duration in a trade union was measured from responses to the question: "How long have you been a member of your trade union?"

It should be added that although I did not test for it, language competency or rather the lack of it in English may have been an important factor in eliciting the pattern of inconsistent responses. This leads us to the suggestion that what I have called "descriptive inconsistency" might have been due to the respondent's not having enough information at his command (lack of education, lack of acquaintance with the labor movement) on the one hand, or to his not having recognized the meaning of the questions posed in English on the other hand. Nevertheless to a labor movement which conducted most of its business in English (the common language among the many ethnic groups comprising the movement) it was really of no consequence *why* there existed a pattern of inconsistent support. For whatever reason, lack of information, lack of education, lack of English language-competency, the inconsistent respondent made estimates of political support difficult to make. As a rule his effect was to make labor leaders (and the author) *overestimate* labor party support.

It comes as no great surprise that an ordinary worker who is not familiar with the ideological position of the labor party is inconsistent. But what is of interest is that some workers and especially some labor leaders who were well aware of such quarrels and who ostensibly belonged to one or the other side were also inconsistent.

V. "Prescriptive" Inconsistency

Having discussed results which seem to show that a fraction of our respondents were "descriptively" inconsistent in reporting support for mutually exclusive options, we can now turn to results which seem to show that an even greater fraction were "prescriptively" inconsistent. This second group of respondents seemed to prescribe one kind of party while actually supporting another kind. Consider Tables 6 and 7 below.[14]

In Table 6, we note immediately that 43.2 percent (248) of respondents prescribed support for a labor party, while only 8.9 percent (51) actually supported an existing labor party. By the same token, only 9.6 percent (55) prescribed support for an ethnic party, while 49.1 percent actually supported such a party.

Cross-tabulating actual by prescribed support (Table 7) and looking more closely at the group prescribing support for a labor party, one notes that of the 248 respondents only 29 or 11.7 percent actually supported such a party, while 128 or 51.6 percent actually supported ethnic parties. In this example, can be seen the difference between the "should" and "do" of labor party support: One prescribes support for labor, but one doesn't actually support it. One prescribes opposition to ethnic parties, but actually supports them.

I suggest that "prescriptive" inconsistency may be due to a lack of commitment to the issues, and a lack of social support for consistency. Before turning to the survey data, a short case study may be illuminating.

Consider the case of Peter A., a labor leader. During the elections of 1964, Peter A., who calls himself a "communist," in turn supported the following political parties: the Nigerian Labour Party, the "capitalist" NCNC and the "feudalist" Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). First consider how A. became a communist.

He was born in 1935 in the Midwest region, not far from the home of the great Nigerian labor leader Michael Imoudu. He attended secondary school in Warri where he graduated in 1949. In 1951 he came to Lagos where he worked as a journalist for the *Nigerian Daily Times*. In 1953, he went to Ghana where he worked as a full-time organizer for the TUC.

Upon his return to Lagos, A., looking for a job, approached Lawrence Borha, General Secretary of the United Labor Congress.[15] Because

---

[14] The last set of data presented in this paper (see Tables 6, 7, and 9) is derived from a survey of 574 railway workers in the Lagos yard of the Nigerian Railway Corporation. The workers were interviewed in May 1965 by a team of twelve interviewers, including the author. Interviews were recorded in English only. The survey was conducted every working day for six days. For a composition of the sample, the reader is directed to Table 9.

[15] In 1965, the time of the study, Nigerian labor was divided among four organizations: The United Labor Congress, the Nigerian Trades Union Congress,

Table 6. Prescribed Party Support and Actual Party Support*

	Prescribed Support	Actual Support
	Percent Who Indicate that Workers Should	Percent Who Indicate that they
1. Support a labor party	43.2%	8.9%
2. Support an ethnic party	9.6	49.1
3. Not mix in politics	35.9	—
4. Support no party ("none")	—	35.0
5. Other	11.2	6.9
Total	99.9 (N=574)	99.9 (N=574)

* The data for the "Prescribed Support" column were derived from the responses to the closed question: "What parties should *trade-unionists* support?" While the data to the "Actual Support" column were derived from the open question: "What parties do *you* find most helpful?" The options given to respondents in the closed question were: (1) "Workers should form a labor party." (2) "Yes, workers should support one of the existing political parties." (3) "Workers as workers, should not mix in politics although they may do so as private citizens." Note that this was not a self-administered question and interviewers were instructed to take down only one choice per question. This means that we were not able to gauge the frequency of *descriptive inconsistency* in this group. It should be noted that descriptive and prescriptive inconsistency are not mutually exclusive categories and may be present in the same respondent.

We suggest that the magnitude of the differences between prescribed and actual support as reported in Table 6 are due to the wording of the questions on the one hand, and to their closedness (openness), on the other hand. Thus, the first question makes salient the occupational identity of the respondent because it asks him to respond in his role as a "trade unionist," or as a worker (e.g., "As a trade unionist, I support a labor party, but as a member of my community, I support my ethnic party.") The second question, on the other hand does not specify the respondent's identity (it asks him to respond as a global, "you."). It is contended that in the second question the respondent is freer to express his real feelings, and consequently his *actual* support. This effect is heightened by making the first question closed (thus giving the respondent the clear choice between labor and ethnic parties), whereas in the open question, the respondent need not *explicitly reject* a labor party as he indicates his choice for an ethnic party.

Table 7. Actual Party Support by Prescribed Party Support

Actual Party Support	Prescribed Party Support			
	Labor Party	Ethnic Party	"Not Mix"	Other
Labor Party	11.7%	5.5%	7.8%	4.6%
Ethnic Party	51.6	56.4	44.6	47.6
"None"	30.6	25.5	43.2	33.8
Other	6.0	12.7	4.4	13.8
Total	99.9 (N=248)	100.1 (N=55)	100.0 (N=206)	99.8 (N=65)

Borha is also a Bini speaker from the Midwest and because of his long experience with the TUC in Ghana, A. felt sure that Borha would give him a job. But Borha refused, calling him a communist and an agent of Nkrumah. Rejected by Borha, he went to see Imoudu, also a Bini speaker. Imoudu was glad to see him. With Imoudu and the more militant trade unionists, A.'s Ghana experience gave him prestige. People called him "comrade" and assumed that he was a Marxist. "That's when I became a Marxist," says A.

Peter A.'s philosophy is a blend of Marxist rhetoric and mildly humanistic values.[16] He is strongly egalitarian and supports higher wages for workers. Yet he is not "ready to sacrifice my generation for the future. We must all live well." Although he contends that Marxism can

---

the Nigerian Workers Council, and the Labour Unity Front.

[16] Questions were based on the "Dogmatism scale" of Milton Rokeach. See his *The Open and Closed Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1960), pp. 71–80.

Table 8. Ideological Friendship by Inconsistent and Consistent Party Commitment*

Friendship (Percent Who)	Party Commitment	
	Inconsistent	Consistent
Choose ideological friends or prefer ideological friends	11%	38%
Think friendship independent of politics	48	54
Contradictory: Always choose ideological friends but think that friendship independent of ideology	41	8
Total	100 ($N=17$)	100 ($N=65$)

*This table is based on the same group of respondents discussed in Table 3.

predict the future, he doesn't insist that he or anyone has the only "correct" philosophy. "Since I do not know all the philosophies in the world how can I tell that there is one which is correct?"

We can assume that Peter A. is not a fanatical Marxist and, like other inconsistents, he does not demand ideological congruence from his friends. Asked, "Is it your view that the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own?" A. answered, "Not at all. What does friendship have to do with politics? As a matter of fact, I am now staying with my best friend (a townsman). He does not believe as I do. Of course I might persuade him that my views are right." Unlike those of true believers, A.'s easy attitude toward ideology is shared by other inconsistents within the ranks of the militant trade unionists.

VI. Friendship and Ideology

We asked the same questions of a group of workers: "Is it your view that the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose political beliefs are the same as one's own?" Respondents were given the following options:

1. I always choose friends whose political beliefs are the same as my own.
2. Although I prefer people who share my beliefs, most of my friends need not hold the political beliefs that I do.
3. My friendship with a man is not at all dependent on his political beliefs.

In asking this question, I had in mind the following proposition. In general, I assumed that a person who tries to homogenize his political environment is more committed to his political beliefs than a person who does not.[17] Being more committed to his political beliefs a person who chooses friends whose political beliefs are the same as his own would be less likely to be changeable in his political allegiances. Consider the data in Table 8.

The results are in the expected direction. One notes that consistents on party choice are three times (38%) as likely to choose ideological friends as are the inconsistents (11%) but the inconsistents are five times as likely (41% to 8%) to be in contradiction not only with respect to party choice but with respect to friendship. That is, inconsistents on party choice tend also to say (1) "I always choose friends whose political beliefs are the same as my own" *together with* (3) "My friendship with a man is not at all dependent on his political beliefs." In passing, one should observe that both inconsistents and consistents most frequently indicated that friendship and ideology were *independent.* Both groups chose with greatest frequency option (3) "My friendship with a man is not at all dependent on his political beliefs." This last result dovetails with the result of Table 3 in which it was indicated that persons most frequently prefer to compartmentalize ("not mix") their workers' roles from their political roles.

These results further confirm our belief that the inconsistents, like the cross-pressured, are the changers, because if they do not make friendships based on a firm commitment to ideology they are free to change from political opinion to opinion, from supporting a labor party to saying that they are opposed to workers mixing in politics.

But friendship is only one way that the inconsistents differ from the consistents. We would expect that if the inconsistents do not have a firm commitment to their beliefs they would be less likely to have a strong commitment to norms of behavior. One is reminded of the warning against "opportunism" in the labor movement issued by Eskor Toyo, a committed

---

[17] See Berelson, *et. al., op. cit.*, "The political conviction of the individual is closely bound to the political character of his personal relations—or at least his perception of their political complexion." p. 98.

Marxist labor leader who had stayed in the movement despite great personal and financial loss. For example, the same Peter A. who answered that his friendship with a man was not dependent on his friend's beliefs, told the following story:

A. tried to contest in the last Federal election. He went to his home town where he addressed a meeting of his clan. He would be a great help, he explained, in getting amenities for the town. He distributed £500 in gifts and since no one in the clan challenged him, he expected to get the NCNC nomination. All his adult life he had been a member of the party; he was chagrined, therefore, when he discovered that the local NCNC refused to endorse him. When A. heard that someone else had been endorsed, he hurried to get the endorsement of the opposition party, an ally of the Northern People's Congress. The point of the story is how irrelevant ideology or loyalty to the party was to A. He switched to the opposition as soon as it became clear to him that he would not win the NCNC nomination. He did this during an election which was said to pit "socialism" and "capitalism" against the "feudal" North.

One suspects that for Peter A. inconsistency was based on a lack of commitment to the issues and to a lack of social support for consistency. There were others in the labor movement, however, who may have been inconsistent in prescribing support for a labor party on the one hand, and actually supporting ethnic parties, on the other, because they found no viable alternatives for such support. This may explain the striking differences in prescribed and actual support for labor and ethnic parties found in Tables 6 and 7.

Turning to Table 9 below, one notes that prescriptive inconsistency, whatever its underlying causes, is common to all ethnic groups, levels of education, ages, incomes, expected incomes, and time spent in the labor movement. Indeed, unlike "descriptive" inconsistency, prescriptive inconsistency is *higher* for persons with secondary education than it is for persons with primary education. (For those with primary education, the percentage difference between prescribed and actual labor party support is 32% − 11% = 21%. The same difference for those with secondary education is 46% − 8% = 38%.)

The data in Table 9 help to clarify the difference between descriptive and prescriptive inconsistency. As has been noted above, a person may describe his position in an inconsistent manner because he is not aware of the issues. On the other hand, a person may be inconsistent between his prescription and his actual choice because he is aware of a norm (support for a labor party), but unwilling to act on that norm. This may explain why better informed workers (those with secondary education) who, one would expect, are aware of the norm to support a labor party, were more likely to prescribe support for such a party than were less well informed workers (those with primary education only). The better informed workers were not, however, necessarily *any more* predisposed actually to support such a party than were the less informed workers. This would explain why the difference, or the inconsistency, between prescription and actual support was *higher* for the *better* informed workers.

VII. The Political Consequences of the Inconsistents

The political importance of the inconsistent supporter derives from his making practical (i.e., stable and predictable) politics difficult. Indeed, the more a politician expects commitment and consistency the more likely he is to become confused by the information given him about the support of the inconsistent follower. This was especially true for mature Marxist labor leaders in Nigeria who staked their careers on the long-range predictability of the Nigerian worker.

From the point of view of committed Marxist labor leaders who opposed the ethnic parties, to support the Labour Party and to support the ethnic parties was not consistent, and therefore not possible. During the period of the Federal Election, a leader of a Marxist labor party contrasted the "ruling circles," that is, the ethnic party elites, to the "workers."[18] The "ruling circles" were corrupt and tribalist. Each political party represented the tribal and economic interests of its group. Thus the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) represented the Northern "Feudalist Emirs." The National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Action Group (AG) represented the interests of the Ibo and Yoruba and the business classes:

> The Emirs and their immediate relations control the Native Administrations and the law courts. . . . These things confirm the NPC as a party of Feudal nobility. . . . The NCNC formerly a mass movement has degenerated into an instrument of unbridled capitalism.[19]

[18] Dr. Tunji Otegbeye, *Ideological Conflicts in Nigerian Politics*, (published by Socialist Workers and Farmers Party (SWAFP), Lagos, 1964), pp. 20–21.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Table 9. Percent Prescribed Party Support and Actual Party Support by Ethnic Group, Education, Age, Income, Expected Income and Time in the Labor Movement

	Ethnic Group									
	Yoruba (*N*=277)		Ibo (*N*=186)		Midwest (*N*=74)		Northerners (*N*=14)		Eastern Minorities (*N*=12)	
	P.*	A.†	P.	A.	P.	A.	P.	A.	P.	A.
Labor	40	8	43	9	55	11	43	7	33	8
Ethnic	9	50	11	55	5	43	0	29	33	25

	Education					
	Primary (0–3 yrs.) (N=91)		Primary (3–6 yrs.) (*N*=338)		Some Secondary (*N*=141)	
	P.	A.	P.	A.	P.	A.
Labor	32	11	46	9	46	8
Ethnic	15	43	9	52	8	50

	Age					
	Under 30 yrs. (*N*=176)		30–50 yrs. (*N*=324)		Over 50 yrs. (*N*=70)	
	P.	A.	P.	A.	P.	A.
Labor	43	11	46	7	34	11
Ethnic	9	47	9	53	16	48

	Yearly Income					
	£100–199 (*N*=139)		£200–299 (*N*=197)		Over £300 (*N*=243)	
	P.	A.	P.	A.	P.	A.
Labor	44	12	43	8	43	7
Ethnic	9	43	8	47	11	50

	Yearly Income Expected in Five Years					
	£100–199 (*N*=56)		£200–299 (*N*=108)		Over £300 (*N*=280)	
	P.	A.	P.	A.	P.	A.
Labor	48	14	44	10	45	8
Ethnic	9	43	3	43	10	52

	Length of Trade Union Membership					
	1–7 yrs. (*N*=134)		8–10 yrs. (*N*=73)		Over 10 yrs. (*N*=354)	
	P.	A.	P.	A.	P.	A.
Labor	40	11	34	3	46	9
Ethnic	10	45	7	56	11	50

* P.=Prescribed Party Support.
† A.=Actual Party Support.
Note: Because of the elimination of categories like "Other" and "None" percentages do not necessarily total 100 percent.

These groups were strongly contrasted to the "working classes." In Nigeria and in Africa as a whole,

> The working class is the most rapidly developing class. The historic mission of this class is to become the leading force in the struggle for socialism.[20]

It was the task of socialists to abolish all "class distinctions" and all social inequalities. The workers were progressive because in this view their rise to power was inevitable and because they believed in progressive programs. This dual capacity of the working classes stemmed from their work experience during which they become "skilled and educated as they become acquainted with the technology of modern production."[21] Most importantly, unlike the "feudal" and "capitalist" classes who have created tribal discord in order to further their ends, *"The sentiments of tribal discord are alien to the working class."*[22]

It was conceivable in this system to be a duped worker and to support the ethnic parties, but once one gained class-consciousness and supported a labor party, one was then opposed to ethnic parties. This did not mean that one could not enter into temporary alliances with such parties—it did mean that one knew his friends and his enemies. There was no room for being *both* class conscious *and* supporting "ruling circles." For ideological Marxists caught up in the political struggle, the hardness and validity of any sign of support was often not questioned. If a worker said he supported a labor party, that was enough. That a worker would be both in support of a labor party and of an ethnic party—that was clearly out of the question.

The inconsistents were unpredictable in two ways. First, as individuals they were more likely to change their minds about their party support. Second, as a group they gave the impression of more support and more solid support than actually existed for a labor party. By oscillating in their private views, they made the political market oscillate between seeming to indicate that a labor party could succeed and that a labor party would fail.

I call the reader's attention again to an important distinction between the inconsistents and those who compartmentalize their roles. The inconsistents say that they would support a labor party but they don't deliver; those who compartmentalize their roles do not say they would support a labor party. This does not mean that the compartmentalizers are more predictable than the inconsistents. It does mean that they do not give out information that can be falsely perceived by political actors. The inconsistents, perhaps because they do not perceive inconsistency the same way as committed Marxists do, communicate false information.

In conclusion, I suggest that false predictions are based not only on faulty ideology, but also on the information available to those who make predictions. In a period of rapid change where interests and identities have not as yet crystallized, and where information is scarce one would expect a high rate of "inconsistents." The importance of the inconsistents is that they confused politicians, Marxist as well as non-Marxist, whose predictions of political support assumed descriptive and prescriptive consistency. Though in the short run the inconsistents make politics unpredictable, and in some ways opportunistic, in the long run they may serve as an important counterweight to those who would squeeze transitional societies into rigid ideological compartments. Precisely because they are inconsistent, our respondents may be more humane (feeling friendship is more important than ideology) and more open to change.

---

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Ibid.*, my italics.

Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization: Another View*

FRANK LEVY
University of California, Berkeley

AND

EDWIN M. TRUMAN
Yale University

Decentralization is one of the important issues of the day. It is unfortunate but perhaps unavoidable that the term has different meanings for different disciplines.

Political scientists and economists both use the term in analyzing organizational structure. But economists are concerned primarily with production. They evaluate an organization for its economic efficiency. For them decentralization is important if it can reduce the cost (or increase the profit) of producing a given set of goods tacitly agreed to by the organization and its clients. This is the view of decentralization presented in the recent paper of Manfred Kochen and Karl W. Deutsch.[1]

Political scientists are more concerned with the governmental process. For them, decentralization is important if it can promote greater diversity of government services or more opportunities for citizens to influence government decisions. This view of decentralization is represented in Richard Goodwin's "Reflections" on the 1968 elections:

> I have no wish to coin a new set of slogans, but certainly the individual must also have the freedom to share in those public decisions which affect his private life beyond merely casting a vote in periodic elections. This does not mean a plebiscite on every problem, but rather a distinct prejudice in favor of community and neighborhood control.[2]

There are important differences between decentralization as treated in the economics literature and decentralization as treated in the literature of politics. Often the two concepts conflict operationally. Professors Kochen and Deutsch imply in their paper that the solution to the decentralization problem in economic efficiency terms will ultimately contribute to our understanding of such controversies as the decentralization of schools.[3] It is our belief that this hope is unfounded. It is our purpose to set out at a fairly general level our reasons for this belief. While describing a problem is nothing like presenting solutions to it, our description may shed some light on the two meanings of decentralization as the term is used today.

We begin by constructing two simple and superficially similar organizational models. In the first we consider an organization which produces and distributes an economic good. The organization exists to maximize its profits or minimize its costs.[4] In the second model, we consider an organization which produces and distributes a government good. This organization exists to maximize the approval of its citizens or clients as reflected in elections, approval of bond issues, and other referenda.[5] We use

---

* We would like to thank Richard N. Cooper, Benjamin I. Cohen, Martin Levin, John M. Montias, Chandler Morse, Richard R. Nelson, and Nelson W. Polsby for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. Frank Levy's research on this topic was supported in part by the Urban Institute, Washington, D.C. We would like to acknowledge, finally, the clerical assistance on this project provided by the Center for Research in Management Science, the University of California, Berkeley.

[1] Manfred Kochen and Karl W. Deutsch, "Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization: Some Implications of a Mathematical Approach," this REVIEW, 63 (September 1969), 734–749.

[2] Richard Goodwin, "Reflections," *The New Yorker*, 44 (January 4, 1969), p. 48.

[3] Kochen and Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 734.

[4] In economic theory, profit maximization and cost minimization are two sides of the same problem. In this paper we use the terms interchangeably.

[5] By the term economic good we do not intend to suggest that such goods are or should be provided primarily by the private sector; we mean to include in this category all goods which are primarily produced and distributed according to traditional profit maximizing rules of behavior. By the term government good we mean to include goods and services which have some degree of publicness in the economist's traditional sense of the term. (The classic articles on this subject were written by Paul A. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 37 (November 1955), 350–356; and "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 36 (November 1954), 387–389. We also mean to include goods which while provided by the government have, at least potentially, a distinct private consumption element. This private element may exist for one of two reasons: (1) the physical impact of the goods is not spread evenly across the political jurisdiction of the government or (2) the goods are divisible,



Figure 1: Standardized Organization Chart

public primary education as our example, but we feel that our argument applies to a broad class of goods provided by governments.

We argue that the economic organization has several special and simplifying features not found in government organizations. Because the example analyzed by Kochen and Deutsch falls in the class of economic organizations, they are able to utilize these features to perform an analysis which is of limited applicability in the government goods case, the locus of much of the decentralization controversy.

In their article Kochen and Deutsch emphasize that their analysis is a first approximation. We confine our analysis to the limited structure of their model with one exception: we explicitly recognize that both the economic and the government organizations are staffed by personnel and assume that they are rational men who perform their duties as a means to the end of advancement in the organization.[6]

I. The Models

For our model of an economic organization we adopt the framework of Kochen and Deutsch's prototype model, "an institution existing to supply objects of value, e.g., books or mail-order items" to its customers.[7] As they develop their argument, the mail-order house has one or more warehouses or service facilities. The problem is to determine the optimum number of facilities given the objective of minimizing costs, distribution costs in the specific example. For purposes of identifying the institution we can assume it has one corporate headquarters.[8] The organization exists to maximize profits and it is financed through consumer purchases.

For our comparison model of a government organization we take a highly simplified model of a school system. The structure consists of a board of education at the center and several neighborhood schools. The organization exists to provide education and is financed by taxes levied on the citizens residing in the area served by the school system.

The superficial similarity of the two types of organizations can be illustrated by observing that their organization charts pictured in Figure 1 are identical. In the economic organization the center is called a headquarters and the facilities are warehouses. In the government organization the center is called a board of education and the facilities are schools. In both types of organizations the center is assigned ultimate responsibility for its operation.

While the organizations are superficially similar in their physical dimensions, there are numerous substantial differences in their operation. In our analysis we focus on three salient differences:

A) In the economic organization, both the personnel in the organization and their clients agree on the items produced. In the government organization there may be substantial disagreement on the form or substance of what is produced.

B) In the economic organization the information which flows between the headquarters and the warehouses will generally be of a numerical form. It is, therefore, of high density, where density is defined in information content per

---

permitting the uniform public element to be accompanied by considerable variation in the private element. (This apparent quarrel with the strong distinction between public and private goods implicit in the original Samuelsonian analysis has been recognized by many authors. See, for example, James M. Buchanan, "Breton and Walden on Public Goods," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,* 33 (February 1967), 111–115.

[6] We recognize, of course, that not all personnel work to gain advancement in their organizations. But for the personnel with whom we are primarily concerned, managers and school principals, the assumption is probably justified. A good listing of the goals of organizational personnel can be found in Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), especially Chapter 8.

page or information content per minute of telephone transmission. In the government organization the information which flows between the board of education and the schools will often not take a numerical form. Information transmission will be less dense and, therefore, more expensive per unit of information content.

C) For the economic organization there exists a set of prices which act as "sufficient statistics", a relatively compact form of information which completely measures the organization's performance of its objective (profit maximization) and which can be used to judge the performance and advancement of the organization's employees. For many government organizations no such sufficient statistics exist. Consequently, performance is much more difficult to judge and advancement more difficult to determine.

II. The Absence or Presence of Conflict

In our simple models we rule out the possibility of conflict arising from within either organization. We confine our analysis to situations where the organization may have to deal with conflict generated by its clients. Such conflicts may arise in two ways. First, a client may complain about the product he receives. Second, a client may complain about the product some other client receives.

For the economic organization neither of these conflicts need alter the organization's behavior. The organization is based on an environment of competition where if the consumer does not like the firm's product, he can take his business elsewhere. Thus, clients who dislike the mail-order house's line of goods will buy somewhere else rather than stay and demand an alternative set.[9]

The environment of the economic organization, moreover, is one in which each of its clients receives his pleasure (consumer utility to the economist) exclusively from those products which he consumes directly. He ignores those products which are produced for and consumed by others. A pacifist looking for toys will evaluate a firm's stuffed animals independently of the firm's production of guns which may be purchased by other consumers. Formally, this condition can be written:

$$(1) \qquad U_i = U_i(X_i)$$

where U_i is the utility function of the ith consumer and X_i is the vector of quantities of goods which the ith consumer consumes directly.

For the government organization both of these simplifying features are absent. In the case of education, there is no other alternative for many low income parents than the public school system. If they disagree with what is being taught in their child's school, they will be more likely to stay and fight the school system rather than remove their child to another school.[10]

In addition the citizen does not restrict his attention to the type of education received by his child. Education has long been considered an agent of socialization and democratization, a process helping to ensure the stability of the society. This is the public good element in public education.[11] The educational system only serves this function if essentially the same material is taught to all children.[12] Each citizen has a stake, even if a relatively diffuse one, in what type of education all children receive. If education were simply a type of private consumption good, we could introduce it into the citizen's utility function as follows:

$$(2) \qquad U_i = U_i(X_i, s_i)$$

where s_i is the education received by the child of the ith citizen. In the education case, we are saying instead that the citizen's utility function should be written:

$$(3) \qquad U_i = U_i(X_i, s_i, s_j)$$

where $s_j (j=1, \cdots, n \text{ and } j \neq i)$ is the education received by the child of the jth citizen.

---

[7] Kochen and Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 739.

[8] It is interesting to observe that Kochen and Deutsch do not find it necessary for their analysis to include a center or headquarters. This omission is trivial in their model, but not in a model of an organization producing government goods.

[9] With today's increased concern over consumer protection this statement is somewhat of an oversimplification. The government may step in and order a firm to alter the nature of its product with or without receiving a complaint from the clients.

[10] These different kinds of behavior by disappointed clients facing different types of organizations are described in some detail in Albert Hirschman's recent work *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations and States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). "Staying and fighting" corresponds to Hirschman's "voice" and "taking one's business elsewhere" corresponds to his "exit."

[11] See footnote 5. Without this or some other public good aspect of education there would be no reason for education to be supplied by the public sector. Instead it could be supplied by the private sector according to the rules of an economic organization. See Milton Friedman's discussion of this issue *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962), especially Chapter 6.

[12] A good example of this attitude was the deep Protestant suspicion of the initial attempts by Catholics to set up parochial schools. See, for example, Alvin P. Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics, 1865–1890" (Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Department of History, Harvard University, 1933).

Because citizens' utility functions are of the above type, a policy in a given school must be evaluated in terms of its effect on *all* citizens in the system regardless, moreover, of whether they have any children in the schools. Policy formulation increases in complexity. In particular an optimal policy or policy mix—one preferred over all alternatives by all citizens—may not exist.[13]

Even if an optimal policy does exist, a citizen with incomplete information may not see it as optimal.[14] Citizen j may request a course in sex education for his child. A majority of parents, opposed to sex education, may inform the school board that if the course is offered, they will defeat a pending school construction bond issue. The actual choice is between the course and a new school. If citizen j were aware of this choice, he might well choose the new school. But if he is unaware of this choice, the board's decision to reject his request may seem quite arbitrary unless he receives further explanation.

While the joint dependence of citizens' tastes complicates policy design, it has a potentially bright side. If the conflicts between citizens are not too severe, the joint dependence of their tastes presents a situation where income redistribution can take place. Because citizens have utility functions like (3), higher income citizens may be willing to pay more than their per capita share of education costs if they can be assured that what is being taught in the school system is for the good of society as a whole. Because these citizens are willing to pay more than their per capita share, lower income citizens can pay less than their per capita share. In this way income redistribution takes place.

III. The Structures of Information Flows

In both the economic and government organizations the optimal amount of decentralization depends on the ease with which information passes between the center of the organization and its service facilities.[15] These information flows partly serve a control function, since certain decisions must always be made at the center. The information flows also perform a monitoring function, allowing the center to keep up to date on facility activities. The results of this monitoring function are used in evaluating facility performance and, in particular, in determining whether facility managers should advance in the organization.

In describing an information structure there are many possible approaches. For our present purposes we can divide information flows into two types: numerical information (information subject to objective measurement) and verbal information. Because numerical information by definition can be objectively measured, it lacks ambiguity.[16] This lack of ambiguity means that an organization using numerical information can obtain a relatively high density of information content per page of written text or per minute of telegraph transmission.[17]

Some information usually classified as verbal can be expressed in numerical form. For example, the color red can be described according to De Broglie's wave equation as energy with a certain wave length or frequency. More generally, information can be treated in a numerical form if the policies of the organization can be broken down into a finite set of discrete alternatives, all known in advance.

This feature is present in the model of an economic organization and, not surprisingly, it is implicit in the model of Kochen and Deutsch. While there is an infinity of items a mail-order house might sell, at any one time it actually offers for sale only a finite set. This set of goods is listed in a catalogue possessed by the organization's personnel and its clients. The only information which need flow in the organization are the catalogue numbers by which the products are identified and the prices of the products.[18] In more complicated models of economic organizations the process of cataloging can be quite complex, but the idea of a discrete set of possible actions still applies.

---

[13] This possibility exists even without interdependent utility functions. See Kenneth Arrow's discussion of the paradox of voting in *Social Choice and Individual Values* (2nd edition; New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963). See also Anthony Down's comments on the paradox in *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 60–62.

[14] If we were to permit some differences to exist between the type of education received by one child and that received by another, arguing that the public component can be separated from the private component of the government good, then it is possible that such decentralization or differentiated responses to different tastes can only be achieved with an *increase* in money costs. This is due to the fact that some economies of scale would be lost from having different children follow different programs.

[15] Because the model presented by Kochen and Deutsch does not explicitly contain a center, they do not consider the question of information flows between facilities and the center. In their model this omission is not serious, but it is important when comparing economic and government organizations.

[16] On the ambiguity of verbal information, see Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media* (paperback edition; New York: Signet Books, 1966), especially Chapter 9.

[17] An analogous distinction between types of information is discussed in some detail by Kochen and Deutsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 742–745. What they fail to recognize, however, is that different types of organizations lend themselves to different types of information flows where the cost per unit of information content, as they do point out, may vary by several orders of magnitude.

If the economic organization chooses to decentralize, its information system can remain intact. This is a result of the buy-it-or-go-elsewhere character of its clients as described in the previous section. If a customer requests a product which is not in the catalogue, a negative response accompanied by this reason will be accepted.

If a school system attempts to decentralize, however, citizens will in general not be content to select from a predetermined set of alternatives. They will suggest programs of their own design, programs which the board of education will not have previously considered. Because of this tendency of the consumer of government goods to stay and fight rather than take his business elsewhere, the school system can catalogue its programs only by anticipating every program which citizens might suggest, an impossible job. As a consequence, complete cataloging and the resulting simplified information systems is far less likely to be realized.[19]

Information processing in a school system is, moreover, hampered by the interdependence of citizens' preferences. As described in the preceding section, the educational program in each school must be evaluated for its effect on all citizens. In an economic organization it is reasonable to assume that most of the requests flowing from the warehouses to the headquarters can be processed on an individual basis. In the school system, many policy requests from neighborhood schools can be processed only by ascertaining the effect of granting a particular request upon all other schools. Requests must be analyzed in combination rather than in sequence. This feature complicates the process of request evaluation substantially and the reasons for a particular decision by the school board may not be obvious to or accepted by the person who initiated the request.[20]

IV. The Presence or Absence of "Sufficient Statistics"

In addition to the availability to an economic organization of information flows primarily of a lower-cost numerical type, it also differs from a government organization because it can draw on the price system as an efficient decentralizing mechanism. If the economic organization's goal is to maximize its profits, then a set of input and output prices offers a basis for comparing the way in which alternative strategies achieve this goal.

At one level these prices can be employed to determine the best structure for the organization. The question "should a new warehouse be opened?" reduces to the more specific question "will the costs of a new warehouse be exceeded by the revenues it will produce?"[21]

The role of the price system in the operation of a decentralized economic organization is even more important. In the introduction to this paper we made the assumption that the personnel of the organizations in our models pattern their behavior to gain advancement within their organizations. If the headquarters of an economic organization gives the warehouse managers a set of prices and announces that advancement will be determined on the basis of his facility's profits, three objectives will have been served. First the managers will have a standard for evaluating their own decisions. (Should the warehouse be operated five or six days a week?) Second if the managers evaluate alternatives on this basis, their decisions will exactly coincide with those the headquarters' personnel would make under similar circumstances. It is this result in particular which allows the headquarters to delegate to the managers nominal authority over a wide range of decisions. This delegation of authority drastically reduces the information which must flow between the center and a facility. Finally the center will have a basis for evaluating managerial performance, promoting those managers who fulfill the organization's goal best.[22]

In an economic organization, therefore,

---

[18] We examine prices in more detail in the following section.

[19] In conversation Professor Sandy Muir has commented that the difference in information flows can be attributed to the difference between an organization primarily concerned with distribution (the mail-order house) and an organization primarily concerned with production (the school). This suggests that production may play a relatively larger role in government goods than in economic goods.

[20] Economic organizations also experience the interdependence of requests, but this interdependency is likely to be of an extremely simple additive form. This occurs, for example, when several facilities request the shipment of quantities from a scarce, centrally stockpiled resource. For a mathematical treatment of this problem as it arises in centrally planned economies, see George Danzig, *Linear Programming and Extensions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), Chapter 23. Typically, the form of interdependence in a government organization will be more complex than simple additivity.

[21] This is a broader formulation of the problem addressed by Kochen and Deutsch in their paper.

[22] Strictly speaking, this characterization overstates the case. The center has no way of determining whether low profits mean a poor manager or a manager placed in an impossible situation. Nevertheless, the observation of low profits at least narrows the center's decision to two alternatives: fire the manager or close down the facility.

prices serve as an efficient mechanism for accomplishing decentralization. We have chosen to call prices in this role "sufficient statistics", because they completely characterize the organization's goal. This term is borrowed from the mathematical statisticians. It refers to a measure or set of measures which condense all the information available without loss.

The existence of numerical information is no guarantee of the existence of a sufficient statistic. A traffic policeman can be evaluated by the number of tickets he writes in an hour but there is no clear relation between this number and the organization's goal of law enforcement, i.e., the number alone does not distinguish between the good tickets and the bad tickets. Similarly, an applicant for a teaching position can be numerically characterized by the highest degree he has obtained (1 = a bachelor degree, 2 = a masters degree, and so forth), but there is no unique relation between the degree held and the quality of the applicant's teaching.

Organizations producing government goods typically do not have sufficient statistics available for use in their operations. In school systems, for example, attempts have been made to evaluate educational programs on the basis of changes produced in scores on standardized tests. These attempts have often come under attack because the tests are culture bound or in some other respect do not measure what they are purported to measure.

Without sufficient statistics, an entirely different pattern of behavior develops in government organizations. The behavior both of the personnel at the center and those in the facilities will be different in a government organization. For the simple model of a school system which we have described, we can identify two types of policies which might be adopted by the board of education. The first is one which will be sure to maintain the political arrangement which supports the organization and is hinted at in the utility function (3). The second type of policy, partially but not completely covered by the first, is one which is professionally acceptable, the kind which specialists in educational research, professional journals and other sources of professional legitimacy label best.[23]

The board of education recognizes its difficulties in transmitting and receiving information. Wishing to economize on costs and, therefore, information flows, the board selects policies which are both politically and professionally acceptable and codifies them into rules. If a school principal wishes advancement, he will adhere to these rules. This phenomenon is what Robert Merton has called the displacement of goals: rules being transformed from a means to an end into an end in themselves.[24] We can draw a distinction between economic and government organizations on this basis. In an economic organization with the help of the price system, the means of regulating behavior and the end of the organization coincide. In a government organization, with nothing to correspond to a price system, the means (rules) take on an independent existence.

The absence of sufficient statistics to aid in the operation of government organizations means that decentralizing such organizations involves an additional difficulty: if a manager is given greater power to respond to his clients, there is no guarantee that he will use the power. Consider the following example. In school systems, an important power is the authority over the hiring of the teaching staff. In our model of a school system, we can imagine at least three ways a vacant teaching position might be filled:

(A) A board of education personnel officer does all the hiring. He sends an acceptable applicant to the school with the vacancy. The principal of the school must accept anyone sent.
(B) The procedure is the same as (A) except that the principal may veto an applicant sent to him by the personnel officer.
(C) The principal does all the hiring on his own.

Suppose that the school system decides to decentralize its hiring procedures and moves from procedure (A) to procedure (C). Under the new policy the principal recognizes that his activities are still being monitored by the board of education. While the principal may have his own ideas about who are the best teachers or wish to accomodate the ideas of his clients, these ideas may be unorthodox by the implicit standards of the board of education. If the principal follows his ideas, the lack of a sufficient statistic means that there is no way for him to justify his unorthodox behavior in terms of the organization's goals. The board of education sees his unorthodox behavior and nothing else. The principal's career advancement may be blocked. In this situation, the lack of a sufficient statistic provides a strong incentive for the principal to follow the old rules even though they have been nominally relaxed and he has been granted more power and independence. This problem may be present not only when there is a change in formal hiring practices, but also when the nominally more decentralized procedure (C) has existed for a long time.[25]

---

[23] There are some policies which are professionally acceptable but not politically acceptable. A good example is sex education for children in elementary schools.

[24] Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," Merton *et al.* (eds.), *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 361–371.

V. Some Concluding Remarks

The goal of an economic organization in our simple model is to maximize profits or minimize costs. We can be certain that under *ceteris paribus* conditions the observed degree of decentralization of such an organization can be justified exclusively on the grounds of economic efficiency. In general terms, this is the model presented by Kochen and Deutsch in their article. Cost considerations also play a role in determining the observed decentralization in a government organization, but there are other reasons why the degree of decentralization observed may differ from what might be expected on the basis of cost considerations alone. First, centralization may be necessary in order to enforce a certain uniformity in the government good provided in order to maintain the organization's political support. Second, as mentioned at the end of Section II, centralization to ensure uniformity may be required in order to achieve some degree of real income redistribution through the production and distribution of government goods; the organization barters uniformity with well-to-do citizens in order to obtain greater tax support. Moreover, because of differences in the types of information flows and control mechanisms available to government organizations, cost considerations alone will often dictate less decentralization than in an economic organization.

A decentralized economic organization is relatively easy to operate because the organization's options are well-specified in advance, information flows between the center and its facilities are compact, and underlying the whole organization there is a set of prices which all personnel in the organization can use to guide behavior and judge performance.

In a government organization the options are not well-defined in advance, information flows are much more cumbersome and correspondingly more expensive, and no underlying mechanism like a price system exists to guide the organization's members.

Our discussion of decentralization of government organizations has emphasized the supply side. Some comments on the demand for the decentralization of government organizations may be useful. Most of the recent controversies over the decentralization of government organizations have centered on the demands of poorer sections of our communities. One basis of comparing demands of different groups for decentralization has been suggested by Richard Hofstadter's concept of a middle-class political ethos[26] and expanded upon by Edward Banfield, James Q. Wilson and their students. In their book, *City Politics,* Banfield and Wilson described the middle-class ideal of urban government as:

> a cooperative search for the concrete implications of a more or less objective public interest, an interest of the community 'as a whole.' The logic of the middle-class ideal requires that authority be exercised by those who are 'best qualified', that is, technical experts and statesmen, not 'politicians.'[27]

In terms of our simple model of a school system, this statement suggests that middle-class citizens prefer education to be left to the professional educators without their becoming (politically) involved in educational decisions. This view in turn implies that as the country becomes more middle-class the demand for the decentralization of government organizations in order to respond better to the conflicting demands of particular groups of citizens will decline.

There is, however, evidence to indicate that such an implication is incorrect.[28] Part of the problem is a semantic one. If all professional educators shared the same view of the world, then hiring one and leaving all decisions to him would imply taking education out of politics. In fact, professional educators lie along the political spectrum. In more than one suburban community in recent years, a superintendent of schools has been dismissed because the community opposed his policies on integration, sex education, or ungraded classes. A more accurate description of middle-class behavior in this case would be that the community hires a professional educator with whose basic philosophy it agrees and it then leaves the day to day operation of the school system up to him. This description suggests a continuing need for diversity and decentralization.

---

[25] Conflict over hiring procedures was one of the elements of the 1968 dispute over the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school district in New York. (See Martin Mayer, "The Full and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, The Teacher's Union and the Teacher Strike of 1968," *New York Times Magazine,* February 2, 1969). At a different level in the educational system, the resumption of final authority over hiring by the Regents of the University of California was in response to the "unorthodox" hiring practices on some campuses. Such lessons are quickly learned.

[26] Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955).

[27] Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 115.

[28] We leave to one side the issue of whether there is an empirical basis for Banfield and Wilson's middle-class ideal. Its existence and operational significance has been challenged by, among others, Raymond E. Wolfinger and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this REVIEW, 60 (June 1966), 306–326.

As average family income increases each family may want to consume more elaborate and highly differentiated government goods. In particular, it may wish to exercise a direct voice in determining what goods are to be offered.[29] If this is true and it is only a hypothesis, then questions of government decentralization to obtain diversity will become increasingly important. We hope that we have demonstrated, however, that the line of inquiry suggested by Kochen and Deutsch will have little applicability in the analysis of this question, since they fail to recognize the differences between the decentralization of an economic organization and the decentralization of a government organization.

---

[29] One piece of evidence supporting this hypothesis is provided in James Q. Wilson's recent book on different police forces. The old-line middle-class ideal corresponds in Wilson's analysis to a "legalistic" style of police force, where policemen regard the law as an absolute and make arrests whenever they see a violation. The ethnic ideal is characterized by the "watchman" style, where the policeman is more interested in maintaining order than in making arrests and is willing to judge each case on the basis of special circumstances. Wilson, however, reports on a third type of police force with a "service" style, where small middle-class communities have opted for a police force which judges cases on their merits and would rather, if feasible, send a drunken driver home than arrest him. This evidence suggests that where circumstances allow, the middle class would rather not be governed by uniform rules but have judgments tailored to individual circumstances. James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

A Note on the 'Equilibrium' Division of the Vote*

DUFF SPAFFORD
University of Saskatchewan

The time-path described by the major parties' shares of vote in presidential and congressional elections has long held a fascination for students of politics because of the hints it offers of a more or less regular "pendulum swing" of party fortunes. A concept often called upon in this connection is that of an "equilibrium" division of the vote,[1] sometimes taken *a priori* to be an equal division in a two-party system.[2] Lacking, however, is a model in which the notion of an equilibrium division can be given empirical expression. Such a model is proposed in this note. The model is then applied to House of Representatives elections.

An equilibrium model. The concept "equilibrium" connotes a state of rest. The best-known application of the concept in the social sciences is in the theory of market-price determination in economics, and it may be drawn upon for illustration. A market is said to be in equilibrium when a price obtains such that the quantity which consumers are willing to buy is equal to the quantity which producers are willing to place on the market. Once established, that price will persist as long as the forces which situate the demand and supply curves remain the same: the market is at rest at its equilibrium price (and associated quantity).

An interesting question arises when we consider a market in which a price other than the equilibrium price is taken to obtain. Will the price subsequently tend to its equilibrium level? Here we must inquire into the *stability* of equilibrium. As Chipman observes: "The real content of the equilibrium concept is to be found not so much in the state itself as in the laws of change which it implies; that is, in the tendencies to move towards it, away from it, or around it."[3] It may be that, when taken out of equilibrium, a system will subsequently move back towards it, approaching ever closer. In such a case, we can describe the equilibrium as "stable". On the other hand, it may be that any small departure from equilibrium will lead to ever larger departures: such an equilibrium can be characterized as "unstable".

To analyse the path taken by a variable when it is out of equilibrium presupposes a model which will generate successive values of the variable through time, i.e., a dynamic model. The simplest type of dynamic model is one based on a single lagged relationship. To refer again to market-price determination, a dynamic model of a market can be constructed by writing quantity supplied as a function of price in the previous rather than the current period (e.g., the "cobweb" model described in any introductory textbook in economics).[4] A special type of the simple lag model is one termed "autoregressive" in which the value of a variable in one period depends on the value assumed by the *variable itself* in the previous period. Denote the value of the variable in period t by x_t and its value in period $t-1$ by x_{t-1}. The hypothesis, then, is

$$x_t = f(x_{t-1}). \tag{1}$$

With a knowledge of the value of x in any period, we can learn its value in the succeeding period. More generally, given x_0, an initial value of x, the equation will trace out the time-path of x_t as t is assigned successive values of 1, 2, 3, · · · .

Equation (1) is used here in the analysis of the time-path of a political party's share of vote. Let x_t represent the share of vote won by a party at an election, and x_{t-1} the share won by the party at the preceding election. Equation (1) is now taken to posit an association between a party's share of vote and its preceding share. The association is presumed to be positive. The basis for this presumption is the well-known finding that voting habits ordinarily show little change over short periods of time. Thus if a party's share of vote is high (low) at one election, it is likely to remain high (low) at the next. Let us think of a "high" share as one which exceeds a benchmark share denoted by x^*, and a "low" share as one which is smaller than x^*. Then if x_{t-1} is (say) greater than x^*, x_t is expected to be greater than x^*. But will x_t be greater or smaller than x_{t-1}? That is, sup-

---

* Thanks are due to my colleague, Peter C. Dooley, and to an anonymous REVIEW referee.

[1] See Donald E. Stokes and Gudmund R. Iversen, "On the Existence of Forces Restoring Party Competition," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (1962), 159–171, and Charles Sellers, "The Equilibrium Cycle in Two-party Politics," *ibid.*, 29 (1965), pp. 16–38.

[2] "We use the term 'restoring' or 'equilibrium' force as a generalized name for factors tending to return the party division to 50 percent in the long run" (Stokes and Iversen, *op. cit.*, p. 161, footnote 6).

[3] John S. Chipman, "The Nature and Meaning of Equilibrium in Economic Theory," *Functionalism in the Social Sciences*, Don Martindale (ed.) (Philadelphia, 1965), p. 36.

[4] See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, *Economics: An Introductory Analysis* (6th ed.; New York, 1964), pp. 396–398.

posing a party's share to be high initially, will it be still higher at the next election? High but not *as* high? We are interested here in the relationship between shares of vote and subsequent changes in shares. In examining the possibilities it will be useful to refer to a simple model.

The model proposed is one in which changes in shares of vote are related to discrepancies between actual shares and the benchmark share x^*. Specifically,

$$\Delta x_t = \lambda(x_{t-1} - x^*) \tag{2}$$

where Δx_t is change in share of vote

$$(\Delta x_t \equiv x_t - x_{t-1})$$

and λ and x^* are constants. Observe that for a discrepancy to be reduced in the next period, λ must be negative. Should λ be positive, any initial discrepancy will be ever magnified until, with the passage of enough elections, one party will win all of the vote. The condition $\lambda > 0$ could be said to imply "bandwagon" behavior on the part of voters; $\lambda < 0$ is consistent with "equilibrium-restoring" behavior. As a bit of experimentation will make clear, negativity of λ is not sufficient to ensure that share of vote will tend to x^*: we must also stipulate $\lambda > -2$. (For $\lambda < -2$, it will be seen, x_t will overshoot x^* and discrepancies will grow ever greater, with signs alternating.) In sum, the condition for stability is $-2 < \lambda < 0$. Further experimentation will show that the choice of a specific value of λ from within this range will be consequential for the kind of time-path described by x_t as it approaches x^*. With $\lambda < -1$, x_t will describe a saw-tooth pattern; but with $\lambda > -1$, no such oscillations occur.

It is also to be noted from (2) that if x_{t-1} is equal to x^*, then $\Delta x_t = 0$, and $x_t = x_{t-1}$. Thus x^*, which was introduced as a benchmark share of vote, can now be re-interpreted as an equilibrium share. It is that value of x which, once established, will be maintained.

An implication of equation (2) is that a party's share of vote is a linear function of its preceding share:

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &\equiv x_{t-1} + \Delta x_t \\ &= x_{t-1} + \lambda(x_{t-1} - x^*), \quad \text{or} \\ x_t &= -\lambda x^* + (1 + \lambda)x_{t-1}. \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

For stability, $(1+\lambda)$, the coefficient of x_{t-1}, must be greater than -1 and smaller than $+1$. This condition follows directly from that set out above for λ.[5]

It is possible to estimate x^* from time series of shares of vote. The empirical counterpart of equation (3) is the linear regression equation

$$x_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \tag{4}$$

where ϵ_t is an error term with expected value zero. Setting the coefficients in (3) equal to their opposite numbers in (4), i.e. $-\lambda x^* = \beta_0$, $1 + \lambda = \beta_1$, we obtain $\lambda = \beta_1 = 1$ and, after substitution,

$$x^* = \beta_0/(1 - \beta_1), \beta, - 1. \tag{5}$$

The basic model represented by equation (3) can be extended in several ways of which two are of interest here. First, we may wish to depart from the assumption of a constant equilibrium value and assume instead that the equilibrium value changes with time (t). Suppose that the equilibrium value is given by the linear equation

$$x^*_t = a + bt. \tag{6}$$

By regression of x_t on x_{t-1} and t it is possible to obtain empirical estimates of a and b. The method is described in the Appendix, item 2.

Second, further lagged values (x_{t-2}, x_{t-3}, etc.) may be incorporated into the model. The method of solving the resulting higher-order difference equations is not dealt with here.[6]

An application. Five versions of the model were fitted to House of Representatives election data for the period 1900–1960, the dependent variable being share (percent) of total vote won by the Democratic party.[7] The results of the regression analysis, given in Table 1, are discussed below, taking the versions in turn.

Version I is the basic model. The sign on the coefficient of the lagged share of vote (V_{-1}) is positive, bearing out the expectation of positive association between successive shares of vote. The coefficient falls within the range indicating stability. If Democratic share of vote is disturbed from its equilibrium value, it subsequently moves back toward it. By making use of equation (5) we can solve for the implied equilibrium share of vote, which turns out to be 47.6 percent.[8]

---

[5] **For a more formal account of stability conditions, see Appendix, item 1.**

[6] The reader is referred to Samuel Goldberg, *Introduction to Difference Equations* (New York, 1958).

[7] Share of total vote was favored over share of major-party vote because of greater simplicity of interpretation. The equations also were fitted using major-party shares; such differences as arose are noted in the text.

[8] This is very close to the mean Democratic share of vote (47.3 percent), the reason being that the means of the unlagged and lagged shares are very similar. If the two series had the same mean, that common mean would be equal to the equilibrium share. A regression line is constrained to pass through the point of means, $\bar{x}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \bar{x}_{t-1}$. Now let $\bar{x}_t = \bar{x}_{t-1} = \bar{x}$; then $\bar{x} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \bar{x}$, or $\bar{x} = \beta_0/(1 - \beta_1)$; cf. equation (5).

Table 1. Regression Analysis of Democratic Party's Share of Total Vote in House of Representatives Elections 1900–1960

Version	I	II	III	IV	V
Variables:					
V_{-1}	0.626† (0.154)	0.386† (0.171)	0.283 (0.181)	0.419† (0.176)	0.613† (0.183)
V_{-2}			0.281 (0.186)	0.392† (0.186)	
D_1					−3.59† (1.70)
D_2					1.67 (1.59)
T		0.114† (0.046)	0.093 (0.047)		0.097† (0.043)
Constant term	17.8	25.7	18.1	9.3	16.0
R^2	.364	.479	.520	.451	.584

Shown in parentheses below coefficients are standard errors. A dagger (†) attached to a coefficient indicates significance at the .05 level.

In Version II, time (T) is introduced into the model. The equation indicates that, if disturbed, share of vote will gravitate towards equilibrium, which itself now varies with time. Following the method described in the Appendix, the equation for equilibrium is found to be $V^* = 41.7 + .186\ T$. Thus over the sample period V^* is taken to vary from 41.7 in 1900 ($T=0$) to 52.9 in 1960 ($T=60$). The sharpness of the trend is due in part to the decline in the share of vote won by independent candidates over the period. If Democratic share of major-party vote is used, there is still a trend but it is much less marked.

A further lagged share of vote, V_{-2}, is added in Version III. The results are not very instructive because of correlation among the explanatory variables, leading to relatively large standard errors of coefficients.

A curiosity presents itself when T is dropped, giving Version IV. The coefficient of V_{-2} is significant, suggesting that current share of vote is dependent on the share recorded two elections in the past. The solution of this second-order difference equation indicates a system which is stable but oscillatory—the equation generates "cycles". The equilibrium share is found to be 49.2 percent of the vote. There are two reasons why these results should not be taken too seriously. The first is the possibility that, with T absent, V_{-2} is carrying a part of the trend; when major-party shares are used, reducing the trend, the coefficient of the twice-lagged share of vote is not significant. Second, it seems likely that V_{-2} is standing in for still another phenomenon. It is well-known that when a Democratic President is in office, Democratic share of vote in House elections usually falls in off-year elections; and similarly for the Republicans. Thus a party's on-year (off-year) performance may be positively associated with its previous on year (off-year) performance.

In Version V, the linear trend term is reintroduced, V_{-2} is dropped, and two dummy variables D_1 and D_2 are added to take account of the behavior of share of vote in off-year elections. The variable D_1 is set at 1 in off-year elections when a Democratic President is in office, and at 0 otherwise; D_2 is set at 1 in off-year elections when a Republican occupies the presidency, and at 0 otherwise. Expectations are that the coefficient of D_1 will be negative and the coefficient of D_2 positive. As it turns out, both nominal signs are as anticipated, though the coefficient of D_2 is not statistically significant. Both the lagged share of vote and the trend term bear statistically-significant coefficients, and the R^2, while modest enough at .584, is higher than that yielded by any of the other specifications.[9]

Analysis of equilibrium and stability properties of Version V is difficult because of the necessity of specifying the values taken on by D_1 and D_2 over time, and no such analysis is undertaken.

---

[9] A comparison of actual shares of vote won by the Democratic party in the four post-sample elections with the shares predicted by Version V may be of interest. Actual percentages with predicted percentages in parentheses, are: 1962, 52.5 (52.0); 1964, 57.2 (54.4); 1966, 50.9 (53.9); 1968, 50.0 (53.8).

Findings. The time-path of share of vote won by a party in House of Representatives elections has been investigated by means of a simple dynamic model. The model is based on the hypothesis—which finds considerable support in micro-analysis of voter behavior—that a party's share of vote will be associated positively with its preceding share. Results of the statistical analysis indicate a moderately strong autoregressive tendency in the Democratic party's share of vote in the period 1900–1960. When schemes implying a constant equilibrium share of vote were fitted to the data in the form of difference equations, the equations were found to possess a stable equilibrium value in the neighborhood of 50 percent of the vote.

Appendix

1. First-order difference equation

Equation (3) in the text is a first-order difference equation with constant coefficients, whose solution gives the value of x_t once an initial value of x is specified. Denote the initial value by x_0. Then, from (3), the value of x in period 1 is given by

$$x_1 = -\lambda x^* + (1+\lambda)x_0,$$

of which an alternative form more convenient for present purposes is

$$\text{(A.1)} \qquad x_1 = x^* + (1+\lambda)(x_0 - x^*).$$

Let us go on to evaluate x_2. Again from (3),

$$x_2 = -\lambda x^* + (1+\lambda)x_1.$$

Substituting for x_1 from (A.1),

$$x_2 = -\lambda x^* + (1+\lambda)[(1+\lambda)(x_0 - x^*) + x^*],$$

which simplifies readily to:

$$\text{(A.2)} \qquad x_2 = x^* + (1+\lambda)^2(x_0 - x^*).$$

Noting the results for $t=1$ in (A.1) and for $t=2$ in (A.2) we might suppose that the value of x_t for any t is given by

$$\text{(A.3)} \qquad x_t = x^* + (1+\lambda)^t(x_0 - x^*), \quad \lambda \neq 0,$$

which can be shown. See Samuel Goldberg, *Introduction to Difference Equations* (New York, 1958), esp. ch. 2.

With (A.3) before us we can set out the stability conditions. For compactness, let $\alpha = 1+\lambda$ and $z = x_0 - x^*$; now

$$x_t = x^* + \alpha^t z.$$

The equation is said to be *stable* if $x_t \to x^*$ as $t \to \infty$. Assuming $z > 0$, six cases can be distinguished:

(i) $\alpha > 1$, then $x_t \to \infty$ as $t \to \infty$;
(ii) $\alpha = 1$, then $x_t = x_0$, or $\to \pm\infty$ (special case not covered by (A.3);
(iii) $0 < \alpha < 1$, then $x_t \to x^*$ as $t \to \infty$;
(iv) $-1 < \alpha < 0$, then $x_t \to x^*$ as $t \to \infty$;
(v) $\alpha = -1$, then $x_t = x^* \pm z$;
(vi) $\alpha < -1$, then $x_t \to \pm\infty$ as $t \to \infty$.

Note that only in cases (iii) and (iv) is the equation stable; for stability, then, $\alpha (\equiv 1+\lambda)$ must be greater than -1 and less than $+1$. In case (iii), where $\alpha > 0$, x_t decreases monotonically, but in case (iv), where $\alpha < 0$, α^t alternates in sign as t is assigned successive integer values, producing oscillations in x_t.

2. Moving equilibrium

A scheme whose equilibrium is given by equation (6) in the text must yield consecutive equilibrium values which differ by

$$x^*_t - x^*_{t-1} = a + bt - [a + b(t-1)] = b.$$

A scheme which accommodates this condition is

$$\text{(A.4)} \qquad \Delta x_t = \lambda(x_{t-1} - x^*_{t-1}) + b$$

Note that if $x_{t-1} = x^*_{t-1}$, then $\Delta x_t = b$ as required, and $x_t = x^*_{t-1} + b = x^*_t$. From the identity $x_t \equiv x_{t-1} + \Delta x_t$ we obtain

$$x_t = x_{t-1} + \lambda(x_{t-1} - x^*_{t-1}) + b$$

which, after substitution of $a + b(t-1)$ for x^*_{t-1}, becomes

$$\text{(A.5)} \qquad x_t = [b(1+\lambda) - \lambda a] + (1+\lambda)x_{t-1} - \lambda bt.$$

From the linear regression equation

$$\text{(A.6)} \qquad x_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{t-1} + \beta_2 t + \epsilon_t, \qquad (E\epsilon_t) = 0,$$

empirical estimates of a and b can be obtained. Equating corresponding coefficients in (A.5) and (A.6), and observing first that $\lambda = \beta_1 - 1$, successive substitutions yield $b = \beta_2/(1-\beta_1)$ and $a = [\beta_0(1-\beta_1) - \beta_1\beta_2]/(1-\beta_1)^2$.

3. Variables and data sources

V: share (per cent) of total vote won by the Democratic party in House of Representatives election (lagged shares are symbolized by V_{-1} and V_{-2}).
Source: to 1928, U.S. Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957*, Series Y 146–149; after 1928, U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1969 edition, p. 355.

D_1: dummy variable set equal to 1 in off-year elections when Democratic President is in office, set equal to 0 otherwise.

D_2: dummy variable set equal to 1 in off-year elections when Republican President is in office, set equal to 0 otherwise.

T: time (1900 = 0, · · · , 1960 = 60).

Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy in Japanese Prefectures*

CHONG LIM KIM
The University of Iowa

The objective of this brief note is to demonstrate that the level of socio-economic development may not be related to the level of political democracy when applied to within-nation comparisons. The between-nation comparisons of economic-political linkages by Lipset, Cutright, and others suggest that a certain level of socio-economic development is a prerequisite for stable democracy.[1] Urbanization, industrialization, education, and communications development are considered to be important components of the political infrastructure which induces a set of attitudes and behavior patterns congruent with key democratic institutions. Using aggregate data collected in 1968 from various Japanese sources, I shall examine the Lipset-Cutright hypothesis.[2]

I. Measurement

Fifteen socio-economic indicators for 46 Japanese prefectures ((To-Dō-Fu-Ken) are selected for analysis because of their theoretical relevance, their prior use, and their discriminatory power. Factor analysis is employed to obtain summary measures of socio-economic development. As shown in Table 1, rotated factors of these fifteen variables (Kaiser Varimax rotation) reveal two dimensions of socio-economic development in Japanese prefectures. The first factor shows high loadings on percent urban population, percent population in *shibu,*[3] per capita income, economic growth rate, percent population in industrial sectors, and others. A total of ten variables load highly on this factor. All seem to be related to the degree of urbanization or industrialization. Hence, we identify this factor as the *urban-industrialism dimension.* The second factor is strongly correlated with five variables: per capita electric power production, newspaper circulation, paved roads, number of automobiles, and per capita library facility.[4] This factor appears to indicate the amount of social overhead capital investment in prefectures. It is labeled as the *social overhead capital dimension.*

With respect to the measurement of democratic development, Neubauer's index of democratic development is used with some modifications.[5] Seven political variables are chosen for analysis because they are presumed to be related to some key features of political democracy: electoral participation, electoral competition, and representation equality. These variables are factor analyzed and the results are reported in Table 2. It is clear in the data that democratic development in Japanese prefectures consists of three distinctive dimensions. The first factor shows high loadings on the percentage of votes received by the winning party in prefectural elections, the percentage of time the dominant party has controlled the prefectural assembly, and the percentage of assembly

---

* The larger project of which this note is a part, the Japan Legislative Research Project, was made possible by a fellowship from the University of Iowa, in connection with a Japanese exchange program supported by the Hill Family Foundation. I wish to thank Mr. Hiroshi Takahashi, a graduate student of the University of Tokyo, for his assistance in collecting the data.

[1] S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," this REVIEW, 53 (March 1959), 69–105. Philips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 582–592. A. Smith, "Socio-economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 13 (February 1969), 95–125. Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, 61 (March 1967), 72–79.

[2] The data sources are: Asahi Shimbun Sha, *1968 Minryoku: To-Dō-Fu-Ken Minryoku Sokutei Shiryōshū,* 1968. Sōrifu Tokei Kyoku, *1965 nen Kokusei Chōsa Hōkoku,* 1966. Keizai Kikaku Chō, *Chiiki Keizai Yōran,* 1966. Mombu Daijinkambō Tōkei Chōsa Ka, *Gakkō Kihon Chōsa,* 1967. Unyu Daijinkambō Tōkei Chōsa Ka, *Rikuun Tōkei Yōran,* 1967. Kensetsu Shō, *Dōro Tōkei Nempō,* 1967. Keizai Kikaku Chō, *Shōhisha Dōkō Chōsa,* 1966. Tōkyō Shuppan Kagaku Kenkyū Shō, *Zasshi no To-Dō-Fu-Ken Betsu Suitei Haisōryo,* 1967. Keizai Kikaku Chō, *Kemmin Shotoku Tōkei,* 1966. Jichi Shō, *Chiho Senkyo Kekka Chōsa,* 1957–1967.

[3] *Shibu* is a Japanese term for urban part as distinguished from *gumbu* or rural areas. It is an administrative unit which often includes a substantial area that we would normally regard as rural. The Japanese census uses a different definition of urban areas, namely the density of population. Thus, these two measures of urbanization do not completely overlap, the correlation between them being .78.

[4] Per capita library facility is a composite score of the number of public libraries and the number of volumes they contain.

[5] Dean E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," this REVIEW, 61 (December 1967), 1002–1009.

Table 1. Rotated Factors of Socio-Economic Variables

Variables	Urban-Industrialism, Factor I	Social Overhead Capital, Factor II
Percent urban population (Census definition)	*.949*	.202
Magazines per 1,000 persons	*.921*	.075
Per capita income	*.873*	*.387*
Percent population in *shibu*	*.844*	*.342*
Percent adult having completed primary education	*.806*	.221
College students per 1,000 persons	*.805*	.070
Percent population in industrial sectors	*.798*	*.523*
Telephones per 1,000 persons	*.795*	*.467*
Economic growth rate	*.681*	*.318*
Railroads per km²	*.644*	*.376*
Automobiles per 1,000 persons	*.333*	*.760*
Paved roads per km²	.270	*.743*
Newspapers per 1,000 persons	*.527*	*.722*
Per capita electric power production	*.302*	*.529*
Per capita library facility	−.060	*.474*
Percent of total variance	60.8	69.9
Percent of explained variance	87.0	100.0

Note: All loadings of .300 or greater have been italicized for emphasis.

seats won by the winning party. This factor appears to indicate the degree of political competition in prefectures. Thus, we identify it as the *competition dimension.* Voter turnout, female voting turnout, and male/female voting ratio in prefectural elections are highly loaded on our second factor.[6] Because all three variables are related to voting participation, we label this factor as the *participation dimension.* Finally, only a single variable, the representation index,[7] shows a high loading on the third factor. A close examination of the between-item intercorrelations of all variables considered also reveals that the representation index is not significantly correlated with any other variable. This indicates that the degree of representation equality is one distinct dimension of democratic development. The third factor is labeled as the *representation dimension.*

Using only those variables which load highly on the urban-industrialism dimension, a separate factor analysis is performed in order to construct an urban-industrialism scale. From this result, we further factor score each prefecture. Similar procedures are employed to create scales for social overhead capital, competition, participation, and representation equality.

II. Results

If we are to confirm the Lipset-Cutright hypothesis in Japanese prefectures, we need to observe sufficiently strong and positive correlations between the two measures of socio-economic development and the three measures of democratic development. The results of analysis are presented in Table 3. It is clear that the degree of urban-industrialism is neither strongly nor positively correlated with all measures of democracy. Urban-industrialism shows a strong *negative* correlation with the level of participation ($r = -.743$) and bears no visible relation to representation equality ($r = .092$).

---

[6] Japanese women gained voting rights for the first time in 1947. Therefore, female voting turnout and male/female voting ratio may be sensitive measures of political participation in the Japanese context.

[7] The representation index is designed to tab the degree of equality in representation. Assuming that the one-man-one-vote principle is a basic element of political democracy, this index calculates the degree of over- or under-representation in terms of the number of assembly seats won and the percentage of popular votes received by each competing party. The formula is:

$$\text{Index} = \frac{\text{Absolute Sum of Differentials in \% of Seats Won and \% of Votes Received by Each Party}}{\text{Number of Parties Competing in Prefectural Election}}$$

The reason for dividing the numerator by the number of competing parties in the formula is because of the varying number of parties actually competing in prefectural elections. For example, in the 1965 Tokyo *To* election there were seven competing parties including the Liberal Democrats, Socialists, Komeito candidates, Communists, Independents, and other minor parties, whereas in the 1967 Akita election only four parties competed.

Table 2. Rotated Factors of Political Variables

Variables	Political Competition, Factor I	Political Participation, Factor II	Representation Equality, Factor III
Percent of time dominant party controlling assembly	*−.956*	−.139	.152
Percent of votes received by dominant party	*−.946*	−.215	−.134
Percent of assembly seats won by winning party	*−.840*	*−.306*	.073
Voter turnout	.208	*.962*	−.061
Female voting	.196	*.935*	−.094
Male/female voting	.221	*.832*	.106
Representation index	−.048	−.021	*.994*
Percent of total variance	54.6	75.9	90.8
Percent of explained variance	60.1	83.6	100.0

Note: All loadings of ±.300 or greater have been italicized for emphasis.

The only evidence that supports the Lipset-Cutright hypothesis is the relationship between urban-industrialism and the level of competition (r = .470).

The amount of social overhead capital, our second measure of socio-economic development, fares no better. It shows very weak relationships with the level of participation (r = .142), competition (r = .086), and representation equality (r = −.134). Thus, the present analysis of within-nation variations in socio-economic development and political democracy in Japan offers little evidence to confirm the generalizations regarding economic-political linkages previously reported in several cross-national studies. The findings presented here suggest that socio-economic factors such as the level of urbanization, industrialization, education, or communications development provide an inadequate explanation for the varying levels of political democracy in Japanese prefectures.[8] These findings would be more valid, however, were the analysis performed in more than one nation. Further research on within-nation variations is needed to test conclusively the Lipset-Cutright hypothesis.

Table 3. Correlations between Socio-Economic Development and Democracy

Measures of Socio-economic Development	Political Participation	Political Competition	Representation Equality
Urban-Industrialism	−.743	.470	.092
Social Overhead Capital	.142	.086	−.134

---

[8] I have offered elsewhere some speculations about the nature of economic-political linkages in Japanese prefectures. See my "Economic Development and Democracy in Japanese Prefectures," Report No. 29, Laboratory for Political Research, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa (July, 1969).

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

During 1968 I was travelling in Great Britain and, as a result, did not have the customary opportunity to reply to Gerald H. Kramer's critique [this Review, Vol. LXII, No. 3, (September, 1968), pp. 955–956] of my article on a theorem about voting [this Review, Vol. LXII, No. 1, (March, 1968), pp. 205–207]. However, articles and critiques are rarely read except [even?] by specialists, and I presumed mathematical political scientists would suitably discount the putatively mathematical strictures contained in the critique. That presumption seems to have been naive since Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordershook [this Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 3, (September, 1970), p. 786n] appear to have recently endorsed the suggestion that my original article was mathematically flawed.

The purpose of my article was to prove (or, if you like, to derive or to deduce) the following theorem: The rational voter votes for the candidate (party) associated with the outcome he (the voter) most prefers. Proofs proceed from axioms to theorems, and since my critics have not claimed to detect a fallacious inference, their criticism has appropriately focused on my model's axioms (or, if you like, postulates or assumptions).

When discussing a mathematical model, a distinction should be drawn between the pure mathematics of the model and the empirical applications of the model. The pure mathematics of my model are sound, but as stressed in the original article, the empirical application of the model is an open question. Given the repeated criticisms of the model, these points deserve elaboration.

With an axiomatic system, one criterion is paramount: The axioms must be consistent. The reason for the unique significance of consistency is brutally simple: If the axioms are not consistent, then every statement logically follows from the axioms. Since I obviously assumed the mathematical theory of probability as well as other axioms, I am surprised by Kramer's assertion that a "justification offered for [Casstevens' reduction postulate] is that it 'does not contradict the mathematical theory of probability,' which may be true, but *is in any event quite irrelevant.*" [Kramer, *op. cit.*, p. 956; emphasis added.] Consistency is hardly irrelevant.

Furthermore, with an axiomatic system, a second criterion is desirable: The axioms should be parsimonious. For example, if a proposed axiom logically follows from the accepted axioms, then that proposed axiom should be called a theorem rather than an axiom (or postulate or assumption). Consequently, I am puzzled by the critical tone of Hinich and Ordeshook's statement that "Casstevens assumes [as his reduction postulate] that if a voter switches from candidate 1 to candidate 2, he does not affect the probability that candidate 3 wins—*an assumption which does not follow logically from his structure.*" [Hinich and Ordeshook, *op. cit.*, p. 786n; emphasis added.] (For similar remarks, in substance and in tone, see Kramer, *op. cit.*, p. 956.) Indeed, if the reduction postulate did follow logically from my structure, then I would have called it a theorem rather than a postulate.

Although guided by intuitive considerations such as parsimony, a mathematician has a free choice of axioms except for the constraint of consistency. Proofs of consistency, from a mathematical point of view, are often difficult to appraise and subject to limitations. For these reasons, despite its importance, I tacitly assumed but did not prove the consistency of the axioms in my original article. (An outline of a consistency proof, available upon request, has been privately circulated.) Kramer, however, apparently concedes the consistency of my axioms for he admits that the consistency of the reduction postulate and the mathematical theory of probability "may be true . . . though plausible examples in which [the reduction postulate] is true are difficult to devise." [*Ibid.*, p. 956.] For a consistency proof, of course, an example does not need to be plausible. Thus, *Kramer presents no purely mathematical criticism of my axioms.*

The theorem about voting does logically follow from the conjunction of the axioms, including the reduction postulate, adopted in my original article. Given the consistency of my axioms, reference to my "attempts" [Hinich and Ordeshook, *op. cit.*, p. 786n; Kramer, *op. cit.*, p. 955] to prove the theorem are somewhat misleading, and if 'technically' means 'mathematically' in this context, then the assertion that my proof is "technically incorrect" [*ibid.*, p. 956] is quite false. *Proof* and *truth* are quite distinct concepts. A proof shows that a theorem is true *if* the axioms are true, but mathematically speaking, consistency rather than truth is required of the axioms. [For an illuminating discussion of consistency, parsimony, proof and truth, see Raymond L. Wilder, *Introduction to the Foundations of Mathematics* (2nd ed.; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), Chapters I, II, and XI.]

The mathematical acceptability of an axiomatic system, of course, does not ensure the empirical acceptability of the system as a model of actual phenomena. My original article stressed that the empirical validity of its axiomatic system, as a model of British-style by-elections, was an open question. Subsequent quibbles about the empirical character of ties and of shifts in probabilities are hardly compelling reasons for rejecting the model: There is inevitably some slippage when an axiomatic system is given an empirical interpretation; and with thousands of electors, I confess that I do not know who [does?] what effect a single voter's change of mind *really* has on the odds. We guess, we conjecture, we model in an effort to advance our knowledge. Kramer, Hinich and Ordeshook, and I use different sets of axioms in our endeavors. We all await decisive empirical evidence from survey researchers.

THOMAS W. CASSTEVENS
Oakland University

TO THE EDITOR:

The argument in Casstevens' original essay is not rigorous, since it involves a number of undefined terms such as "election," "outcome," and "win;" evidently the reader is expected to take these terms in their generally accepted, ordinary language meanings. I trust the following interpretations accord reasonably well with ordinary usage: in an "election," the "outcome" depends on the numbers of votes cast for the various candidates; under the simple-majority single-ballot system, a candidate "wins" if he receives more votes than any other candidate; and if the two or more leading candidates receive precisely the same number of votes, then a "tie" is said to have occurred. I presume it also generally agreed that the courses of action available to an individual voter include not voting, not indicating a preference for a particular office, casting an invalid ballot, or otherwise failing to vote for any of the candidates in a particular race.

To supplement Casstevens' notation slightly, let V_0 denote the action (by the voter in question) of not casting a valid ballot for any of the candidates, let T_{ij} (T_{ijk}) denote a tie between candidates i and j (a three-way tie between i, j, and k), etc., and let n_i denote the number of votes received by candidate i from all voters except the one in question. In a three-candidate race the conditional probability of the first candidate winning, given that the voter in question votes for him, is evidently

$$\begin{aligned} P[W_1 \mid V_1] &= P[(n_1+1>n_2)\ \&\ (n_1+1>n_3)] \\ &= P[\{(n_1>n_2+1) \vee (n_1=n_2+1) \\ &\quad \vee (n_1=n_2)\}\ \&\ \{(n_1>n_3+1) \\ &\quad \vee (n_1=n_3+1) \vee (n_1=n_3)\}] \\ &= P[\{a_1 \vee a_2 \vee a_3\}\ \&\ \{b_1 \vee b_2 \vee b_3\}] \end{aligned}$$

(where "a_1" is shorthand for the expression "$n_1>n_2+1$", etc.). After some elementary manipulation this expression reduces to

$$\begin{aligned} P[W_1 \mid V_1] = {} & P[a_1b_1] + P[a_1b_2] + P[a_1b_3] \\ & + P[a_2b_1] + P[a_2b_2] \\ & + P[a_2b_3] + P[a_3b_1] \\ & + P[a_3b_2] + P[a_3b_3]. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Ties are to be "ignored," which from the context clearly means that the probability of any tie is to be assumed equal to zero (p. 205, right, lines 16–17). Consider the probability of a tie between candidates 1 and 3, given action V_3; evidently this is

$$\begin{aligned} P[T_{13} \mid V_3] &= P[(n_1>n_2)\ \&\ (n_1=n_3+1)] \\ &= P[a_1b_2] + P[a_2b_2]. \end{aligned}$$

Since by assumption this probability is zero, the second and fifth terms of (1) vanish. So also do the third (since $P[T_{13} \mid V_2]=P[a_1b_3]=0$), fourth (using $P[T_{12} \mid V_2]$) sixth ($P[T_{123} \mid V_2]$), seventh ($P[T_{12} \mid V_3]$), eighth ($P[T_{123} \mid V_3]$), and ninth ($P[T_{123} \mid V_0]$). Hence (1) reduces to

$$P[W_1 \mid V_1] = P[a_1b_1]. \tag{2}$$

Now consider the probability

$$\begin{aligned} P[W_1 \mid V_2] &= P[(n_1>n_2+1)\ \&\ (n_1>n_3)] \\ &= P[a_1b_1] + P[a_1b_2] \\ &= P[a_1b_1], \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

since we have shown above that $P[a_1b_2]=0$. From (3) and (2) it follows that $P[W_1 \mid V_1]=P[W_1 \mid V_2]$, which directly contradicts the assumption (p. 206, left, line 18) that $P[W_1 \mid V_1]>P[W_1 \mid V_2]$. Thus Casstevens' assumptions are inconsistent, and his proof is technically (i.e., mathematically) incorrect.

Finally, to restate the more important point, even if a more careful treatment of ties or some other modification could resolve this inconsistency, the content of Casstevens' assumptions—

the "reduction postulate" specifically—makes them substantively irrelevant to the proposition stated as a theorem in the first paragraph of his essay.

GERALD H. KRAMER
Yale University

TO THE EDITOR:

I would like to reply to John P. Diggins' article "Ideology and Pragmatism: Philosophy or Passion" in the September, 1970 issue of the REVIEW. The whole issue of delineating rationalism, pragmatism and ideology from each other is a fascinating one. But Prof. Diggins' attempt to criticize Sartori's methodological premises because they do not adequately describe historical examples of communism and/or fascism assumes that these versions of practiced ideology were themselves theoretically consistent which they were not and are not today. The Soviet Union is no more communistic in the Marxian sense (or even Lenian sense) than the United States is either democratic or capitalistic in the Lockean or Smithean sense. Therefore, a bad example of a theoretical system is not sufficient to disprove the major tenets of Sartori's methodology simply because the historical examples are "more apparent than real."

However, the major target of my criticism surely must be directed against Diggins' assault on the New Left. His comments concerning the New Left inadvertently raise a most interesting issue despite Diggins' apparent misunderstanding of them; *i.e.*, are disruptive and at times violent tactics consistent with rationalism? Although Diggins' never addresses this question, his biases and values are plainly stated:

> For the New Left reason is the enemy, doctrine is a delusion, and theory a snare. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the political mood of the rebellious young is based on emotion and spontaneity, a "soul politics' where style substitutes for content and engagement for inquiry (p. 900).

It is indefensible to leave such a damaging charge without a justification of it. However Prof. Diggins never gives us so much as a citation for evidence. In addition he never attempts to compare the theorists of the New Left in terms of their rationale with the rationale of the movement's more activist factions or elements. Whether or not one agrees with the writings of such people as Marcuse and Cleaver is unimportant without an examination and critique of their arguments. To impugn the theoretical underpinnings of the New Left, and they are considerable, by the irresponsible actions of a few is a disgrace, and Prof. Diggins' has only demonstrated his ignorance and value bias. The fact of the matter is that it is a thoroughly defensible question to ask just what is the New Left. Prof. Diggins' quantum leap condemnation of the entire New Left movement has all the characteristics of a vigilante hanging proceeding in the face of the host of unanswered questions about them which he raises and neatly ducks.

Be that as it may, the basic question which is raised by Diggins' critique of Sartori's work, which apparently is quite troubling to the former, is one for which Diggins gives laudatory credit to Sartori. This is trying to understand the connection between a value belief system and a thought process. It seems to me that differing value beliefs are the crux of the theoretical differences which Prof. Diggins has with the New Left and other belief systems as well. Criticizing Sartori for being interested only in the "how" rather than the "why" of value belief systems is an interesting point, but not an important one. For if Diggins understood Sartori's point relating to how beliefs motivate reasoning, he would be far more careful and constructive in analyzing the behavioral outcomes of differing belief systems not the least of which is his impugned New Left activist.

One cannot discuss epistemological systems without examining value foundations. This is a point about which Diggins shows some apparent academic if not consistent interest in his criticism of Sartori's "how" concern. Without an understanding and examination of value belief systems, no ideology or system of thought can be intelligible. The whole argument between pragmatism and rationalism begins with their differing value systems concerning their beliefs in the importance of empirical evidence vis-a-vis their respective theoretical frameworks. Pragmatists and rationalists simply *believe* in different things. On this basic point concerning the importance of value belief systems of different thought systems both Diggins and Sartori seem to be guilty of gross negligence. In short, Diggins' argument is with Sartori's own value bias and value blindness—a point about which Sartori can equally accuse Diggins:

> An inquiry into the nature of political investigation is itself vulnerable to queries of method. Because of this, it is necessary to get at the question of presuppositions at the very beginning. Presuppositions will not be avoided in this way; for like Archimedes and his lever, every analyst must have a place to stand. (Frohock, *The Nature of Political Inquiry* (Dorsey), p. 3).

STEPHEN W. HARTMAN
Florida Atlantic University

To the Editor:

Nowhere in the article did I criticize Sartori's methodological premises because they failed to describe "communism and/or fascism" with the assumption "that these versions of practiced ideology were themselves theoretically consistent. . . ." Nor did I claim the Soviet Union has any lineal connection with Marxism. I did state that America historically has been imbued with Lockean values, and if Hartman denies this there's not much one can say other than to suggest he re-read Marcuse (and perhaps Tocqueville, Thoreau, and D. H. Lawrence.) My purpose in juxtaposing Lincoln and Lenin had nothing to do with the structural realities of America and Russia. Rather, I simply suggested that two leaders can behave similarly in a historical context regardless of different ideological visions.

Hartman roasts me for never giving "so much as a citation for evidence" and for never attempting to compare the diverse theorists of the New Left with the more activist factions. Perhaps it is more than coincidence that I have undertaken such a task in my forthcoming book, *The American Left in the Twentieth Century*. Meanwhile one can find an interesting discussion of the ambiguity between epistemology and politics in Staughton Lynd's *The Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism*, and, more recently, in Stuart Hampshire's "Russell, Radicalism, and Reason" (*New York Review*, October 8, 1970). Hartman also claims Sartori and I are "guilty of gross negligence" because our differences really derive from our "own value bias and value blindness." I'm certain Sartori is aware of the genetic fallacy here, but I'm not at all certain Hartman is aware of the value ambivalence in my argument.

Thus he accuses me of a "quantum leap condemnation of the entire New Left" because I stated, in a heuristic aside, that the "existential subjectivism of today's youth" defies Sartori's argument. Why would a young radical nurtured on Marx be insulted at being told that "doctrine" and "theory" are reified delusions? And why would a radical nourished by Thoreau be "impugned" by my remark about "reason"? In American history the apriori Transcendentalists were the eloquent critics of oppression while the slave apologists prided themselves on being rational, positivistic, even "sociological." Today in eastern Europe it is the humanists and existentialists who accuse the Stalinists of bureaucratic empiricism. And in the United States it is the New Left that appeals to a "higher law" of moral obligation while the White House croaks its cunning refrain: "Let us reason together." My reservations about the New Left are mathematical, not philosophical. Apparently the irony of my remarks escaped Professor Hartman.

John P. Diggins

University of California, Irvine

To the Editor:

Book reviews being what they are—someone's opinion about someone else's opinion—there is little point in arguing with most of them. I must however take exception to the book review by Kofi Ankomah of W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957–1966* (LXIV Review 3:978–979). To the rapid reader this review might suggest that Thompson has written a hollow book; to the contrary, it is the review that is hollow. The review is a compound of all of the things that reviewers should seek to avoid. It asks the book to answer such questions as, how is Ghana's foreign policy now different from that under Nkrumah or how does Ghana's foreign policy approach differ from other African countries'? That is an interesting subject for another book; it is not the subject of Thompson's. The review is also blind to a number of the very points that Thompson tackles. The reviewer asks who formulated Ghana's policy or what the influences were on policy makers or what the error was in Nkrumah's policy. Yet all of these are questions the major portion of Thompson's book is devoted to; more precisely, an examination of the relation of ends and means in a particular country's foreign policy is the one important conceptual contribution that the book does make. Ankomah accuses Thompson of borrowing unfavorable myths about Nkrumah; while Thompson's judgments are not always complimentary to the former Ghanaian president they are explored and examined enough in the more than 400 pages of the book to the point where it is ludicrous to suggest that they were advanced without being supported. The review indicates that the book was based "solely on interviews," but then goes on to admit the falsity of its own judgment when it suggests that Thompson misused "classified public documents," (whatever that contradictory phrase implies). Indeed, the review is as clear a case of projection as one could fear to find; in criticising the book for camouflaging its ideological sentiments as scientific research, it hides the fact that the reviewer is proposing his ideological prejudices as scientific judgments! It is interesting to read Ankomah's cries of injured national pride. It would, however, be useful to have a review of Thompson's book.

I. William Zartman

New York University

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

BOOK REVIEWS

Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom. HAROLD F. GOSNELL.

Fried, An Anatomy of Values. RALPH ROSS.

Gurr, Why Men Rebel. IVO K. FEIERABEND.

Miller, One Hundred Thousand Tractors: The MTS and the Development of Controls in Soviet Agriculture. ANNA ELIZABETH POWELL.

Ryan, John Stuart Mill. JOHN D. LEWIS.

Simmons, French Socialists in Search of a Role, 1956–1967. VINCENT E. MCHALE.

Zald, Organizational Change: The Political Economy of the YMCA. RAY E. JOHNSTON.

BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

BOOK REVIEWS

Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom. By James MacGregor Burns. (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1970. Pp. 722. $10.00.)

James MacGregor Burns has produced a brilliant book which is sound in scholarship, keen in analysis, and most felicitous in style. He has presented a stirring and dramatic account of Franklin D. Roosevelt's last four years in the White House. But the book is much more than a biography of Roosevelt from 1940 to 1945; it is a history of World War II on all fronts and of the American people during those trying years. He encompasses military history, administrative history of the war agencies, political history including public opinion trends, legislative battles, congressional and presidential elections, and economic and social history. Since Freidel stops his multivolume work with 1932 and Schlesinger his with 1936, the two volumes by Burns now constitute the most authoritive and complete account of Roosevelt and his times.

In addition to providing a detailed and masterful history of the period, the book makes a number of important contributions to the understanding of today's problems. It traces the origins of the cold war to the broken promises and delays regarding the second front and the conflict between the lofty aims of the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, the United Nations Declaration, and the Declaration on Liberated Europe and the Roosevelt decision to press for military victory by any means, relying upon his military rather than on his political advisers. The Americans and the British paid too high a price for Russian support and at the same time they alienated Stalin by failing to divert Nazi forces by a second front and by lagging in furnishing promised supplies. Before his death Roosevelt was well aware of Stalin's aims in Eastern Europe and the Far East and there was almost an open break between the two on the British-American peace feelers with the Nazi generals in Italy.

On the domestic side, Burns points out that the present unrest on campuses and in center cities inhabited by underprivileged minorities goes back to the changes taking place under Roosevelt in education and in the role played by minority groups. In the push to win the war the services of scholars were enlisted to conduct scientific research on military projects. Academic energies were diverted by huge government grants from pure research to applied research on military problems. During World War II, American military objectives were generally accepted by the public, but they are not today: hence, campus unrest at military research and the R.O.T.C. The war also brought huge population changes. Minority groups migrated from rural areas to center cities, where they competed with majority elements for housing, educational opportunities and jobs. Roosevelt, in order to keep the South within the fragile Democratic coalition, did not move fast enough to meet the rising expectations of the emerging minority groups.

The book gives evidence of a mammoth research on primary and secondary sources. Burns cites materials from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the Harry S. Truman Library, the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the British Museum, and the libraries of such American universities as Columbia, Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Brandeis, and abroad—Moscow State Library and the libraries and institutes of many German universities. As in his early volume, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox,* he has not identified specific statements or quotes with footnotes but has grouped his notes (which he calls bibliography) by chapters and subheadings. Interested scholars familiar with the literature can run down his authorities but they might encounter some problems. He relies more heavily on letters, memoirs, official documents, official histories (particularly military histories), and a basic book list of some 200 titles than on contemporary newspaper and periodical materials. He gives credit to a number of research assistants for library research, drafts and translations from German and Russian. His own travels to London, Paris, Moscow, Leningrad, Berlin, Munich and many other European points indicate a generous travel fund. He does not cite the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. His narrative is a masterpiece, but it could have been improved with military maps, election maps, and maps on political boundaries and occupation zones. The book contains an excellent selection of photographs and cartoons and a well prepared index.

Burns is still puzzled about how to explain Roosevelt's behavior. He continues to cling to his analogies of the lion and the fox and the prophet and the prince to explain some of Roosevelt's contradictory acts. "Roosevelt," he concludes, "was a practical man who proceeded now boldly, now cautiously, step by step toward immediate ends. He was also a dreamer and sermonizer who spelled out lofty goals and summoned people to follow him. He was both a soldier of Faith, battling with his warrior comrades for an ideology of peace and freedom, and a prince of the state, protecting the interests of his nation in a tumultuous and impious world." While he hints at the influence of Roosevelt's early upbringing upon his character formation, he does not explore the theory of Roosevelt as an oral optimist, nor does he try to evaluate effects of Roosevelt's illnesses upon his conduct as president.

In treating Roosevelt's role in the nomination of Harry Truman as vice president by the Democratic National Convention of 1944, Burns describes his behavior as that of a fox—Roosevelt slyly led a number of persons including Henry Wallace and James Byrnes to think he was for them while all the time he had agreed with political advisers that Truman was the man. Burns accepts the common interpretation that Roosevelt's letter of endorsement of Wallace was a "kiss of death" because it left the convention free to make its own choice. Actually, Wallace wanted such a letter and he did not expect Roosevelt to send an ultimatum to the convention as he had in 1940. Roosevelt was opposed to Wallace's renomination but he wanted to let his old friend down lightly. He did this by giving him a chance to battle on his own for the nomination. Wallace made a fine showing in the convention. Rather than acting as a fox, Roosevelt was a very considerate friend. In describing this episode, Burns makes two slight mistakes. Ickes was not for Truman in this convention. He was against Wallace before the convention, but at the convention he sent a telegram to Roosevelt denouncing the Truman nomination. Also there is no proof that Roosevelt wrote a note endorsing Truman after the July 11, 1944 meeting. Burns does not explain why Roosevelt was not more concerned with the problem of succession.

In a brief review it is impossible to do justice to this splendid book. It throws new light not only on Roosevelt but on Churchill, Stalin, De Gaulle, Chiang Kai-shek, and many others. Political scientists should be especially interested in Burns's discussion of the transformation of the presidency, the foundations of modern presidential government, and the testing of his theories regarding the operation of presidential and congressional parties during the war years.

HAROLD F. GOSNELL

Howard University

An Anatomy of Values. By Charles Fried. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 265, $11.00.)

Charles Fried is one of the few scholars who write of values and morals but do not neglect actual behavior. Although he is a professor of law he has learned the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy, as did H. L. A. Hart before him, and uses them to deal with the problem of value. Mr. Fried has even adopted the analytic philosopher's prose style: everything is laid out carefully, so the reader knows just where he is in the argument; the argument itself is replete with examples, for they are evidence, instance, or analogy; the language is pedestrian because a felicitous phrase might mislead the reader, distracting him from the logic of the case; and there is constant repetition, for fear the reader's attention has flagged.

For Mr. Fried our ends make us what we are. There is a clear implication of choice in this, as opposed to the idea that what we are determines our ends. There is a plurality of ends, Mr. Fried argues, and they cannot be reduced to pleasure or the greatest good for the greatest number or any other *summum bonum.* Ends are equated with values. Morality is both a group of ends, those which affect others significantly, and a structuring principle for all ends.

Mr. Fried makes a fascinating analysis of the complexity and types of ends. Even eating dinner is a complex end, including handling, cutting, lifting, biting, chewing, swallowing, tasting, smelling, becoming full. Perhaps it also includes memories, associations, and expectations. Surely it includes an order, a temporal sequence, rhythm, and tempo. Eating is of course necessary to life, but apart from that it can be an end in itself. This leads to a distinction between instrumental and rational ends, in which putting machinery together in order to make an automobile is instrumental but learning the steps of a dance is rational, because the steps, rhythm, pauses *are* the dance. (One remembers Yeats's line: "How can we know the dancer from the dance?") A rational end contains a number of elements ordered in accordance with a reflexive principle.

Applying this analysis to morality, and avowedly following Kant, Mr. Fried holds firmly that the very idea of morality is a sum of the ideas of equality, of impartiality, and of all persons as ends in themselves. He presses this notion nicely, finding the principle of morality basic to all other principles and placing special emphasis on what he calls reciprocity, which allows each of us to recognize others in the way he recognizes himself. In reciprocal rational actions, the behavior of all the participants is necessary for the attainment of the rational end of each participant. The ideal case would be performance of a string quartet.

As to the value of being moral, it is the value of being one kind of man rather than another, the value of being able to give and accept trust, friendship, love, generosity. Our ends make us what we are and moral ends make us what we should be. If "what we should be" is too strong for Mr. Fried, then moral ends make us into men he admires. He is cautious about using older moral terms, and says, ". . . you are under no obligation to be moral, but if you are moral, these and these are your obligations." Such caution throughout seems to me to vitiate a very subtle analysis. Being moral *consists* in accepting and acting out moral obligations. And how can one be under no obligation to accept his obligations? Mr. Fried is putting in a second step where there can be no second step. He is saying we are under no obligation to accept any obligations, but if we do accept them, then they are thus and so. In that case why are they "obligations" at all (the word he uses) and not a completely free choice of courses of action?

Mr. Fried uses his argument up to this point to deal with justice, which he regards as institutional, not individual, relying heavily on John Rawls, the concept of society, which follows Talcott Parsons, and "the life plan," which is a rational ordering of ends, their relations and priorities, and the importance of death for a well-ordered life. Throughout he emphasizes basic human equality and a concern with others as ends, a Kantian morality that suits the universality of Mr. Fried's judgments.

In criticism of the coherent and well-argued scheme that I have barely sketched, I would suggest, first, that values and ends are far from the same things, as Mr. Fried asserts. He writes of "ends like love or justice," which are values, but betrays himself by many phrases like "ends and values." Values are general and ends particular, and if we use both words to mean universals like love and justice we need still another word for the particulars we try to bring about by the use of appropriate means. But Mr. Fried has no such word and uses "ends" to mean both such particulars and the values they may embody. Second, the identity of morality with ends of a special kind, those that affect others, is in this context an identity of some values with obligations, an identity then of what we prize and cherish and find desirable with what is binding and constraining. Mr. Fried would have no problem with this, I suppose, because he thinks that morality is a good, an end in itself. Yet again, despite his strong assertion to this effect, he knows that morality has another aspect and he writes of moral relations as "these constraints."

I appreciate Mr. Fried's general directions in this, as in other matters, very much, because I do not think the good and the right, value and morality, can be kept apart. They are parts of an ethical universe of discourse in which they are entwined. But they are not identical. Rather individual values are, ideally, judged by morality and all morality is, ideally, judged by our values, in a constant interaction of the two.

RALPH ROSS

Scripps College and
Claremont Graduate School

Why Men Rebel. By Ted Robert Gurr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. Pp. 407. $12.50.)

This impressive work offers a broadly conceived theory of political violence based on careful and thorough scholarship in the social sciences. Gurr molds a complex yet integrated multivariate scheme based on theoretical insights and empirical findings in psychology, sociology and history, as well as political science. He presents a coherent network of hypotheses, thoroughly discussed and documented yet precisely and parsimoniously stated, each with the potential for further empirical test. The entire volume is a rare, perhaps a unique example of systematic empirical theory in political science. It is emphatically not simply a framework for analysis, or a compilation of raw insights, or an eclectic collection of unrelated hypotheses. On the contrary, the book stands as an important contribution to social science theory in general and to the theory of violence in particular, as well as the single most complete and comprehensive statement on the topic in the literature.

A review of contemporary work on political violence and aggression reveals several diverse insights. Biologically inclined theorists assert an aggressive instinct that possesses man and beast alike. In this view, aggression is in the nature of man and violence inevitably finds expression in the private, as well as the public sphere. The frustration-aggression hypothesis, on the other hand, sees the aggressive impulse as the result of deprivations, thwarted goals and disappointed expectations. It is social discontent, a state of mind common to large collectivities, that gathers the energies for revolution and social turmoil. The instinct and frustration hypotheses seem denied, however, by those who argue that aggression is learned, and acquired in much the same manner as all human behavior. Such a view discerns the roots of civil strife in violent culture and in the socialization processes of political systems. Yet another strain of thought argues social strategy. Man, in trying to achieve his social and political goals, sometimes chooses aggression from among his varied alternatives. Violence, then, is seen as the continuation of peaceful conflict and politics by other means. In this view, it is a rational, utilitarian instrumentality rather than an instinctual or learned behavior or the angry response to frustration.

These hypotheses are amended by sometimes overlapping, sometimes supplemental insights. Incongruence, inconsistency or conflicts, in either the objective arrangements of social systems or in the subjective perceptions and valuations of its members, may create the impulse to violence. The mass media are also sometimes held responsible for the contagion of violence, while "'devil" theories see criminal or deviant social elements and conspiracies at the core of civil turmoil. In addition to these general propositions, a plethora of more specific explanatory factors derive from the many studies of individual revolutions and examples of turmoil. Indeed, no factor, political, social, economic or psychological seems entirely blameless. Incompetence and corruption of elites; cleverness of conspirators; desertion of intellectuals; social change, but also social stagnation; poverty, but also improvement of the social lot; pernicious ideas and revolutionary ideologies; rising expectations; a sense of injustice, discrimination and indignation; permissiveness of political regimes, but also tyranny; too little social mobility, but also too much of it: all have been cited as lying at the root of political strife. It is fair to say that, taken as a whole, current theories and generalizations regarding violence present a confusing and untidy package.

In *Why Men Rebel*, however, Gurr performs a remarkably successful synthesizing feat. He manages to join several diverse theoretical insights into a scheme that can accommodate many specific factors and reconcile their apparent contradictions. Initially, and most fundamentally, the framework is based upon the frustration-aggression hypothesis, or rather, a synonymous social concept, relative deprivation. This notion is defined as the discrepancy between those conditions of life to which people in society think they are justifiably entitled (value expectations) and those desirable social circumstances which they feel they are capable of achieving and maintaining (value capabilities). This discrepancy induces social discontent, which may lead to widespread anger, which, in turn, may be triggered into collective and political violence. Several chapters of the book deal with the societal conditions that are likely to increase value expectations and decrease value capabilities. Among these, Gurr discusses the availability of value stocks in society, the effect on social groups of differential value gains, and the problem of value opportunities.

Although the frustration-aggression insight is quite central, most schools of thought previously mentioned find some representation within Gurr's complex scheme. Thus normative and cultural conditions, as well as utilitarian determinants, receive independent treatment in at least two separate chapters. These factors are seen as crucial in politicizing and structuring discontent, guiding and triggering the actual outbursts of aggressive and violent behavior. While deprivation only gathers the violent potential, learned, normative and rational utilitarian factors facilitate or inhibit the occurrence of overt violence. In these sections, Gurr's discussion includes consideration of the cultural sanctions for violence, the role of ideologies, the past record of violence in the community, legitimacy, and the effectiveness of political systems. In addition, among the variables that inhibit or facilitate violence and determine its target, Gurr concentrates much of his attention on the important variable of the use of force and coercive control within political regimes. Similar attention is focused on the institutional support in the political community given to incumbents and insurgents by the populace. Finally, it should be pointed out that Gurr is not only interested in explaining and predicting the magnitude of political violence but in exploring three separate subcategories of civil disturbance: turmoil, which is seen as a relatively spontaneous set of behaviors with mass involvement; conspiracy, which is highly organized, but with limited participation, and internal war, which includes events of the highest degree of violence, highly organized, with high mass involvement. Riots and strikes are typical of the first form of violence; *coup d'etat* and mutiny represent the second, and civil war and revolution, the third.

The concluding chapter, and the Appendix, reveal fully the complexity and intricacy of the scheme. Some eighty hypotheses and their corollaries are enumerated and arranged in the form of causal and processual models. As already intimated, these hypotheses initially stem from psychological insights but subsequently are joined to constructs that represent other facets of man's social experience and the structures of complex social systems. Gurr is able to combine motivational psychological variables with structural sociological and political ones, forging a more lucid scheme than would otherwise be possible. The resultant theory of political violence should provide a pleasant surprise for the political scientist. It shows how much other disciplines within the social sciences can contribute to systematic theory and more complete understanding of political phenomena. Similarly, the psychologist who despairs of the ultimate usefulness of his more precise knowledge, based as it often is on studies of rats and college sophomores, may take heart on reading *Why Men Rebel*. It is not a question of whether this or that discipline can offer a more fundamental explanation, or whether there may be only one appropriate level of explanation, given the nature of the variable under analysis. Rather, psychological, motivational variables are used to identify the social circumstances, the structural and political conditions that may account for the swelling of revolutionary energy and the final specific expression of violence.

Gurr does not hesitate to use a body of theory drawn from one social science discipline to refine social theories in yet another. It is this effort at a unified social science that seems at the core of his success in theoretical reconstruction. And yet, because of this, it must be expected that some readers will take exception to the work. For example, there are scholars who are not persuaded of the wisdom of this type of synthesizing effort, and others who may regard it as premature, given the relative underdevelopment of the field. Especially, students of violence who doubt the utility of motivational explanations, and of the frustration-aggression hypothesis in particular, will dislike this emphasis in Gurr's book. In addition, theorists who are impressed by instinctual, biological explanations of violence will be disappointed; Gurr's synthesizing effort does not reach that far. And, finally, there are members of the discipline who frown upon empirical theory, whether for reasons of "radical empiricism" or "'radical normativism."

However, all critics will have to contend with this work as a model of careful scholarship, broad erudition, precision and clarity of conceptualization, and an exceptional example of mature general theory. The task which Gurr set himself in this work is more than fulfilled: ". . . to make a reasonably parsimonious synthesis of the diverse speculations and evidence about the origins, extent and forms of group violence in politics, and to do so in a way that contributes to deductive and empirical inquiry in the service of better theory" (p. 357). Undoubtedly, further deductive, as well as empirical work will be greatly facilitated by the appearance of this book. One result of reading the volume is a growing awareness of the conceptual lacunae in all theories of violence. For example, how crucial is the concept of value to the notion of frustration, defined as the discrepancy between value expectancy and value capability, and yet how scattered is this notion in the literature: in the philosophies of ethical systems, in the writings of great historians who wish to characterize the ethos of an age, in the mundane economic analysis of value, price, and utility, in socialization studies or in the hierarchies of needs suggested by psychologists. Or, again, how central the notion of anger to the topic of violence, and yet how rudimentary the social science or even the psychology of emotions.

In this process of deductive elaboration and integration, the constructs advanced by Gurr will doubtless be amended by future theorists. His model prompts further systematic theory construction and his sets of hypotheses provide an open invitation to empirical testing. For these reasons, *Why Men Rebel* will serve as a focal point in the theory of political violence, structuring and mapping the concept for future theoretical elaboration and empirical research.

IVO K. FEIERABEND

San Diego State College

One Hundred Thousand Tractors: The MTS and the Development of Controls in Soviet Agriculture. By Robert F. Miller. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 423. $12.50.)

From its inception in the 1920's until its demise in the late 1950's, the network of machine tractor stations (MTS) played a crucial role in Soviet agricultural development. Originating as a simple production institution, the MTS rapidly acquired additional functions in the area of social and political control. *One Hundred Thousand Tractors* offers a comprehensive examination of this important, but little studied institution. Professor Miller sets for himself the twin tasks of presenting the history of an important Soviet institution and using this history as a source of data and illustrations to examine the interaction of economic, political and ideological factors in the formulation and conduct of Soviet domestic policy. As a multipurpose organization with administrative and political responsibilities in production and non-production areas, the MTS offers a particularly useful vantage point for viewing this interplay of factors. In addition to this general focus, the author selects the following three specific problem areas for examination using the case of the MTS: "(1) the functions of ideology in the Soviet domestic decision-making process, (2) the principles and practices of Soviet public administration as applied to agriculture, and (3) the development of patterns of Party control in the countryside."

Roughly, the organization of the book follows this topical outline. This procedure results in some repetition since the author traces the chronological development of the MTS within each of the problem areas. After an overview of the general development of the MTS system, Part I of the book focuses on the emergence of the official theory of the MTS and its relation to other agricultural institutions. Since the MTS was not directly forecasted in Marxist agrarian theory, ideological formulations developed with the institution of the MTS. The author maintains that it was largely to justify reliance on non-economic means of control in agriculture that elaborate ideological underpinnings for the MTS were developed. Once articulated, this formulation became a mainstay of Soviet agricultural theory and tended to exert a conservative influence on further development of agricultural policy and the evaluation of existing agricultural institutions. Miller's treatment of the role of ideology in the development of MTS policy constitutes one of the most satisfying portions of the book. Recognizing the complexity of this role, he makes a convincing case for the continuing influence of ideology in decision-making, noting shifts in the relative importance of the various functions over time.

Part II examines the organization and operation of the individual stations and the position of the MTS within the system of state agricultural administration at its different stages of development. Relatedly, Part III details the changing patterns of Party involvement in the agricultural system and the MTS. In both its administrative and political aspects, the history of the MTS reflects the Soviet penchant for re-organization as a solution to substantive problems. The successive re-organization of the MTS system followed a roughly cyclical pattern which was closely related to the major phases of Soviet agricultural policy. The author identifies two basic modes of organization and operation, one which tended to prevail during crisis periods such as the collectivization drive and the war period, and another which emerged during relatively "normal" times. Under the crisis mode, the MTS was given increased responsibility for agricultural production and its position was enhanced *vis a vis* other agencies of the state agricultural bureaucracy. Such periods were generally followed by a return to a more decentralized mode of operation in which some of the MTS functions were re-allocated to other administrative agencies. A similar pattern is observed in the involvement of the Party in agriculture. In crisis periods, Party personnel attached to the MTS abandoned indirect leadership in favor of direct involvement in agricultural production. Additionally, the Party organization in the MTS was strengthened at the expense of the regular raikom organization and the MTS assumed more importance as a center for political activity and control.

The next sections of the book are devoted to an examination of the events leading to the liquidation of the MTS system and to a brief look at developments in Soviet agricultural policy in the post-MTS period. Ultimately, the decision to abolish the MTS was closely related to a shifting emphasis in values among the top political leadership. Throughout its history, the MTS was plagued by performance problems which the cycles of re-organization did little to solve. Under Stalin, this was apparently an acceptable cost for maintaining political and social control in the village. For Khrushchev, the goals of economic abundance and efficiency clearly superceded the pursuit of control of the village as an end in itself. The MTS was one of the major victims of the drive for increasing agricultural efficiency.

As a history of an institution, this book is clearly an important contribution to Soviet scholarship. As a study of domestic decision-making, it leaves something to be desired. While the author presents a wealth of information and many important insights into the agricultural policy-making process, if judged by social scientific desiderata, his work suffers on several counts. The treatment of the interplay of factors affecting the policy-making process remains largely descriptive and theoretically uninformed. Only passing reference is made to social scientific literature which is relevant to his specific problem areas.

In his conclusions, the author does attempt to construct what he terms a "'loose paradigm" to aid in understanding domestic decision-making in the Soviet Union and to suggest possible comparisons to other decision-making systems. Based on his investigation of the MTS, Miller argues that the following factors play a major part in policy formulation and implemention: (1) ideology, (2) high-level political infighting, (3) personal style of leadership, and (4) situational factors. The first three of these factors are labeled as intervening variables while the last is "the closest thing to an independent variable in the Soviet policy process." Unfortunately, no definitions of these variables are provided, nor is Miller concerned with how they are to be systematically measured. But more important, no attempt is made to specify how these variables are related to one another. While there is little question that these factors are important influences on policy-making, the significant question is how these factors interact, under what conditions, and with what outcome. Until the paradigm is tightened up enough to provide assistance in answering this question, it is of limited utility.

While there are problems with this book, the author has at least made an effort to construct and use the type of framework for analysis that has proved useful to students of comparative politics. It is encouraging to see that some scholars are taking seriously the call to integrate studies of Soviet politics into the mainstream of comparative political studies. Given the ambitious scope of the goals stated by the author, it is not surprising that he is only partially successful in realizing them. Despite its limitations, this book will be essential to individuals interested in Soviet agriculture and will be interesting to scholars with a wide range of other interests.

Anna Elizabeth Powell
Michigan State University

John Stuart Mill. By Alan Ryan. (New York: Random House, 1970. Pp. 268. $6.95.)

A revival of interest in J. S. Mill is shown by the long term project of the Toronto Press to publish his complete works, by numerous recent articles, by the ambitious intellectual history of liberal political thought, *Human Nature and History,* by R. D. Cumming, and now by Mr. Ryan's provocative short study. Not long ago most political theorists found it possible to dismiss Mill after dutiful sketches of his revision of Benthamism, his defense of liberty, his warning against simple majoritarianism, and his ideas about representative government. His general philosophy they were inclined to leave to the more specialized philosophers and the views of the philosophers were, on the whole, either condescending or highly critical of Mill's methodological system. In the light of recent emphasis among political scientists upon methodological precision, a new analysis of the problems involved in Mill's general philosophy is a particularly welcome service to political theorists as well as to logicians.

It is well known that Mill hoped to establish a science of social study that would rank in prestige with the physical sciences and to incorporate psychology and ethics into a single system with the rest. His alleged failure to do so has been treated with contempt by some—Popper and G. E. Moore, for example—and benevolent tolerance by others—Cumming and Ryan. Ryan maintains that, in spite of serious *lacunae,* Mill had a consistent general theory which has been misunderstood and distorted by his critics—Anschutz and Popper, for example. Ryan sets out to explain exactly what that theory was, not primarily to criticize it; but, before he goes far, he is deep in criticism as well as explication.

The goal of Mill's philosophy, which Ryan calls "inductivism," was, he explains, to establish "a correct theory of scientific explanation, human action, and social science in order to provide the basis of a rational ethics." The route to that goal was through induction, that is, as Mill often repeated, "the operation of discovering and proving general propositions." "For a general truth is but an aggregate of particular truths; a comprehensive expression, by which an indefinite number of individual facts are affirmed or denied at once." The operation involves, not merely a matter of naming or recording, but also a process of inference. Ryan accepts Mill's claim that he was a thoroughgoing empiricist in his insistence that scientific explanation must be built from particular empirical facts and this, he points out, involved a reductionist atomistic drive. But, denying that Mill could properly be labelled a deductionist, he finds him to be a rationalist in his admiration of system and in his emphasis upon deductive relations among the laws of explanatory systems.

It is clear that Mill's object was not merely to create a science of society as part of his general philosophy and to refute the claims of the intuitionists, but also to contribute thereby to the rational development of society by rational social policies. The problems raised by his attempt to fit social science and morality into his general system occupy a large part of Ryan's book. Ryan's thesis is that "Mill's conception of what it is to be rational, holds together his account of the philosophy of science, the philosophy of the social sciences, and his justification of utilitarian ethics." But he finds serious flaws in some of Mill's central arguments.

Running through much of Mill's discussion of correct methodology was the conflict between his determination to find unalterable natural laws of social change and his concern to direct social change—of how to preserve human freedom of choice and moral responsibility in a deterministic universe. Mill argued that, whereas men's actions are determined, they are determined by his character and, contrary to Robert Owen, that one is capable of making his own character. Thus the demands of science and of freedom of choice and moral responsibility were reconciled. Quite aside from the philosophical debate over determinism, Ryan finds Mill's case a weak one and the weakness he traces to Mill's logical atomism when applied to individual psychology and to sociology. Mill explained further that morality, though heavily dependent upon the science of human nature, is an art rather than a science. Evaluative judgments should be construed as rules or precepts deduced from ultimate principles, not as factual statements. Although ultimate principles in morality cannot be proved, rational arguments for the utilitarian principle can be produced without moving outside the limits of empiricism and Mill was prepared to produce them. Denying that Mill was guilty of the naturalistic fallacy, Ryan finds his view of rationality in ethics "plausible and attractive" but incorrect. Mill, says Ryan, was not in fact dealing here with an empirical problem but appealing to logical reasoning.

The general problem of Mill's defense of utilitarian ethics appears sharply in Mill's consideration of justice which Ryan maintains is "a principal independent of and in some ways opposed to that of maximizing general happiness." Mill's failure to resolve the problem of conflicts between justice and utility Ryan relates to the atomism of Mill's philosophy and ultimately to his false analogy between "the logical structure of the natural sciences and the art of morality."

Ryan's last chapter correcting misinterpretation of the essay *On Liberty* by Lord Devlin and numerous predecessors should no longer be necessary. There Ryan properly explains that Mill's concern was not about the enforcement of morals and the limits of political action but about the curtailment of individual liberty, whether by law or opinion and that, aside from compulsion where unwarranted, Mill was quite willing to advocate other means of deterrence, such as persuasion, advice, warning of the consequences of actions. Ryan states Mill's position very well; but an attentive reader of the essay should have gotten the point independently, whether Lord Devlin did or not.

Although much that appears in the book is familiar, Ryan's emphasis upon Mill's basic consistency makes the total picture that emerges refreshingly suggestive and stimulating. The book may not greatly interest those who, saying they have no system, are, in Mill's words, "almost always in the grip of unexamined prejudices." But the careful and lively analysis should force more serious consideration of Mill upon those political theorists who are accustomed to dismiss him too readily on grounds of his methodology. It would perhaps have made the book more immediately relevant for political scientists, had Ryan pointed out specifically the bearing of his analysis upon contemporary problems of methodology in politics, as in passing he sometimes does. But that was not his purpose and he has accomplished admirably what he set out to do.

JOHN D. LEWIS

Oberlin College

French Socialists in Search of a Role, 1956–1967. By Harvey G. Simmons. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 313. $9.75.)

There is a fundamental axiom in the traditional folklore of French political life which holds that parties are born on the Left and die on the Right. In many ways, the rise and decline of the French Socialist Party (SFIO-*Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière*) bears witness to this traditional image. Writing in 1932, Emmanuel Berl in his *La Politique et les partis* had listed the SFIO under the section dealing with "revolutionary parties." However, after a disruptive two decade interlude of war, occupation, resistence, civil disorder, constitutional changes and socio-political reconstruction, the SFIO lost its revolutionary *élan*, and slipped into political stagnation and conservatism. The SFIO, as well as the non-Communist Left in general, had failed to offer France either fresh imaginative leadership or a viable alternative program of government suitable to the needs of newly emergent socio-political forces not mortgaged to past battles or ideologies. To many Frenchmen, the Socialists seemed hopelessly out of date in a time of rapid change and political innovation.

The French Socialist dilemma extends back well beyond the postwar years considered by Mr. Simmons. Born in 1905 as the result of a marriage between two disparate currents of the French Left—the liberal humanitarianism of Jean Jaures and the Marxist socialism of Jules Guesde—the formation of a united Socialist Party constituted an important benchmark in the political history of modern France. In ideological terms, it represented the triumph of scientific socialism over the more traditional utopian schemes of Saint-Simon and others. In a functional sense, it also fulfilled an aggregative need in arresting—temporarily at least—the characteristic propensity of the French Left toward fragmentation and division.

The initial union had been an extremely fragile one, and was never fully consummated on the ideological plane. In reality, the two strands of political thought remained in a tenuous equilibrium as separate ideological domains within the institutional confines of a single party organization. The persistence of these ideological factions nourished centrifugal tendencies in the face of political impasse, and had the effect of imparting a schizophrenic posture to the French Socialist Party with respect to major political, social and economic issues. The result was political ambivalence.

The success of the Bolsheviks in Russia and the subsequent hiving off of the French Communist faction in 1920, left the intransigent Socialists at a severe doctrinal and organizational disadvantage. With the Communists successfully coopting the revolutionary heritage and ideals of the French Left, the Socialists almost by default found themselves committed to the peaceful and legal transformation of existing capitalist society. Faced with a doctrinal crisis of identity and lacking legitimacy as the true voice of the French Left, the Socialists have floundered ever since in the ideological vacuum of "reformism."

Mr. Simmons joins the Socialist odyssey in search of a role with the year 1956, and the coming to power in France of a Socialist-led government. Similar to the ill fated Popular Front of twenty years before, the coming to power of a Left government occurred at a most unpropitious moment. It seems almost ironic that each time the French Left has approached political success, in either the parliamentary or electoral arenas, the sheer complexity of domestic or international problems operated to paralyze and frustrate the Left's freedom of action. In virtually every case, ideology and principles were forced to give way to political reality and expediency, which in turn further exacerbated intraparty differences.

In chronological fashion, Simmons proceeds to examine the pattern of Socialist promise and response in selected issue areas, their parliamentary and electoral performance, and the interactive effects of these experiences on the organizational structure and intraparty life of the SFIO. In this respect, Simmons has produced an extremely lucid and readable overview of the French Socialists' dilemma.

There are, however, several disappointing aspects to this work which limit its utility in explaining the contemporary political dynamics of the SFIO. First, other than a vague notion of "role-searching," there is little in the way of a unifying analytical framework which might have linked the behavioral and policy variables under consideration to other levels of French political life. The Socialist dilemma is merely one segment of the dialectical struggle for Left-wing unity in France. Yet the issue of Left-wing unity itself, especially under the Fifth Republic, cannot be treated independently of the dynamics of the French party system in general, and the structure and functioning of the party subsystem within the larger polity. Recent pressures for a simplified party system in France which impinged directly upon the behavior of the SFIO and other Left groups did not occur in a vacuum, but were largely an outgrowth of changes in the wider socio-political environment. We are left with no integrating analytical vehicle that would enable us to piece together all of these complex interrelationships.

Second, by focusing almost exclusively on the level of party elite, Simmons does not fully elucidate the nature and importance of elite-mass linkages in France and their relation to the behavior of the SFIO. Party politics in France cannot be understood solely as an elite phenomenon. In many ways, the elites are forced to operate within a circumscribed set of electoral and institutional parameters. Electoral behavior is discussed largely in the form of passing commentary, despite the fact that one important aspect of the SFIO dilemma has been the changing nature of the French electorate and the emergence of new sociopolitical forces. The tables in the Appendices (pp. 270–75) listing the characteristics of the French voting population by partisan preference in 1956, 1958 and 1962 merely whet one's appetite for a more thorough analysis of their relevance to the contemporary predicament of the SFIO.

Superficially, with respect to elite styles and programmatic posture, the difficulties facing the French Socialist Party appear to be symbolic of those facing all European Socialist parties. However, there are important cross-polity variations in party behavior which can only be explained through a more rigorous intrasystemic analysis which would interrelate several levels of data within each polity. For example, Vittorio Capecchi and his associates in *Il Comportamento Elettorale in Italia* (1968) have observed that, contrary to France, the Italian Socialist Left has been positively influenced by the development of a modern industrial society.

The Italian Socialists have been able to attract electorally the more dynamic stratum of the newly emergent societal forces. In the case of France, a simple examination of the geographical spread of the SFIO indicates that it has gradually receded from the more dynamic urban/industrial centers of the less developed, sparsely populated regions. Having lost the support of the majority of the French working classes, it has attracted the support of marginal groups largely interested in the defence of the *status quo*.

Finally, there is the question of data. While one valuable asset to Mr. Simmons' work is his extensive coverage of the internal files and documents of the SFIO, selected interviews with French political elites appear to have been unstructured and only occasionally cited throughout the text. We are left with no comparable or equivalent instrument for assessing patterns of elite perceptions in a variety of political domains, and thus forced to draw our own inferences from their public utterances. A more systematic interview structure would have greatly improved our understanding of the perceived salient dimensions of the French political universe on the part of the party elites, and their relationship to role options open to the SFIO.

The tables listed in the appendices provide an interesting, but limited, profile of the SFIO elite in terms of background variables and career experiences. A more fruitful approach would have been to construct a series of tables based upon cross-tabulations of these variables, and then to integrate the results directly into the text.

These shortcomings in data and analysis do not detract seriously from the positive qualities of Simmons' overall effort. They merely reflect the criticisms of one who has studied French political dynamics from another vantage point. We are only now beginning to see the accumulation of a body of sophisticated and analytically rigorous literature in English on the nature of party life in France. I would consider Mr. Simmons' work as a positive contribution to this effort.

VINCENT E. MCHALE
University of Pennsylvania

Organizational Change: The Political Economy of the YMCA. By Mayer N. Zald. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970. Pp. 260. $11.50.)

Most studies of organizational change have been set in a psychological-sociological framework and have focused attention on the individual as the unit of analysis ignoring the larger unit of the organization. For example, psychological studies of organizational change have investigated the relationships between staff and management, morale and productivity, personality structures and leadership traits, incentives and satisfaction and so forth through a maze of dyads of dependent and independent variables. When these studies use technological change as an independent variable, they generally ignore changes in larger organizational structure and focus on micro-system components. This same criticism can be brought against the industrial-sociological approach to the study of organizational change. For instance the investigations of Barnard, Gouldner, and Blau, to mention only three, have narrowly focused on internal structures providing scant attention to external and environmental pressures for total structural change. In brief, both psychological and sociological analyses (as well as historical studies) of organizational change are inappropriate for the analysis of the organization as a collective identity with systemic properties.

After reviewing these and other shortcomings of the psychological and sociological approaches to understanding the organization as an entity, Mayer Zald, in *Organizational Change: The Political Economy of the YMCA*, chooses to develop a general and comparative framework of the political economy of an organization as a tool for the comparative study of change. The framework is the product of an inductive analysis of the YMCA as an international organization and the Chicago Association as a part of it. The intellectual foundations of the framework are derived largely from recent advances in political science and economic theory. The concepts of the polity are drawn from the so-called structural-functionalists and general systems analysts in political science. The critical economic concepts are in the spirit of recent exchange theories as developed by Buchanan and Tullock, Curry and Wade, Dahl and Lindblom, William Mitchell, and Louis Pondy.

In addition to the overriding organizational *ethos*, the direction, scope and acceptance of organizational change can be explained in terms of the interrelationships of four economic structures and five political structures of the organization. Analyzing the economy of the YMCA, Zald asserts that the structures and resulting processes involving the differentiation of labor, technologies, incentive systems and the mechanisms for the internal allocation of resources and costs available to the organization, are predictive of the level of change and level of conflict caused by change. This economy, he finds, is directly interrelated to the organization's polity, especially as its constitution, its demand aggregation processes, its power structure and internal alliances constrain and limit change.

The product of this investigation of the YMCA is a hypothetical-deductive model that produces a series of interlinking or axiomatic hypotheses for future comparative analysis. The hypotheses may be logically ordered by those relating the organizational economy to internal and external change and those relating the organizational polity to internal and external change. Only a sampling from the wealth of propositions generated by the study is presented here:

Propositions relating the organization's economy to organizational change:

1. When an organization uses several types of incentives (solidarity, material, and purposive) to attract and hold member commitment, the *amount* and *balance* (sic) of incentives offered for each organizational segment and each member's relative gratification or deprivation contributes to the conflict level for that segment.
2. A large scale organization offering material incentives (salaries and security competitive with the external market) has a greater hold over its members than an organization based on solidarity and purposive incentives.
3. Material incentives submerge conflict because individuals are exchanging compliance for money and fringe benefits.
4. Organizations having different incentive bases also create a differential set of "comparison levels for alternatives" for their members.

The polity of the organization relates to organizational change in the following ways:

1. The same issues may differentially threaten an organization's constituting principles.
2. The lack of exclusiveness of membership (a constitutional constraint) permits organizations to expand client services and products.
3. Demands for change develop within specific organizational sectors and not necessarily with organizational elites.
4. The politics of scarcity almost always involves a zero-sum game in which one person's or group's gain is another's loss.
5. The politics of abundance resembles non-zero-sum games where cooperative strategies rule.

Again, these are but a sampling, and an inadequate one at that, to reflect the value of Zald's theoretical model.

No single review or single set of superlatives can do justice to Zald's *Organizational Change: The Political Economy of the YMCA;* nor can they do justice to its contribution to research and teaching in the fields of organizational behavior and comparative politics. The book is a requisite for all academic courses in these two fields as well as courses in general systems analysis. The book's contribution to political science must rank with that made by March and Simon, Almond and Coleman, Dahl and Lindblom, Lasswell and Kaplan, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, to name only a few of the outstanding contributors to our profession. However, Zald stands on his own. This reviewer has been a long time admirer of his early works on welfare organizations, organizational decentralization, and professionalism. It is clear that *Organizational Change* is the result of a long and disciplined process of intellectual development.

RAY E. JOHNSTON

Wayne State University

BOOK NOTES

Political Theory, History of Political Thought, and Methodology

Bentham, Of Laws in General. MICHAEL BARKUN.

Grunsky and Miller, editors, The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies. PHILIP S. KRONENBERG.

Oppenheim. Moral Principles in Political Philosophy. ALAN WERTHEIMER.

Wheeler, Democracy in a Revolutionary Era: The Political Order Today. CURRIN V. SHIELDS.

Of Laws in General. By Jeremy Bentham, Edited by H. L. A. Hart. (London: The Athlone Press, 1970. Pp. 342. $——.)

There may seem scant justification in reviewing a work completed in 1782. However, a brief look at its publishing history indicates that we are dealing, as it happens, with virtually a new work. Jeremy Bentham left this work in substantially complete but unpublished form at his death. It remained in manuscript, along with the other Bentham papers at University College, London, until 1939. At that time, Charles Warren Everett unearthed it and his edition of the work, the first publication, appeared in 1945 as *The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined*. It now emerges once more as *Of Laws in General*, distinguished in its second incarnation by the editorial hand of the most eminent contemporary jurisprudential scholar, H. L. A. Hart.

The work itself turns out to be a curious amalgam of daring, innovative suggestions and sterile, endlessly multiplied typologies. In his efforts to grasp the complete character of legislation, Bentham spun out extraordinarily complex classificatory schemes. While they produce the appearance of logical completeness, in the end the excessive division and subdivision of the subject matter only increases the complexity of the problem without offering anything by way of explanation. Bentham's aim was to provide an understanding of the contents of systems of legal rules, in order finally to grasp the relationship between civil and penal law. For all the flashes of insight, there is finally an aridity to his approach through typologizing, and it is well to recognize that in this regard contemporary social science was neither the first nor the worst offender.

What then commends such a work to us after one-hundred and eighty-eight years? First, there is a sensitivity to language as a determinant in human behavior, which only now is beginning to reappear. With all of the subsequent effort, including notably Hart's own, a full understanding of the link between language and action still lies ahead of us. Second, Bentham perceived the artificiality of the distinction so commonly made between "civil" and "criminal" (what he called "penal"), so long as one begins from a coercive base. The premise may be questioned but once accepted the union of civil and penal follows. Political scientists, so often concerned with criminal justice but so little interested private law, would do well to meditate on Bentham. Finally, Bentham cannot resist yet another attack on legal fictions. His attack must be read in the context of his commitment to law reform, yet even outside that framework it is well to be reminded of the psychological hold that concepts exert once we have granted some "objective" reality to them. Many of those to which Bentham gives special attention—including "power," "obligation," and "liberty"—are hardly less reified today than they were when he wrote.

A word remains to be said concerning Professor Hart's contribution, and it must, unfortunately, be a negative one. The copious editorial notes deal exclusively with the ordering of the text and the clarification of points which might have been clear to Bentham's intended audience but are obscure today. I have no desire to minimize the labor involved either in these annotations or in Professor Hart's grapplings with the original manuscript itself. We can with reasonable confidence assume that his text conforms with Bentham's intentions, to the extent that they can now be known. What we might have expected in addition, however, is a special kind of insight into the meaning and significance of the work. That is a contribution that transcends questions of the ordering of paragraphs and that Hart is pre-eminantly qualified to make. Why he chose not to provide such an interpretive gloss, and construed his editorial mandate in the narrowest of terms, goes unexplained; whatever the explanation, the omission is to be regretted.—MICHAEL BARKUN, *Syracuse University*

The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies. Edited by Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller. (New York: The Free Press, 1970. Pp. 592. $11.95.)

Any collection of reprints (only two selections were prepared especially for this volume) from a major body of literature which bears the subtitle "Basic Studies" is an exercise in editorial courage. Oscar Grusky and George Miller have acquitted themselves well in this particular combat. They have crafted a volume of selections from the literature on organizations which reflects the development of important conceptualization and suggests the state-of-the-art of empirical inquiry in this field.

The volume is organized into five parts which comprehend theory, method, a series of substantive topics, and several examples of cross-national research. Part One, "Classical Theoretical Perspectives," is intended to introduce the reader to the work of a group of scholars who the editors identify as "classical theorists" of the sociology of organizations. Predictably, this section opens with several key extracts from the writings of Max Weber on bureaucracy. The section also includes excerpts from important works by Michels, Frederick W. Taylor, Roethlisberger and Dickson, Barnard, and Parsons. Part Two, "Current Theoretical Perspectives," consists of five selections representing different perspectives or types of theory which enjoy some acceptance among contemporary students of organizational sociology (functional, decision-making, compliance, exchange, and open-systems theory). Part Three, "Methods of Study," is an effort to sample a range of techniques used to study organizations by drawing upon research selections which illustrate these techniques. The methods or issues of technique treated in this section are: participant observation, generalization from single cases, comparative research within a single culture, experimental technique, and cross-cultural research. Part Four, "Selected Substantive Problems," consumes over half of the pages in the book. Selections are organized around six problems of organizational research (organizational goals, formal structure, organizational control, informal adaptations, succession and mobility, and professionalization and commitment) which were chosen on the basis of two criteria: the implications of the problems for the behavior of all organizations and familiarity of the editors with the research literature in these problem areas. The editors attempted to draw their selections from recent studies—they range from 1954 to 1968, although the majority were published in the mid-1960s—and to reflect a shift from problems concerning structure to those involving social process. Part Five, "Organizations in Other Industrial Societies," endeavors to demonstrate the application of the comparative approach to crossnational research by presenting studies of organizations in the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan. The editors intended to emphasize "the importance of cultural differences for organizational structure and functioning" (p. 527) by selecting studies of highly industrialized nations. They point out in their introductory comments in Part Five that cross-cultural analysis, like comparative research on organizations in single societies, serves to contribute to the quest for universal propositions.

The selections in the volume are generally of high quality. But Grusky and Miller could have done several things to improve the book which would have distinguished it from the other quality readers presently found on the market. First, they assert in the Preface a commitment to present a "uniquely sociological orientation" in the volume. Yet one does not find any attempt by the editors to conceptualize this *unique* orientation for the reader. Instead, the reader is forced to rely on his own crude content analysis of the selections included by Grusky and Miller in order to infer what the editors mean by a "uniquely sociological orientation." The results of my own content analysis suggest that the editors are unable to provide a uniquely sociological orientation. The selections by March and Simon, Brewer, and Day and Hamblin, among others in the volume, are clearly social-psychological in their orientation. To include an excerpt by March and Simon, for example, is clearly justifiable because of the contribution of their book *Organizations* to theorizing about complex organizations. But their orientation is not sociological and cannot be made so even if one wishes to assume the expedient that "sociology is what sociologists do!" (No one has ever accused Herbert Simon of being a sociologist.) My disappointment with the failure of the editors to deliver on their promised orientation was further increased by their glaring omission of the theoretical work of James D. Thompson. Thompson comes closer to a sociological orientation than any organization theorist I could name. His focus is on the whole organization; he minimizes psychological and social-psychological factors and emphasizes the patterned interactions among organizational roles and among groups as well as the exchange patterns between organization and environment. Yet Grusky and Miller did not choose to draw upon his contributions to the sociology of organizations.

A second criticism of the volume is its exclusion of studies of interorganizational behavior. This area is on the leading edge of inquiry about organizations and the more important contributions there have come from sociologists. But the editors chose to ignore this emerging facet of organization theory with no justification. They state somewhat glibly that "sociologists may very well fault us for failing to stress such important problem-areas. . . ." (p. x) This is a surprising gap in a collection of "basic" studies. Third, the volume would have been improved by a comprehensive bibliography. A volume of basic studies can only sample the quality literature of a field. A selected bibliography of additional sources pertaining to each section of the volume would have been an aid to students. This is especially important due to the rather limited introductions which the editors provide at the beginning of each of the five sections of the book. A bibliography would give students a more firm basis for locating the selections used in the volume in the larger body of literature on organizations.

This is a good collection in spite of these weak areas. Most of the major works in organization theory have been sampled and the editors' policy of reprinting long, unified excerpts from these works will certainly benefit student learning. Students of Political Science and Public Administration will find much of interest in the sections on theoretical perspectives and method together with the excerpts from Lipset, *et. al.*; Peabody, Little, Goffman, Grusky, Bendix, and Crozier.—PHILIP S. KRONENBERG, *Indiana University*

Moral Principles in Political Philosophy. By Felix E. Oppenheim, (New York: Random House, 225 pages, $2.25.)

This book does not suffer from a lack of focus or direction. Felix Oppenheim is a philosopher schooled in the tradition of the logical positivist approach to ethics, and wishes to apply the tools of analytic philosophy to a basic problem of political philosophy—the possibility of demonstrating that moral principles are "true" or "objective." Oppenheim is not particularly concerned with what the philosophers "really meant," but with the adequacy of their philosophical assumptions. In the course of a whirlwind tour through the works of more than twenty political philosophers in what Stanley Hoffman might call a "wrecking operation," Oppenheim argues that most of them make an important philosophical mistake in assuming that it is possible to show that moral principles are true. The general approach of this book is quite refreshing. It is all too rare that political philosophies are examined from such a systematic, rigorous, and analytical perspective.

The structure of the argument is clear and tight. Oppenheim distinguishes political ethics, which is concerned with providing moral principles or politics, from political philosophy, which is concerned only with the philosophical status of those moral principles. In Oppenheim's terminology, political ethics is to political philosophy what ethics is to metaethics. This, then, is clearly a work in political philosophy. Oppenheim then states that there are only two philosophical positions that one can adopt with regard to moral principles in politics: value-cognitivism and value-noncognitivism. Value-cognitivism asserts that moral principles can be "known," that they are in some sense "objective," that they can be either true or false. Value-noncognitivism asserts that moral principles are only subjective expressions, that they do not assert anything, that they cannot be either true or false. Throughout most of the book Oppenheim examines cognitivist philosophies from a noncognitivist perspective. Cognitivists are further classified as being either "intuitionists" (moral principles are known to be true through intuition or reason) or "naturalists" (the truth of moral principles can be empirically demonstrated). This part of the book demonstrates two points: that it is possible to arrive at quite different moral principles from identical metaethical assumptions, and that both naturalists and intuitionists commit a philosophical mistake. The final chapter is designed to elucidate what Oppenheim takes to be the philosophically correct position of value-noncognitivism and defends it against some common criticisms. The argument is always clear and never loses sight of its principal concern.

Yet the argument is disappointing because it begs the crucial question. Early in the book, Oppenheim says that he is interested in "whether and how ethical principles can be justified . . ." (p. 8). The problem of justification which at this point is stated in rather open terms is soon restated more specifically: "Is the adoption of any given moral principle an expression of subjective commitment, or can such principles, or their denial, be shown to be objectively true . . . ?" (pp. 18–19). This question which serves as the framework of the entire argument automatically precludes any other understanding of the philosophical status of moral principles. Why is it not possible that moral principles have a completely different status from the two interpretations suggested? Oppenheim does not consider that matter because the very question which serves as the framework of the argument assumes the noncognitivist position to be true. Noncognitivists would assert that moral statements "do not have the function of conveying information about matters of fact; they serve a different purpose, namely that of *expressing* valuational and normative attitudes" (p. 24). Noncognitivism assumes that if a statement cannot be empirically tested (and if it is not analytic or tautological), then it must be a subjective expression. But the crucial point is that this is a philosophical position which requires a philosophical justification. And Oppenheim just does not provide that justification. If we accept Oppenheim's dichotomy as circumscribing the entire problem we are forced to agree with his conclusion that noncognitivism is the more satisfactory position. But there is no reason to accept his framework as conclusive. There is no reason to accept Oppenheim's assertion that if cognitivism is false (with which I agree) "then its denial, noncognitivism must be true" (p. 167). By assuming that noncognitivist position from the beginning, Oppenheim has begged the most crucial question. I would argue that the dichotomy which he presents neither obviously nor self-evidently exhausts the perspectives that could be adopted.

Oppenheim's inability to allow for any other perspective is evidenced most clearly in his analysis of H. L. A. Hart's *The Concept of Law.* It is Hart's concern to demonstrate that if we accept certain assumptions about human behavior, it is possible to show that "given survival as an aim, law and morals should include a specific content" (*Concept of Law*, p. 189). Hart does not argue that we must accept these moral principles as "objectively true," he does not commit the "naturalistic fallacy," and he does not try to derive an "ought" from an "is." Rather, Hart attempts to show that the entire structure of moral thought and language makes no sense without certain moral principles, without "the minimum content of natural law." The soundness of Hart's position is not at issue. What is at issue is Oppenheim's interpretation. Since Oppenheim acknowledges that Hart is a competent philosopher, I would think that he should assume that Hart would not lightly commit a basic philosophical mistake, that he would not assert that "a norm can in some way be derived from a fact," without elaborate justification (p. 106). I would think that Oppenheim would assume that if Hart seems to commit a mistake, perhaps he is misreading Hart's intention. But that is precisely what Oppenheim does not do. Oppenheim argues that Hart, along with many others, falls into the "naturalistic" trap. The adoption of his dichotomy blinds Oppenheim (and anyone else, I assume) to other philosophical approaches to the problems of moral philosophy.

The logical positivist critique of moral philosophy has always been closely linked with the behavioral movement in political science. An entire discipline has generally accepted the unobjectionable claim that a science of polititics must deal with empirically testable statements along with the more doubtful claim that moral statements are merely subjective expressions. Oppenheim is probably correct when he says that "noncognitivism is the assumption underlying most modern writings dealing with empirical political research. It is also the dominant view among political theorists" (p. 166). That is what is most disturbing. Modern philosophy has not ended with logical positivism, nor has metaethics ended with noncognitivism. It would be short-sighted and downright stupid to assume that this basic problem of political philosophy has been solved and that it needs no further attention. If the argument of this book were accepted as conclusive it would follow that we could all close our eyes when it is imperative that we keep them open.—Alan Wertheimer, *University of Vermont*

Democracy in a Revolutionary Era: The Political Order Today. By Harvey Wheeler. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 224. $5.95.)

Harvey Wheeler's thesis is that "The world and all its parts are now in the same universe of political conflict. The problem that remains is to discover how this world political community can find its identity, then concentrate upon its areas of agreement, and finally produce its implicit social contract." "The institution of world order is the only practical . . . political solution to world problems." That proposition, he says, is "demonstrably self-evident." Pope John XXIII's *Pacem in Terris* provides a viable agenda for discussions of world order. The problem is to project "the principles of civic order" to a world scale embracing numerous political entities. This requires the invention of a "new kind of ideological federalism."

What about "democracy in a revolutionary era"? The era is the period of the disintegration of the nation state and the emergence of world order—the past several centuries, apparently. Which is a bit confusing, since more new nation states have emerged in the past thirty years than in the past three centuries. But what he means is that the old nation states are undergoing a process of internal change as they respond and adjust to the challenge of "world order." Presumably the new nation states will in time as they develop undergo the same process of change. What is revolutionary about this era is political change, rapid and profound, brought about by crisis resulting from industrialization, cultural development, and modernization.

Now, "democracy." Democracy in the modern world is inevitable. It is also desirable—that "requires no argument." During the "revolutionary era" despotism has gradually been replaced by middle-class oligarchical rule—rule of the many by a few—which in turn has gradually given way to more democratic order. At least democracy has furnished the rhetoric of politics, even though authoritarianism has furnished much of the content. Imperialism too has faded away, as despotism has been replaced by democracy.

Democracy has an "inner logic." "There are three basic elements. One is scientific, one organizational, and one philosophical." The scientific element is that no alternative to democracy can be substantiated. The organizational element is that a "freewill democratic system is simply more efficient for complex, highly integrated operations." The philosophical element is recognition that "all members of the society are of equal value and must be accorded their rightful role in the political process through which collective values are established." In sum, political development means democratization.

Such is the terrain Harvey Wheeler seeks to chart. He ranges widely: from the War of the Roses to the Watts Riots, from *Pravda* to Plato, Aristotle to Marx, Nasser to Machiavelli and back to James Madison, President Eisenhower, and De Gaulle. The approach is cultural-historical. The style is impressionistic and speculative. The tone is Toynbee-esque.

To explicate his thesis Wheeler traverses some well-trodden ground: authoritarianism, the origins of Liberalism, the problems of bureaucracy, the scientific revolution, science and politics, political ecology, ideology and class, cultural transformation, balance of power, the bipolar world, the military mode, the satellite system. About these and other subjects he offers some wise observations and provocative generalizations. The book reveals a fine mind at work. The author has read widely and thoughtfully; he has pondered the ideas which have emerged in the growth of civilization in the West. This is a most civilized book authored by a scholarly thinker.

It is this quality that gives the book a disturbing sense of unreality in a world of human animals. Wheeler is every bit a political thinker. But politics is not only a realm of thought; it is also an arena of practice. Politics is a sophisticated art to practice. Political community is a human creation. Political relations are tenuous and undulating. Political authority is a rather subtle relationship between ruler and ruled. Political order is a never-ending, restless, tentative reaffirmation of commitment to the shared values of a community. A political system is a fragile and delicate human creation. A democratic political system is the most fragile and delicate of all because it depends on the good will, public spirit, and self-discipline of the many rather than a few.

Wheeler believes that a democratic system is the most precious of human creations and the best means of political order. I agree. But in our world an act of faith—belief in the desirability of democracy—is not enough to maintain political order. Hitler and Ho Chi Minh had different political values, as do the radical militants who dynamite research facilities, assassinate judges, murder policemen with sniper fire, fire-bomb classrooms, kill kidnapped diplomats with ice-picks, and burn banks.

A political system is an alternative to anarchy; war and violence are testimony to political breakdown. But politics is a *means* by which persons who value order *can* live together, resolve conflicts without blood-letting and affirm common purposes by consensus. Some people in this world, including persons in this country, Aristotle notwithstanding, are more animal than political. They value certain ends more than political means. They are willing to use any means, non-political violence as well as political processes, to attain their ends. For those of us engaged in the arena of political practice, making the system work has the highest priority. And these are times when any day anarchy may be just around the corner.

This is not to say that Wheeler has not written a fine book—he has indeed. It is to say that his book is lacking in relevance to practices in "the political order today."—CURRIN V. SHIELDS, *University of Arizona*

American Government and Politics

Breckenridge, The Right to Privacy. LOIS MORELAND.
Claude, The Supreme Court and the Electoral Process. PETER FISH.
Donovan, Militarism, USA. MORRIS JANOWITZ.
Gerwin, Budgeting Public Funds: The Decision Process in an Urban School District. RUFUS BROWNING.
Goodwin, The Little Legislature: Committees of Congress. JOHN MANLEY.
Graham, Everyman's Constitution. Historical Essays on the Fourteenth Amendment, the "Conspiracy Theory," and American Constitutionalism. STEPHEN B. WOOD.
Hennessy, Political Internships: Theory, Practice, Evaluation. JAMES T. MURPHY.
Ruchelman, Political Careers: Recruitment Through the Legislature. SAMUEL C. PATTERSON.

The Right to Privacy. Adam Carlyle Breckenridge. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970. Pp. 152. $5.75.)

How much privacy can an individual enjoy in a country where there is increasing fear of widespread dissemination of drugs and narcotics among the young; where population congestion in cities and centuries' old oppression of the nation's black citizens leads to open rebellion; where the incidence of crime moves ahead at unprecedented speed; where computer technology makes it possible for hitherto inaccessible individual personal data to be distributed to multiple sources without that person's consent or knowledge? What is the law of the right to privacy

Adam Carlyle Breckenridge attempted to bring some understanding to the issue when he reiterated the problem in his book, *The Right to Privacy.* In his own words about his purpose, he said, "The primary object is to present the views of judges in particular instances as a means of showing judicial attitudes toward privacy as a right and how and why and to what extent, it is to be protected against governmental invasion or intrusion."

His book of one hundred and fifty-two pages was divided into five chapters and an appendix which he included because it "has been the source and reference for many court decisions and opinions about a right to privacy." The book reads easily and is clearly written. Evidence of his scholarship is found in the abundance of footnote references and documentation. These things and the compilation of numerous courts' decisions are highly commendable.

Perhaps it is because the author was attempting to produce only a factual account of what the courts have said about the right to privacy that this reviewer feels the book leaves something to be desired. The author stated at the beginning that he was biased in favor of individual rights vis à vis the interests of the community. His bias was not very apparent. What the book lacked was the author's analysis of the courts' disposition of cases. What he showed were judges' attitudes toward the right of privacy as stated in his purpose. But he did not, in this reviewer's estimation, explain the how and why of the attitudes, which he also purported to do. The scholar's role need not be limited merely to the replay of historical fact. He must state his reasons for arriving at his particular conclusions, giving critical analysis when necessary.

What is the source of the right, if it is, indeed, a right, to privacy? The author said it was not recognized in the common law. It was not considered a right in the courts of this country, he said, until just before the twentieth century. There still is controversy about the source of the right. However, Professor Breckenridge did not attempt to argue this important question. Nor did he attempt to rebut Mr. Justice Black's dissent in *Griswold v. Connecticut,* 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a case to which the author alludes frequently and seems to rely heavily on for future protection of the right to privacy.

It was in the concluding chapter where the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act is discussed, that the reviewer expected to find Professor Breckenridge's clear, reasoned, statement on the right to privacy and its relationship to issues and social problems of the 1970's and the future. It was not there. Throughout the book he had alluded to the need to balance the rights of individuals against the community. He had posed the problem. He had quoted the courts. He had not argued about why the court should or should not have disposed of the cases as it had. That intellectual endeavor would have stimulated the reader's analysis of the cases. It also would have helped the reader to remember why it was necessary to read about so many cases.

As the country emerged from an agrarian to and industrial-commercial economy, as sheer population increase changed the ecology of the universe, values also had to change. Perhaps the erstwhile civil libertarian view of protecting the individual's rights against government and society should be viewed from a different perspective in the 1970's. For example, it was the individual's right to private property which prohibited black Americans as a group from using the facilities of most of the nation's hotels, restaurants, theatres, and other places of public accommodation. It was only six years ago that this morally destructive practice was prohibited. There is a great possibility that an analysis of the right to privacy as it relates to the social, economic, political and religious issues of the 1970's and future decades will reveal that there exists a cultural lag in our view of protecting the rights of individuals first and foremost and groups or society secondarily. Finally, it must be emphasized that one's personal life should not be the subject of inquiry. Only those activities which affect the larger society should be probed.—Louis B. Moreland, *Spelman College*

The Supreme Court and the Electoral Process. By Richard Claude. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. Pp. 296. $10.00.)

Edward S. Corwin observed that "constitutional law has always a central interest to guard." In recent decades the Supreme Court has made clear that the central interest meriting judicial protection is a broad category of political rights. Preeminent among these rights are those associated with the electoral process. They are, the Court said long ago, "preservative of all rights." Time and again, the justices have been called upon to provide remedies for clogged political channels. Not the least of the obstructions have appeared in the form of voting discrimination, restrictions, and frauds, as well as in that of malapportioned election districts. It is to these elements of the electoral process that Claude addresses himself in this book. Beyond the scope of his study are the panorama of political rights, particularly those set forth in the First Amendment, which lie at the foundation of informed and effective political action. "A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government," noted Madison in Federalist No. 51. But when majorities or rural minorities in the several states restrict access to or otherwise distort the electoral process, then, as Claude emphatically demonstrates, "experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."

The book itself may be divided into two major sections, one dealing with litigation and congressional legislation related to voting rights, the other treating the more recent issue of representation. Within these broad topical categories, the presentation is more or less chronological and descriptive. The author comprehensively relates the development of constitutional amendments, congressional civil rights and voting acts, and judicial doctrines. The emphasis is on the substantive aspect of legal development in the venerable tradition of legal scholarship. To be sure, there are glimpses of the larger judicial process but not in the proportions one might expect in the light of Chapter 1 which describes in some detail the "input" side of litigation in the field of voting and reapportionment. When District Judge Waring in 1947 quoted President Truman, called on South Carolina to rejoin the Union, and extended the principle of *Smith v.*

Allright, important ramifications of the "58 Lonely Men" variety vaguely emerge. There are glimpses, too, of intra-court decision-making as in the *Classic* case. Again, the author's emphasis lies elsewhere; thus such glimpses are brief and in the later Warren Court reapportionment cases, perhaps speculative as well.

Claude steers clear of the Kurland-Bickel-Hart-Wechsler "craftsmanship" debate surrounding Warren court opinions. Nor does he directly treat or pass judgment on the legitimacy or scope of judicial review although it is clear that the author looks favorably upon the active use of this power by the Supreme Court in the realm of voting and apportionment. Nevertheless, he enumerates some of the more mechanical shortcomings of the litigation process arising from its case by case approach. Alexander Bickel in his *Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress* carries this kind of criticism one step further. He argues that "in dealing with problems of great magnitude and pervasive ramifications, problems with complex roots and unpredictably multiplying complex offshoots ... the judicial process is ... too remote from conditions and deals, case by case, with too narrow a slice of reality." For these and other reasons, Bickel concludes that the Court is "a most unsuitable instrument for the formulation of policy." Claude, on the other hand, perceives that the Court's policymaking process does not always constitute the last act. Congress, on more than one occasion, has responded to judicial stimulation and enacted broad legislation as it did in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1968 in the wake of *United States v. Guest* (1966).

Nationalization of the electoral process via judicial and congressional action has been the consequence. With this as his theme, Claude spins the web of his book. He relates the early extension of federal protection in congressional and, much later, in primary elections. At virtually every step, these thrusts and others are parried by the logic of "dual federalism"—that the right to vote, is a right derived from the states or that apportionment issues are enmeshed in the state "political thicket" and not amenable to judicial resolution, or that poll taxes are legitimate revenue measures within the state's police powers. Thus federal-state conflict, with the Tenth Amendment looming in the background, provides the context in which the Court forges new federal rights. The author makes only a limited effort to relate the Court's development of voting rights to its work in other areas such as commerce and economic due process, and he does not mention the *Civil Rights Cases* of 1883. It would seem that Justice Miller's warning, in the 1873 *Slaughterhouse Cases,* against constituting the "Court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States" and that the Fourteenth Amendment could not have been intended "to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States," set the stage for a number of economic regulation as well as voting cases, including *Minor v. Happersett* two years later. But ultimately the Field-Bradley dissents prevailed in the realm of economic due process. "It was," said Bradley, "the intention of the people of this country in adopting [the Fourteenth] amendment to provide National security against violation by the States of the fundamental rights of the citizen. . . ." But, as Claude shows, development of voting protections proved slow under the Fourteenth amendment alone given the "silence" of Congress. It would appear that Justice Stone's demolition in *Classic* of state derivation of congressional voting rights might well be viewed in the light of his repudiation of "dual federalism" in *United States v. Darby* shortly before.

So too the Warren Court's rule in reapportionment may be placed in a somewhat larger context. The three most important decisions of that Court, in the eyes of its former Chief Justice, were *Baker v. Carr, Brown v. Board of Education,* and *Gideon v. Wainwright.* Each of these decisions in different constitutional areas is characterized by equalitarianism and the nationalization of rights once solely under state protection. Thus when Justice Brennan declared in *Baker* that "judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar," he could look back not only to voting cases, but to school desegregation cases as well.

The "one man, one vote" strict majoritarian approach of the Warren Court has raised further problems as the author notes. In *Fortson v. Morris* (1966) the Court found that the Georgia legislature might bypass the popular choice for governor and choose Lester Maddox as Governor. Many years ago James Bradley Thayer stated that "the Constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of choice ... whatever choice is rational is constitutional. This is hardly true in the realm of voting equality even if the states' voters approve an apportionment plan in a popular referendum! The equal protection clause bars representation plans which are merely rational. In related areas the Court has moved more cautiously. Claude considers these "penumbra" categories such as gerrymandering and multimember districts in the context of dicta in *Reynolds* and subsequent decisions. Yet one wonders whether gerrymandering on a basis other than race, such as political party or economic or social status really accords with the equalitarian thrust of the Warren Court. Then there is the problem of multi-member districts, an issue which the Court has skirted in recent years. It raises, of course, the whole issue of adequate representation of minority groups, interests and parties in large multi-member districts. Then, too, one wonders about the effect of applying "one man, one vote" to all instrumentalities of local government. In *Avery v. Midland County* (1968) the *Reynolds* principle was extended to local units exercising "general governmental powers." After Claude's book went to press, the Court held in *Hadley v. Junior College District* (1970) that the principle applied to elected school trustees who "perform important governmental functions." The ultimate outcome of this extension may be to encourage removal of local and regional governmental units from the electoral process and the establishment of state legislative or gubernatorial appointive systems.

In spite of Claude's evident optimism regarding the Supreme Court's efficacy in opening the political system to various "out" groups in the electorate, one questions how meaningful the Court's answers in the realm of reapportionment will prove in the long run. Stephen L. Wasby in *The Impact of the United States Supreme Court* observes that studies by political scientists have "found that there was no significant relationship between malapportionment and policy outcomes, suggesting that bringing about population-only reapportionment might not mean major shifts in policy." At a time when the legitimacy of all American institutions is in question, it may be that clearing political channels and equalizing representation will fail to prove adequate or acceptable to vocal and intensely interested segments of the voting population. It may be that though the Court can act incrementally, it can hardly hope to resolve all the conflicts, failings and cross-currents in American political institutions and culture. Some problems may not even be susceptible to any governmental actions.

In summary, Professor Claude's book offers a thorough and carefully presented description of the role of the Supreme Court and Congress in enhancing the scope of voting rights and fair representation. Its chapters are separable and will likely prove a useful source of material for those seeking information on particular aspects of judicial construction of state and federal laws affecting the electoral process. With a few exceptions, this Johns Hopkins University Press book is free of typographical errors. It appears, however, that on page 235, in discussing the implied powers doctrine, the author intends to refer to *McCulloch v. Maryland* rather than to the cited case of *Marbury v. Madison*. And finally, probably to satisfy judicial behaviorists, the last chapter contains a Guttman scale of Warren Court voting in non-unanimous electoral process cases. It proves what most Guttman scales prove after competent case analyses, namely the obvious. "As expected, [declares Claude,] Justices Douglas, Goldberg, Brennan, Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Fortas and Marshall rank in the most liberal positions (with scale scores of over +.50), while Justices Stewart and Harlan have maintained consistently 'conservative' positions in electroral process cases."—PETER G. FISH, *Duke University*

Militarism, USA by James A. Donovan. (New York: Charles Scribner's 1970, 265 pp. $6.95.)

In *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960), I spoke of an "absolutist" and a "pragmatist" orientation in order to highlight the internal diversity that exists at the high levels of the U.S. military establishment. *Militarism USA* presents a broad critique of U.S. military policy and operations from the point of view of a "pragmatist" thinking, prepared by a retired Marine officer. Because of its coverage and authorship it is an indispensible document for those political scientists concerned with teaching and policy analysis of military affairs.

The fact that the author is a retired Marine officer is really no paradox. There has been stronger published criticism of South Vietnam from Marine Corps officers than from other services; for example, General David M. Shoup and Colonel R. Corson. In fact, there has been a long tradition of vocal dissenting Marine officers, and since World War II, there has been a strong self-critical orientation among a minority of Marine officers. Their officer corps is based on a system of recruitment which includes a strong component of civilian university graduates; the size of the Corps is small making possible stronger individual response, and the self-directed Marine intellectual is a part of the Corps standard operating equipment.

In essence this book is an expansion of General David M. Shoup's article in the April 1969 *Atlantic Monthly*, "The New American Militarism," which Colonel Donovan helped prepare. Colonel Donovan has had a long and outstanding combat record plus service as a staff officer for General Shoup. After his retirement, he became editor of the *Journal of the Armed Forces*.

In its expanded form the book is more balanced penetrating and useful than the original article. In the main, it covers familiar ground, but from the point of view of a career officer; his criticism centers on the excessive size and budgetary support of the U.S. armed forces, the overcommitment of U.S. military policy, and the ineffectiveness of U.S. military operations in Vietnam, especially of strategic airbombardment. I found that his analysis suffered because of a failure to distinguish the context of U.S. military policy in Europe as compared with the Far East.

The wide sweep of the book and its polemical character constitute both its strength and its inherent limitations. He starts with the basic assumption that the war in Vietnam was essentially a civilian decision. He opens the way for a full scale analysis of the transformation of U.S. army opposition in the 1950s to ground force involvement in Southeast Asia to the emergence of new policy perspectives. But this research task remains to be completed in detail. We need to know much more of the nature and form of this opposition. We need to know the details of army planning which concluded a land commitment would require at least 1,200,000 to 1,500,000 men. Civilian control of the military means loyalty to civilian decisions. But there exists mechanisms for recording dissent, both for the current and future record. The question needs to be answered why at least one chief of staff in the 1960s did not resign as would have been appropriate if such opposition really existed. Such a move, even if limited to a single resignation, would have recorded opposition and maintained professional loyalty.

The author is best in reporting on those aspects of military operations and planning with which he was directly involved. He is particularly revealing in describing interservice rivalries at the Pentagon level and assessing the separate military actions of the four services in Vietnam. His accounts of the life and organization pressures under which staff action officers in Washington operate is excellent and help account for the fierce rivalries and cumbersome decision making process. (I would like to see Colonel Donovan prepare a book in depth on Marine Corp planning and operations in South Vietnam.) He is open in revealing his hostility to the "civilian militarist" who guided Vietnam policy. In presenting his views on Bundy and Rustow one sees the real stuff out of which day-to-day civil military relations are made. "Bundy could walk away from his failures and enjoy the luxury of publicly changing his views. The professional military must live with the tragic war to the bitter end —and they don't dare express any but confident and loyal platitudes" (page 122). "With the departure of President Johnson, Professor Rustow, who had been disenfranchised by Eastern academic circles because of his militarism, crept back into the anonymity of a teaching position in Texas, where his history will probably neglect his part in the sanguinary episode of Vietnam" (p. 123).

With the completeness appropriate for a professional officer, he presents his views for redirecting military policy; the format conforms essentially to the Fulbright-McGovern-Mikva approach. He argues for a reduction of effort, though there is little specification of priorities and regional implications. One finds an absence of sufficient appreciation of the profound changing world order that nuclear weapons and third world nationalism have produced. Because he does not come to terms with the knotty problems of controlling and directing a responsible and flexible politico-military posture especially under the emerging volunteer system, his policy analysis might easily be read as a form of neoisolationism, which is clearly not his intention.
—Morris Janowitz, *University of Chicago*

Budgeting Public Funds: The Decision Process in an Urban School District. By Donald Gerwin. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969. Pp. 170. $7.50.)

This is another of the series of pioneering studies of organizational decision processes that includes works by Cyert and March (on firms), by Crecine (on municipal government budgeting), and several others. Gerwin follows a now familiar paradigm: repeated intensive access to the decision makers (mainly the superintendent of the Pittsburgh school district and his staff); detailed questioning and examination of documents to reveal decision rules for allocation of funds to subunits or to provide cues for the researcher's induction of rules when officials can not express them; formulation of a computer simulation model of decision routines; and testing of the model's output against the past behavior of the human decision process.

In this study, a model formulated apparently in 1966 is tested against data for the 1961–65 period. The model takes into account such elements of the budgetary context as expected revenues, debt service on new bond issues, requests for salary increases and new personnel, rather stable priorities among subunits, and existence of surplus or deficit. Allocations for materials and personnel to some twenty-four accounts are predicted ,most of them identified with specific subunits—e.g., vocational education, social studies, elementary education. As usual in the studies, the results are mixed, but the model looks like a fair representation of the decision rules actually applied. It is better than a set of simple, naive models since the relevant portion of the simulation model predicts allocations for materials much better than a model that simply assigns to each major subunit the same fraction of the total allocation for materials that it received in the previous time period.

Studies of government budgeting, including this one, labor under disadvantages that Cyert and March, and other researchers into decision making by firms, did not have to face. These disadvantages are characteristics of the budget process itself—its timing and the measurability of some of its elements. Whereas pricing, production, and sales decisions are made many times each year, budgeting is done only once. And whereas many salient features of the firm's environment are quantified, available to the decision maker, and clearly related to major goals of the firm (e.g., prices of competitors, demand, share of market), analogous features of the budgetary environment are either not quantified or not readily available to the decision maker. For example, intensity of demands for higher salaries is not readily quantified; and the superintendent is not likely to have information about how incremental shifts in budget allocations will affect learning (hopefully, a goal of the school system).

If stimuli are not readily quantified, they are likely to be neglected in a largely quantitative model of organizational decision processes. My hunch is that this happened in Gerwin's study. However, this is almost impossible to ascertain because the researcher's foci of attention in data collection are not well specified. (Unfortunately, this defect has become traditional in studies of this kind. It must be remedied before convincing replication and [dis]confirmation are conceivable.) We are told that many hours were spent with officials asking them questions about decisions. What questions? Was their description of the influences on their decisions accepted, or was a broader net cast, guided by a prior model of possible influences on them? We are not told. In this respect, the early researchers in this field have done themselves a disservice. Careful description of data collection procedures and the cumulative development of systematic methods for studying decision making at this level of detail would give others more confidence in findings, and make it easier for others to replicate and extend this kind of research, hence more likely that this will be done.

Another problem for researchers of government budget decisions arises out of the disadvantages noted above. Typically, researchers working to describe decision making in the simulation mode have been constrained to describe decision routines, not rare events, for reasons having to do with the number of observations and reduction of sampling error. However, price, production, and sales decision routines in the firm appear to capture many of the core decisions, crucial to the survival and goal attainment of the organization; budgetary routines appear not to include a correspondingly broad scope of decisions crucial to the maintenance of a superintendent's regime or to other goals of the school system. Many decisions with potentially great significance for the superintendent's career and for the distribution of educational services to his clientele may have little impact on the allocation of the budget to the broad categories Gerwin studied. Decisions on the closing of schools; on the selection of school location, renovation, and equipping; and on content of courses (e.g., sex education, social studies) may fall in this category. Further, whereas important shifts in levels of aspiration for key goals in the firm may occur routinely in response to a relatively rapidly changing environment, this may not be the case for government budget allocation decisions, either because the political "market" for such allocations as Gerwin studied does not change rapidly enough to be captured in a description of decision routines, or because changes in budgetary behavior are only infrequently registered in overt decisions, and therefore not caught in the description of routines. For example, Gerwin mentions (p. 33) but does not explain an upward shift in the priority of vocational education in the budget process. It is a rare event, the only one of its kind noticed during the period under study.

In short, a description of decision routines in government budgeting is more likely than a similar account of the firm's routines to leave out interesting developing pressures from the (political) environment, and changes in policy. On the other hand, it may be true for this organization during this period, as Gerwin finds, that feedback from its political environment was slight and information on educational consequences of allocations almost nonexistent. Under this circumstance, as Gerwin describes it, budget allocation becomes largely an exercise in internal conflict avoidance.

This brings us to a final problem, one which afflicts both decision makers and researchers of government budgeting. If the consequences of alternative allocations for goals are higly uncertain, then there is correspondingly less interest either in incrementally different allocation decisions or in the possibility of alternative decision processes. Whereas a good model of the firm's decision process could be used to examine questions of normative interest either from the point of view of the firm (What decision rules yield highest profit?) or from the perspective of an economy of firms (What decision rules yield price deflation in response to declining demand?), similar use of budgetary models is not feasible unless they include the generation of normatively interesting consequences.

But that's another study. In the meantime, Gerwin's effort on one school system, demonstrates how to do part of the job that we may eventually learn to do comparatively for many systems, for other levels and agencies of government, and for broader networks of decision, influence, and consequence.—Rufus P. Browning, *Michigan State University*

The Little Legislatures: Committees of Congress. By George Goodwin, Jr. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970. 284 pp. $8.50)

The voluminous and ever-growing literature on Congress may be classified according to the stress placed on describing the complexity of the legislative process, the prescriptive orientation toward the policy decisions of Congress and the ways in which these decisions are reached, and the concern shown for explaining legislative behavior in a theoretical or analytical context that links congressional studies to systematic research in various fields of social science. The first two kinds of studies overlap considerably more with each other than with the third, and are exemplified in the work of such scholars as George Galloway and James MacGregor Burns. The third type of study is less concerned with generalizations about the structure of congressional operations or with the controversies surrounding Congress than with explaining and generalizing about the attitudes, perceptions, and activities of congressmen as they go about performing the diverse roles associated with being a member of Congress. Richard F. Fenno, Jr. is, of course, the most prominent practitioner of this third approach to Congress, but many other contemporary students of Congress also find themselves more excited by this approach than by the older, and more traditional, schools of thought.

George Goodwin's *The Little Legislatures,* a study of congressional committees in the 1947–1970 period, clearly falls mainly into the first and second categories of congressional studies, and one's reaction to it is likely to be affected accordingly. Goodwin demonstrates that a traditional, largely descriptive, a theoretical study of committees can, if it is done well, be informative and useful, and Goodwin's book is done very well indeed. The number and variety of congressional committees are so great that the author, in his effort to get an over-view, had to rely heavily on the work of others. His book, therefore, has a textbook quality to it; since he demonstrates a familiarity with most, if not all, the literature on Congress the beginning student should find the book especially instructive. But Goodwin does more than synthesize the extant literature and herein lies the major value of this study.

This volume is a useful sourcebook on committee organization, composition, and operations since 1947. A great deal of information is presented on such matters as the regional and ideological makeup of committees, the distribution of committee leaders by age, region, and constituency, the use of discharge petitions in the House, conference committee activity, the pecking order of committees, relations between committees and party leaders, and the like. One of his most significant arguments is that the seniority system does not lead to committee leaders as old and as hidebound as many people think, though it is doubtful that the voices of the reformers will be stilled by such knowledge. The problem with elderly and conservative committee chairmen has never been that they dominate most committees but that just a few Byrds, Smiths, Colmers, Russells, McMillans, and Eastlands, are enough to make many observers question the system that selects such men for important positions.

It need not detract from the impressive scholarly merit of this book to observe that many of the questions that might be raised about committee politics are not fully treated. The lack of a theoretical framework for comparative committee analysis, the few insights offered into the highly variable internal dynamics (as opposed to structural arrangements) of committees, the absence of typologies for the exploration of such questions as differing patterns of committee leadership, the relatively small emphasis on coalitions as basic explanatory units of legislative strategy—all of these limit the utility of this book for those seeking help on questions not readily asked from a traditional perspective. Goodwin, of course, did not set out to make these kinds of contributions and so is not liable for having failed. Yet it may not be unfair to point out that his choice of research topics does restrict the value of the book, and leaves an abundance of important matters to the imagination of other scholars.

Given the importance of committees in Congress, any substantial reform of Congress would almost have to affect these little legislatures. It is, perhaps, an index of committee power that the committee system is most resistant to formal alteration. Committees can and do change, as Goodwin makes clear, but they do so slowly, informally, and some seem to do so hardly at all. This raises the final question treated in this book: What of proposals for reform?

Goodwin's answer is clear. By and large, he prefers the congressional committee system as is. On the positive side, a system of strong committees buttresses Congress in its dealings with the executive branch, and this he feels is good. Moreover, he argues, the existing system both reflects and promotes government moderation in the "relatively low boiling point, increasingly complex, continental democracy" of the United States. Impressed with the expertise and political wisdom of the senior committee leaders he interviewed, the author concludes that "Congress has been responsive to the strongly expressed demands of the American people" and has successfully reached compromises on intensely held minority demands. He seems to endorse a number of mild and somewhat vague changes (e.g., that the seniority system be maintained but with some leeway in choosing chairmen when special talents outweigh the benefits of seniority) but, in the main, critics of Congress will find little support in his espousal of "greater emphasis on rational decision-making of the constitutional balance model."

One can grant all of the advantages of the committee system cited by Goodwin and still, of course, dispute his sanguine conclusions. The essential problem with the committee system that Goodwin does not handle satisfactorily is that some committees, by refusing to search for or failing to achieve a consensus on important issues, have blocked needed legislation for long periods of time. It is all well and good to observe, say, that Congress did pass medical care for the aged in 1965, and that ultimately it responds to a wide assortment of needs, but it is also well to remember that in the interim a lot of old people had somehow to struggle with medical bills, and that, while the gestation period drags on in Congress, a lot of needs grow worse. It is this aspect of congressional committee politics that is perhaps most deserving of scholarly attention, and on this point the present study is less than illuminating. Had the author taken the normative questions he raises at the end as a context within which to develop the substance of his work, the study might have been greatly improved and his conclusions a little less out of place. With these mixed feelings, it is possible to conclude that *The Little Legislatures* is a worthy, if somewhat troubling, addition to the literature on Congress.—John F. Manley, *University of Wisconsin*

Everyman's Constitution: Historical Essays on the Fourteenth Amendment, the "Conspiracy Theory," and American Constitutionalism. By Howard Jay Graham (Madison, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1968. Pp. 613. $12.50.)

College and university librarians, in recent years, have campaigned persistently to be accorded faculty status—to be given rank equivalent to traditional faculty positions, to become eligible for and receive tenure, and to enjoy the same rights and privileges as regular faculty members. Librarians, it is said, are integrally involved in the educational process; they provide invaluable and otherwise unattainable assistance to faculty and students, especially at a time when learning involves ever larger components of self-directed study; and they increasingly undertake meaningful substantive research and engage in both conventional classroom and innovative forms of teaching.

Although he never held a regular faculty appointment, Howard Jay Graham, as attested by this superb collection of finely crafted essays, provides persuasive evidence for the librarian's argument. Graham earned his livelihood as a law librarian, chiefly at the University of California (Berkeley) and at the Los Angeles County Law Library. The present volume, published after his retirement at the urging of Professor Leonard W. Levy of Brandeis University, brings together for the first time his major articles; nearly all were originally published in law journals and, therefore, are not readily available to scholars at most institutions. The collection at once records an unusual and unusually important intellectual odyssey—a life dedicated to scholarly endeavor and one richly rewarding to anyone interested in the development of American constitutional law.

Early in his career Graham became attracted to, then progressively fascinated with, the origins and intended meaning of the Civil War amendments to the Constitution, in particular the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment which have been the constitutional basis for nationalizing a substantial portion of the Bill of Rights. He consciously set about reconstructing the history of the amendment's enactment and to ascertaining the purposes of those who drafted and ratified it. This search, extending more than thirty years, became virtually all engrossing. Graham brought to it a keen analytical mind, scrupulous regard for historical facts, sensitivity to democratic values, and tireless pursuit of original materials. The result has been profoundly important. Graham describes his essays as having twice or more "figured prominently in major cases and trends," but such modesty, although wholly characteristic, hardly does justice to the impact of his scholarship upon Supreme Court decision-making and constitutional development. Levy, in a forward to the book, provides a more accurate assessment; Graham, he writes, "has played an important part in the developing history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even as he chronicled its origins and purposes, he influenced its interpretation." His two articles on the "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment probably have no equal in informing our understanding of the amendment's purposes and its potential for equalizing the conditions of American life.

Graham never wrote a book. But the present volume constitutes more than a collection of unusually important articles. Levy encouraged him to provide connective tissue, and this Graham has done in the form of original introductions as well as annotations and occasional revisions of notes that explain the circumstances which influenced the writing of each article and seek to link the separate statements into a comprehensive whole. The theme, encapsulated in the title *Everyman's Constitution*, is that the tripartite injunctions laid against the states in the Fourteenth Amendment "nationalized the fundamental rights of American citizenship and of human personality." Thus, Graham seeks, in his contemporary commentary, to demonstrate that the processes and protections embodied in the amendment, as revealed in his original research and the resulting journal articles, are "ideally suited to wipe out" the remaining scourges of racial prejudice in present-day America.

Before proceeding, it seems appropriate to pay tribute to Graham, the teacher who might have been. Read together, the essays in this collection constitute a scholarly achievement of unquestionable merit and significance. The reader recognizes that he has encountered a first-rate intelligence, and the introductions afford rare insight into the factors which shaped the development of Graham's career—in itself a fascinating chapter in intellectual history. We can, I believe, justifiably conclude that, despite an evident handicap—deafness—, Graham would have been an uncommonly engaging and peculiarly stimulating teacher, especially in graduate research courses. Many scholars have benefited directly from his skill as a librarian. His students, no doubt, would similarly have received generous assistance and encouragement, been enlivened by the vitality which characterized his saerch for knowledge, and held to his exacting standards of scholarship.

So much for past accomplishments and what might have been. The present volume, regrettably, is not without faults. For example, while undeniably fascinating, the introductions are characterized by an annoying ellipticism, perhaps dictated by reasons of economy, for this is a thick book. More important, no set of introductions, no matter how skillfully constructed, can transform a series of discrete articles into a comprehensive whole. For all his brilliance Graham overreaches when he tries to "retell the story of our constitutional derailment and rerailment" in such a way as to resolve once and for all every constitutional problem associated with incorporating the black race (to use the first Justice Harlan's phrase) "as a component part of the people for whose welfare and happiness government was ordained."

Everyman's Constitution needs desperately to be delineated, and I can think of no one better prepared for this task than Graham. But this volume does not answer that need. When Everyman's Constitution is finally written, the author will owe as much, indeed perhaps more, to Graham than to any other man. At the same time, he will need imperatively to give greater attention to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than Graham ever did. This first, and vital, principle in Everyman's Constitution, deepfreezed if not destroyed outright in the *Slaughter House Cases,* seems destined someday to become the fulcrum for accomplishing the equalitarian revolution which the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses alone will not suffice. Graham's book appears distressingly and unaccountably incomplete as a consequence of his virtual neglect of the primacy and power of this clause.

As addendum, *Everyman's Constitution* was published two years ago—the hundredth anniversary of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. In view of its importance, it should have been reviewed much earlier in this journal. To put the matter plainly, neither Graham nor the profession has been well served by the delay.—STEPHEN B. WOOD, *University of Rhode Island*

Political Internships: Theory, Practice, Evaluation. By Bernard C. Hennessy. Penn State Studies, Vol. 28 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 1970. Pp. 129. $1.00.)

All too infrequently political scientists pause for a systematic evaluation of pedagogical strengths and weaknesses. Indeed, I suspect, far too many of us consider such evaluations ill-advised in that (a) they eat up valuable research time (an admittedly scarce resource) and (b) they constitute a threat to assumed classroom prerogatives.

Evaluation of undergraduate internships as a teaching instrument is, unequivocably, the chief motivation for Hennessy's little book. In addition to undergraduate internships, Hennessy attempts to assess the progress of some well established graduate student and faculty internship and fellowship programs. Since Hennessy views his work as a first step in the direction of a somewhat more systematic monitoring of internships than has been the case in the past, he concludes by suggesting some "notes" toward a "theory of internships."

If evaluation is the purpose of the monograph, then some notion of what an internship is, how it fits into classroom teaching, and what its purposes are, are the appropriate points of departure. Having begun in this way, Hennessy moves directly into raising some of the basic questions about undergraduate internships such as who is likely to be an intern, the right combination for an ideal internship, and, most importantly, the effect of internships on future political activity, a sense of political efficacy, and, finally, on careers. For his analysis, Hennessy draws extensively on data from a variety of internship programs: The National Center for Education in Politics, independent programs such as those at Mount Holyoke, Wellesley, Goucher, Amherst, Williams, and, to some degree, the NCEP Graduate Fellowships in State and Local Politics and the Ford Foundation Legislative Graduate Internships.

Hennessy's concept of internships is obviously based on his considerable knowledge of internship programs—Hennessy was an NCEP Democratic National Committee Fellow (1959–60), NCEP Associate Director (1960–61), and NCEP Director (1961–69)—and frequent reflection about them from the perspective of a political scientist and teacher of politics. For him, political internships fall squarely within and are supplementary to the traditional liberal arts program, being designed to develop "citizen-politicians." This purpose obviously squares with the customary concept of the "democratic ethos" which "requires that large numbers of citizens develop and maintain a commitment to amateur participation in politics." Though it does not follow logically, Hennessy asserts that the kind of political internship most suitable to developing citizen-politicians is

> a period of service as a regular staff member for a political agency or leader, under conditions that provide opportunities to observe the relationship of detailed practice to generalizations about politics (theories, propositions, or hypotheses). In short, an internship is an intensive period of practical work designed to supplement, to exemplify, or selectively to highlight, the student's understanding of political fact and strategy.

The purpose, its rationale, and the pedagogical strategy outlined above are clearly applicable to undergraduate internships—and, as Hennessy notes, not just to those who happen to be government majors.

Hennessy reports some rather interesting, if not necessarily conclusive, findings about the effects of internships. Most obviously, with respect to the preponderance of social scientists and to the preponderance of political scientists among that group, he notes that, "from the point of view of recruiting and encouraging citizen politicians, we may regret not having had more interns from outside the political and social sciences." Though Hennessy found that internships do not *discourage* political activity, the overall results are somewhat discouraging. Here are some examples: just 39 percent of NCEP interns—who were asked if they thought it made a difference—responded affirmatively; Pennsylvania interns (PCEP) are *less likely* to engage in party activities than PCEP non-interns (42 percent versus 32 percent) or campaigning (42 percent versus 35 percent); somewhat more encouraging results were found among the Oregon students, in that on the Ohio Wesleyan Political Participation test the interns displayed a significant difference in political activity before and after internships, whereas the carefully matched non-interns did not.

Though the evidence of the internship's effect on political activity is somewhat sketchy and the results are, at best, mixed, the results on the relationship on the kind of office in which the intern serves and political activity are somewhat more conclusive and, to boot, have a moral. As compared to the Williams-Mead group, for example, which places emphasis on summer congressional and federal agency internships, the NCEP group—less than half of which interned in Washington—scores much higher on subsequent political activity, the differences running as high as approximately 34 percent. And, among both NCEP and Williams interns, those who interned in state and local positions were much more likely to keep relatively consistent social contacts with the politicians than are those who served in Washington. Says Hennessy, "I point out here, as my general knowledge of internships and these data suggest, *that for developing and fixing long-term interest in political involvement, state and local party or campaign internships are best.*" (emphasis added)

Supplementing a liberal arts undergraduate education by placing undergraduates into everyday political situations over a relatively long period of time toward the end of developing more effective citizens for a democratic polity is clearly a different kind of an internship than confronting graduate students and junior faculty with everyday political life. In particular, post-undergraduate internships are typically designed (or, at least *ought to be*) for supplementing the graduate education or collegiate teachers of politics or for generating research through participant-observation—and, preferably, *both*. The differences in recruitment and selection of interns and the ideal conditions for an internship in the two kinds of internships highlight the fact that they are, indeed, quite different. Whereas Hennessy rightly bemoans the fact that undergraduate internships are over-supplied with political scientists, those who select graduate fellows would obviously be inclined to concentrate almost exclusively on that group; and whereas the ideal undergraduate internship requires very close supervision by the instructor and, ideally at least, a very sympathetic political principal, the post-graduate intern is undoubtedly better served by loose supervision and, further, a sympathetic political principal is not absolutely essential for a fruitful participant-observation experience.

Though recognizing, for example, the enormous research potential of the Congressional Fellowship Program, Hennessy does not systematically set forth the purposes, rationales, and teaching or research supervision strategies suitable to the various post-undergraduate internships. Hence, though Hennessy reports some interesting findings regarding graduate student and faculty internships, the program evaluation is not nearly as systematic as in the case of the undergraduate programs. In assessing the graduate student and faculty fellowships, Hennessy draws exclusively on the three well established programs: the NCEP Graduate Fellowships in State and Local Politics, the Ford Foundation Legislative Graduate Internships, and the American Political Science Congressional Fellowship Program. Save for the Ford Program, about which he indicates that the "activist" is more likely to be selected than the "academically-inclined," Hennessy reports nothing about the selection and placement of graduate interns.

Some of the more interesting political activity consequences of the post-undergraduate programs reported by Hennessy are as follows: for all three programs, more than one-half of the political scientists end up teaching in college; NCEP graduate fellows are much more likely than NCEP undergraduate interns (44 percent versus 39 percent) to attribute the internship experience to subsequent political activity; the NCEP graduate fellows are much more likely to stay in political (59 percent versus 41 percent) and social contact (87 percent versus 57 percent) than are the NCEP undergraduate interns—not surprising in light of the fact that the graduate fellows are (a) likely to intern in a state or local office, and (b) are likely to assume college teaching positions. Career-wise, both NCEP and the APSA fellows are inclined to attribute substantial increases in their knowledge of politics, both locally and nationally, to the fellowship experience. Not surprisingly then, nearly all NCEP and APSA fellows report that the fellowship contributed "considerably" or "very substantially" to their pedagogical preparation. Precious few publications, however, have resulted from either the NCEP or APSA programs—just 16 books and 3 articles from APSA and 3 books and 3 articles from NCEP.

The fact that the findings reported in Hennessy's monograph are sketchy and tentative is much more a comment on our habitual reluctance to monitor pedagogical efficiency than on the author's ability to pull together vastly disparate and almost hopelessly incomplete sources of data and weave them into coherent set of findings. And, moreover, how can the success of graduate fellowships be evaluated when the objectives are left inexcusably unclear?

Just as the tentativeness of Hennessy's findings are quite beyond his control, so too, are his notes on a theory of internships. With the exception of a few political scientists—most notably Professor James A. Robinson and Hennessy—the important questions regarding internships in political education and political research have not been asked. The key idea to a systematic epistemology of internships is that of *verstehen*. In its most drastic oversimplified version, *verstehen* means acquiring a "feel" for politics. As in the case of Robinson, Hennessy effectively notes that feel boils down to learning a role, for the intern to be able to predict what is expected of him and of others and how the political principals enact roles under varying circumstances. In this way, the intern gains access to the *realpolitik* essential for a successful internship. But Hennessy erroneously assumes that feel means the same thing to undergraduate interns as it does to the graduate intern. For the undergraduate, feel is an end in itself; for the participant-observer graduate student or faculty fellow, however, feel is but the beginning of a successful research strategy. In particular, feel alerts the researcher to manifestations of elements of political behavior and thereby enables him to generate ideas about how to collect data from the political principals to test hypotheses. Still, however, Hennessy does provide a number of very useful rules of thumb concerning the intern, the office, and academic preparation for and supervision of a program for those responsible for supervising undergraduate internships.

Though my last few paragraphs are somewhat critical, I like Hennessy's little book. It is must reading for those who are supervising undergraduate internships. For $1.00 the monograph is a "steal."—James T. Murphy, *Wesleyan University*

Political Careers: Recruitment Through the Legislature. By Leonard Ruchelman. (Cranbury, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970. Pp. 216. $7.50.)

This workmanlike study apparently is a revision of a doctoral dissertation, and it still bears some of the unfortunate marks of its genesis. The theoretical orientation of the book is especially weak, unsuccessfully and too briefly attempting to link the empirical analysis to the broad theoretical concerns of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Harold Lasswell. Furthermore, the data base is far too narrow to deal with the author's desire to analyze the effects of social and political change on legislative recruitment, consisting only of standard items of documentary information for members of the New York legislature in the 1931 and 1951 legislative sessions. The justification for the limitation of the data base to the 416 legislators in one state serving in these two years is not convincing, and the narrow base of evidence severely constrains the capacity of the investigator to fulfill what appear to be his analytical purposes.

The author's more modest research objectives are laudable enough. He sought to glean from the record some kinds of evidence about the attributes of persons recruited to serve in the New York legislature at two points in time, those who became legislative leaders, and those who left the legislature for private life or for some other political office. The analysis of the social background characteristics of these New York representatives turns out to be pedestrian, involving the presentation of familiar empirical statements about commonplace differences between Democratic and Republican politicians. These data are discussed as if factors such as age, education or occupation affected legislative decision-making, with no apparent awareness of the analyses by other political scientists which demonstrate the limited impact which social background characteristics can have on legislative decisional behavior.

Ruchelman's analysis of what happens to people when they leave the legislature is more interesting. He is able to confirm that relatively few leave the legislature because of defeat at the polls; 1931 and 1951 New York legislators, by a proportion of 60 percent, left the assembly because they resigned from office. A substantial part of the Republicans retired because of old-age, or took offices in the state executive branch; a considerable proportion of the Democrats, predominantly elected from New York City, acquired positions in the City judiciary. Unsurprisingly, lawyer-legislators have a particular propensity to job mobility from the legislature to judgeships. One pattern of political mobility which appears from this study to be notably absent in New York politics is movement from the state legislature to statewide elective office.

It is not enough to say that this book is theoretically muddled and empirically pedestrian. The author does attempt to raise theoretically interesting questions, and to bring empirical evidence to bear on them. His intentions seem to have been perfectly solid. But, woefully little in the theoretical literature of his discipline could have helped him when, presumably as a graduate student, he planned and executed this study. Adequate models of political mobility have not been developed; sufficient theorizing and testing of propositions about the nexus between politician-attributes, career aspirations, and political experiences on the one hand, and policy-making, or representative, behavior on the other, have not been done. Old myths continue to be repeated (and Ruchelman repeats most of them) as a substitute for what everyone knows is inadequate conceptualization and analysis. Ruchelman clearly has tried to penetrate the mists and oozes of "political recruitment theory," but the conceptual apparatus of his discipline have not been adequate to the task, and the empirical evidence he tries to manipulate could not yield significant generalizations which might have led further along the way to more surefooted theoretical ground.

Surely a starting point in such an endeavor would be clarification of what we are trying to account for. Ruchelman gropes for something to explain without coming to closure in his attempts to bring his data to bear on legislative decision-making, representative role-playing, unethical conduct, the stability of the polity, and the "latent function" of the legislature as a "stage" in political careers. Ruchelman rightly points out that the legislature is, at least in the American cases, more than a law-making factory, and that much of the behavior of legislators is to be seen as career-making. Nor can the evidence here help to pinpoint relationships between ambitional motivations, career-making, and linkages to the represented in constituencies and occupants of other political positions. And, the legislature certainly is more than a career-making factory. At a bare minimum, one wants to know whether, indeed, the socio-political attributes and career patterns of legislators impinge on and influence their policy-making behavior.

Instead of moving in the direction of dealing with the conceptual and explanatory problems which his analysis poses, the author makes four recommendations for legislative reform which strike me as being wholly unsupported by, and disconnected from, his empirical evidence or any interpretation which could be drawn from the data. He believes the New York legislature should (1) be made unicameral, (2) become a full-time, professional legislature, (3) consist of members elected for four-year terms, and (4) be elected on the basis of a proportional representation electoral system. Since Ruchelman's analysis tells us nothing about the effects of "recruitment" on public policy or symbolic representation in the present structural arrangements, it is impossible for him to project the effects of these reform palliatives on anything.

—Samuel C. Patterson, *University of Iowa*

Comparative Government and Politics

Alba, The Latin Americans. Cole Blasier.

Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia. Russell H. Barrett.

Bon, et al., Le communisme en France et en Italie, Vol. I.: *Kriegel,* Les Communistes francais: Rochet, L'Avenir du Parti Communiste francais. William G. Andrews.

Casanova, Democracy in Mexico. Robert E. Scott.

Kothari and Roy, Relations Between Politicians and Administrators at the District Level. Paul Wallace.

Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana. David J. Finlay.

Gray, editor, Modern China's Search for a Political Form. Derek J. Waller.

Hayter, Russia and the World: A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy. Alvin Z. Rubinstein.

Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution. BRIAN WEINSTEIN.
Rotberg and Mazrui, editors, Protest and Power in Black Africa. CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM.
Ojukwu, Biafra, 2 volumes. WILLIAM JOHN HANNA.
Simandjuntak. Malayan Federalism 1945–1963: A Study of Federal Problems in a Plural Society. MARVIN L. ROGERS.
Stein, India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era. ALFRED FERNBACH.
Womack, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution. MARVIN ALISKY.
Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics. GEORGE O. TOTTEN.

The Latin Americans. By Víctor Alba. (New York: Praeger, 1969. 367 pp. Cloth, $10.00; paper, $2.95.)

Writing an introduction to the societies collectively known as Latin American, some quarter of a billion persons occupying a continent and a half, is a large order indeed. In *The Latin Americans* Víctor Alba unflinchingly shoulders this task, surveying the past, present, and possible futures. He describes the economic, political, and social problems, and touches on international relations and culture as well.

Víctor Alba is qualified for such a survey, that is, if anyone can be qualified. He has written voluminously about Latin America, worked in Mexico for many years, and traveled widely throughout the area. He has frequently lived in the United States and knows how to interpret Latin America to the reader here. He identifies himself as a Latin American, although his Spanish birth and upbringing give him an independent perspective. Thus, he embodies that rare combination of knowledge and detachment, permitting an objectivity difficult for a North American or a Latin American to achieve.

In one trenchant paragraph Professor Alba demonstrates his grasp of human relations across the two cultures:

> There is, in the relations between the two peoples, a mixture of contempt and admiration, of envy and sympathy. The Latin American imitates the American's way of life (at least in the cities), and at the same time that he criticizes the United States for its materialism, he is very much concerned with his own material comfort. He gets along with the Americans personally because he tells them what he thinks they would like to hear. The American, for his part, cannot understand how such affable friends, who make him so welcome in their homes, can at the same time be so violently anti-American. The American envies—without saying so—the unpreoccupied, happy life and ease of communication of many Latin Americans, and even their (imaginary) Don Juanism. The Latin American envies—without ever saying so—the comforts and wealth of the American, the security of his existence, the guarantees afforded by his political system. But when they speak of one another's countries, they mention American racial segregation instead of the struggle to end it, and Latin American inefficiency rather than the fact that things work despite it.

A book of this sort is vulnerable to the charge of superficiality. In fact, it would seem impossible to avoid skimming across the surface in any work which attempts, as does this, to combine immense scope with extensive illustrative detail. But its purpose does not appear to be to advance major new interpretations of Latin American reality or plumb the depths on any particular subject. Also, any author who is prepared to write about so many different specialized fields is not reluctant about risking errors in detail and interpretation. His presentation of political issues avoids the extremes of the Right and the Left.

Víctor Alba writes clearly and simply, and this book is more orderly than some of his earlier and hastily produced studies. His chapter headings raise some big, vague, probably unanswerable questions, such as: What do Latin Americans want; Where is Latin America going; Is Latin America in the World; and Who Wants Social Change? He does not really come to grips with these questions, nor attempt to clarify them, as would surely be necessary for any systematic response. But the questions are provocative and they provide a kind of loose-jointed and crude framework for arranging a mass of descriptive data on important subjects. In so doing, he demonstrates his encyclopedic knowledge of Latin America.

The Latin Americans is a popular work suitable as supplementary reading for introductory courses to Latin America within the various disciplines, especially those focusing on the contemporary scene. Also, it provides a useful introduction for tourists in one sturdy volume of 367 pages.—COLE BLASIER, *University of Pittsburgh*

Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia. By Henry S. Albinski. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970. Pp. 238. $8.00.)

In this book Albinski begins by pointing out that Australian politics has been from the start of the nation "inward turning," concentrated on practicality rather than broad principles, and not required to emphasize defense and international matters, the latter because of the British shield. World War II and its aftermath has produced changes, with a major Australian role in shaping the United Nations, increased interest in Asian problems, and the influx of migrants from countries other than the United Kingdom. Newspapers, television and radio have increased their coverage of international news, and there is a growing interest among the public in such coverage. But the author concludes with reference to political debate on international affairs, "the public has not been subjected to a reasonably sharp, uncluttered dialogue on this subject."

In summarizing Australian party attitudes on Vietnam, Albinski quotes from former Prime Minister Holt: "We are fighting to resist aggression against a small country. But the issues are very much larger for us even than that. We are fighting to preserve the security of Southeast Asia as a whole." He summarizes the Labor opposition's position thus, "At the core of the Vietnamese situation has always been an indigenous impulse for nationalist expression and social reform, with which the American-supported authorities in Saigon have been hopelessly out of touch." To the Liberal and Country parties it is a question of Chinese communist expansion into Southeast Asia; to the Labor party it is a matter of the nationalist aspirations forced into communist alignment because of American misunderstanding of what is involved. The disagreement widened when in 1964 the Liberal-Country party government introduced military conscription and later began sending combat forces to Vietnam. Understandably, this broadened the party conflict to cover not only Vietnam but also the question of conscription.

The more specific party positions on Vietnam developed as follows. The Labor opposition argued that military operations should be scaled down to a holding operation, so that real negotiations could start. It also supported the withdrawal of Australian draftees in line with its argument against conscription. It welcomed the bombing halt announced by President Johnson in 1968 much more enthusiastically than the government, and it claimed that the sudden change demonstrated that the United States was really not consulting with Australia on major Vietnam policies. Labor argued that the Australian government should more actively press the United States to make a start on negotiations. In spite of the bombing halt, the government held to its position that strong military actions should be continued. Its position was that a reduction in military actions would help the Communists by withdrawing support from the Vietnamese government and that Australian support of reduced military action would pull the rug from under the American allies. It pointed out that the United States had taken numerous initiatives in the direction of negotiations and said that in any case negotiation must be from a position of strength. The government firmly supported the domino theory.

In dealing with the stylistic characteristics of the party debate over Vietnam and conscription, Albinski points out that the disagreements have become increasingly personal and bitter. Labor has accused the government of making policy into a cheap contest for votes by announcing policy just before elections or of arranging the visit to Australia by President Johnson only a month before an election. The government in turn has charged that Labor has cooperated with the Communists in producing turmoil at the public appearances of Liberal speakers. Each has accused the other of toying with the lives of Australian soldiers in the interest of politics.

Albinski goes into considerable detail on the position of various Australian groups towards Vietnam and conscription. Among major Protestant groups he finds that the Methodists are the most accommodationist in seeking initiatives to solve the Vietnamese conflict and in criticizing conscription. Protestant leaders have taken a strong lead in taking public positions, and they seem to have some effect on church members. Except for a progressive minority, Catholic opinion "seemed either becalmed or, where it was forcefully presented, to be decidedly supportive of official policy." Yet there was a change by 1967 and 1968 which saw the Catholic hierarchy in favor of constructive peace-seeking and of effecting a reconciliation with the Labor party. Catholics have even joined Vietnam and conscription protest groups and have participated in marches and other protests. In June, 1968, a poll showed that Catholics as compared with the main protestant denominations were the most disposed toward a complete suspension of bombing in North Vietnam. Australian war veterans as represented in the Returned Services League have moved from a completely hawkish stand on the war to a position of questioning the bombing of the north and of emphasizing the political character of the Vietnam war. In addition some veterans formed a new organization with less than 1000 members (the R.S.L. has a quarter of a million members) to support the peaceful settlement of international conflict.

The author makes the point that Australian academics have become more vocal on social problems and that of those who have taken a position on Vietnam-conscription the majority have been "critical of established government policy." Professors have taken part in teach-ins and have also expressed themselves in the media as being critical of government policies on both Vietnam and conscription. Performing and creative artists have also participated in protests against the war and conscription. Student groups have opposed the war and have argued for those seeking conscientious objector status or refusing to register for the draft. Students also raised funds for the NLF and even for North Vietnam, and continued to do so in the face of a hurriedly adopted national law providing penalties for such actions. Even so, the student activists make up a small minority of students. Various polls cited by Albinski show that the attitudes of students are not strikingly different from the attitudes of young people throughout Australia. But there has been a growing student tendency to challenge established political party positions, whether government or opposition.

Albinski makes the point that the vigor of the Vietnam conscription debate had a marked effect not only on foreign policy debate but also on party politics in general. In particular the government parties put themselves out on a limb and were unprepared for the American announcement of the bombing halt and Britain's decision to withdraw from Asia. They moved to reappraise their "forward" policy of defense in Asia and in so doing moved closer to the policies of the Labor party.

The author concludes that the Vietnam war and conscription has raised the level of public interest in foreign affairs. While public opinion polls cited early in the book showed Australians as having little interest in the subject, those cited at the end show that Australians have become aware of international affairs, even to the point of listing Vietnam and international affairs as numbers one and two in level of importance to them.—RUSSELL H. BARRETT, *University of Mississippi*

Le communisme en France et en Italie. Vol. I: Le communisme en France. By Frédéric Bon, *et al.* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1969. Pp. 336. 67 F.)

Les Communistes français. By Annie Kriegel. (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1968. Pp. 319. 7.50 F.)

L'Avenir du Parti Communiste français. By Waldeck Rochet. (Paris: Éditions Bernard Grasset, 1969. Pp. 188.)

The most durable feature of the French political landscape since World War II has been the strong Communist Party. Gaullism has risen thrice, fallen twice, and may fall yet again. The Radicals have been buried at least twice and no one knows whether their current savior, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schrieber, is reincarnation or ghost. The MRP filed for political bankruptcy and crept away. The SFIO stands like a snowman in the April sun. Poujadism flashed in the pan. Crises come and go—currency, housing, strikes, EDC, Indochina, Algeria. Republic replaces Republic. The Soviet-American alliance becomes the Cold War and then the Thaw. Unprecedented governmental stability succeeds record instability. Wartime devastation becomes recovery and then affluence. Through everything, the French Communist Party marches inexorably. Its share of the vote in parliamentary elections has never fallen below 18.9 percent, more than 10 percentage points higher than the next highest lowpoint for a French party since World War II. Small wonder that the PCF holds the attention of students of French affairs.

The scholarly trail since World War II is sprinkled with attempts—often very useful—to explain one or more aspects of French Communism. Nicole Racine's bibliographical essay in the book by Bon *et al.* lists 211 books, monographs, and major articles. Thinking only of scholarly books published on this side of the Atlantic, major works by Einaudi, Micaud, Cantril, Fejtö, and Almond come to mind. Still, much of the mystery remains.

These three books, then, are welcome and valuable additions. The first one listed has the most to offer. As one of the most recent books in the superb series sponsored by the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, it has a very distinguished reputation to uphold. Like several of its predecessors, it is a collection of original essays. Twelve scholars have contributed nine essays. Together they have written a general survey of the party. Georges Lavau's stimulating essay analyzes the place of the party in the French political system. Separate studies by Jean Touchard and Frédéric Bon deal, respectively, with the rudiments and structure of the party's ideology. In addition to her bibliographical essay, Miss Racine has contributed a piece on the relationship of the PCF to French intellectual life since 1956. Guy Rossi-Landi describes the composition, structure, and means of action of the party and Jean Ranger traces the course of its electoral support since 1945. Finally, two chapters (one by Monique and Raymond Fichelet, Guy Michelat, and Michel Simon; the other by Alain Lancelot and Pierre Weill) analyze the data produced by two recent surveys of public opinion toward the PCF.

The Bon book is the product of a colloquium sponsored by the *Fondation* on March 1–2, 1968. None of the papers was revised to take into account the disorders and election in France during May and June of that year or the reaction of the PCF to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August (though Lavau added a four-page "Postface"). Probably, that decision was wise. All too often, political science books chase the headlines too frantically. However, an additional essay describing and assessing the impact of those critical events on the party would have enhanced the value of the book greatly. Also, footnotes at appropriate places in the essays would have been useful to call attention to the ways in which the 1968 events affected the judgments reached earlier. After all, those events illuminated the true character of

French Communism more clearly than anything since World War II. They should have been taken into account more fully.

The book also suffers from a certain imblance. Three chapters totaling 100 pages deal with ideological matters and two chapters totaling 58 pages deal with public attitudes toward the party. On the other hand only 25 pages are devoted to organizational questions and almost nothing on the "practical politics" of the party, the day-to-day and election campaign activities that certainly go much further than ideology in explaining the party's staying power. What these authors do, however, they do well. Their book is packed with fact and insight and contributes much to our understanding of one of Western democracies most important political parties.

No name appears in Miss Racine's bibliographical essay as frequently as Annie Kriegel, yet at least three of her books and several other works are not included. Among the omissions is the book under review. Although most of Miss Kriegel's earlier work deals with the history of French Communism, this book is a sociological study focused on the contemporary party. In contrast to the book reviewed above, Miss Kriegel says nothing about ideology or the public's opinion of the party, but she says a great deal about its flesh and bones. Voters, readers of the Party press, members, party workers, and leaders are counted, described, and analyzed. So are the party's elements of organization and its decision making processes, even its secrets.

The Kriegel study is thorough and clear. She makes the party come alive by dealing not only with such formal categories of members as age classes and occupations but also with the various "generations," representing successive waves of recruitment. She also describes convincingly the ways Communists become involved with their party. Finally, her discussion of the recruitment to and conduct of the party leadership is full and informative.

On the other hand, sometimes her use of statistics is confusing. For instance, to support her point that the party is aging, she says that *"moins d'un adherent sur dix a moins de 25 ans: proportion médiocre dans un pays où les jeunes de 15 à 29 ans representent plus d'un Français sur cinq."* Yet, she never tells us the minimum age for party membership. If it's 18, her population figure covers 15 years and her party figures only seven years, which makes the party look pretty good. Also, her obvious antipathy for Georges Séguy and admiration for Benoît Franchon cast a shadow over her brief comments on the CGT. Finally, I felt that if she had analyzed her data on women in the party more rigorously she could have extracted a great deal more information about the real condition of the party's membership than she did. These quibbles, aside, however, her book must be recognized as the best general picture we have so far of the inside of the French Communist Party.

The short book by Waldeck Rochet can be given only a short remark here. It deserves to be analyzed fully, in conjunction with the proceedings of the 1969 PCF Congress and other recent party documents, in order to assess the impact of the 1968 crises on the party's public stance. Suffice it to say here that Rochet's book provides an official party interpretation of the May-June 1968 disorders, analyzes France's present social and economic conditions, presents the party's immediate and long-term goals, surveys the international situation, and describes the Communist movement, as he sees it.—WILLIAM G. ANDREWS, *SUNY at Brockport*

Democracy in Mexico. By Pablo González Casanova. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 245. $7.95.)

This English translation of *La Democracia en México* provides students and scholars who may feel uncomfortable reading Spanish with an opportunity to view Mexico's political process through the eyes of a leading Mexican political sociologist. The author, who previously was Director of the School of Political and Social Sciences and later of the Institute of Social Research, both at the National University, became Rector of that institution in 1970. In its Spanish version, *La Democracia en México* has become a standard reference on Mexican politics, and in English it may well do the same.

The present translation is from the 1967 second edition, which corrected a few typographical errors of the first, added sereval new points and examples to support the general theses of the book, and updated the extensive social, economic, and political data roughly through 1964. Unfortunately, the timing of publication made impossible the inclusion of electoral data from the presidential and congressional contests of July, 1970. The results of this campaign were so much in pattern with earlier recent elections, however, that González Casanova's principal conclusions are not materially affected. In fact, neither the Spanish nor the English later versions are much changed from the original 1965 edition, which suggests that Mexico's politics have not been very dynamic during the past decade or so.

Democracy in Mexico continues to provide useful insights for the foreign scholar. Despite some changes in presentation of the statistical tables, the book supplies a very convenient grouping of data relating to Mexican society and politics, but this sort of information is collected in other sources, through generally in scattered form. For the outsider the main value of the work lies in the systematic and sophisticated analysis of Mexico's political system as interpreted by a Mexican. The author provides a viewpoint quite distinct from those offered by the army of foreigners who have discussed the subject. This may be because González Casanova demonstrates high sensitivity for the nationalist feelings of the Mexicans but it is enhanced by his refusal to apply mechanically concepts or approaches invented elsewhere, often for political systems clearly different from Mexico's.

If some outside observers do not share the author's conclusion that the conditions for a socialist revolution are not present in Mexico, and that a consistent Marxist must work within the system even though his long-range goal is the achievement of socialism, most would accept his very guarded discussion about the factors working to limit the full flowering of democracy in the country. Similarly, if many foreigners do not sense ever-present imperialist pressures on economic and political life in the country as does González Casanova, many Mexican political writers and social scientists do. Such persons have a larger role in determining governmental attitudes than one might imagine, so an understanding of their views can be very useful. A careful review of the ideas expressed in this study can give the outside investigator a perspective on Mexico's politics not often found in the works of non-Mexicans, no matter how systematic.

To my mind, one of the most interesting sections of *Democracy in Mexico* is the comparison in chapters ten and eleven between "Marxist" analysis and "sociological" analysis. Contrasting these two approaches to a real political situation offers the reader a practical example of their relative strengths and weaknesses. These chapters also can provide students with some notion of Marxian conceptualization in action, an experience that is not often available to North American young people. They could be an introduction to future political scientists' understanding of a Marxist analytical approach, whether to utilize it in their own research or to refute the findings of others.

A concluding point. It is regrettable that in translating *La Democracia en México* several potentially important errors in the second edition's statistical tables were carried over intact. For example, on page 221, Table 18, errors appear in both the top and bottom sections. The top is merely a repetition of a line, but in the bottom the presidential electoral data given for 1968 clearly should be for 1964, if for no other reason because there was no presidential election in 1968. Again, if one compares voting totals for the 1964 election on pages 221, 231, and 237 minor differences will be noted, probably because different sources were used in each case. These slips are not terribly important to the general findings of the study, but they could confuse the unwary trying to demonstrate deep significance from numerical data. Certainly a few errors of this sort do not reduce the significant contribution Professor González Casanova has made to our understanding of Mexico's politics.—ROBERT E. SCOTT, *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*

Relations Between Politicians and Administrators at the District Level. By Shanti Kothari and Ramashray Roy. (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration and the Centre of Applied Politics, 1969. Pp. 215. $8.00.)

In modernizing countries, Samuel Huntington asserts in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, "the primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order." Institutionalizing authority is requisite for any political system, and particularly difficult for a modernizing polity attempting to adhere to democratic norms. Shanti Kothari and Ramashray Roy critically examine the relationship between two important elements of the polity in India: politicians and administrators. Moreover, they focus on the district level which, in India, historically has been the operational center of politics and administration. The introduction of a new system of local rural government in the 1950s, *Panchayati Raj*, adds even more importance to the district and sub-dictrict levels.

Role perceptions of the two groupings differ markedly, the authors emphasize, resulting in ambiguity and encroachment of each into the legitimate sphere of the other. The frequency and extent of the mutual encroachments, they state somewhat too boldly, is "likely to subvert the basis of political organization." (p. 160) Huntington's dictum, quoted above, appears to be particularly appropriate given the authors' conclusion. Is the political order of India, or this one district, threatened and what are the implications for democracy in India?

Part of this pessimistic conclusion appears to be based on the authors' assumption that a clear-cut division of functions *should* exist between administrators and politicians, and significant deviations from this ideal norm threaten the entire enterprise. Their empirical findings provide abundant evidence that Meerut District is not a Weberian world in which goal formulation and goal execution are strictly delineated and institutionalized in practice. Where, it may be asked, does such an ideal state exist?

A behavioral approach, complete with appropriate language and methodology, is employed throughout the book. At the second level of execution the study is in fact well done and can be categorized as a successful pioneering work in India and for newly developing countries. Nonetheless, closer adherence to a functional approach in the conceptual model could have obviated some of the *should* assumptions which color the findings.

More significantly, to what extent were political and administrative functions being carried out successfully in this territorial jurisdiction of 2,700,000 inhabitants? It can be argued that the particular structures are not as important as the functions. American politics and administration at the county level—somewhat equivalent to the Indian district—do not differentiate so highly between politicians and administrators that a comparable study with comparable results to the above would be unexpected. For example, the American county sheriff, judge, and court house political establishment would feel at home in the India of this study.

Conflict between administrators and politicians is to be expected in India as in any political system. It is not surprising that 45.3% of the administrators claim they should share in the formulation of broad policies. Nor should our eyebrows lift askance at the 38.6% of the political leaders who, consonant with a spoils system, assert the right to share in the distribution of loans, grants and subsidies (p. 160). It *is* surprising that only 5.7% of the administrator sample would favorably consider unsound proposals of popular leaders (p. 57). The same table documents the close relationship between the administator and the ruling elites: 47.2% of the administrators agreed that they must assist powerful local leaders if such action would aid program implementation. Another 35.8% were ambivalent. A line between a "sound" and a "unsound" program can shift in this context.

Findings such as the above do provide abundant evidence that a notable—perhaps radical—change has been taking place in India's political culture. Her hierarchically ordered, authoritarian past in which administrative entities commanded without question is being transformed. A subject culture is in the process of becoming a participant culture. Program implementation may suffer in the short run as this study asserts. It may even suffer in the long run—or it may not. Subversion of the political order does not, in any case, necessarily follow. Change is a more accurate term and it can be in either a positive or negative direction.

Two sets of questions flow from this kind of study. First, a group of general questions can be raised about the nature of the relationship between administrators and politicians in all political systems. Unfortunately, there are too few studies for comparative purposes. Samuel Eldersveld's *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* in its own way deals with some of the same concerns, but without the value-laden assumptions that mar this study. Stripped of its "shoulds" and compared with Eldersveld's Detroit study, a more realistic assessment of parties and administrators may be gained. Further research can more specifically examine the web of relationships that deal with such functions as aggregation, representation, and implementation.

A continuing mystery, at least to this reviewer, is how the result of these relationships really relates to implementation. The legitimacy question by contrast is less complex. One is struck by the *lack* of congruence at the sub-national level between political stability or political efficacy, and program implementation. Conventional wisdom dictates that there must be a positive correlation. Empirical research has yet to prove with a high degree of validity that such is the case. Meerut District is a case in point. Despite the negative conclusions of the authors, they point out that the district ranks high in levels of politicization and economic development (p. 25.)

A second set of questions may be applied more specifically to India. Bureaucratic attitudes are seen to be excessively rigid in the study and "very weak" in approving of "representative politics" (p. 166). To what extent is an increasingly active and potent political sector, even with the authors' questioning of their democratic values, changing the political configuration of the district? In this context, can the administration continue to be viewed as a "steel frame" or is it becoming part of an administrative and political process more consonant with a participant than a subject political culture? On a more pessimistic level, if indeed administrators and politicians view each other in terms of unfavorable stereotypes, what is the effect as regards legitimization of the system? Objectively, each may be operating similarly to successfully functioning bureaucrats and politicians elsewhere. Cognitively, falling far below *expected* standards may have serious consequences for the system. It is possible that the authors' conclusions may be correct for the wrong reasons.

Finally, in an almost ritual sense, one must pose the obvious question about a study that deals with only one unit. How comparable would a study in another district in India be to this one? Asoka Mehta, in the foreward, believes that a different result would obtain in a study in Maharashtra.

Despite some of the sharp criticisms in this review, this is an important book. It is a study for the Administrative Reforms Commission of the Government of India and may lead to policy developments, particularly in regard to the bureaucracy. The Indira Gandhi Government is furnished with additional information—if it needed it—regarding attitudes. Closer attention now should be paid to actual behavior. Some of the findings of this study, as indicated above, infer that the administrators are somewhat more flexible than their attitudes indicate. A wealth of material is contained in this relatively small volume, including forty tables and six diagrams. It also should be noted that the cooperating groups evidence a notable degree of institutional development. The Indian Institute of Public Administration, the Centre of Applied Politics, and the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies are effective, productive institutions. The book is a meaningful contribution to the growing body of behavioral literature in comparative administration, and is a pioneering work for its subject in India.—PAUL WALLACE, *University of Missouri*

Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana. By Roger Genoud. Published in Cooperation with the Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 229. $17.50.)

The ousting of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples Party on February 24, 1966, commanded world wide attention. As the first sub-Saharan colony to gain independence in the post-war years, Ghana's experience was considered to have special historical significance. Symbolically Ghana was at the forefront of African independence movements, African unity, and neutralism in international politics. Ghana was viewed as a state moving toward socialism under the mobilization of the Party and the leadership of Nkrumah. Yet a handful of Army and Police removed Nkrumah, banned his Party, imprisoned the leadership, and suspended the constitution with very little difficulty or opposition. Nkrumah fell from a world figure to an exile while on a peace mission to Peking and Hanoi. What went wrong in Ghana? How did a country comparatively well developed among the new states end up brankrupt with its leadership discredited just nine years after independence?

Numerous authors have sought to untangle what happened. Roger Genoud's work treats the problem in a broad context, utilizing an historical interpretation of the interface between nationalism and economic development during the CPP years 1951–66. The author states that "it is a study of the experience of decolonization, an analysis of the strategy of decolonization of the Nkrumah-CPP Government, and its implementation." As background he examines the socio-economic structure of Ghana in the 1950's, then interprets the process by which the country moved from what he calls a "comatose vision" of decolonization to the formation of a seven year plan in 1963. In Part II he considers economic problems and performance and the political record of the Nkrumah regime.

To analyze the relationship between decolonization and development raises many questions, perhaps none more significant than whether that relationship can indeed be explained and interpreted. Genoud makes a positive contribution toward such an explanation. He views decolonization and development as questions of strategies (policies) and tactics (means). To decolonize is to further autonomous development, to create the basis for a new country which, he argues, is inherent in nationalism since it is "a dialectical response to the modern colonial impact. . . ." In Ghana, Nkrumah and the Party entertained broad objectives of modernization and development, but specificity and implementation did not develop until after independence and settlement of inter-Party competition, and until economic difficulties promoted the growth of concern about economic development.

According to Genoud, the CPP economic strategy was not "socialist," even though much of the rhetoric was. Instead the plan was for a mixed economy, more open than closed, which seemed a logical transitional phase in the decolonization process. Implementation was partially successful in terms of "recapturing" control of the economy, but failed to balance trading partners and attract sufficient foreign capital. Although there were marginal improvements in the economic infrastructure, politically the CPP failed to merge strategy and tactics, to integrate rhetoric, plans, and action. Genoud argues that after consolidating power by 1960 the Party ceased to mobilize Ghanaians and eventually withered away and was absorbed by the State. Thus Nkrumah was left balancing political factions while operating transitional policies of development. This required a policy of equilibrium and avoidance of major choices. Any dramatic breakthrough in development would therefore have to depend on building the infrastructure. In the end Nkrumah failed, but the lessons were clear —development is a total process, and if taken seriously it creates risks, tensions, and dangers, particularly when the means to achieve development are limited in relation to the problems and when "the main contradiction still lies, as far as the former colonies are concerned, between these former colonies and the industrial countries."

Genoud's work is actually an extended interpretative essay which also evaluates a number of views on Ghana—particularly the Fitch and Oppenheimer "Marxist" critique. Data for the book come largely from the works of others. For those who know Ghana much will be familiar, but the presentation of the theme is somewhat unique, and much of the book's strength derives from the attempt to combine politics and economics. The argument does not rest on single variables such as Nkrumah or Party ideology. This reviewer believes the essay would have benefited from a clearer treatment of decision-making and priority setting as well as consideration of the socio-psychological necessities encountered in decolonization and development. Genoud does not suggest an answer to how much development and autonomy is possible given the realities of international economic structuring, nor does he suggest what would consitute "arriving" beyond a transitional stage of development. The book is nevertheless a step toward a theory of decolonization and development through effective use of a case study. The major blemish of the book is a price beyond reason and belief.—DAVID J. FINLAY, *University of Oregon*

Modern China's Search for a Political Form. Edited by Jack Gray. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 379.)

This book grew out of a series of seminars organized by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London for academics, journalists, civil servants and others interested in the study of China. All the contributions to this volume are by the academic participants in the seminar, and the essays themselves, which are primarily historical-descriptive, reflect their authors' very widely varied scholarly interests.

The papers range in content from a discussion of representative institutions in Shanghai from 1905–1914 (by Mark Elvin), through the origins of socialist thought in China (by Martin Bernal), and a study of the Federalist movement of the 1920's (by Jean Chesneaux), to a discussion of the performance of cadres in contemporary China (by James Macdonald) and the role of the border areas in China's foreign policy (by George Moseley).

The difficulties inherent in pulling together this gallimaufry into a coherent whole are epitomized by the rather amorphous title of the book. This reviewer was never clear either as to how to operationalize the definition of "political form," or as to what was the unifying theme of the book, if any.

Nevertheless, in spite of the above caveats, there is a good deal of scattered information and interpretation that the specialist will find of interest. If the book's theme is to be interpreted as China's struggle for national unity and integration ("political form"), then several authors, including Jerome Ch'en, who writes the introductory essay, do address themselves to this question.

Ch'en, in his essay entitled "Historical Background," examines with meticulous scholarship the period from 1895 to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the attempts of revolutionaries and reformers to change the nature of the Chinese state. Ch'en takes 1895—and the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War—as a base date for the birth of Chinese nationalism, and for the desire on the part of the Chinese not just to emulate the West in terms of technological achievements but in political expertise as well. He then vividly traces the major forces obstructing these goals, namely Confucian orthodoxy and the use of force in support of factional interests, which were operative throughout the entire Republican period from 1911 to 1949. These obstructions were apparently removed by 1949, but as the Cultural Revolution has shown, the latter impediment to national unity is by no means dead. Ch'en's essay also has some illuminating statistics indicating the deteriorating conditions under the Nationalist regime, and he points out that Chiang Kai-shek's concentration on grandiose schemes for the economy, while neglecting the immediate problems of the peasants, could only have contributed to furthering the aims of Mao Tse-tung and his followers.

George Moseley, in his paper entitled "The Frontier Regions in China's Recent International Politics," deals with the persistent problem that all Chinese central administrations have had to face of devising a state form to encompass both Chinese (Han) and non-Han peoples. Discussing this problem from the time of the Ch'ing dynasty, through the Republican era, up to and including the People's Republic of China, Moseley notes that by 1911, the process of dismemberment of the frontier regions was well under way, and that the Republican revolution accelerated this process. Consequently, had it not been for World War II, which resulted in the alliance of China with other powers against Japan, the detachment of the frontier zones from the Chinese empire might well have become permanent. Moseley concludes with an analysis of the role of the border areas in Chinese communist foreign policy. It would be well worth while to have this essay updated to include the pivotal role of the national minority areas during the Cultural Revolution.

The essay by James Macdonald on "The Performance of Cadres" discusses the work-style of cadres in communist China during the 1963–66 period. Although this essay comments on the red versus expert conflict and on the general decline in cadre morale in the early 1960's, it suffers from a lack of structure and in general adds only marginally to the literature already available. There is little concerning the seniority system by which cadres are ranked and the effect of this on possible generational conflict between the "Yenan" cadres and those recruited after 1949, or concerning the types of individuals recruited over time and the impact of differing domestic programs on Party recruitment policies.

In addition to those cited, other authors include Patrick Cavendish on "The 'New China' of the Kuomintang," John Gittings on "The Chinese Army," and Sybille van der Sprenkel on "The Role of Law in the Changing Society." There is also a conclusion by the editor, Jack Gray, which however, does not attempt to relate the various authors' conclusions to each other in any systematic way.—DEREK J. WALLER, *Vanderbilt University*

Russia and the World: A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy. By Sir William Hayter. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1970. 133 pages. $4.95.)

Studies of Soviet foreign policy are becoming more common. Most of them, however, seem to be aimed at the layman rather than the specialist. Nonetheless, they often merit reading by the latter, especially if the analysis is authoritative, based on scholarship and experience.

Sir William Hayter, Warden of New College, Oxford University, and formerly British Ambassador in the Soviet Union, has written a concise, lucid study of recent Soviet foreign policy. He writes tersely of the characteristic features of Soviet policy generally known and accepted by students of Soviet affairs: the contradictions between the preoccupation of Soviet ideology with the "world communist movement" and the primacy accorded by Soviet leaders to the preservation and extension of their imperial system; the "hermetic impenetrability" of Soviet policy and the isolation of the men who make decisions, coupled "with a degree of untruthfulness rare even in political life"; and the importance not only of the Party but of the secret police and the military establishment in the shaping of policy. Hayter finds distressing the concentration of power in the hands of a few key leaders who have had little exposure to the non-Communist world, but acknowledges that the Soviet "diplomats with whom Westerners come into contact are mostly technicians, able and experienced in their field," so presumably they keep their government fully (though not always accurately) informed.

There are seven brief substantive chapters treating Czechoslovakia, Germany, the Third World, China, International Organizations, the United States, and Sir William Hayter's concluding observations. Regrettably, and somewhat inexplicably, as much attention is devoted to the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 as to the other five arenas of Soviet engagement. In so short a book the disproportionate emphasis on Czechoslovakia is a serious weakness: whatever the continuing interest in the subject it is not comparable in significance to the Sino-Soviet rift, to the forward strategy of the USSR in the Middle East and South Asia, or to the SALT talks—none of which is accorded treatment commensurate with its intrinsic significance.

In examining the possible explanations for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the author gives much weight to the Soviet fear of counter-revolution, especially on the part of the military, who "visualized the Czechoslovaks as being on a slippery slope, at the bottom of which, whatever their leaders were saying now, lay neutralization and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, with a consequent weakening of the Soviet defensive line in Europe." The uneasiness of the military and the anxious authoritarianism of the CPSU leadership led Moscow to move. The author hints at, but does not explore, the extent to which fear of the incipient aspirations for greater autonomy of major nationality groups in the USSR also reinforced Soviet resolve to squash the Czech liberalization.

Sir William Hayter is clearly a believer in NATO, as his analysis of Soviet policy and aims in Germany indicates. With a passing swipe at those who, "like General de Gaulle, would like the Americans to withdraw from Europe," he says that an American presence is essential to ensure not only the security of West Berlin, but of all Western Europe: the alternative would be a Europe subservient to the Soviet Union. For Hayter, the "Cold War" is not over, however much some of its features may have undergone modification.

The section on the Third World is the least satisfactory in the book. Hayter writes of the "embarrassments" and "failures" which the USSR has experienced in its courtship of the Middle East, but neither provides specific instances nor makes clear the criteria for these surprising statements. The Middle East is not exactly an arena of Soviet "failure," and the Soviets have managed to penetrate there on a massive scale, politically, militarily, and economically, though Hayter argues that "all the Russians have earned so far ... has been the humiliation of watching their protégé ... receiving a trouncing from a smaller country backed by the West. . . ." He correctly observes the determination of Khrushchev's successors to acquire the military capability of making their presence felt wherever they choose, but, no doubt influenced by the oft-cited Cuban crisis, he does not think the Soviet leadership would commit itself "to a course of action which might face it with the risk of an escalating armed conflict with America, particularly in relation to areas which are not vital to its interests." A comforting thought, but one this writer regards with considerable skepticism.

Studies of the foreign policy *behavior* of the Soviet Union are in their infancy, notwithstanding the imposing number of titles appearing on the general subject. Sir William Hayter is eminently equipped to write a major work on Soviet foreign policy, a Beloffian tome on the 1950's and 1960's. We need to know more about how diplomats analyze Soviet policy, about the kinds of data they consider salient, about the areas we should explore. Perhaps he will apply his talents to this task in the not too distant future.—ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, *University of Pennsylvania*

Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution. By David and Marina Ottaway. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970, Pp. 322. $8.75.)

The Ottaways have given us an excellent book about an important and interesting African country. Although Algeria, with its 12,000,000 people, is mid-way in population between Nigeria and Gambia and is by no means the richest country on the continent in spite of its oil, it is ahead of many in its development, has made its voice heard in international affairs, and has already made an important contribution to the history of post World War II liberation movements and experimentation with socialism.

In this land, once the capstone of France's African empire, the only successful war of liberation in Africa against European settlers and the European metropole was fought from 1954 to 1962. After independence the country captured the imagination of Europeans and others who flocked to Algiers to help build a "true socialist society" which would provide an example, they thought, for the Afro-Asian-Latin American Third World. Although a military coup d'état in 1965 removed "socialist" leaders along with their Third World ideology, the new clan which took over has not been indifferent to liberation elsewhere in spite of the priority given to internal order and centrally directed development.

Mr. Ottaway, who spent three years in Algeria as a journalist before continuing his academic career at Columbia has written, in collaboration with his wife, a political history of the country covering the period 1962 to 1968. His sources of information include the usual newspapers, public documents, interviews plus others, not always indicated, but which provide a great deal of information. The period 1962 to 1965, l'époque Ben Bella, is particularly well done, giving the impression the author was quite close to the events he describes.

The Ottaways' main point is that there has been no socialist revolution in Algeria. Ben Bella, they say, manipulated socialist ideology and programs and projects to help liberation movements elsewhere in an opportunistic way to keep and increase his own power in a culture dominated by clan—*asabiya*—rivalries deeply rooted in Algerian history, transformed but not eliminated by a century of French rule.

The authors describe Ben Bella's victory after a period of civil strife in 1962/1963 with the help of the army headed by Houari Boumediène; never secure, however, he initiated programs to gain popularity which contributed to economic chaos left from the war and did nothing to solve administrative problems. For example, the Decrees of March 1963 provided for decentralized "self-management" of former French enterprises and farms seized by workers, but Ottaway says that these workers had little political consciousness in spite of the eight-year war and were also quite simply unable to run the enterprises. In 1964 mass meetings to discuss the future of Algeria, Ben Bella gave the people the illusion of democracy just as the March Decrees gave the illusion of socialism, the authors say. In April 1964 the Algiers Charter planned for a supposed further move to the Left, but the regime was overthrown before long.

In 1965 Colonel Houari Boumediène, Ben Bella's former ally but then head of a new clan of his own, seized power claiming, as a loyal Muslim, his opposition to "atheistic Marxist Socialism" towards which the country seemed to be moving. The Ottaways say again that ideology was purely secondary. Boumediène really feared he and those personally loyal to him—his clan—would be ousted from power by Ben Bella.

The new Algerian leader began to change Ben Bella's policies but found himself bound by the same need to create a power base and legitimate institutions. With most support coming from war veterans he demoted the party, the FLN, on which Ben Bella had depended and changed the emphasis from self-managed enterprises to state companies. He cut Algiers off from previous close ties with African countries like Guinea but drew closer to the Soviet Union and the Arab states.

In the 1967 Arab-Isreal war Algeria sent troops and plans and then began to move back into association with former allies in Africa. Boumediène also revived the FLN under a Secretary General loyal to himself and began to worry about the rise of newly competing clans within the government and party. He has, according to the authors, increasingly emerged as the Single Leader and is becoming similar to Ben Bella although state capitalism remains more important than self-management. In spite of the lack of mass support, revived clan conflict, absence of social revolution, the "country is well on its way to becoming economically self-sufficient."

The Ottaways' political history of Algeria seems at times to dismiss Ben Bella's 'socialism" too brusquely, for even if his motives were to maintain his personal power, the programs initiated were experiments of a socialist nature. The book also has less of the in-depth political science analysis of clan politics that one finds in William Quandt's recent *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954–1968* (1969) and has little about the liberation movement itself which is discussed most recently by Mohamed Lebjaoui (*Vérités sur la révolu-*

tion algérienne (Gallimard) or by Yves Courriere in his three-volume series beginning with *Les Fils de la Toussaint* (Fayard), but the authors have done what they said they would do. The book is therefore an important contribution to an understanding of politics in a country during a specific period where the situation has seemed confused to those unable to follow the complicated changes as they occurred. Written in a lively style, the authors are not afraid of crisp judgments which they make without losing scholarly depth.

A glossary, lists of members of Algerian cabinets, biographical sketches of leaders, details about the army and a selected bibliography complete this thoroughly satisfying book.—BRIAN WEINSTEIN, *Howard University*

Protest and Power in Black Africa, Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, editors. (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1970. 1247 pp. $25.00.)

Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui have edited one of the most interesting and potentially important anthologies dealing with sub-Saharan Africa to appear during the past decade. Thirty-six essays, all newly minted for this volume and all of above-average quality, deal with the twin themes of protest and power in Black Africa. What the editors have done is to take a series of political, military, religious, economic and literary events, heretofore regarded as disparate and discrete and arrange them along a temporal continuum by means of a common theme—the African reaction to European exogenous intrusions. Even if, as Ali Mazrui suggests in his postlude, the various arts of resistance to the imposition of alien rules may be divided into a number of categories distinguished by different motivations, nevertheless, the continuum has meaning in and by itself. Taken as a whole, the volume not only applies a final quietus to one of the central colonial cliché-myths, that by and large Africans did not resist the European penetration, but also lucidly illustrates the ways in which that resistance took, and continues to take, subtle and complex forms.

The book is divided into eight sections, the titles of which are self-explanatory: part one deals with "Resistance to Conquest," part two, "Rebellions Against Alien Rule," part three, "The Religious Expression of Discontent," part four, "The Emergence of Pressure Groups and Political Parties," part five, "The Economic Expression of Discontent," part six, "The Literary Expression of Protest," part seven, "Revolutions, Coups, and Readjustments in the Post-Independence Era," and part eight, "Sovereignty and Diplomacy in Post-Independence Africa." The sections, each involving three to seven essays, are self-contained and can be read as separate, problem-oriented entities or in conjunction with the introduction and conclusion.

In a work of this size and scope it is difficult to pinpoint particular essays, but a number of outstanding ones merit special attention. Carl Brown's analysis of "The Sudanese Mahdiya" is the best on that subject I have encountered, while James Fernandez's "Affirmation of Things Past" is a most sophisticated and incisive analysis of the multifaceted question of religious response to foreign inputs. For political scientists, two companion pieces, Gerald Moore's "Literary Protest in French-Speaking Africa" and James Povey's "Political Protest in the African Novel in English," provide most useful overviews of African literature as a potential source for political analysis. For example, Ferdinand Oyono's *The Old Man and the Medal* is as penetrating an indictment of the impact of the colonial system on individual Africans as we are likely to have. Willard Johnson's "The Integrative Backlash of Insurgency" and Crawford Young's "Rebellion and the Congo" are two first rate pieces illustrating how the tools of history and political science, if properly utilized, can provide enduring insights into seemingly ephemeral political events.

For my part, I would have preferred that the editors provide each section with a short introduction, placing the essays which follow in context. For example, the four essays dealing with primary African resistance to European conquest would have gained greatly if the reader were given some rough index of the overall rate of such resistance on a continent-wide basis. There are also a number of minor flaws—mostly connected with the composition of the work—which I found irritating. For one thing, the author's notes do not appear until page 1215. Also, works cited in both the footnotes and bibliography do not contain the names of the publishers and the final map, illustrating 1969 Africa, omits the French territory of Afars and Issas as a colonial territory. On balance, however, *Protest and Power in Black Africa* emerges as a most valuable book; in fact too valuable to appear at such a prohibitive price. Were it to appear in paperback, perhaps in two volumes, it would prove to be enormously helpful in a great variety of courses dealing with Africa.—CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM, *Bowdoin College*

Biafra: Selected Speeches and Random Thoughts of C. Ojukwu, with Diaries of Events. By Odumegwu Ojukwu. (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

It has been more than a year since Nigeria conquered Biafra to end the thirty-one month civil war. Publication of the book under review took place but three months before the fall. Since Biafra's moment in history has passed, one might argue that the relevance of Ojukwu's book has passed too. Personally, I do not agree. This combination of a diary of events, selected speeches, comments to journalists, and letters provides insights and evidence for understanding a particular set of events and for generalizing about a number of matters of concern to political scientists. Furthermore, the book is a rich and moving portrayal from the Biafran perspective of the Biafran tragedy.

Because I found it difficult to summarize the material in *Biafra,* I have chosen to pass along some of the notes I took while reading the book. (1) How does one decide between claims for self-determination and claims for territorial integrity? "We are fighting a war which for us is one of survival.... We are fighting that we shall not be slaves, so that our children will not be slaves." In my files is a copy of an official Nigerian Federal Government white paper which makes this statement: "There can be no doubt now that Nigeria must be preserved as one united country if we are serious about achieving lasting peace in order to allow our part of Africa to resume its orderly process of social and economic development."[1] And a related question: what price can a people afford in order to achieve independence? "In spite of the indescribable sufferings of our people, our will remains undaunted and our determination unshaken. ... Most of our lands are now beyond our reach; our cities are in ruins; our industries have been destroyed and our trade disrupted."

(2) In 1947, Western Nigeria leader Obafemi Awolowo asserted that "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression." And a year later, the Northern leader, Abubakar Balewa, stated that "the Nigerian people themselves are historically different ... and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite." And so, when Ojukwu wrote that "Nigeria never was and can never be a united country," was he not articulating the received wisdom? Is this not a case of political culture influencing political behavior?

(3) Can psycho-cultural hypotheses help to explain the attitudes and actions of many Nigerians towards the leading ethnic group of Biafra, the achievement oriented Ibos? Ojukwu quotes this 1964 Northern Nigeria party manifesto: "The time has come. We are going to show these intellectual fools.... Our only obstacles are the Ibos. They have overplayed their card. They will sink." (II, 20) And from my files: "Ethnic groups tend to be chauvinistic but the Ibos were the most militantly chauvinistic and this naturally created apprehension in the minds of the others."[2]

(4) Under what circumstances do—and should—major world powers intervene in conflicts such as the Nigerian civil war? "Peace, indeed everything pertaining to this war, depends on one man and one man only, and that person is Harold Wilson.... There is no aspect of this war in which Britain is not involved."

There are still numerous items in my notebook: international disintegrative contagion, the utility of Dahl's paradigm for understanding the conflict, the fierce commitment of leaders to an apparently lost cause, the apparently slanted news reports in the *New York Times,* the United States as a model for self-determination, and many others. In sum, I found this book informative and stimulating. Many political scientists, regardless of their personal involvements during the civil war, will find it worth reading.—WILLIAM JOHN HANNA, *The City University of New York, Lehman College*

Malayan Federalism 1945–1963: A Study of Federal Problems in a Plural Society. By B. Simandjuntak. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 347. $11.75.)

Following World War II Britain attempted to replace Malaya's fragmented political system with a single, centralized form of administration called the Malayan Union, which excluded Singapore and provided a common citizenship for the multi-ethnic population of the Malay peninsula. Overwhelmingly opposed by the Malays (comprising 50 percent of the population), the Malayan Union was never fully implemented. It was replaced in 1948 by the Federation of Malaya, which perpetuated the prewar privileged position of the Malays and retained the political identity of the Malay Sultanates. This highly centralized federal system provided the institutional framework under which Malaya achieved independence in 1957. It was subsequently modified when Malaya joined with Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak to form the Federation of Malaysia in 1963.

Simandjuntak's book is the first detailed study of federalism in Malaya and Malaysia. Historical rather than analytical in approach, it is based upon an impressive amount of painstaking research in Britain. The author, an Indonesian citizen, was unable to pursue further investigation in Malaysia because of hostilities between that country and his own at the time of his research. Had he been able to interview national and state political leaders and to investigate at first hand the character of Malayan federal-state relations his approach might have been modified.

The book is divided into two parts. Part one, a detailed political history of postwar Malaya before 1963, presents an excellent summary of political developments, including abandonment of the Malayan Union, the rise of communal-based parties, the first two national elections, and Malayan relations with Singapore. The negotiations preceding the formation of Malaysia are discussed at length. Very little is said, however, regarding the actual implementation of Malayan federalism in the sense of interactions between the federal and state governments. Such omission is understandable in the author's case since virtually nothing on this subject has been published.

---

[1] *Framework for Settlement: The Federal Case in Kampala,* Lagos, Ministry of Information, 1969, p. 15.

[2] *The Collapse of Ojukwu's Rebellion and Prospects for Lasting Peace in Nigeria,* Lagos, Ministry of Information, 1968, p. 5.

Part two of Simandjuntak's book is a discussion of what he calls the major problems of Malayan federalism: determination of the criteria for citizenship, adoption of a national language, creation of a national educational system, provision of federal funds for state governments, promotion of economic development and integration, and defense. In a series of historical accounts he describes how Malaya dealt with these problems before 1963. He discusses the consideration of these issues leading to the formation of Malaysia and the way they were dealt with in the Malaysian constitution. These chapters provide a wealth of background information on contemporary Malaysian politics and the underlying tensions of a pluralistic society.

Although it contains periodic references to K. C. Wheare's *Federal Government* this book lacks a conceptual focus, particularly in the second half. The various communal groups in Malaya cut across the boundaries of the federating units. Only at the end of his study does Simandjuntak acknowledge that communalism, not regionalism or the interaction between federal and state governments, has dominated virtually every aspect of Malayan politics during the postwar period. Thus communalism, not federalism, dictated the way in which Malaya dealt with most of the "federal problems" considered in part two. After independence the powers and responsibilities of the national and state governments did not become an important political question until the formation of Malaysia was proposed in 1961. The true character of Malayan federalism was revealed in negotiations prior to creation of the larger federation. Although the Malaysian Agreement mentioned a federation of fourteen states, in actual fact the preceding discussions suggested four territories in which the eleven states of Malaya were consistently regarded as a single unit. The author largely ignores the paramount reason for the success of federalism in Malaya through 1963, namely the tricommunal Alliance Party's control of the central government and all but one of the state governments.

Although students of federal systems per se will find little of value in this volume, it is a useful addition to the literature on Malaysian politics. Its detailed account of negotiations preceding the formation of Malaysia is particularly valuable. Its discussion of basic differences in outlook between Malaya and Singapore and the tenuous nature of the Malaysian federal scheme help to explain the expulsion of Singapore in 1965, the central government's dismissal of the Sarawak Chief Minister a year later, and the continuing estrangement between the central government and Sarawak.—MARVIN L. ROGERS. *University of Missouri*

India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era. By Arthur Stein. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. 320. $9.50.)

Why and how India and the Soviet Union transformed their relationship from a cool, standoff position to cordial cooperation during the Nehru Era is the focus of Professor Stein's cogent analysis in *India and the Soviet Union.* Both countries support the status quo in South Asia, and their policies have developed in terms of immediate and fundamental interests.

Initially, with such pressing concerns as Kashmir and Goa, India gained strong Soviet support for her position in the United Nations. To help her in building up the public sector of her economy, India received valuable capital investment and technical assistance from the Soviet Union. In turn, India supports the Soviet Union in a number of international organizations—on disarmament, for example—often, in fact, reflecting parallel policies which she would have advanced in any case.

The interests of the two countries have coincided since the late Fifties with respect to Peking, although recently India has been concerned that the Soviet Union's attempt to keep Pakistan from becoming dependent on China has reduced Soviet support for India's position on Kashmir. The Soviet Union has now become the major outside source of armaments for India, and Stein believes that the concern of both with China, and other common interests, will continue to provide a basis for close cooperation. The mutual friendship has not, however, prevented the governments of Nehru and his successors from adopting a hard line toward the communist movement within India, nor prevented the Soviet Union from criticizing the leadership of the Congress and the slow progress made by it toward land reform and the goals of socialism.

Stein has researched his subject well, relying not only upon Indian and Soviet documentary sources and commentaries but upon personal interviews which his trips to India and the Soviet Union made possible. His frame of reference is historical and functional, and he presents a good account of Soviet economic aid to India. The analysis of the relationship between the two countries is carried to 1968.

Stein notes that India has been slow to develop a critical scholarship concerned with the Soviet Union, but there is little speculation as to whether the presence of such scholarship would have influenced India's policy in any way. Soviet military aid to India, especially since the death of Nehru, is summarized and mention is made of a growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. However, the strategic interests of the two countries are not examined in depth, and no indication is given of their potentials for conflict or cooperation in the Indian Ocean, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. Stein by implication indicates that Nehru correctly perceived Soviet objectives and India's foreign policy needs, while Stalin held misconceptions with respect to India's intentions which could be corrected only by Stalin's successors. He does not ask what options were really available to India in her relationship with the Soviet Union. If one takes as fixed points the requirements of an Indian policy based on internal needs such as development and unity, and no reconciliation with Pakistan because the price seems too high, then India's policies with respect to the Soviet Union seem to fulfill her interests. One might speculate, however, what changes might have occurred in these policies had Nehru sought and achieved an accommodation with Pakistan over Kashmir or had he held a better perception of the Chinese threat in the 1950's.

Stein's explanation for India's more critical attitude toward the West than toward the Soviet Union after 1953 is sound. The communist nations were posing no challenge to India's immediate interests, whereas India regarded SEATO and the U.S.-Pakistani Arms Agreement as direct threats to her security. In addition, although the Russians were occasionally clumsy at the political level, they were careful not to attempt to make political capital out of their economic aid to India. The success of Soviet relations with India, Stein points out, probably modified Soviet international policy and reinforced the basis for Chinese criticism of Moscow.

While many points remain to be explored more fully, Stein's work is a significant contribution to an understanding both of India's foreign policies and the Soviet Union's role in Asia. This is a field warranting much further exploration, and one must hope that Stein will continue his contributions to it. We need to consider India's response to recent Soviet proposals for regional cooperation looking to the security of Southeast Asia. We must also speculate concerning the impact upon Indo-Soviet relations of a possible softer foreign policy line from Peking. All of these matters, of course, will also influence future United States policy in South Asia.—ALFRED FERNBACH, *University of Virginia*

Zapata and the Mexican Revolution. By John Womack, Jr. (New York: Vintage, 1970. Pp. 435 Paper, $2.95.)

After its appearance as a Random House hardcover edition in 1968, Womack's book rapidly was accepted by historians as a definitive study of Emiliano Zapata. Now in paperback form, *Zapata* will be on many reading lists in comparative politics or at least in Latin American politics. For Womack displays a feeling for the complex strains of Mexico's Revolution and of Mexican culture, and he skillfully links historical political progression to cultural roots.

This vivid account of Mexican peasant life reveals much about the political leaders who established the institutionalized Revolution soon after Zapata's death. Womack conveys an understanding of peasant revolutions which will be of value to students of other areas of Latin America and of other areas of the developing world.

This book was fashioned out of Womack's 1965 doctoral dissertation in history at Harvard, and reflects its origin in the documentation cited in footnotes. If the author had been able to add the cultural dimension found in the *corridos* or folk songs of the 1910–1917 period, he would have enriched even more what is a well-written integration of political confrontations into the social fabric of its era.

Womack gives us a treasure-trove of information about the state of Morelos, of special value to those of us involved with Mexican politics at the state and local levels. This becomes especially apparent when one contrasts the Womack background on Zapata's home state of Morelos with much of the Zapatista literature, such as the recent popular history by Robert P. Millon, *Zapata: the Ideology of a Peasant Revolutionary,* in which the Morelos political personalities are condensed into the briefest summary statements. In an appendix, Womack thoughtfully supplies the full text of Zapata's 1911 Plan de Ayala, his blueprint for revolutionary reform, usually otherwise available in English in a highly abridged or even truncated form.

Zapata's followers forced upon the leadership of the Revolution a policy of concern for the rural poor of Mexico, and made agrarian welfare a continuing commitment of subsequent governments after Carranza. Although distribution of unused land and return of village-owned communal farms (*ejidos*) were their primary objectives, the Zapatistas also developed a program for national social reforms, with these men of the South evidencing an ideological orientation in their plans. By putting the Zapatista agrarian programs into the perspective of the Revolution itself, Womack helps the student of Mexican affairs better understand the Mexican articles of political faith publicly enshrined in electoral oratory and official documents for more than a half-century.

Inasmuch as Zapata was a man barely literate, many students of Mexican political history have speculated about the ghost writers of Zapata's eloquence and skill in his open letters to President Carranza in early 1919. Womack points out that ex-schoolmaster Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama was the phrasemaker, not only for these letters but also for much of the Zapatista ideology. In 1944, when Soto y Gama became director of the National Preparatory Schools in Mexico City, he was still denying, as he had since Zapata's assassination in 1919, having put all the political words into Zapata's mouth. In view of the denials, many historians, such as H. B. Parkes and Howard F. Cline, have qualified slightly their attributions of Zapatista phraseology to Soto y Gama. But the context of the Womack research and narrative makes the link very clear.

One bonus of this narrative history is the readable style of the writing, free of the pompous, polysyllabic circumlocution with which a number of chroniclers of Mexican political history bore students. For example, in telling about the frustrations of the villagers in pressing their legitimate land claims after the death of Zapata, Womack writes: "The Governor's response was a fast shuffle, a favor instead of justice . . . not a restitution but a grant . . . (the villagers) took provisional possession of the grant, still subject to challenge and eviction . . . their original titles now practically worthless. . . ."

Emphasizing that in the 1920's the country people of Morelos state remained loyal to the federal government and kept their state relatively quiet, Womack adds: "For the villagers the proliferation of politicians was about as welcome as a visitation of locusts." These refreshing comments in no way dilute the high-level scholarship which amassed the data nor the analysis he yields in an adult manner. In other words, Viva Zapata!—MARVIN ALISKY, *Arizona State University*

Big Business in Japanese Politics. By Chitoshi Yanaga. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 371. $8.75.)

The seemingly obvious often goes unexplored. Such has been the case with the predominant influence of big business on the administrative bureaucracy and on party politics in postwar Japan. This first systematic treatment should serve as a necessary reminder of the "facts of life" to political science specialists on Japan and as a surprising eye-opener to those interested cross-nationally in the role of business in the political process.

In an essentially tripartite presentation, Professor Yanaga of Yale University, well-known for his work on modern Japanese politics and history, first artfully sketches the political process and the character, structure, and functions of business, next insightfully explains the articulation of business with the Hydra-headed bureaucracy, and then carefully illustrates this interaction with four case studies: (1) the emasculation of the Occupation-inspired anti-monopoly policy; (2) big business' conversion of public opinion from an aversion to anything atomic to supporting the development of nuclear energy; (3) the successful negotiations of Southeast Asian reparations settlements; and (4) the growth of, and reactions against, the United States-Japan partnership, which business and government viewed as more economic than military (p. 273). Each case study successfully combines topical with chronological treatment. The question of big business' role in and responsibility for environmental pollution and waste would also have made an interesting study, but the book was written before the furor over this issue developed. The conclusion assesses rather optimistically the implications of these matters for democracy and for Japan's playing a broker role in foreign affairs.

Timely and unexpected ramifications come to light as for example, in the examination of Japan's involvement in South Vietnam as seen in reparations negotiations. Vietnam had "scarcely suffered war damage" under Japan's brief formal occupation. But, especially when South Vietnam came under American protection, certain Japanese businessmen suddenly saw prospects of "sizable profits" to be made from having South Vietnam ask for "fairly large reparations." These were really investments, whose returns would in effect be guaranteed by American intervention in Vietnam. In fact, all reparations, restricted to capital goods and technology, rather than financial capital and consumer goods, have turned out to be good long-term investments, the bills for which were footed by the Japanese taxpayer. These investments stimulate trade; certain firms profit directly; the taxpayer gets the trickle-down. Earlier Japan had profited from the Korean war, when "72 percent of the nation's production capacity was directly engaged in the manufacture of weapons" (p. 255), which were paid for by American off-shore procurements. They enabled Japan to import and helped her postwar economic "take-off." (In contrast, Japan's present stepped-up spending on defense is an economic drain.)

This book is refreshingly free of cold-war rhetoric, except occasionally as in the gratuitous comment that the Korean war "left no doubt that Communism's ultimate objective was Japan's industrial complex." In attempting to deal objectively with the subject, Yanaga studiously avoids the word "corruption," although he hints at it now and again. For instance, in discussing former National Railways bureaucrats who retire and go into related business, he comments that contractors "make profits ranging from 13.7 to 37 percent," when doing construction work for the National Railways (p. 117).

By his extensive use of the new postwar term "*zaikai,*" Yanaga may be hoping that it will supersede "*zaibatsu,*" which is no longer correctly applicable to the changed economic structure. *Zaikai* connotes the new big-business power elite, which, it is the thesis of this book, is decisive in the making and breaking of cabinets and in the adoption or rejection of both basic and minor economic and even foreign policies. The difficulty in proving this hypothesis lies in the fact that, as the author so well shows, big business is not unified, and so, for instance, when some important *zaikai* elders wanted Japan to go slow in negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, it was easy to point out that others, who were interested in the northern fisheries industry, wanted a speedy conclusion. In any specific instance, even on ratification of the 1960 Security Treaty revision, there have always been divisions, and it is extremely difficult to pinpoint ultimate decisions. Indeed, in this particular instance, which is minutely explored in this book, it turns out that the decision to call off President Eisenhower's visit to Japan was made on the weight of the police's and Self-Defense Forces' confessions of inability to handle the situation. This was in the face of obstinate support for the visit by important *zaikai* leaders, who were utterly unprepared for the about face. Nevertheless, despite the need for many more specific case studies with more rigorously applied methodology, Yanaga's hypothesis that big business determines "the direction of Japanese politics as well as the economy" is convincing. Big business really seems to have provided the national drive during the last two decades that has brought unprecedented prosperity, though increasingly unevenly distributed, an aspect not discussed in this study. To what extent big business will find its power encroached upon by other interest groups in the future is an interesting question in light of the fact that, while Japan is now third in the world in gross national product, it is somewhere between sixteenth and twenty-first in terms of living standards.

Yanaga's perfect command of both English and Japanese enables him to exhaust Japanese sources and interpret them with an American social science orientation, but this, it seems to this reviewer, is not an excuse for an almost complete boycott of relevant citations of excellent American and other Western scholarship, even in the bibliography. At the other extreme, Yanaga uses almost no Japanese words (except for *zaikai*) or abbreviations that have become fairly common in English: Nikkeiren is invariably JFEA, when not spelled out. But these suggestions, along with one for a more complete index, would simply make an already well-organized, beautifully argued, and absolutely essential study still more convenient to use.—GEORGE O. TOTTEN, *University of Southern California*

International Politics, Law, and Organization

Bevans, Treaties and other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949. SALO ENGEL.

Falk, editor, The Vietnam War and International Law, Volume 2. KLINE R. SWYGARD.

Falk and Black, editors, The Future of the International Legal Order, Vol. 1. THOMAS M. FRANCK.

Treaties and other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949. Compiled under the direction of Charles Bevans. Volumes 1–4, Multilateral. Vol. 1: 1776–1917; Vol. 2: 1918–1930; Vol. 3: 1931–1945; Vol. 4: 1946–1949. (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publications 8407, 8441, 8484 and 8521, 1968–1970. Pp. 906, 1157, 1430 and 874. $8.50, $10.25, $11.75, $8.25.)

According to the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution, the Constitution, treaties and federal legislation are the "supreme law of the land." The text of the Constitution and of constitutional amendments are easily available. In addition, Senate document number 39, 88th Congress, First Session, entitled *The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation,* contains very useful "annotations of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the U.S." As for legislation, the text of the federal laws and information about their status are readily available, and the "U.S. Code Annotated" as well as the "Federal Code Annotated" permit easy consultation of the relevant statutory provisions and the practice thereunder.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the third source of the supreme law of the land, *U.S. Treaties.* As far as their texts are concerned, they were originally published in the *U.S. Statutes at Large.* From 1950 on they are published in the series *U.S. Treaties and other International Agreements* (U.S.T.). They are also published as individual pamphlets in advance of the bound volumes of U.S.T. under the title *Treaties and Other International Acts Series.* The latter replaced the two separate series *Treaty Series* and *Executive Agreement Series.*

A more handy edition of the U.S. Treaties in four volumes was issued by Malloy-Redmond-Trenwirth, covering the period 1776 to 1927. The publication under review constitutes an updated edition of the Malloy compilation. The first four volumes comprise the multilateral treaties from 1776–1949. They are to be followed by some 11 volumes of bilateral treaties for the same period. A volume of cumulative analytical indices concerning the multilateral and bilateral treaties is to conclude the series. The cut-off date of 1949 was chosen because of the above mentioned U.S.T. which starts with the year 1950.

With regard to the status of, and other information on, U.S. treaties, there is now the yearly State Department publication *Treaties in Force.* This lists the treaties and agreements *in force* as of January 1 of each year, the parties to the treaties, the dates of ratification and entry into force, and the sources where the texts of the treaties can be found; but it does not reproduce these texts themselves.

From 1948 to 1950 the State Department also published *U.S. Treaty Developments* which was designed to "compile in one publication up-to-date factual information on the subsequent status" of the treaties and on "subsequent developments affecting them." Unfortunately, this very useful publication has been suspended. The information it contains is confined to references to said subsequent developments and to indicating where the details of such developments can be found, but it does not contain summaries or briefs on such developments nor the texts of the treaties themselves.

There is, finally, Miller's *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States.* Its eight volumes cover the period 1776 to 1863 and contain excellent historical notes. Unfortunately, the collection is not likely to be completed.

The four volumes of the Bevans compilation under review are very handsome and no doubt the remaining eleven volumes on bilateral treaties will be equally handsome. It is quite useful to have the text of the multilateral treaties concluded by the U.S. from 1776–1949 in four volumes *in lieu* of the large *Statutes at Large* or of the *Treaty Series* and the *Executive Agreements Series.* It will also be handy to have the texts of all the bilateral treaties concluded by the U.S. from 1776–1949 in eleven volumes and to be able to dispense in this respect with the same three voluminous sources. And the promised concluding Index volume will be very useful indeed, since there is no cumulative Index to the said three publications. In the meantime it would have been good to have a cumulative Index to the *four* volumes concerning the multilateral treaties.

However, if one wants information on the status of a particular treaty, one has to look into the annual *Treaties in Force,* and, for the limited periods covered by *U.S. Treaty Developments* and Miller's series, these publications do provide useful and valuable data. Beyond those data, whoever researches the legislative, administrative, or judicial practice under the treaties will have to look everywhere since there is no single or multi-volume publication which compiles these data. Anybody who has searched for such materials knows what a difficult research job that is. And for the years since 1950 the researcher still has to have the more than 50 volumes of the above mentioned U.S.T. for which there is no cumulative Index either and which contain "nearly two-thirds of the total number of treaties and agreements entered into by the U.S. between 1776 and 1968" (Preface, p. III). Thus, even when the Bevans compilation is completed, one needs, as of now, close to 70 volumes to have the texts of the multi- and bilateral treaties concluded by the U.S. from 1776 to date. This is not exactly a handy collection.

The Bevans compilation reproduces the treaties concluded during the aforementioned period whether they are in force today or not. For the historian the inclusion of treaties no longer in force may be valuable and practical; for the jurist this is hardly the case. Of the 449 multilateral treaties published in the four volumes, only 262 (58%) were in force at the time of publication, on the basis of the data provided therein, while 187 (42%) treaties no longer are in force.

The cutoff date of 1950 also involves the risk of misleading the reader, as one example, the UN Charter, will show. The text of the Charter as adopted in 1945 at San Francisco is reproduced in Volume 3 of the collection (page 1153). An inconspicuous note at the end of the information concerning the signature, the advice and consent of the Senate, the ratification by the President and the deposite thereof, the entry into force and the proclamation of the charter by the President, refers to the Charter amendments adopted in 1963 and 1965 and to the volumes of U.S.T. where the text of the amendments can be found. The amendments themselves are not reproduced in Volume 3, not even in footnotes to the amended articles of the Charter, nor is there a further reference to these amendments in connection with the amended articles. All this may be quite consistent with the system adopted for the publication of the series and the cut-off date of 1949 (although it may be questioned whether it is consistent to give information about later developments if the situation as of 1949 is the determining factor). However, an unsuspecting reader, not familiar with the Charter, may easily overlook the note at the end of the information on the Charter and, finding no references to amendments in connection with the amended articles, may easily believe that a text published in 1969 is the text in force at that date.

A much more useful publication than the present series would have been one giving the texts of the treaties in force together with information concerning the relevant legislative, administrative and judicial practice. The State Department is said to have under active study a computerization project which, when completed, would serve as a source of compilation of all relevant treaty information. Judging from the experience with *U.S. Treaty Developments* and the speed with which the present series is being issued, this sounds like *Zukunftsmusik*. But even if it is not, how will the computerized information conveniently reach the interested researcher?—SALO ENGEL, *University of Tennessee*

The Vietnam War and International Law, Volume 2. Sponsored by the American Society of International Law, Ed. by Richard A. Falk. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. ix, 1270. $25.00 cloth, $7.50 paper.)

The scope of this lengthy volume is much broader than the title suggests. It contains thirty-eight papers, one document and one Supreme Court decision in the first seven parts and seven documents in the eighth. Titles are: I. Some Policy Perspectives; II. The Legal Status of the United States Involvement; III. The Role of the United Nations; IV. The Laws of War; V. The Vietnam War and the Constitution; VI. Thoughts on Settlement; VII. Approaches to the Relationship between Law and Foreign Policy; VIII. Documentary Appendices.

Any reader would first be well advised to read the "Introduction" by the Civil War Panel of the American Society of International Law to discover the plan and purpose of the Panel because they are not easily distinguishable in the conglomerate of articles and documents. The stated reasons for a second collection of readings was to make "conveniently available valuable writings since the first publication and to include several central legal problems that were virtually ignored in the first collection." "The main objective of the Panel . . . is to encourage a deeper appreciation of the relevance of law to civil war." The pursuit of objectives was "heavily," but not exclusively, "influenced by the interpretation given to the experience of the American involvement in the Vietnam War." Much of the content does not draw attention to the stated focus of the Panel.

According to the Panel, "The volume as a whole has been planned as a balanced presentation of the controversial problems. . . ." Gaps in the available literature are cited as a factor limiting complete achievement. If the term "balanced" relates to pros and cons on a purely numerical basis, the term is acceptable. However, in other respects some serious imbalances appear.

The highest incidence of polemics and absolutist positions noted by Jaro Mayda appears in the articles that both oppose U.S. policy and charge illegality. Perhaps since the intensity of feeling surfaces more frequently in this group, the reader also feels their impact more. This may also be a reflection of the strong convictions of the editor against policy and for illegality. On specific issues, greater attention is sometimes given to certain aspects than to others. In some instances critical factors are completely ignored. Furthermore, some of the basic issues are not included in the discussions. This cannot fairly and in all instances be attributed to gaps in the literature.

Examples of the above would include the failure to give adequate attention not only to the limitations and failures of the United Nations but also the extent to which obligations under the Charter may have been reduced or eliminated by the failure of the United Nations both individually and collectively to effectively substitute collective action for self help. This is aside from the Charter authorization of self defense. Concern in this volume over respect for law is not matched with concern for territorial integrity and political independence. Adequate consideration of the problem of security has also been neglected, especially in the context of absolute weapons with "fifteen minute" delivery on the one hand and "wars of national liberation" on the other hand. Critical limitation in the discussion of the last topic could have been filled in part by Truong Chinh's *The August Revolution,* particularly in the context of Southeast Asia. The communist backgrounds of the Viet Minh could have been revealed in excerpts from Hoang Van Chi's *From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Viet Nam.* Further imbalance is found in the section on The Vietnam War and the Constitution. Arguments supporting more congressional power are not matched by the consideration of the extent to which changing circumstances dictate greater executive responsibility. Additional imbalance is glaringly evident in the essential neglect of the legality or illegality of involvement by States other than the United States.

In summary—the intent of the foregoing comments is to forewarn any reader that this is not a definitive collection of materials on which a conclusive answer can be formulated concerning the legality or illegality of action by involved parties in the Vietnam conflict.

This reviewer suggests that the reader moves from the "Introduction" to the article by Jaro Mayda, pp. 260–70, and the introduction to Hannon's article by John Norton Moore, pp. 871–3, for critiques of the literature on the Vietnam conflict. Mayda's comments relate to all literature and Norton's more specifically to that pertaining to the Geneva Conference of 1954 and to the origins of the insurgency. Nevertheless, their evaluations are significantly pertinent to the volume under review. In addition to the widespread polemics in more general debate, Mayda is especially distressed by "the deep split among *international* lawyers..." and "the general thrust and quality of the arguments on both sides, revealing the defects in the structure and methodology of contemporary international law as a viable instrument of policy and order." Norton notes that "there are continuing disagreements about historical truth in the Vietnam war which go far deeper than any credibility gap...."

Since much of the alleged illegality of the American action is based on alleged violations of the Geneva agreements, is it not both ironic and alarming that Professor Norton can say that "John Hannon's... article..." about 14 years after the event, "is the first systematic study of the content of the settlement reached at Geneva"? Norton adds that it is "the most complete and best documented study available...." This reviewer recommends that it be given a much earlier chronological priority.

The Panel observes that the literature of the second volume, more than the first, "lends itself... to a somewhat more systematic plan of organization." In relation to the purposes and objectives previously noted, the organization remains seriously deficient in terms of aiding the reader to see the woods for the trees. Hoffman's article in part VII should be read with the first part on "Some Policy Perspectives." Since Professor Falk's article is substantially concerned with a change in the structure and execution of American policy, it might well be shifted to the part on the U.S. Constitution. The several papers on intervention in Part VII also relate to Part II. Organization also remains complicated by the appearance of papers which relate to more than one of the several major parts. The documentary appendices might better be included in the parts to which they relate. The reader should at least be encouraged to read the documents in conjunction with the relevant parts. Perhaps the greatest organizational and content deficiencies relate to the failure to consolidate in adequate measure the historical data and factual base at the beginning of the book. This coverage is flimsy in relation to the legal discourse and makes of the latter something of an exercise in futility in relation to determinations of guilt or innocence. Because of the organizational problems, introductions, running commentary, and summaries (which are totally lacking) would have been most helpful.

All except possibly one of the fourteen members of the Civil War Panel and most of the contributors are law-oriented. The broad reach of the book requires expert background in Vietnamese history and government, U.S. foreign policy, international politics of Southeast Asia), constitutional law, and organization, international politics (including the nation building (since one part looks to the problem of settlement), as well as international law. The deficiencies in expertise in these areas is reflected in the exclusion of documents which could fill in some of the gaps and in the mistakes which the most competent people in law make when they relate to disciplines and subjects outside their areas of competence.

This review has been critical in the interests of encouraging others to fill in the gaps and to warn the reader that he will find less than the title might lead him to expect. In one way or another all of the papers make a valuable contribution to our awareness of the manifold problems involved and of the essential complexity of the whole.—KLINE R. SWYGARD, *Oregon State University*

The Future of the International Legal Order, Vol. 1. Trends and Patterns. Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black, editors. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 618. $15.00.)

In the introductory sentence of his essay in this volume ("Participation of the 'New' States in the International Legal Order of the Future"), Professor A. A. Fatouros says: "An attempt to look into the future multiplies the uncertainties and ambiguities with which our perception of the present is filled. As questionable conclusions are derived from unreliable data, and the uncertainties and the schematizations on one point are combined with problematical predictions with respect to another, total uncertainty grows in geometrical progression. The final result is full of ambiguities and approximations, contingent upon a multitude of indefinite events; it ceases to be useful as a picture, however vague, of actuality and it can only have the limited reality of an outline of patterns of possibilities. Still, while a significant difference in the degree of uncertainty does exist, the actual method of proceeding and the essential quality of the findings do not differ radically from those used or drawn in studies of the past or of that mixture of recent past and immediate future that we call the present. Not only is our understanding of past events uncertain and contingent, perhaps less than but not radically unlike our image of the future; more than that: to be validly perceived, the past must be perceived in terms of the future."

Such a scrupulously cautious approach to futurology marks this impeccable, many-faceted study of trends and patterns by twelve international legal scholars. The emphasis is, in Richard Falk's words, on a "disciplined inquiry into the structure and process of authority" in international relations, while attempting to find a middle path between the extreme normative and pure-behaviorist definitions of international law. Indeed, far from being a shopping list of upcoming events, the book concerns itself almost entirely with ways of understanding the present. These are not startling, for most have been developed by the authors elsewhere. Somewhat unexpected is the inclusion of a "lets-cut-out-the-illusions" essay by Julius Stone. This particular role is the one Professor Stone assigned himself long ago; but if he plays it successfully enough, there is unlikely to be a future about which to speculate. Law and civilized, systemic conduct in all societies is, at bottom, as fragile as *Li*, the "politeness of the heart." Where law is concerned, even in authoritarian societies, the police, courts and legislature are not the source of law but tokens of the society's willingness to defer the direct exercise of power through revolution, violence or other forms of non-normative action.

The survival of international law seems to me to depend on a mixture of three factors: (1) a perceived congruency of mutual self-interest in an area or field of interaction which can be normatized, e.g., postal and consular normatization; (2) a shared consubjective perception by each player in the continuing game of international relations that he has a greater stake in the continuation of the game than in winning any particular round; (3) an endemic societal preference for continuity and predictability in the behavior of its members, a preference made virtually mandatory by the development of nuclear weapons.

Happily, all three ingredients are present in the international system today. Despite the wars in Indo-China and the Middle East—*even* in these areas—actors in the international community evince a remarkable degree of preference for normative, reciprocal and predictable behavior. What country in the society of states plays the role of Black Panthers or Weathermen? The answer is: none. Indeed, some Middle East watchers have been hoping that the Palestinian guerrillas would succeed in capturing control of Jordan exactly because they believe that the process of becoming a government is the ultimate socializing experience for idiosyncratic politicians.

In a variety of ways, using a full range of models and methodologies, Professors Black and Falk have shown that the very emergence of a future, as well as its substantive directions, depends upon an enlightened way of perceiving the present in terms of predictable patterns of mutually advantageous behavior and in an enlightened, far-sighted, definition of "advantage." These studies thus contribute not only to an understanding of the future but to its possibility.—PROFESSOR THOMAS M. FRANCK, *Center for Int'l Studies, New York University Law School*

ERRATA

In the December, 1970 issue of the APSR a book note, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN BRITISH POLITICS (Norman J. Vig) was erroneously attributed to Marlan Bissett. The proper spelling is Marlan Blissett.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 7–11, 1971, at the Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.

RESULTS OF THE 1970 MAIL BALLOT ELECTION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

(as certified to the National Office by
the American Arbitration Association
January 6, 1971)

OFFICERS

For President-Elect	*Votes*
*Heinz Eulau	4711
Hans J. Morgenthau	3563
For Vice Presidents	
*Edward C. Banfield	5228
*Victoria Schuck	4912
*John A. Davis	4607
David Spitz	4555
Richard Falk	3619
For Secretary	
*Thomas R. Dye	5553
Edward Malecki	2611
For Treasurer	
*Donald R. Matthews	5792
Ben Stavis	2438

For The Council (Two-Year Terms)	*Votes*
*William P. Robinson, Sr.	5233
*Philip E. Converse	5195
*James W. Prothro	4939
*Chadwick F. Alger	4544
*Joyce M. Mitchell	4503
*Dankwart A. Rustow	4225
*Gordon Tullock	4057
*Fred I. Greenstein	4004
Bernard C. Cohen	3606
David Kettler	3409
Samuel C. Patterson	3299
Mulford Q. Sibley	3204
Ralph Guzman	3080
Marcus Raskin	2761
Emily Card	2522
Charles Press	2333

*Elected.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

1.A Power to Fix Dues given to Council	
accept	5138
reject	1385
1.B Mail ballot referendum on resolutions	
accept	5545
reject	1041
1.C APSA take Positions on Matters Relating to Discrimination against Disadvantaged Groups	
accept	2888
reject	3583

RESOLUTIONS

11.1 Establish APSA Committee on Environmental Problems	
accept	3569
reject	2837
11.2 Terminate Congressional Fellowship Program	
accept	1183
reject	5282
11.3 Restore independently-organized panels to Caucus for a New Political Science at annual meetings	
accept	1924
reject	4672

RESOLUTIONS (*Continued*)

11.4 APSA publicly deplore actions of Los Angeles police on August 29, 1970	
accept	1284
reject	5167
11.5 APSA develop alternative criteria for admission of Chicanos to professional training	
accept	1779
reject	4513
11.6 APSA encourage Chicano research on nature and causes of Los Angeles riot of August, 1970	
accept	1367
reject	4928
11.7 APSA fund Chicano research on nature and causes of Los Angeles riot of August, 1970	
accept	1538
reject	4744

RATIFICATION OF DUES SCHEDULE

111.1 Approve Council's proposed dues schedule as given in *P.S.* (Summer 1970), p. 425.	
approve	3626
disapprove	3004

Articles Accepted for Future Publication*

June, 1971

Blair Campbell, University of California, Los Angeles, "Prescription and Description in Political Thought: The Case for Hobbes"

James A. Caporaso and Alan Pelowski, Northwestern University, "The European Economic Community as Time-Series Quasi-Experiments"

Daniel W. Fleitas, Florida State University, "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal Information Elections"

John E. Jackson, Harvard University, "Senate Roll Call Voting: Statistical Models"

Arend Lijphart, University of Leiden, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method"

John E. Mueller, University of Rochester, "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam"

David E. RePass, University of Minnesota, "Issue Salience and Party Choice"

Paul M. Sniderman, Stanford University, and Jack Citrin, University of California, Berkeley, "Self-Esteem and Isolationist Attitudes: Psychological Sources of Political Beliefs"

Sidney G. Tarrow, Yale University, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Voter Involvement: The Case of France"

Jack E. Vincent, Florida Atlantic University, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly"

September, 1971

William J. Crotty, Northwestern University, "Party Effort and Its Impact on the Vote"

Iliya F. Harik, Indiana University, "Opinion Leaders and the Mass Media: A Reconsideration of the Two-Step Flow of Communications Hypothesis"

Jerry Hollenhorst and Gary Ault, Southern Illinois University, "An Alternative Answer to: Who Pays for Defense?"

J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Johns Hopkins, "Judicial Biography and the Behavioral Persuasion"

Allan Kornberg and Robert C. Frasure, Duke University, "Policy Differences in British Parliamentary Parties"

Robert D. Putnam, University of Michigan, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of 'Ideology' "

December, 1971

Lawrence W. Beer, University of Colorado, "Freedom of Information and the Evidentiary Use of Film in Japan: Law and Sociopolitics in an East Asian Democracy"

Robert S. Erikson, Florida State University, "The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll Call Voting"

B. Michael Frolic, York University, "Decision-making in Soviet Cities"

William H. Riker, University of Rochester, Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, and Kul B. Rai, Southern Connecticut State College, "A Theory of the Number of Political Parties: The Case of India"

Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University, " 'Nondecisions' and the Study of Local Politics"

---

* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

This issue of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW is the last under the Managing Editorship of Austin Ranney. The first issue under the Managing Editorship of Nelson W. Polsby will be that of June 1971.